- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 1075 OF 2023(SC-ST) BETWEEN: SRI. K. VENKATESH, S/O LATE KUTTALAPPA, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, R/AT SOOPAHALLI VILLAGE, MAJARA GANDLAHALLI, KASABA HOBLI, CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUK AND DISTRICT – 562 101. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. VISHWANATH .R HEGDE, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, M.S.BUILDING, DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDI, BENGALURU – 560 001, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY. 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHIKKABALLAPUR, CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT. 3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, CHIKKABALLAPUR SUB-DIVISION, CHIKKABALLAPUR DISTRICT. Digitally signed by PRAJWAL A Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 4. SRI. CHANDRAPPA, S/O LATE CHIKKAMALLAIAH, AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS, 5. SRI. THYAGARAJA S M, S/O LATE CHIKKAMALLAIAH, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, NOS. 4 & 5 BOTH R/AT SOPPAHALLI VILLAGE, MAJARA GANDLAHALLI, KASABA HOBLI, CHIKKABALLAPURA TALUK AND DISTRICT – 562 101. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R1 TO R3, SRI. JNANESH KUMAR .K, ADVOCATE FOR R4 & R5) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 06/03/2020 IN WP NOS. 3060-3061/2014 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT AND DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION AND ETC. IA No.1/2024 IS FILED UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT PRAYING TO CONDONE THE DELAY OF 532 DAYS IN FILING THIS APPEAL. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING ALONG WITH IA NO.1/2024 THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) This appeal is directed against the order dated 06.03.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.3060/2014 filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5 herein respectively, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition by stating in paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 as under: “7. It is very clear from the above provisions of Section that no person shall transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. The original grantee contrary to Section 4(2) of the Act has sold the land in favour of Narasamma, who is mother of petitioners on 18.03.1986. The legal representative of original grantee has filed an application for resumption of land before the Assistant Commissioner in the year 2009. The application for resumption of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act has been filed after lapse of 23 years from the date of sale. There is an inordinate delay in invoking the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. This view is fortified by the Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), at paragraph No.8 has held as under: “However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly.” 8. It is very clear from the above judgment of the Apex Court that the application for resumption of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act has to be filed within a reasonable time. In the case on hand, land has been granted in the year 1967-68. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. The original grantee has sold the land - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 in favour of mother of petitioner on 18.03.1986. The application for resumption of land has been filed in the year 2009 and there is an inordinate delay of 23 years in invoking the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, the application itself is not maintainable. 9. In view of the above, the impugned orders at Annexures-A and B are liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Order dated 06.01.2014 passed by respondent No.2-the Deputy Commissioner and order dated 02.07.2012 passed by respondent No.3-the Assistant Commissioner at Annexures-A and B respectively are quashed.” 2. The writ petition was filed by the respondent Nos.4 and 5 herein challenging the order dated 06.01.2014 passed by respondent No.2 (the Deputy Commissioner) and the order dated 02.07.2012 passed by respondent No.3 (the Assistant Commissioner), whereby the said Authorities have restored the land in favour of the legal representatives of the original grantee under Sections 4 and 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (‘the PTCL Act’ in short). - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 3. The facts as noted by the learned Single Judge are that the land bearing old Sy.No.105 (new Sy.No.105/3) measuring 02 acres situated at Soppahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Chikkaballapura Taluk was originally granted in favour of Kuttalappa under the Darkasth Rules in the year 1967-68 and Saguvali Chiti was issued on 12.06.1974, with a condition not to alienate the property, for a period of 15 years. 4. It is a fact that the original grantee had sold the land in favour of Smt.Narasamma, who is the mother of respondent Nos.4 and 5 under the Registered Sale Deed dated 18.03.1986. The legal representatives of the original grantee have filed an application for resumption of land before the Assistant Commissioner in the year 2009, which was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner (Respondent No.3) by the order dated 02.07.2012. The appeal filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5 before the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent No.2) resulted in the dismissal of the same. 5. The finding of the learned Single Judge is primarily that the application for resumption of land has been filed after an inordinate delay of 23 years invoking the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In that background, the learned - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 Single Judge in support of his conclusion has also referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in 2018(1) KAR.L.R. 5 (SC), in paragraph No.7, which we have already reproduced above. 6. The submission made by Mr.Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is primarily keeping in view of the amendments brought to Section 5(1), whereby sub-Clauses (c) and (d) have been incorporated. 7. The Co-ordinate Bench in W.A.No.210/2023 decided on 25.11.2024, has in Paragraph No.4.4 referred to the amendments which have been brought in Section 5 of the PTCL Act. The conclusion reached by the Co-ordinate Bench from paragraph No.4.4 onwards is as follows: “4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, “(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” 4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings. 4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (Para 22) 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:8482-DB WA No. 1075 of 2023 6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as above, the judgment and award of the learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly disposed of.” 8. In view of the position of law, and also the fact that the appeal has been filed with a delay of 532 days, we are of the view that the appeal needs to be dismissed both on merits as well as on the ground of limitation. 9. Pending I.A.No.1/2024 do not survive for consideration and stands dismissed as infructuous. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE SMC/List No.: 1 Sl No.: 44