Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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2025:CGHC:27124-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved On 23/06/2025 Pronounced On
24/06/2025
REVP No. 20 of 2025 Dhurendra Singh Raghav, S/o Late Shri Surendra Singh Raghav, Aged About 50 Years, R/o MIG 30, Sahyog Park, Mahavir Nagar, Ring Road, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - P.S. Chouhan, S/o Late Shri D.S. Chouhan, Aged About 86 Years, R/o Smriti Bhawan, Near Green Chowk, Behind Bharat Petrol Pump, Station Road, Durg, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Sukhvir Singh Raghav, S/o Late Shri Surendra Singh Raghav, Aged About 63 Years, R/o 5/6, Mahavir Nagar, Ring Road, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Jitendra Gupta, Advocate
D.B. : Hon'ble Shri Justic
e Sanjay S. Agrawal &
Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal C A V Order Per Sanjay S. Agrawal, J.
1. This review petition has been preferred by defendant No.2- Dhurendra Singh Raghav, under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Rule 19 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh ARPAN SRIVASTAVA Digitally signed by ARPAN SRIVASTAVA Date: 2025.06.24 17:13:12 +0530
2 Rules, 2007, seeking review of the judgment and decree dated 22.08.2023 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in First Appeal No.83/2022. The parties shall be referred hereinafter as per the description before the Trial Court. 2. A suit for recovery of an amount of Rs. 17,00,000/-(Rupees Seventeen Lakh Only) along with the interest, was instituted by the plaintiff/ Respondent No.1- P.S. Chouhan, alleging inter-alia, that since the defendants were in need of money in order to facilitate their business of seeds, a request was, therefore, made by them for the loan amount of Rs.17,00,000/-(Rupees Seventeen Lakh Only). It was pleaded by the plaintiff that since the alleged amount was not available with him, therefore, he had pledged his FDR worth Rs.18,00,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakh Only) and obtained the same from the bank and, thereafter, advanced the alleged amount of Rs.17,00,000/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakh Only) to the defendants by way of self cheque, while endorsing the name of defendant No.2-Dhurendra Singh. However, despite repeated requests being made, the same was not repaid, therefore, he was constrained to institute the said claim. 3.
In response, the defendants have denied to receive the alleged amount by way of loan and, pleaded that, out of compassion and, for helping the plaintiff, the alleged amount has been withdrawn from his account at Durg. 4. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 05.03.2022, passed in Civil Suit No.16-B/2015, has dismissed the plaintiff’s claim holding that no loan amount as such was advanced by the plaintiff. 3
5. The aforesaid judgment and decree was reversed by this Court vide impugned judgment and decree in appeal preferred by the plaintiff while taking note of the endorsement made in the name of defendant No.2 in the alleged cheque (Ex.P-3C). The relevant observations made at Paragraphs 11 and 13 to 15 read as under:-
“11. The endorsement in the cheque (Ex.P-3(c) would show that it was endorsed in favour of the defendant No.2. It being so the nature of endorsement would fall under Section 15 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (In short “the Act of 1881”). This section purport that for the purpose of negotiation, the instrument is endorsed by signing the instrument and nature of the document would be the person would be the holder in due course. The signature of the defendant No.2 on the back side of the cheque is an admitted fact, which was signed not in the capacity of maker, but in the capacity of holder, which mean that instrument was transferred with an intention for transferring the right to other person for consideration. The holder means a person, who hold the bill in a representative capacity and the effect of such endorsement would be transfer of the property to the transferee and all legal incidents of such property would also stand transferred to the transferee. 13. A perusal of Ex.P-3, which was a self cheque endorsed in the name/favour of defendant No.2, certainly contains a direction to pay specified person to the bank. A perusal of the word in Ex.P-3 would reflect the intention of the parties which shows pay self through Dhurendra Singh Raghav or bearer of Rs.17 Lakhs. The endorsement in full made in the cheque, which naturally authorize the defendant No.2 to receive the amount form the bank. 14.
The contention of the defendant No.2, who accompanied the plaintiff to the bank that in order to help him out to receive the money on the request of the plaintiff, he travelled from Raipur to Durg and went along with him to the bank and thereafter, after the money was received, it was handed over to the plaintiff. This statement of fact when evaluated with the statement of plaintiff that the defendant was in hurry to get the amount and instead of A/c payee cheque, asked for self cheque with endorsement appears to be more probable. The statement of defendant that only to
4 help the plaintiff to receive the amount from bank, he travelled from Raipur to Durg and received the amount in cash counter of bank and handed over to plaintiff, appears only a self serving statement against human conduct. If the plaintiff was capable enough to go to the bank, we don't see any sufficient reason that he will sit back only at the time of receipt of cash and push the defendant No.2 to receive the cash by making endorsement on the cheque under Section 16 of the Act of 1881. Therefore, the submission of the plaintiff that though the documents have not been proved to show that actually, the defendant No.2 was acting on behalf of defendant No.1, who availed loan, the fact that the cash received by the defendant No.2 from the bank can be presumed on the basis of the preponderance of probability by evaluating the documentary and oral statements and conduct of the parties. 15.
According to the plaintiff, an amount of Rs.17 Lakh was given to the defendant No.2 by way of loan may not be admitted, but the fact remains the liability of the person to whom money is paid by mistake, the analogy can be drawn from Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that a person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered by mistake, must repay or return and the same can be applied in the facts of this case.”
6. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree, the petitioner/ defendant No.2 had preferred a special leave petition before Hon’ble the Supreme Court where the same was registered as Special Leave Petition to Appeal (Civil) No.22787/2023, which was dismissed on 06.11.2023 as the petitioner had withdrawn the same after arguing the matter for some time. The said order reads as under:-
“1. After addressing some arguments, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks leave to withdraw the present petition with liberty to file an application before the High Court pointing out the error that is purportedly crept into the final para of the impugned judgment. 2. Leave as sought for, is granted. 3. The petition for special leave to appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn with liberty granted, as prayed for.”
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7. The aforesaid order was questioned by the petitioner in review, being Review Petition (Civil) No.7201/2024, but the same was found to be dismissed vide order dated 24.09.2024, which reads as under. “1. Delay condoned. 2. Special Leave Petition (c) No.22787/2023 was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court by an order dated 6th November,
2023. The petitioner in the said special leave petition has now applied for a review of the order dated 6th November,
2023. 3. We have perused the review petition.
Since learned counsel for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the special leave petition with liberty to apply before the High Court to point out the error that purportedly crept into the final para of the impugned judgment, and as such liberty was granted, we are of the considered opinion that no case for review has been set up. 4. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed. 5. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
8. After the dismissal of the special leave petition as well as the said review petition, the instant review petition has been filed by the petitioner/ defendant No.2, while questioning the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.08.2023 in First Appeal No.83/2022. 9. The said finding recorded by this Court has been assailed mainly on the ground that the judgment and decree of the Trial court has been reversed based upon the presumption drawn on the basis of Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as well as the provision prescribed under Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to the counsel appearing for the defendant No.2, the said presumption has been drawn as the alleged self cheque was issued by the plaintiff while endorsing the name of defendant No.2, but, the same has been drawn
6 contrary to the pleadings made by the plaintiff. While referring to the provision prescribed under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, it is contended further that the impugned judgment and decree has been drawn while mis-interpretting the said provision and, therefore, the same can be interfered in this review petition and, in support, the reliance has been placed upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Shatrunji Vs. Mohammad Azmat Azim Khan, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 200 and Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa and Others, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 596. 10.
On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Court, submits that the ground alleged herein is beyond the scope of the review jurisdiction as there is no apparent mistake in the impugned judgment and decree and, therefore, no interference is called for and the petition, as framed, deserves to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 12. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, considering further the aforesaid contention of the parties, it appears that the grounds raised herein are beyond the scope of review jurisdiction as we do not find any error apparent on the face of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in view of the elaborate observations made therein at Paragraphs 11 and 13 to 15. At this juncture, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra reported in (2019) 20 SCC 753, are to be seen wherein, it was held at Para 17 as under:-
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“17. We have gone through both the judgments of the High Court in the instant case and considered rival
submissions on the point. It is well settled that an error which is required to be detected by a process of
reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. To justify exercise of review jurisdiction, the error must be self- evident. Tested on this parameter, the exercise of jurisdiction in the present case was not correct. The exercise undertaken in the present case, in our considered view, was as if the High Court was sitting in appeal over the earlier decision dated 17.02.2017. Even assuming that there was no correct appreciation of facts and law in the earlier
judgment, the parties could be left to challenge the decision in an appeal. But the review was not a proper remedy at all. In our view, the High Court erred in entertaining the review petition and setting aside the earlier view dated 17.02.2017.”
13. Insofar as the reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner in the above-referred matters, the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are, however, distinguishable from the facts involved herein, as the impugned judgment and decree has been drawn upon due consideration of those provisions, i.e. the provisions prescribed under Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as well as, the provisions prescribed under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, therefore, under such circumstances, no reliance could be placed upon it.
14. In view of the aforesaid background, the instant review petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) Judge Sd/- (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Arpan