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2025 DAILYLAW 31084 (RAJ)

EX. CFN ASHOK SINGH S/O SHRI MAGAN SINGH v. THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN THROUGH ITS SECRETARY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

SAW/306/2017 · 2025-05-20

Anand Sharma, Inderjeet Singh

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[2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 306/2017 IN S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8029/2011 Ex. Cfn Ashok Singh s/o Shri Magan Singh resident of Laxmi Kirana Store, Sunder Nagar, War No.9, Madan Gunj, Kishangarh, District Alwar ----Appellant Versus 1. The State of Rajasthan through its secretary to the department of Transport, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Chairman, Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer through the Secretary. 3. The Union Of India, Through The Secretary To The Government Of India, Ministry Of Defence New Delhi- 110011. 4. 5. 6. The Director General Re-settlement, Government Of India, Ministry Of Defence, New Delhi-110011. 101440 Jabbar Singh Udawat, C/o Of Chairman, Rpsc, Ajmer. 101545 Dinesh Singh, C/o Of Chairman, Rpsc, Ajmer. 7. 101238 Hem Singh, C/o Of Chairman, Rpsc, Ajmer. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Mahendra Singh Gurjar, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. R. D. Rastogi, Additional Solicitor General assisted by Mr. C. S. Sinha, Advocate. Mr. Surendra Singh Naruka, Additional Advocate General. Mr. Ripu Daman Singh Naruka, Advocate. Mr. Imran Khan, Advocate assisted by Mr. Monu Kumar, Advocate. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 20/05/2025 This special appeal (writ) has been filed by the appellant- petitioner assailing the judgment dated 06.02.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (2 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] Brief facts of the case are that in pursuance of the advertisement dated 01.08.2008, appellant-petitioner applied for the post of Motor Vehicle Sub-Inspector under the Ex-serviceman quota. The prescribed educational qualifications for the post, as per the applicable recruitment rules, are as follows: 1. Must have passed Secondary Examination of a recognised Board; and 2. A Diploma in Automobile Engineering. (3 years’ course) or a diploma in Mechanical Engineering awarded by the State Board of Technical Examination (3 years’ course) OR Any qualification in either the above disciplines declared equivalent by the Central Government or State Government; and 3. Working experience of at least one year in a reputed Automobile Workshop which undertakes repairs of both light motor vehicles, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger motor vehicles fitted with petrol and diesel engines; and 4. Must hold a driving licence authorising him to drive Motor cycle, heavy goods vehicles and heavy passenger vehicles. Nothing contained in this Notification shall apply to persons whose names were under consideration for appointment to the post of Inspector of Motor Vehicle (by whatever names called by the State Government prior to first day of July, 1989 or to an officer appointed to such post before the first day of July, 1989 or to an officer appointed to discharge functions of a non-technical nature” Grievance of the appellant-petitioner is that the appellant- petitioner is having an equivalent qualification for the required post. The learned Single Judge considering the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-petitioner and after examining the scheme of rules held as under:- “Heard. Considered. Neither reliance by the counsel for the petitioner on the amendment notification dated 12-2-1986 nor on the instructions issued by the Director General Employment Exchange as a guide for equating trade certification issued by the Army Authorities with posts in the Civil Sector nor, for that matter, the circular dated 27- 1-2012 on equation of service trade/ civil trade issued by the Ministry of Defence Government of India based on the equation of the Director General of Employment and Training, [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (3 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] Ministry of Labour and Employment is of any avail to the petitioner's case. I am of the considered view that the amendment to the Rules of 1979 by notification dated 12-2-1986 nowhere equates the petitioner's trade certificate as a Mechanical Motor Vehicle Class-I with a three year diploma in Mechanical/ Automobile Engineering. The notification does indeed vest discretion in the competent authority under the Rules of 1979 to resort to lower standard/s for recruitment of the Ex- servicemen to vacancies on a post in the reserved quota, not filled up, however consonant with capacity of the candidate so selected, to discharge the job in issue to requisite levels of performance. Such discretion however does not vest under the Rules of 1963 nor has it being so argued by counsel for the petitioner. Recruitment to the post of Motor Vehicle Sub Inspector has to be made strictly within the eligibility parameters set out in the Rules of 1963. Reliance by counsel for the petitioner on the notification dated 12-2-1986 and resultant amendment to the Rules of 1979 is thus of no avail for this reason. As far as the instructions for use as guide to equivalence of army trades with certain Civil Trades issued by the Director General Employment Exchanges and reiterated subsequently by the Army authorities is concerned, a bare perusal thereof evidences that the Trade certification of MV Class-I issued to the petitioner on 30- 9-2001 from the Corps of Electronics & Mechanical engineering EME Centre Secunderabad has been equated to the post of mechanical Foreman/ mechanic of various kinds. It cannot be construed to constitute equivalence of the petitioner's MV Class-I certification with a three year diploma in Automobile/ Mechanical Engineering. In the facts recorded above, the letter dated 2-6- 2001 issued by the Director Sainik Kalyan Department stating that the petitioner's MV Class-I Trade Certificate issued on 30-9-2001 (NCO Code B 845.10) was equivalent to the three year Automobile/ Mechanical Engineering diploma is obviously misdirected, not based on correct facts and palpably perverse. Hence also of no avail to the petitioner. The inevitable conclusion which follows from the above discussion is that the petitioner does not have the requisite qualification of a three year diploma in Automobile/ Mechanical Engineering from a recognized University/ Board or another qualification recognized equivalent therewith by the Central or the State Government to be appointed as a Motor Vehicle Sub Inspector under the Rules of 1963. Consequently the petitioner was/ is not entitled to such [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (4 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] appointment. The cancellation of the petitioner's selection to the said post under the quota reserved for Ex- servicemen vide order dated 21-10-2011 therefore cannot be held to be illegal or arbitrary. The challenge thereto in this petition is hence without merit. Petition Dismissed.” We have perused the judgment dated 06.02.2017 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court. Admittedly, the appellant-petitioner is not having the qualification as prescribed under the rules for the post in question. The appellant-petitioner is having a different qualification and prayed before this Court for declaring that qualification as ‘equivalent’ to the qualification as required under rules. In support of his contentions and prayer, counsel for the appellant-petitioner relied on the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘State of Orissa versus Mohd. Yunus and others’, decided on September 17, 1993; reported in 1994 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 55. Heard. Perused. The Hon’ble Suprme Court in the matter of Ashok Kumar & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in (2017) 4 Supreme Court Cases 357, in paras No.13 to 18, held as under:- “13. The law on the subject has been crystalized in several decisions of this Court. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla (2002), this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar MANU/SC/7926/2007 : (2007) 3 SCC 100, this Court held that: [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (5 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] “18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part, in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same.(See Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil (1991) and Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission). 14. The same view was reiterated in Amlan Jyoti Borroah where it was held to be well settled that candidates who have taken part in a selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein are not entitled to question it upon being declared to be unsuccessful. 15. In Manish Kumar ShahI v. State of Bihar, the same principle was reiterated in the following observations:(SCCp.584, para 16) “16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the Petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The Petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the Petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition. Reference in this connection may be made to the Judgments in Madan Lal v. State of J &K, Marripati Nagaraja v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Dhananjay Malik and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines. 16.In Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, candidates who had participated in the selection process were aware that they were required to possess certain specific qualifications in computer operations. The Appellants had appeared in the selection process and after participating in the interview sought to challenge the selection process as being without jurisdiction. This was held to be impermissible. 17. In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, candidates who were competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of Uttrakhand participated in a written examination held in pursuance of an advertisement. This Court held that if they had cleared the test, the [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (6 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] Respondents would not have raised any objection to the selection process or to the methodology adopted. Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the Respondents were disentitled to seek relief Under Article 226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that (SCC P.318, para18) “18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome”. 18.In Chandigarh Admn. v. Jasmine Kaur, it was held that a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting himself or herself to the selection process cannot turn around and complain that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of his or her non-selection. In Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, this Court held that:(SCC P. 500, para17) “17. Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on one more point that the Appellants had participated in the process of interview and not challenged it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost four months between the interview and declaration of result. However, the Appellants did not challenge it at that time. This, it appears that only when the Appellants found themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the candidates should not have participated in the interview and challenged the procedure or they should have challenged immediately after the interviews were conducted.” This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras Institute of Development Studies V. S.K. Shiva Subaramanyam.” We have also gone through the scheme of rules in which it has been provided that a qualification can only be declared equivalent to any other qualification either by the Central Government or by the State Government. Admittedly, in the present case, the qualification which the appellant-petitioner possesses has neither been declared equivalent either by Central Government or State Government nor it has been prescribed under the rules. [2025:RJ-JP:21230-DB] (7 of 7) [SAW-306/2017] It has also been observed that the equivalence of a qualification with regard to any candidate can only be considered by the competent authority and it is not for the High Court to consider the equivalence of the qualification possessed by the appellant-petitioner. We have also considered the fact that the appellant- petitioner has challenged the condition of advertisement after taking part in the recruitment process. In our considered view, no case is made out for interference in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this court. Hence, this special appeal (writ) is dismissed. (ANAND SHARMA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J Tushar/119