( 2025:HHC:23485 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CWPOA No.1747 of 2020 Decided on: 21st July, 2025 Kishori Lal .......Petitioner versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner: Mr.Raju Ram Rahi, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr.Gautam Sood, Deputy Advocate General. Satyen Vaidya, Judge (Oral) Heard. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Clerk in Himachal Pradesh Secretariat on 16.06.1981. He was promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 31.05.2006. 3. The petitioner faced charges under the criminal as well as disciplinary proceedings. He was placed under suspension w.e.f. 06.07.2011. 4. In the disciplinary proceedings, the petitioner was absolved of the charges framed against him vide order dated 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. ( 2025:HHC:23485 ) 2 20.03.2014. In the criminal proceedings also, the petitioner was acquitted by the learned Special Judge (Forest), Shimla vide judgment dated 01.06.2015 passed in Session Trial No.29-S/7 of 2013. 5. Thereafter, the petitioner represented to the respondents to grant him service benefits, which had been withheld on account of pendency of disciplinary and criminal proceedings. 6. The petitioner was granted benefit of promotion to the post of Section Officer Class-I (Gazetted) vide Notification dated 20.04.2016 with retrospective effect from 21.03.2012 on notional basis only. 7. The grievance of the petitioner is that the denial of actual monetary benefits to him from the date of he was promoted to the post of Section Officer Class-I (Gazetted) is illegal and no reason has been assigned for denying him such benefits. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment passed by three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. K.V.Jankiraman and others, (1991) 4 SCC 109 to contend that even if the acquittal by criminal Court is not technically considered to be honourable acquittal, still the competent ( 2025:HHC:23485 ) 3 authority was legally obligated to render reasons for denying actual monetary benefits to the petitioner. 9. In K.V. Jankiraman (supra), it has been held as under:- “26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not 'found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/ criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non- availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down' an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/ criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz.. "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: "However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional ( 2025:HHC:23485 ) 4 promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so." 10. The mandate of law as declared in K.V. Jankiraman (supra) is clear and unambiguous. The right of petitioner to be provided with reasons for denial of monetary benefits for the period he held the promotional post, has clearly been denied in the case of petitioner. 11. The impugned Notification reads only as under:- “The Governor, Himachal Pradesh, on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, is pleased to order the promotion of Shri Kishori Lal, Retired Superintendent Grade-II to the post of Section Officer, Class-1 (Gazetted). on notional basis, in the pay band of Rs. 10300-34800/- Grade Pay of Rs. 5000/-+ Secretariat pay of Rs.2000/-w.e.f. 21.03.2012 to 30.09.2012 and in the pay band of Rs. 15600- 39100/-+Grade Pay of Rs.5400/-+Secretariat pay of Rs.2000/-w.e.f.01.10.2012 to 31.05.2013.” 12. Thus, the petition is disposed of by setting aside the Notification dated 20.04.2016 (Annexure A-6) with direction to the 2nd respondent to pass an order afresh strictly in terms of mandate in K.V. Jankiraman (supra), as noticed hereinabove. Respondent No.2 shall complete the exercise ( 2025:HHC:23485 ) 5 within eight weeks from the date of passing of this judgment. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. July 21, 2025 ( Satyen Vaidya ) (naveen) Judge