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2025 DAILYLAW 30684 (HP)

VASEEM v. THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS

CWP/9788/2025 · 2025-07-17

Virender Singh

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Judgment text

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1 2025:HHC:23018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. : 9788 of 2025 Reserved on  : 08 .07.2025 Decided on    : 17.07. 2025 Vaseem …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner      : Mr. Karan Kapoor, Advocate. For the respondents  : Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with Mr. Mohinder Zharaick and Mr. H.S.   Rawat,   Additional   Advocates General,   Ms. Ranjna   Patial   &   Mr. Rohit   Sharma,   Deputy   Advocate General, for respondents No.1 to 3. Virender Singh, Judge By way of the present writ petition, petitioner­ Vaseem has invoked the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following substantive reliefs, amongst others: 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:23018 “(i) That   the   impugned   office   order Annexure P­4, dated 28.05.2025, may kindly be quashed and set­aside. ii) The petitioner may kindly be released on parole for a period of 28 days on the terms and   conditions,   which   this   Hon’ble   Court deems   fit   in   the   interest   of   justice   and   fair play.” 2. As per the case set up by the petitioner, he has been convicted by the Court of learned Special Judge, Fast Track Special Court (Rape/POCSO), Mandi, District Mandi, vide   judgment   dated   03.04.2024,   for   the   offence, punishable under Section  6  of the POCSO Act and has been sentenced to undergo 20 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/­. In default of payment of fine, he has further been directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years. 3. As per the custody certificate dated 12.03.2025, annexed   with   the   petition,   the   petitioner   has   already undergone   a   total   substantive   sentence   period   of  three years, twenty six days. 4. The petitioner applied for grant of parole for a period of 28 days, by way of application, dated 27th August, 2024 (Annexure P­2), in order to meet his family. 3 2025:HHC:23018 5. According to the petitioner, his application has been rejected by respondent No. 2, on 28th May, 2025, vide Annexure P­4, without assigning any justifiable reason. 6. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to quash and set aside the order (Annexure P­ 4), by virtue  of which,  the  request  of the petitioner for releasing him on parole, has been rejected. A prayer has also been made to allow his request for parole. 7. When put to notice, the factual position, with regard   to   conviction   and   sentence   imposed   upon   the petitioner, has not been disputed by the respondents. 8. It has also not been disputed that the petitioner had applied for grant of  28  days’ parole, on 27th  August, 2024, to meet his family. 9. According to the respondents, the request of the petitioner was duly forwarded to the District Authorities, i.e.   District   Magistrate, Saharanpur   (U.P.),   and Superintendent   of   Police,  Saharanpur   (U.P.),   however, District   Magistrate, Saharanpur   (U.P.),   has   not recommended   the   prayer   of   the   petitioner,   vide   letter Annexure ­D, as upon inquiry, it was found that the family 4 2025:HHC:23018 of the petitioner had sold their house and land and left village Shukartal, about eight years ago and they are now residing   in   village   Brahampura,   Police   Station   Sarsawa, Saharanpur. The   other   allegations   have   also   been controverted by the respondents. 10. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition. 11. As per the custody certificate, annexed with the instructions,   placed   on   record   by   learned   Additional Advocate General, the substantive sentence undergone by the petitioner is three years, four months and seven days. The petitioner has applied for 28 days’ parole, which was recommended   to   be   rejected   by   the   District   Magistrate, Saharanpur, vide letter, dated  21st  May, 2025 (Annexure­ D). 12. The primary purpose of releasing the convict on parole   has   elaborately   been   discussed   by   the   Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Asfaq versus State of Rajasthan and others, reported in (2017) 15 SCC 55. Relevant paras­17 to 24, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under: 5 2025:HHC:23018 “17. From the aforesaid discussion, it follows that amongst the various grounds on which parole   can   be   granted,  the   most   important ground, which stands out, is that a prisoner should   be   allowed   to   maintain   family   and social ties. For this purpose, he has to come out   for   some   time   so   that   he   is   able to maintain his family and social contact. This reason   finds   justification   in   one   of   the objectives  behind  sentence   and  punishment, namely, reformation of the convict. The theory of   criminology,   which   is   largely   accepted, underlines that the main objectives which a State   intends   to   achieve   by   punishing   the culprit are: deterrence, prevention, retribution and   reformation. When   we   recognise reformation   as   one   of   the   objectives,   it provides   justification   for   letting   of   even   the life   convicts   for   short   periods,   on   parole,   in order to afford opportunities to such convicts not   only   to   solve   their   personal   and   family problems   but   also   to   maintain   their   links with the society. Another objective which this theory underlines is that even such convicts have   right   to   breathe   fresh   air,   albeit   for periods. These   gestures   on   the   part   of   the State, along with other measures, go a long way for redemption and rehabilitation of such prisoners. They are ultimately aimed for the good of the society and, therefore, are in public interest. 18. The   provisions   of   parole   and   furlough, thus,   provide   for   a   humanistic   approach towards   those   lodged   in   jails. Main purpose of such provisions is to afford to them an opportunity   to   solve   their   personal   and family   problems   and   to   enable   them   to maintain   their   links   with   society. Even citizens of this country have a vested interest in preparing offenders for successful re­entry into society. Those who leave prison without strong   networks   of   support,   without employment prospects, without a fundamental 6 2025:HHC:23018 knowledge of the communities to which they will   return,   and   without   resources,   stand   a significantly   higher   chance   of   failure. When offenders   revert   to   criminal   activity   upon release, they frequently do so because they lack hope of merging into society as accepted citizens. Furloughs or parole can help prepare offenders for success. 19. Having noted the aforesaid public purpose in granting parole or furlough, ingrained in the reformation   theory   of   sentencing,   other competing public interest has also to be kept in mind   while   deciding   as   to   whether   in   a particular   case   parole   or   furlough   is   to   be granted   or   not. This   public   interest   also demands   that   those   who   are   habitual offenders   and   may   have   the   tendency   to commit the crime again after their release on parole   or   have   the   tendency   to   become threat   to   the   law   and   order   of   the   society, should not be released on parole. This aspect takes care of other objectives of sentencing, namely, deterrence and prevention. This side of the coin is the experience that great number of crimes are committed by the offenders who have   been   put   back   in   the   street   after conviction. Therefore,   while   deciding   as   to whether a particular prisoner deserves to be released   on   parole   or   not,   the   aforesaid aspects have also to be kept in mind. To put it tersely,   the   authorities   are   supposed   to address the question as to whether the convict is   such   a   person   who   has   the   tendency   to commit   such   a   crime   or   he   is   showing tendency to reform himself to become a good citizen. 20. Thus,   not   all   people   in   prison   are appropriate   for   grant   of   furlough   or   parole. Obviously,   society   must   isolate   those   who show   patterns   of   preying   upon   victims. Yet administrators   ought   to   encourage   those offenders who demonstrate a commitment to 7 2025:HHC:23018 reconcile   with   society   and   whose   behaviour shows   that   aspire   to   live   as   law­abiding citizens. Thus, parole program should be used as a tool to shape such adjustments. 21. To sum up, in introducing penal reforms, the   State   that   runs   the   administration   on behalf of the society and for the benefit of the society   at   large   cannot   be   unmindful   of safeguarding   the   legitimate   rights   of   the citizens   in   regard   to   their   security   in   the matters   of   life   and   liberty. It   is   for   this reason that in introducing such reforms, the authorities   cannot   be   oblivious   of   the obligation to the society to render it immune from   those   who   are   prone   to   criminal tendencies and have proved their susceptibility to indulge in criminal activities by being found guilty (by a Court) of having perpetrated   a   criminal   act. One   of   the discernible purposes of imposing the penalty of   imprisonment   is   to   render   the society   immune   from   the   criminal   for   a specified period. It is, therefore, understandable that while meting out humane treatment to the convicts, care has to be taken to ensure that kindness to the convicts does not result in cruelty to the society. Naturally enough,   the   authorities   would   be   anxious to ensure that the convict who is released on furlough   does   not   seize   the   opportunity   to commit another crime when he is at large for the   time­being   under   the   furlough   leave granted to him by way of a measure of penal reform. 22. Another   vital   aspect   that   needs   to   be discussed is as to whether there can be any presumption   that   a   person   who   is convicted of serious or heinous crime is to be, ipso   facto,   treated   as   a   hardened   criminal. Hardened   criminal   would   be   a   person   for whom it has become a habit or way of life and such   a   person   would   necessarily   tend   to 8 2025:HHC:23018 commit crimes again and again. Obviously, if a person has committed a serious offence for which   he   is   convicted,   but   at   the   same time it is also found that it is the only crime he has committed, he cannot be categorized as a hardened criminal. In his case consideration should be as to whether he is showing the signs   to   reform   himself   and   become   a good citizen or there are circumstances which would   indicate   that   he   has   a   tendency   to commit the crime again or that he would be a threat   to   the   society. Mere   nature   of the offence committed by him should not be a factor to deny the parole outrightly. Wherever a person convicted has suffered incarceration for   a   long   time,   he   can   be   granted temporary parole, irrespective of the nature of offence for which he was sentenced. We may hasten to put a rider here, viz. in those cases where   a   person   has   been   convicted   for committing   a   serious   office,   the   competent authority, while examining such cases, can be well   advised   to   have   stricter   standards   in mind   while   judging   their   cases   on   the parameters of god conduct, habitual offender or   while   judging   whether   he   could   be considered highly dangerous or prejudicial to the public peace and tranquility etc. 23. There can be no  cavil  in saying that  a society   that   believes   in   the   worth   of   the individuals can have the quality of its belief judged, at least in part, by the quality   of   its   prisons   and   services   and recourse   made   available   to   the   prisoners. Being in a civilized society organized with law and a system as such, it is essential to ensure for every citizen a reasonably dignified life. If a person commits any crime, it does not mean that by committing a crime, he ceases to be a human being and that he can be deprived of those aspects of life which constitute human dignity. For a prisoner all fundamental rights are   an   enforceable   reality,   though 9 2025:HHC:23018 restricted by the fact of imprisonment. {See – Sunil Batra (II) v. State (UT of Delhi) (1980) 3 SCC 488 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)   1   SCC   248   and   Charles   Sobraj   v. Superintendent Central Jai, Tihar, New Delhi, (1978) 4 SCC 104. 24. It is also to be kept in mind that by the time an application for parole is moved by a prisoner, he would have spent some time in the   jail. During   this   period,   various reformatory methods must have been applied. We can take judicial note of this fact, having regard to such reformation facilities available in   modern   jails. One   would   know   by   this time as to whether there is a habit of relapsing into   crime   in   spite   of   having   administered correctional   treatment. This   habit   known   as “recidivism”   reflects   the   fact   that   the correctional   therapy   has   not   brought   in   the mind   of   the   criminal. It   also   shows   that criminal   is   hardcore   who   is   beyond correctional therapy. If the correctional therapy has not made in itself, in a particular case, such a case can be rejected on the aforesaid ground i.e. on its merits.” (self emphasis supplied) 13. In light of the above decision, this Court would now   proceed   to   consider   the   fact   as   to   whether   the rejection of the petitioner’s prayer, seeking his release on parole, is sustainable in the eyes of law. 14. The   ground,   upon   which,   the   prayer   of   the petitioner has been declined by the respondents, is the recommendation made   by   the   District   Magistrate, 10 2025:HHC:23018 Saharanpur. The said recommendation has been made on the ground that the family of the petitioner had sold their house   and   land   and   left   village   Shukartal,   about   eight years ago and they are now residing in village Ibrahimpura, Police Station Sarsawa, Saharanpur. 15. In   letter   dated   21.05.2025,   of   Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur (U.P.), old address of the applicant, i.e. resident of village Shukartal, as well as, new address village Ibrahimpura/Brahampura, has been mentioned. In this letter, a specific reference has been given that after selling their landed property from village Shukartal,   the   family   of   the   petitioner,   has   now   been settled in village Ibrahimpura/Brahampura, as such, the said objection is not liable to be considered. 16. So far as the objections, which have been raised by   the   complainant,   in   this   case,   are   concerned, reasonable/stringent conditions can be imposed, in case, the relief, as claimed, in the writ petition, is granted to the petitioner, as, the prisoners should be allowed to maintain their family and social ties. They should also be given an 11 2025:HHC:23018 opportunity  to solve their personal and family problems and to enable them to maintain their links with society. 17. In such situation, in the considered opinion of this Court, rejection order, dated 28th May, 2025 (Annexure P­4), passed by respondent No.2, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. As such, the same is quashed and set aside. The prayer, so made in the application (Annexure P­2) is allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be released on parole, for a period of 28 days. 18. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed, in the following terms: (i) Order, dated 28th May, 2025 (Annexure P­4), rejecting   the   request   of   the   petitioner   for parole, is quashed and set­aside; (ii)   Respondents   are   directed   to   extend   the concession   of   parole   to   the   petitioner,   for   a period of 28 days, on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of 1,00,000/­, with two ₹ sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of Superintendent of Jail,  Model Central  Jail, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P.; (iii) The petitioner shall also undertake that he shall not cause any threat or inducement to the   family   of   the   victim,   nor,   try   to   contact them, in any manner; (iv) It is made clear that the petitioner shall surrender before Superintendent of Jail, Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P., on expiry of parole period. In case, the petitioner 12 2025:HHC:23018 breaches any of the conditions of parole order or creates any law and order problem, then, the respondents are free to cancel the parole and   take   action   against   the   petitioner,   in accordance with law; (v) In peculiar facts and circumstances, of the case, the respondents are at liberty to impose any other just and reasonable condition(s), in addition   to   the   conditions   mentioned hereinabove, if deemed fit and proper, to meet the ends of justice; (vi)  Violation of any of the above conditions shall   be   treated   as   a   negative   factor   for consideration of similar prayer, in future. 19. Pending   miscellaneous   applications,   if   any, shall also stand disposed of, accordingly. 20. Registry   to   communicate   this   order   to   the Superintendent of Jail, Model Central Jail, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P., for compliance. ( Virender Singh ) Judge July 17, 2025 ( ps ) Digitally signed by VIKRANT CHANDEL Date: 2025.07.17 13:14:06 IST