IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 287 of 2025 Reserved on: 18.5.2026. Decided on: 15.6.2026 Rajesh Kumar Sharma ...Petitioner Versus M/s PDC Healthcare ...Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Petitioner : Mr Surinder Saklani, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Ashok Kumar, Advocate, vice Mr Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 16.4.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.12.2023, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 2026:HHC:22041 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainants filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant No. 1 is a Firm and deals in the manufacturing of pharma products. Complainant No.2 is the managing partner who is looking after the affairs of the firm and managing its day-to-day affairs. Accused No.1 is the proprietary concern, and accused No.2 is the sole proprietor of accused No.1. He is managing the affairs of accused No.1. The accused purchased medicines worth ₹2,85,276/- on 25.3.2015. Accused No.2 paid ₹1,20,276/- in cash and issued a post-dated cheque of ₹1,65,000/- to repay the remaining amount. The complainant presented the cheque to their bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a legal notice to the accused asking them to repay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was returned unclaimed by the Postal Department, and it is deemed to be served. The accused failed to pay the amount despite the deemed service. Hence, a 3 2026:HHC:22041 complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainants examined Ankit Gupta (CW1), complainant no. 2, to prove the complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), denied the complainants’ case in its entirety. The accused claimed that the cheque did not bear his signature and he was not liable to pay anything to the complainant. The witnesses deposed against him falsely. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that there was nothing in the complainant’s cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. His version was corroborated by the copy of the invoice placed on record, which shows that the accused had purchased articles worth ₹2,85,276/- from the complainants. The cheque was returned with an endorsement 4 2026:HHC:22041 ‘insufficient funds’. The complainants had issued a notice to the accused, which was returned with the endorsement ‘unclaimed’, and it was deemed to be served. The accused failed to repay the money to the complainants despite the deemed service of the notice. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹2.00 lacs and, in the default of payment of fine, to undergo further one month’s imprisonment for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the cheque was issued to discharge the debt. The complainant No.1 was a firm, and complainant No.2 was the Managing Partner of the Firm. The complainant No.2, being a Managing Director, did not require any authority from the Firm to represent it. The complainants’ version that the 5 2026:HHC:22041 accused had purchased the articles from the complainant was duly proved by the documents placed on record. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The notice was sent to the correct address and was deemed to be served. The plea taken by the accused in the complainant’s cross-examination that the cheque was issued as a security will not help the accused because a security cheque can also attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly consider the material on record. The cheque was issued in the name of M/s PDC Healthcare, and the complaint was filed by Mr Ankit Gupta, who failed to produce any authorisation on record. The Firm was a juristic person, and no complaint could have been filed on its behalf without a proper authorisation. The notice was not served upon the accused. The accused No.1 is a partnership firm, and not all the partners of the firm were 6 2026:HHC:22041 arrayed as accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. 10. Mr Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The cheque was issued in the name of M/s PDC Healthcare, and the complaint was filed by complainant No.2 without any authorisation. Accused No.1 is a firm, and all the partners of the Firm were not arrayed as accused. The notice was returned with a report that the addressee had left the address, and the notice was not served upon the accused. The plea taken by the accused that a security cheque was issued was highly probable, and the learned Courts below erred in rejecting this plea. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in C. Krishniah Chetty Vs. 7 2026:HHC:22041 Deepali Company Pvt. Ltd., Commercial Appeal No.61 of 2021, decided on 27.5.2021 in support of his submission. 11. Mr Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the accused No.2 is firm, and he is competent to file the complaint. The notice was sent to the correct address and was returned with an endorsement ‘unclaimed’. Therefore, the notice was deemed to have been served upon the accused. The accused had an option of paying the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice, but they failed to do so, and the plea that the notice was not served upon them is not available to them. The learned courts below had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent 8 2026:HHC:22041 defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: 9 2026:HHC:22041 (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC 10 2026:HHC:22041 OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- 11 2026:HHC:22041 consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by 12 2026:HHC:22041 a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: - “5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300, this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him 13 2026:HHC:22041 with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.” 20. It was submitted that no proof of the registration of the firm was filed, and the complainant has to be treated as an unregistered firm. A complaint filed by an unregistered firm is not maintainable. This submission cannot be accepted. The law regarding the filing of the complaint by the unregistered firm was discussed by this Court elaborately in Uttam Traders Ranghri v. Tule Ram, 2018 SCC OnLine HP 3407, where the divergent views of various High Courts were noticed by the Court and it was held that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act only bars the civil proceedings for the recovery of money by an unregistered firm, and not the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: - “33. From the aforesaid discussion, it would be noticed that, save and except an isolated authority of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Amit Desai's case 14 2026:HHC:22041 (supra), all other High Courts in the country have categorically held that the proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, are not recovery proceedings. 34. Therefore, even an unregistered Partnership firm can maintain a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. 35. That apart, it would further be noticed that the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in fact, is contrary to the ratio of the judgment laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Vijayan's case (supra). Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that the criminal prosecution initiated by the complainant against the respondent is not hit by Section 69 of the Partnership Act.” 21. Hence, in view of the judgment of this Court, the submission that a complaint filed by an unregistered firm is not maintainable cannot be accepted. 22. It was submitted that the cheque was issued in the name of M/s PDC Healthcare, and the complainant No.2 has not mentioned any connection to the complainant No.1. This submission cannot be accepted. The complainant stated in para- 1 of the proof affidavit (Ex.C1/CW1) that he is a partner of the Firm. This part of the testimony was not challenged in the cross- examination and is deemed to be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was reiterated in 15 2026:HHC:22041 Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4, and it was held at page 34: “58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is required to be cross-examined to bring forth inconsistencies and discrepancies, and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18:50 hrs; therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2- 9-2014 at 14:30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time, i.e. 17, 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014. Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, the argument that the accused was arrested on 1- 9-2014 at 18:50 hrs is not tenable. 59. The House of Lords, in a judgment reported as Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), considered the principles of appreciation of evidence. Lord Chancellor Herschell held that it is absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross- 16 2026:HHC:22041 examination showing that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged. It was held as follows: “Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross- examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses. Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessive cross- examination of witnesses, and it has been complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross-examination of a witness which errs in the direction of excess may be far more fair to him than to leave him without cross-examination, and afterwards, to suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a point on which it is not otherwise clear that he has had full notice beforehand that there is an intention to impeach the credibility of the story which he is telling.” 60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion, held as under: 17 2026:HHC:22041 “My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily express my concurrence with the Lord Chancellor as to the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than not to cross- examine witnesses upon evidence which they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give them an opportunity of explanation, and an opportunity very often to defend their own character, and, not having given them such an opportunity, to ask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have said, although not one question has been directed either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they have deposed to.” 61. This Court, in a judgment reported as State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850, quoted from Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) to hold that in the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under: (State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13) “13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of cross-examination on the explanation of the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a witness to be questioned: (1) to test his veracity, 18 2026:HHC:22041 (2) to discover who he is and what his position in life is, or (3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.” 62. This Court, in a judgment reported Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC 288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268, laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross- examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 294-95, paras 15-16) “15. Moreover, there was no effective cross- examination made on the plaintiff's witnesses with respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW 1 and PW 2 have not been cross- examined as to the factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-examination is a matter of substance, not of procedure. One is required to put one's own version in the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of non-cross- examination is that the statement of the witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross- examining the witnesses has been considered by this Court in Bhoju Mandalv.Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906. This Court repelled a submission on the ground that the same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested before the courts below. A party is required to put his version to the witness. If no such questions are put, the Court would presume that the witness account has been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440. 19 2026:HHC:22041 16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag 60, it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by one party in the pleadings not challenged either in pleadings or cross-examination by another party must be accepted as fully established. The High Court of Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR 1961 Cal 359 has laid down that the party is obliged to put his case in the cross- examination of witnesses of the opposite party. The rule of putting one's version in cross-examination is one of essential justice and not merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court, Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949 SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83 has laid down that when attestation is not specifically challenged, and the witness is not cross-examined regarding details of attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the document was attested. If the other side wants to challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Karnidan Sardav.Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683 has laid down that it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of administration of justice allows of cross-examination of opposite party's witnesses for the purpose of testing their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.” 23. Therefore, the complaint could not have been dismissed on the ground that the complainant No.2 had not established his connection to the complainant No.1. 20 2026:HHC:22041 24. The complainant no. 2 had asserted in the complaint that he was authorised by the partner of the firm to file a complaint, but no authorisation was filed. It was submitted that the complaint is not maintainable. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Karnataka High Court in Padmavati Finance Registered vs Md. Yosuf Ali S/O Haji Abdul Hameed Criminal Appeal No.3608/2009 decided on 05-07-2013 that any partner of the firm can file a complaint under Section 19(2)(a) to (h) of the Partnership Act. It was observed: - “21. Section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act deals with the mode of doing an act to bind the firm, which reads as follows: "22. Mode of doing act to bind the firm. - In order to bind a firm, an act or instrument done or executed by a partner or other person on behalf of the firm shall be done or executed in the firm’s name, or in any other manner expressing or implying an intention to bind the firm". Thus, as per the provisions which are barred under Section 19(2)(a) to (h) of the Partnership Act, any partner of the firm can file the complaint, as the definition under Section 2(a) of the Partnership Act gives rise to a right enforceable by or against the firm. 22. In the instant case, one of the partners of the firm complained about the accused when the cheque issued by him was dishonoured. The partner of the firm, therefore, has an enforceable right under the law on behalf of the firm or against the firm unless barred under Section 19(2) of the Partnership Act or against the bylaws of the partnership deed. 23. In the instant case, learned counsel for the 21 2026:HHC:22041 complainant fairly submitted that there are no specific bylaws permitting any partner of the firm to file a complaint with the firm for the benefit of the firm, which is the payee defined under Section 142 of the Act. 24. Even during the trial, the accused had not produced any kind of evidence to prove that the firm is not intending to prosecute him for the offence under Section 138 of the Act and that the firm has no intention to prosecute him. In that view of the matter, the complainant representing the firm is competent to lodge the complaint on behalf of the firm for recovery of the amount due to the firm from the accused by invoking the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. 25. Having regard to the above facts and circumstances, the learned Magistrate was not justified in acquitting the accused on the sole ground that the complainant was not authorised to file a complaint on behalf of the firm. 25. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Reshmi Constructions v. Laxman Vithal Chunekar, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2894: (2014) 5 Mah LJ 537 that the partner of a firm can file a complaint on behalf of the firm without any authorisation. It was observed at page 541: “17. From the above provisions of the Act, it is clear that every partner is an agent of the Firm and his other partners for the purpose of the business of the firm, and the acts of every partner bind the firm and his partners, unless, of course, the partner had, in fact, no authority to act for the firm and his other partners. The learned trial Magistrate relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Alka Toraskar v. State of Goa, 2007 (1) Goa L.T. 159, which pertains to a Co-operative Society. The trial Magistrate further relied upon Fragrant Leasing and Finance Co. Ltd. v. Jagdish Katuria, 2008 All MR (Cri.) Journal 3 and the judgment in the case of Chico Ursula D'Souza v. Goa Plast Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (6) Mh. L.J. 353: 2008 (3) 22 2026:HHC:22041 Mh. L.J. (Cri.) 323: 2009 (1) All MR 290, both of which pertain to Company. Admittedly, a Company is a separate juristic person distinct from its directors or shareholders, and the Company acts through the resolution passed by the Board of Directors. Because of the above, a person who claims to represent another is bound to produce an authority or power which entitles him to appear. The above is not the case with the Partnership Firm. As has already been seen above, each partner is an agent of the Firm. In the present case, it is not that some person, on the strength of a power of attorney, had filed a complaint and had deposed on behalf of the complainant. In the present case, the complaint was not filed by PW 1, but it was filed by the Firm, through PW 1, as a partner of that Firm. The person who deposed on behalf of the complainant was one of the partners of the said Complainant-Firm. In fact, the agreement dated 5-4- 2005 was signed by the same partner, Shri Pandharinath Chafadkar (PW 1), for himself and as attorney of the other two partners, Arun Chafadkar and Narayan Nigalye. In the circumstances above, the finding of the Trial Magistrate that there was no authority for PW 1 to file the complaint or to depose on behalf of the complainant is not correct.” 26. Therefore, the complaint was maintainable. The judgment in C. Krishniah Chetty (supra) deals with the company and is not relevant to the present case. 27. Ankit Gupta (CW1) stated in his proof affidavit that the accused was a regular customer of the complainants and had purchased the articles worth ₹2,85,276/-. This part of his statement was not challenged in the cross-examination. Rather, it was suggested to the complainant that the cheque was handed over by the accused to him before taking the articles as security. 23 2026:HHC:22041 This suggestion shows that the issuance of the cheque and the signatures of the cheque are not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 383: - “38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner. **** 42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.” 28. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the suggestion made to the complainant in the cross- 24 2026:HHC:22041 examination to hold that the issuance of the cheque and the signatures on the cheque were not disputed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724, that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: - “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 25 2026:HHC:22041 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.” 29. This position was reiterated in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under: “6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence.” 30. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE 15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra). 26 2026:HHC:22041 16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions. 17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197]. 31. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption. 32. The accused claimed in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC that he was not liable to pay anything to the complainant. He did not produce any evidence to support this version. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under section 313 is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 700: “20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of 27 2026:HHC:22041 defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration." (Emphasis supplied)” 33. The complainant filed an invoice (Ex.C8/CW1) which shows that an amount of ₹2,85,276/- was due on 25.3.2015. This invoice corroborates the complainants’ version. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the complainants’ version was duly proved on record that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge the debt/liability. 34. It was submitted that the accused No.1 is a partnership Firm and only accused No.2 has been arrayed as an accused and not any other person. This submission will not help the accused. The complainant Ankit Gupta stated in para 2 of the proof affidavit (Ex.C1/CW1) that accused No.1 is a proprietary concern and accused No.2 is the sole proprietor of the concern. This part of his testimony was not challenged in the cross- examination. It was nowhere suggested that accused No.1 is a partnership Firm and any other person besides the accused No.2 is a partner of the Firm. Therefore, the statement of Ankit Gupta has to be accepted as correct that the accused no. 1 is a proprietary concern and the accused no. 2 is its partner. 28 2026:HHC:22041 35. Even if the plea taken by the accused is accepted to be correct that the accused No.1 is a partnership Firm, it will not help the accused. It has been found out above that the cheque bears the signatures of the accused. The liability of the signatory was decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89. The following question inter alia was referred for consideration by the larger bench: - “(c) Even if it is held that specific averments are necessary, whether, in the absence of such averments, the signatory of the cheque and or the managing directors or joint managing director who admittedly would be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business could be proceeded against.” 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the entire case law on the subject, answered the reference as under: (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141. 29 2026:HHC:22041 37. A similar view was taken in K Ranganayakulu vs State of Telangana and others, 2026 INSC 555. 38. Thus, the accused No.2 would be liable by virtue of his position as the signatory, and the other partners would be liable only if they were in charge and responsible to the Firm for its affairs. There is no evidence that the other partners were in charge and responsible for the affairs of the firm; thus, they were not required to be impleaded. 39. The complainant stated that the cheque was returned with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. This is duly corroborated by the return memo (Ex.C3/CW1), which shows the reason for dishonour was “funds insufficient”. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95: 24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable. 30 2026:HHC:22041 40. In the present case, no evidence was produced to rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds.’ 41. The complainant stated that the notice was returned unclaimed. The registered envelope (Ex.C7/CW1) mentions that the addressee had left the address and the delivery could not be effected. The notice was sent to the address that was furnished by the accused in the notice of accusation, and the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, (2006) 6 SCC 456: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 114: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 629, that a notice returned because the addressee was not available, it would lead to a presumption that the notice was validly served and the burden would be upon the accused to show that the report is incorrect. It was observed at page 462: “14. If a notice is issued and served upon the drawer of the cheque, no controversy arises. Similarly, if the notice is refused by the addressee, it may be presumed to have been served. This is also not disputed. This leaves us with the third situation where the notice could not be served on the addressee for one or the other reason, such as his non- availability at the time of delivery, or premises remaining locked on account of his having gone elsewhere, etc. etc. If in each such case the law is understood to mean that there has been no service of notice, it would completely defeat 31 2026:HHC:22041 the very purpose of the Act. It would then be very easy for an unscrupulous and dishonest drawer of a cheque to make himself scarce for some time after issuing the cheque so that the requisite statutory notice can never be served upon him, and consequently, he can never be prosecuted. There is good authority to support the proposition that once the complainant, the payee of the cheque, issues notice to the drawer of the cheque, the cause of action to file a complaint arises on the expiry of the period prescribed for payment by the drawer of the cheque. If he does not file a complaint within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, his complaint gets barred by time. Thus, a person who can dodge the postman for about a month or two, or a person who can get a fake endorsement made regarding his non- availability, can successfully avoid his prosecution because the payee is bound to issue notice to him within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. He is, therefore, bound to issue the legal notice, which may be returned with an endorsement that the addressee is not available at the given address. xxxxx 18. This Court noticed the position well settled in law that the notice refused to be accepted by the drawer can be presumed to have been served on him. In that case, the notice was returned as “unclaimed” and not as refused. The Court posed the question, “Will there be any significant difference between the two so far as the presumption of service is concerned?” Their Lordships referred to Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and observed that the principle incorporated therein could profitably be imported in a case where the sender had dispatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served on the sendee, unless he proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for such non- service. This Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the drawer, holding that where the notice is returned by the 32 2026:HHC:22041 addressee as unclaimed, such date of return to the sender would be the commencing date in reckoning the period of 15 days contemplated in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. This would be without prejudice to the right of the drawer of the cheque to show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address. Since the appellant did not attempt to discharge the burden to rebut the aforesaid presumption, the appeal was dismissed by this Court. The aforesaid decision is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it was held that the principle incorporated in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act would apply in a case where the sender dispatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it, but that would be without prejudice to the right of the drawer of the cheque to show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address.” 42. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that when a notice is returned unclaimed, it is deemed to be served. It was observed: “8. Since in Bhaskaran's case (supra), the notice issued in terms of Clause (b) had been returned unclaimed and not as refused, the Court, posed the question: "Will there be any significant difference between the two so far as the presumption of service is concerned?" It was observed that though Section 138 of the Act does not require that the notice should be given only by "post", yet in a case where the sender has dispatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it, the principle incorporated in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short 'G.C. Act') could profitably be imported in such a case. It was held that in this situation service of notice is deemed to have been effected on the sendee unless he proves that it was not really served and that he was not responsible for such non-service.” 33 2026:HHC:22041 43. This position was reiterated in Priyanka Kumari vs. Shailendra Kumar (13.10.2023- SC Order): MANU/ SCOR/ 133284/ 2023, wherein it was observed: “As it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another, (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 510, that when notice is returned as 'unclaimed', it shall be deemed to be duly served upon the addressee, and it is a proper service of notice. In the case of Ajeet Seeds Limited Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah (2014) 12 SCC 685 (2014), the Hon'ble Court, while interpreting Section 27 of the General Clauses Act 1897 and also Section 114 of the Evidence Act 1872, held as under: - "Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication sent by post would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Further, Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that, despite the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business." 44. A similar view was taken in Krishna Swaroop Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1458, wherein it was observed: “13. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1887, deals with service by post: “27. Meaning of Service by post.-Where any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of 34 2026:HHC:22041 this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression “serve” or either of the expressions “give” or “send” or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”. 14. The concept of deemed service has been discussed by this Court on various occasions. It shall be useful to refer to some instances: 14.1 In Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264, which was a case concerned with the payment of arrears of rent under the J&K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. The proviso to Section 11, which is titled “Protection of a Tenant against Eviction”, states that unless the landlord serves notice upon the rent becoming due, through the Post Office under a registered cover, no amount shall be deemed to be in arrears. Regarding service of notice by post, it was observed that in order to comply with the proviso, all that is within the landlord's domain to do is to post a pre-paid registered letter containing the correct address and nothing further. It is then presumed to be delivered under Section 27 of the GC Act. Irrespective of whether the addressee accepts or rejects, “there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by the addressee.” 14.2 In the context of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it was held that when the payee dispatches the notice by registered post, the requirement under Clause (b) of the proviso of Section 138 of the NI Act stands complied with and the cause of action to file a complaint arises on the expiry of that period prescribed in Clause (c) thereof. [See: C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Mouhammed (2007) 6 SCC 555] 35 2026:HHC:22041 14.3 The findings in C.C. Alavi (supra) were followed in Vishwabandhu v. Srikrishna (2021) 19 SCC 549. In this case, the summons issued by the Registered AD post was received back with endorsement “refusal”. In accordance with Sub-Rule (5) of Order V Rule 9 of CPC, refusal to accept delivery of the summons would be deemed to be due service in accordance with law. To substantiate this view, a reference was made to the judgment referred to supra. 14.4 A similar position as in C.C. Alavi (supra) stands adopted by this Court in various judgments of this Court in Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v. Manju Jain (2010) 9 SCC 157; Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Posani (1989) 2 SCC 602; CIT v. V. K. Gururaj (1996) 7 SCC 275; Poonam Verma v. DDA (2007) 13 SCC 154; Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy (P) Ltd. v. Lloyds Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund (2007) 14 SCC 753; Union of India v. S.P. Singh (2008) 5 SCC 438; Municipal Corpn., Ludhiana v. Inderjit Singh (2008) 13 SCC 506; and V.N. Bharat v. DDA (2008) 17 SCC 321. 45. In the present case, the accused has not proved that he was not responsible for non-service; therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the notice was deemed to be served upon the accused. 46. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed: 36 2026:HHC:22041 “It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court, along with a copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring the statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 47. The accused did not claim that he had repaid the amount to the complainant, and it was duly proved on record that the accused had failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice. 48. Therefore, it was duly proved before the learned Trial Court that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge his legal liability, the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement 37 2026:HHC:22041 ‘insufficient funds’, and the accused failed to pay the money despite the deemed receipt of a notice of demand. Hence, all the ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 49. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and pay compensation of ₹2,00,000/- to the complainant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provision of section 138 is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203: “6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.” 50. Keeping in view the deterrent nature of the punishment, the sentence of one year cannot be said to be excessive. 38 2026:HHC:22041 51. The learned Trial Court had imposed the fine on 18.12.2023. The cheque was issued on 15.9.2015. Thus, the sentence was imposed after the lapse of about eight years from the issuance of the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: - 19. As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520]” 52. The interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the amount of ₹1,65,000/- for eight years would be ₹1,18,800/-. Learned Trial Court imposed a fine of ₹2.00 lacs and ordered that it be disbursed as compensation to the complainant, which means that an amount of ₹35,000/- was awarded as compensation on the cheque amount of ₹1,65,000/-. Therefore, 39 2026:HHC:22041 the amount of fine cannot be said to be excessive, requiring an interference from the Court. 53. No other point was urged. 54. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. 55. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th June, 2026. (Chander)