RAMJI LAL S/O PRABHUDAYAL v. KAILASH CHAND S/O BHAIRURAM PALSANIYA
CMA/4072/2024 · 2025-01-15
Ashok Kumar Jain
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 30609 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 30609 (RAJ) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
[2025:RJ-JP:2424] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4072/2024 Ramji Lal S/o Prabhudayal, Aged About 44 Years, R/o Jajaikalan, Dhani Nitharwalon Ki, P.s. Shahpura Distt. Jaipur, Raj. ----Appellant Versus
1. Kailash Chand S/o Bhairuram Palsaniya, Aged About 51 Years, R/o Dhani Navodi Ki, Ward No. 24, Triveni Road, Shahpura, P.s. Shahpura, Distt. Jaipur (Raj.) (Driver And Regd. Owner Jeep No. Rj-32-Ua-4392)
2. The New India Insurance Company Limited, Through Regional Manager, Office Nehru Palace, Tonk Road, Jaipur, Distt. Jaipur, Raj. (Insurance Co. Jeep No. Rj-32-Ua- 4392) Validity Date 30.01.2018 To 29.01.2019 ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ram Sharan Sharma For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN
Order 15/01/2025
1. Instant claim petition is preferred by appellant claimant aggrieved and dissatisfied from award dated 28.06.2022 in claim case no. 190/2022 (95/2018) passed by learned Additional District Judge no.2, MACT, Shahpura, District Jaipur.
2. Office has pointed out a delay of 714 days in filing instant misc. appeal for enhancement of award passed on 28.06.2022. The application indicate that appellant was not aware about period of limitation, therefore they have preferred to condone delay of nearly 2 years.
[2025:RJ-JP:2424] (2 of 5) [CMA-4072/2024]
3.
Learned counsel for appellant submits that delay was beyond control of appellant and appellant was rustic villager and not aware about legal procedure. 4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 5. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but
[2025:RJ-JP:2424] (3 of 5) [CMA-4072/2024] because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 6. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court.
In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay. 7. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.:
[2025:RJ-JP:2424] (4 of 5) [CMA-4072/2024] (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 8. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed.
The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act
have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though
liberal
approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various
[2025:RJ-JP:2424] (5 of 5) [CMA-4072/2024] factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision. 9. Having considered the submissions and also the material placed on record, it is quite clear that there is no document in support of any claim of delay.
The appellant claimant has filed a claim before the learned Tribunal in the year 2018 itself for injuries sustained in an accident occurred on 20.02.2018. It is hard to believe that appellant was not aware about any right of appeal particularly when appellant has filed claim petition within time before the tribunal, therefore, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is not supported with sufficient ground or any document. Hence, same is liable to be dismissed. 10. The application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and consequently, Civil Misc. Appeal, are hereby dismissed. 11. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J CHETNA BEHRANI /61