1 2025:CGHC:36531 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4796 of 2020 1 - Sanat Kumar Banerjee S/o Late Onkar Banerjee, Aged About 58 Years Presently Posted As Head Constable, Police Station, Champa, District - Janjgir - Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa,, (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Home (Police) Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.) 2 - The Director General Of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.) 3 - The Deputy Director General Of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.) 4 - The Inspector General Of Police, Bilaspur Range, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, (C.G.) 5 - The Superintendent Of Police, Janjgir, District - Janjgir - Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, (C.G.) ... Respondents {Cause title is taken from Case Information System} For Petitioner : Mr. Vimlesh Bajpai, Advocate appears on behalf of Ms. Nirupama Bajpai, Advocate. For Respondents : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Advocate. 2 (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Order on Board 28.07.2025 1. Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 29.06.2019 (Annexure P-3) passed by respondent No. 4- The Inspector General of Police, Bilaspur Range, Bilaspur whereby the petitioner has been held guilty of misconduct under paragraph 64 (10) of the Police Regulation and inflicted penalty of reduction of rank from the post of “Assistant Sub-Inspector” to the post of “Head Constable” for three years from the date of passing of order and the order dated 14.02.2020 (Annexure P-1) whereby appeal preferred against the order dated 29.06.2019 was dismissed by respondent No. 2 – The Director General of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur (C.G.). 2. Facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner, in nutshell, are that while the petitioner was posted as “Assistant Sub Inspector” in Police Station Jaijaipur, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), he was served with the charge- sheet on the allegation that while investigating Crime No. 128 / 2018 against accused – Briahspat Sahu for the offence under Sections 380 & 454 of the IPC, the petitioner has obtained amount from Shyam Sundar Sahu (brother of accused) for providing undue benefit to accused Briahspat Sahu. The petitioner filed reply to the charge-sheet denying the allegation. 2.1 Being dissatisfied with the reply, respondent authorities initiated departmental enquiry against petitioner and after completion of departmental enquiry, Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 4.8.2018 (Annexure R-1) before respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 while accepting enquiry report, vide impugned order dated 29.06.2019 (Annexure P-3) imposed major penalty upon the petitioner and he was demoted in the lower rank to 3 the post of “Head Constable” from “Assistant Sub Inspector”. Appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 29.06.2019 was also dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 14.02.2020 (Annexure P-1). Therefore, the petitioner filed instant writ petition seeking relief of setting aside / quashment of both the orders on the ground mentioned in the writ petition. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that without affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, he has been inflicted major penalty of reducing his rank from the post of “Assistant Sub Inspector” to the post of “Head Constable”. He would further submit that in departmental enquiry, neither the documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer had been provided to the petitioner nor adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses has been provided to him. It is further submitted that the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty only on the basis of Audio-Video CD without proving it with the certificate issued under Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is further contended that without any reliable evidence, petitioner has been penalized with major penalty and the appellate authority also did not consider aforesaid facts and dismissed the appeal in mechanical way. Learned counsel further submitted that at present, the petitioner has been retired from service, therefore, he prayed that instant petition may be allowed and the impugned orders passed by disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority may be set aside directing the respondent authorities to re-instate the petitioner on his previous post from the date of reduction of his rang by giving him all consequential benefits. 4 4. The respondents / state has filed its reply. Learned counsel for the state while referring to its reply would submit that the petitioner had demanded and received money from brother of the accused – Briahspat Sahu in connection with Crime No. 128/2018, which was recorded by the complainant in his mobile phone. On being complaint made against the petitioner along with C.D., departmental enquiry was instituted against him, in which, due opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by following Rules, Regulations and principle of natural justice. During enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded evidence of departmental witnesses and evidence adduced by delinquent employee / petitioner and after analyzing the same, charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner under Regulation 64 (10) was found proved by the Enquiry Officer. Learned counsel further submits that thereafter, explanation was sought for from petitioner by disciplinary authority by providing him copy of enquiry report, which was also replied by the petitioner. It is further submitted that earlier also, i.e. in the year 2017, major penalty was imposed against the petitioner for alike offence, thus, he was found to be a habitual wrongdoer, but his conduct was not improved, therefore, the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty of reducing his rank from the post of “Assistant Sub-Inspector” to the post of “Head Constable”. It is next contended that the petitioner has not produced any valid fact to interfere with the departmental proceedings and punishment inflicted against him and it settled position of law that in Departmental Enquiry proceeding, writ court has very limited jurisdiction and it cannot sit as an appellate authority. No any grave error or mistake has been pointed out by the petitioner to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the appeal is liable to be rejected. In this regard, he relied upon in 5 the case of State of Rajasthan & others vs. Bhupendra Singh 1 and State Bank of India and another vs. K.S. Vishwanath 2 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record with utmost circumspection alongwith record of departmental enquiry proceedings. 6. In the instant case, departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner in pursuance of the complaint made by Shyam Sundar Sahu - brother of accused Briahspat Sahu, who was arrested in connection with Crime No. 128 / 2018 for the offence punishable under Sections 380 & 454 of the IPC. In departmental enquiry, following charge was inflicted against the petitioner :- vkjksi vipkjh lmfu lur dqekj cuthZ “01 Fkkuk tStSiqj ds vi-dz- 128@18 /kkjk 380] 454 Hkknfo dh foospuk djrs gq, vkjksih c`gLir lkgw dks ykHkkfUor djus vkjksih ds HkkbZ ';ke lqanj lkgw ls :i;s izkIr dj Hkz"V vkpj.k iznf’kZr dj iqfyl jsX;qys’ku ds iSjk 64 dh dafMdk ¼10½ ds foijhr vkpj.k iznf’kZr djuk A” 7. Perusal of original record of enquiry report shows that while supplying charge-sheet, the petitioner was also supplied list of witnesses alongwith documents. In this regard, he had submitted his receipt on 28.11.2018 to the Sub Divisional Officer (Police), Champa, District Janjgir-Champa. During enquiry, four departmental witnesses were examined, who have also been cross-examined by the petitioner himself. Enquiry Officer, after recording 1 2024 SCC Online SC 1908 2 (2022) 15 SCC 190 6 evidence, held guilty to the petitioner for the said misconduct. Record of Enquiry report also shows that after receiving enquiry report, the same was accepted by disciplinary authority, opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority and after considering his entire service record, in which, the petitioner was also found penalized for 62 times for minor punishment and at once imposed major punishment in the year 2017, the petitioner has been inflicted punishment, as has been sated in opening paragraph of the order. 8. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a case of present nature, is no longer res integra. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao 3 , a three judge Bench held as under :- ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner 3 AIR 1963 SC 1723 7 inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. ’ (emphasis supplied) 9. While considering the same issue, in the case of State Bank of India and another Vs. K. S. Vishwanath (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering various judgments, has observed as under :- “18. Recently in the case of State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj 4 after considering other decisions of this Court on judicial review and the power of the High Court in a departmental enquiry and interference with the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry, it is observed and held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is further observed and held that the High Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, 4 (2020) 3 SCC 423 8 and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. It is further observed that if there is some evidence, that the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review/reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 19. In paragraphs 9 to 14, Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered other decisions on the power of the High Court on judicial review on the decisions taken by the Disciplinary Authority as under: [See : N. Gangaraj case, SCC pp. 426-30, paras 9-14] “9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao5 , a three- Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726 27, para7) “7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, 5 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 9 which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” 10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India6, again a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13) “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary 6 (1995) 6 SCC 749 10 authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel7 , this Court held that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil8, this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : 7 AIR 1964 SC 364 8 (2000) 1 SCC 416 11 “16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya 9 , this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 58788, paras 7 & 10) “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the 9 (2011) 4 SCC 584 12 domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] , High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .) xxx xxx xxx 10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the 13 departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.” 13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335] , wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not 14 find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.” 20. That thereafter the Supreme Court has observed and held in paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under: “7. The disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the evidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges levelled against the respondent stand proved. 8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decisionmaking process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority. xxx xxx xxx 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] and B.C. Chaturvedi [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” 15 10. Applying the ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in afore- cited cases to the facts of the instant case, it is quite vivid that due opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner prior to institution of Departmental Enquiry Proceeding and prior to imposing punishment. The petitioner himself had cross-examined the departmental witnesses, as such, principle of natural justice with regard to due opportunity of hearing has been followed by the respondent authorities while initiation of departmental enquriy and while imposing major penalty upon the petitioner. 11. Allegation against the petitioner is getting money from brother of accused Briahspat Sahu to provide him undue benefit in the crime registered against the accused. The said allegation was recorded by complainant in his mobile video, which was also seen by Enquiry officer. It is alleged by petitioner that recording of audio-video CD was not provided to the petitioner, whereas, he himself had submitted receipt before the Enquiry Officer that he has received documents as per list. He himself had cross- examined the witnesses, therefore, aforesaid contention raised by the petitioner is not found to be sustainable. 12. In departmental enquiry proceeding or in a quashi judicial proceeding, strict provisions of The Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable, rather in such proceedings, allegations are considered / proved on the basis of principle preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, contention raised by the petitioner that Audio-Video C.D. has not been proved as per the provisions contained in Evidence Act is not sustainable. 13. Upon perusal of record of departmental enquiry, it is not found that the petitioner has been held guilty on said misconduct without any evidence, even otherwise the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter, 16 which can be canvassed before the High Court, rather this issue is considered by the appellate authority. 14. Nothing has been brought by the petitioner before this Court, which induces this Court to interfere with the proceeding conducted by respondent authorities by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. As per impugned order (Annexure P-3), earlier also the petitioner had been penalized for alike misconduct, despite that his conduct did not improve and he was penalized again for the same misconduct. As such, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned orders passed by disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority. 15. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, writ petition, being sans merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost (s). Sd/- (Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi) Judge AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR DUBEY Date: 2025.08.04 13:20:00 +0530