2025:HHC:38116 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 936 of 2025 Reserved on: 7.10.2025 Date of Decision: 13.11.2025 Harsh Tomar ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the petitioner : M/s Anirudh Sharma and Pavinder, Advocates. For respondent No.1/State : Mr. Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. For respondent No.2 : None. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 230 of 2017, dated 17.8.2017, registered at Police Station Sadar, Solan, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(1)(w) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (SC&ST Act) based on the compromise. It has been asserted that the accused 2025:HHC:38116 2 promised to solemnise the marriage with the informant and maintained physical relations with her. He failed to honour his promise. The informant became pregnant in September 2016, and the accused had the pregnancy terminated. The accused discovered in January 2017 that the informant belonged to the Scheduled Caste. He refused to solemnise the marriage by saying that they belonged to different castes. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. A charge sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of the investigation. The accused and the informant had settled the matter with the intervention of the respectable persons of the society. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The complaint was made to the police under some misconception. Hence the petition. 2. I have heard M/s Anirudh Sharma and Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Tarun K. Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-State. 3. Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the parties have reconciled the matter with the intervention of the respectable members of the society. The 2025:HHC:38116 3 informant does not want to proceed further with the matter. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed based on the compromise. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhukar and others v. State of Maharashtra 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 710 and Jasveer Singh Sodhi and others Vs. State of H.P. and another, SLP(Crl.) No. 58295 of 2024, decided on 19.9.2025 in support of his submission. 4. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the offence alleged against the petitioner/accused is heinous, which cannot be compromised. The petitioner had not only maintained physical relations with the victim but had also terminated her pregnancy. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the power of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and laid down the following principles: - 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High 2025:HHC:38116 4 Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached a settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power, the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been committed under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the 2025:HHC:38116 5 basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak, and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice, and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crimes against society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are 2025:HHC:38116 6 remote and bleak. In the former case, it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings, whereas in the latter case, it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on a complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them, which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of an offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is for this reason that at this stage the investigation is still on, and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage 2025:HHC:38116 7 before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same, resulting in the acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC, and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime; therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. This question was again considered in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189 and the following principles were summarised: 16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 2025:HHC:38116 8 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed, though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 2025:HHC:38116 9 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may, in appropriate situations, fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if, in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 and it was observed: “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable 2025:HHC:38116 10 offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for 2025:HHC:38116 11 the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected, after investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It was laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that heinous offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed 2025:HHC:38116 12 based on the compromise and only offences which are predominantly civil in nature can be compromised. It was observed: 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR, or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and 2025:HHC:38116 13 predominately civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 10. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Dnyaneshwar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2562, that the offence of rape is against society, which cannot be quashed based on a compromise between the parties. It was observed: 2025:HHC:38116 14 “4. At the outset, it is to be noted that the offence that was registered was under the category of a heinous crime and therefore, a compromise at a later stage will have to be scrutinised minutely. Merely because the informant is now giving consent for quashment of the proceedings, this Court cannot use its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of the applicants.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised in Madhukar (supra) that the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC is grave and heinous in nature, and quashing of the proceedings on the basis of the settlement should not be permitted rightly. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held on facts that the FIR could be quashed based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, it is apparent that the FIR was quashed because of the peculiar circumstances of the case; hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 12. In Jasvir Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the allegations were grave in nature. The FIR was an emotional outburst due to the pending civil litigation between the parties, and no case was made. Hence, the FIR was quashed. 13. In the present case, the compromise does not show that the allegations were false; rather, it was stated that the matter was compromised amicably with the intervention of the society. Therefore, the cited judgments do not apply to the present case, 2025:HHC:38116 15 and the general principle that an FIR registered for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be quashed based on a compromise would continue to apply. 14. In view of these binding precedents, the present petition cannot be allowed, and it is dismissed. 15. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 13th November 2025 (Chander)