1 APHC010440592019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3333] TUESDAY, THE TWENTY EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE V.SUJATHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 8008/2019 Between: Buddhi Reddy Satyanarayana ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND State of A.P. and another ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. G RAMA GOPAL Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: 2 ORDER: This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1 in Crime No.327 of 2019, dated 19.09.2019 on the file of Station House Officer, Muvvalavanipalem Police Station, Visakhaaptnam registered for the offences punishable under Sections 354(a), 376, 419, 420, 452, 498-A, 506, 509 of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”) read with Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 2. The respondent No.2/defacto complaint filed a complaint stating as follows: a) The complainant’s late husband Tenneti Gowripati Sasthry worked as Professor in Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, they blessed with daughter by name Vidyadhari, after the demise of her late husband on 12.01.1995 she had acquaintance with accused No.1 who was the student of her husband. Accused No.1 used to take care of all the family affairs relating to the defacto complainant and her family and show affection towards them. By believing his attitude, she started live-in relationship with him. On several occasions, she requested accused No.1 to marry her, but he always postponed the issue stating that the reputation of both families will be ruined in the society and informed that they shall wait for right time. b) The accused No.1 has executed a registered Will dated 03.04.2008, bequeathing a flat in favour of the complainant after his demise. In fact, the 3 complainant paid all the instalments towards the purchase of the said flat from her own funds. Accused No.1 performed the marriage of complainant’s daughter with his nephew. However, after the marriage, accused No.1 began avoiding the complainant without any reason. Some days after the marriage of her daughter, her son-in-law deserted her daughter without any reason, in collusion with accused No.1. With malafide intentions, accused No.1 obtained the complainant’s signatures on blank cheques and white papers by blackmailing and threatening and also asked the complainant to issue blank cheques for payment of EMI’s i.e., car loan and housing loans and to withdraw her family pension. Without any reason accused No.1 neglected the complainant and cheated her in many ways intending to indulge her in false cases on their own names and some other names. c) In December 2017, accused No.1 and 2 jointly came to her house and insisted the complainant to vacate the house instantly and further, they threatened if she did not hear their words they will see the complainant and her daughter’s end. As she did not listen to those words and asked them to get out of her house they started abusing her in filthy language. Subsequently, accused No.2 with the instigation of accused No.1 abused her physically and thrown her and by catching front part of her blouse with his hand, pressed her body. Accused No.1 beat her many times during live-in relationship, caused grievous hurt and those actions made her to attempt to suicide. Recently accused No.3 also instigated by accused No.1 intends to file false civil and criminal cases against the complainant. Therefore, the complainant lodged a 4 complaint before the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Visakhapatnam, which was forwarded to the concerned Police Station for registration of crime and investigation. Thereupon, the police registered a case in crime No.327 of 2019, dated 19.09.2019 against the accused Nos.1 to 3. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor for respondent-State. 4. None appeared for the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused No.1 submitted that in the complaint there is no mention about the complainant approaching the police authorities prior to filing the present private complaint. He further submits that none of the guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others case are followed while exercising the power of the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 6. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that the alleged acts of the petitioner are sufficient to conclude that the petitioner committed offence and requested to dismiss the petition. 7. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: 5 “Whether the proceedings in FIR No.327 of 2019 on the file of learned Muvvalavanipalem Police Station, Visakhapatnam, is liable to be quashed against the petitioner herein by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” 8. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: 6 In “R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: (i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no 1 AIR 1960 SC 866 7 justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs.Dhanalakshmi v. R.Prasanna Kumar2” In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal3” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 2 AIR 1990 SC 494 3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 8 Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others 4 has dealt with the provisions of Section 156 Cr.P.C. and the duty and the approach of the Magistrate while exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The relevant paragraphs in the said judgment reads as under: 20. The learned Magistrate, as we find, while exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has narrated the allegations and, thereafter, without any application of mind, has passed an order to register an FIR for the offences mentioned in the application. The duty cast on the learned Magistrate, while exercising power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., cannot be marginalized. To understand the real purport of the same, we think it apt to reproduce the said provision: "156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case. -(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was no empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned." 21. Dealing with the nature of power exercised by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, a three-Judge Bench in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others v. V.Narayana Reddy and others[2], had to express thus: "17. ….It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or chargesheet under Section 173." 22. In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa[3], the two-Judge Bench had to say this: "The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed [(2008) 5 SCC 668] examined the requirement of the 4 (2015) 6 Supreme Court Cases 287 9 application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation." 23. In Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi[4], this Court ruled thus: "18. ...’11. The clear position therefore is that any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter." 24. In CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd.[5], the Court while dealing with the power of Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences, has opined that having considered the complaint, the Magistrate may consider it appropriate to send the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And again: (Madhao v. State of Maharashtra, SCC pp. 620-21, para 18) "18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under [pic]Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3)." 10 25. Recently, in Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat[6], while dealing with the exercise of power under Section 156(3) CrPC by the learned Magistrate, a three-Judge Bench has held that: ".... the direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under the said provision is issued. In other words, where on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a direction is issued. Cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and postpones issuance of process are cases where the Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient ground to proceed." Having observed the ingredients above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in paragraph 27, as under: 27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. 10. From the above, it is evident that while referring the private complaint, the concerned Magistrate has to be vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and there should be proper application of mind before forwarding the complaint to the police for registration of a crime and investigation. 11. In the case on hand, the endorsement dated 29.08.2019 made by the learned Magistrate, whereby the complaint was forwarded to the concerned police for investigation, reads as under: “Complainant present. Heard. The complaint is forwarded to the SHO, MVP P.S. unde Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation and report called on 11.10.2019.” 11 12. From the above, it is clear that no reasons whatsoever were furnished by the learned Magistrate for reaching conclusion to forward the complaint to the police for investigation. The impugned Endorsement does not reveal any application of mind by the learned Magistrate as to the nature of the allegations made. 13. In view of the above, following the principles laid down in Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, this Court is of the opinion that the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner is nothing but abuse of process of law and hence, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 14. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner/Accused No.1 in FIR No.327 of 2019 on the file of Muvvalavanipalem Police Station, Visakhapatnam are hereby quashed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this petition, shall stand closed. __________________ JUSTICE V.SUJATHA Date: 28.01.2025 KGR