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2025 DAILYLAW 30460 (KAR)

NABEELA ASMAT v. THE CHIEF MANAGER

WP/19473/2025 · 2025-07-03

S Sunil Dutt Yadav

body2025

Judgment text

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- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF JULY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV WRIT PETITION NO. 19473 OF 2025 (GM-RES) BETWEEN: 1. NABEELA ASMAT AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS W/O MOHAMMAD SAMIULLA NO. 501, 5TH FLOOR, PRISTINE VARA 123, INFANTRY ROAD MUNICIPAL WARD NO. 78 VASANTH NAGAR BENGALURU - 560 001 … PETITIONER (BY SRI. G M SHARATHKUMAR., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE CHIEF MANAGER STATE BANK OF INDIA STRESSED ASSETS RECOVERY BRANCH (05173) NO.11/90, 3RD FLOOR NEAR OPP TRUSTWELL HOSPITAL J C ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 002 2. SARAVANAN M S/O M MANI AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS NO. 32, UNITY LINE EJIPURA VIVEK NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 047 Digitally signed by VIJAYA P Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 ALSO AT NO.502, 5TH FLOOR PRISTINE VARA, 123, INFANTRY ROAD MUNCIPAL WARD NO. 78 VASANTH NAGAR BENGALURU - 560 001 … RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. DIVYA PURANDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1) THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 21/12/2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED MAGISTRATE IN CRL.MISC NO. 5046/2024 UNDER SECTION 14 OF THE SARFAESI ACT, ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF THE X ACMM, MAYOHALL, BENGALURU AT ANNEXURE-A AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV ORAL ORDER The petitioner has called in question the validity of the order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. Various contentions have been raised including that the petitioner is a bona fide tenant. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits that only certain kind of tenancies are protected as contemplated under Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is further submitted that all these - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 factual aspects could be raised before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and cannot be considered before this Court, in light of the factual contentions raised. 3. In light of the contentions raised, it is relevant to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others - (2010) 8 SCC 110 that the appropriate remedy would be to relegate the petitioner to seek for substantive remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 4. In light of the observations made by the Apex Court, it can be noticed that several factual contentions raised by the petitioner are the matters that cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 5. Accordingly, the petition is disposed off relegating the petitioner to avail of the substantive remedy as regards the impugned proceedings. All contentions of both the sides are kept open. 6. In light of disposal of writ petition, it would meet the ends of justice by directing the respondent- Bank not to take any precipitative steps for a period of three weeks from today. 7. The interim protection granted under this order is only to enable the petitioner to avail of his substantive remedy and must not be considered to be an order passed on the basis of adjudication on merits. Upon the lapse of the time stipulated, the protection granted would cease to operate and the authorities before whom petitioner may approach are to look at the matter afresh uninfluenced by the observations made herein. 8. Needless to state that while considering the aspect of limitation, in the event the proceedings are - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:23911 WP No. 19473 of 2025 instituted before the DRT, time spent before this Court may be taken note of appropriately. 9. No doubt, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank submits that the articles of the house of petitioner have been kept outside, however, in light of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and noticing that the petitioner is relegated to avail of the substantive remedy, the above protection is granted. 10. Needless to state that, once the protection stands discharged, the respondent Bank is at liberty to take further steps in pursuance of the impugned order unless restrained by the order of DRT. Sd/- (S SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE VGR