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2025 DAILYLAW 30219 (HP)

DEVENDER KUMAR AND ORS v. STATE OF HP AND ANR

CRMMO/988/2025 · 2025-11-19

Virender Singh

body2025

Judgment text

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2025:HHC:39634 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. 988 of 2025 a/w Cr. Appeal (C­SB) No. 12 of 2025 Decided on :  19.11.2025 Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025 Devender Kumar @ Dhani Ram & Ors. …Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & Anr. …Respondents Cr. Appeal (C­SB) No. 12 of 2025 Devender Kumar @ Dhani Ram & Ors. …Appellants Versus State of H.P. …Respondent ___________________________________________________________ Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025 For the petitioners : All petitioners in person, with Mr. Narendra   Guleria, Advocate. For the respondents   : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional A.G., with Ms. Ranjana Patial, Deputy   A.G.   for   respondent No.1/State. 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:39634 Respondent   No.   2   in   person with   Mr. K.R.   Kashyap, Advocate. _________________________________________________________ Cr. Appeal (C­SB) No. 12 of 2025 For the appellants : All appellants in person, with Mr. Narendra   Guleria, Advocate. For the respondent     : Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Additional A.G., with Ms. Ranjana Patial, Deputy   A.G.   for   the respondent/State. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioners have approached this Court, by way of Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya   Nagarik   Suraksha   Sanhita,   2023   (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing of FIR No. 69/2022 dated   21.02.2022,   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “FIR   in question”) registered under Section 3(1)(zc) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (hereinafter referred to as “SC&ST (POA) Act”), with Police Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P., along with judgment of conviction   and   order   of   sentence,   dated   05.08.2025, passed   by   learned   Special   Judge   (Family   Court)   Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as “the trial 3 2025:HHC:39634 Court”), on the basis of the compromise, which is stated to have taken place between the petitioners and respondent No. 2. 2. It is the case of the petitioners, in Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, that the FIR in question was registered at the instance of respondent No. 2, in which, she had alleged that she belongs to the Scheduled Caste community and had   solemnized   inter­caste   marriage   with   Gopal   Singh. The  marriage   was  not socially  accepted by  the  accused persons­petitioners,   who   are   close   relatives. The complainant­respondent No. 2 had been socially boycotted, on account of her scheduled caste status  and she was deliberately excluded from participating in family rituals. 3. On the basis of above facts, police registered the FIR   in   question   and   criminal   machinery   swung   into motion. 4. As   stated   above,   after   completion   of   the investigation, police has filed the charge sheet against the petitioners in the Court. On 05.08.2025, the learned trial Court,   has   convicted   the   petitioners   for   the   offence punishable under Section 3(1)(zc) of the SC&ST (POA) Act 4 2025:HHC:39634 and   they   have   been   sentenced   to   undergo   rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years each and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/­ each. In default of payment of fine, they   have   been   directed   to   further   undergo   simple imprisonment for six months. 5. Against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.08.2025, passed by learned trial Court, the petitioners in Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, have filed Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2025, before this Court. 6. As per the case of the petitioners­appellants, now the matter has been settled between the parties, as, they are from the same family. The terms and conditions of the compromise were reduced into writing and the same has   been   annexed   with   Cr. MMO   No.   988   of   2025,   as Annexure P­4. On the basis of Annexure P­4, a prayer has been made to allow the Cr.MMO No. 988 of 2025 and Cr. Appeal No. 12 of 2025, by quashing the FIR in question, as well as, judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.08.2025, passed by the learned trial Court. 7. When put to notice, respondent No. 1­State has filed   the   status   report,   in   Cr. MMO   No.   988   of   2025, 5 2025:HHC:39634 disclosing   therein,   the   manner,   in   which   the   FIR   in question   has   been   registered   and   how   the   police   had conducted   the   investigation   and   filed   the   charge   sheet against the petitioners, which resulted into passing of the judgment   of   conviction   and   order   of   sentence   dated 05.08.2025, by the learned trial Court. 8. Respondent No. 2, in Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, who,   at   one   point   of   time,   had   levelled   the   allegations against the petitioners­appellants, when appeared before this Court today, has made her statement, exonerating the petitioners­appellants   from   the   allegations,   which   have been   levelled   against   them,   affirming   that   the   FIR   in question was lodged by her, on account of trivial dispute and now, matter has been compromised between them, as petitioners­appellants and respondent No. 2 in Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025 are of the same family and they want to live peacefully in the society.   The said compromise has been annexed with Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, as Annexure P­4. 9. Respondent No. 2 has also deposed that she has no objection, if Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, as well as, 6 2025:HHC:39634 Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2015, are allowed, in view of the compromise and the FIR in question is quashed, as well as, judgment   of   conviction   and   order   of   sentence   dated 05.08.2025, passed by learned trial Court, are set aside. 10. Similar type of statement has also been made by the petitioners­appellants separately. 11. Heard. 12. In view of the above factual position, the first and material question which arises before this Court about the fact whether the compromise in the present case can be accepted, as the learned trial Court after the full fledge trial, had passed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, which is being assailed before this Court. 13. Answer to this question is in positive, as appeal is the continuation of original proceedings and considering the fact that the appeal has been admitted for hearing, it can be said that the findings so recorded by the learned trial Court, convicting the petitioners­appellants have not attained finality. As such, the plea of compromise can be taken into consideration. While holding, so view of this Court is being guided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a case 7 2025:HHC:39634 reported as “AIR Online 2021 SC 927, Ramawatar Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh”, relevant paragraphs No. 11 to 16, as as under:­ “11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving non heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could   be   set   aside   at   any   stage   of   the   proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck post conviction, the Courts should, inter alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the   compromise   has   been   arrived   at,   as   well   as,   the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While   concluding,   the   Court   also   formulated certain guidelines and held: “19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in  the context  of quashing  criminal  proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the   injury,   if   any;   (iii)   Voluntary   nature   of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after   the   occurrence   of   the   purported   offence and/or other relevant considerations.” [Emphasis Applied] 12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary   compromise   between   the   complainant/victim and the accused. 13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article   142 or   under Section   482 Cr.P.C.,   are exercisable   in   postconviction   matters  only   where   an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate 8 2025:HHC:39634 court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before   the   final   Court,   is   sine qua non   to   involve   the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely,   where   a   settlement   has   ensued   post   the attainment   of   all   legal   remedies,   the   annulment   of proceedings   on   the   basis   of   a   compromise   would   be impermissible. Such   an   embargo   is   necessitated   to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with   lurking   suspicion   about   its   bona   fide. We   have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers   is   not   to   incentivise   any   hollowhearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s). 14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be   noted   that   even   though   the   powers   of   this   Court under Article   142 are   wide   and   farreaching,   the   same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court  can  altogether   ignore  the  statutory   provisions   or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to   regulate   the   use   of   its   power   and   discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr6 has eloquently clarified this point as follows: “48. The   Supreme   Court   in   exercise   of   its jurisdiction   under Article   142 has   the   power   to make   such   order   as   is   necessary   for   doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within   which   to   exercise   those   powers   and   6 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory   provision   governing   a   subject,   except perhaps   to   balance   the   equities   between   the conflicting   claims   of   the   litigating   parties   by “ironing   out   the   creases”   in   a   cause   or   matter before   it. Indeed   this   Court   is   not   a   court   of restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is well   recognised   and   established   that   this   Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely disputesettling. It   is   a   “problemsolver   in   the   nebulous   areas”   (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 9 2025:HHC:39634 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article   142. Indeed,   these   constitutional   powers cannot,   in   any   way,   be   controlled   by   any   statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant   to   be   exercised   when   their   exercise   may   come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.” 15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been   specifically   enacted   to   deter   acts   of   indignity, humiliation   and   harassment   against   members   of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition   of   the   depressing   reality   that   despite undertaking   several   measures,   the   Scheduled Castes/Scheduled   Tribes   continue   to   be   subjected   to various atrocities at the hands of uppercastes. The Courts have   to   be  mindful   of   the   fact   that   the   Act  has   been enacted   keeping   in   view   the   express   constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15 , 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twinfold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste­ based atrocities. 16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the   offence   in   question,   although   covered   under   the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law,   the   Court   can   exercise   its   powers   to   quash   the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence   is  covered   under   a   ‘special   statute’   would   not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C. Self emphasis supplied.” 10 2025:HHC:39634 14. In   view   of   the   statements   of   the   parties, especially the statement of respondent No. 2­complainant, who, at one point of time, had lodged the FIR in question, but, when appeared before this Court, has exonerated the petitioners­appellants, by stating that the matter has been compromised between them, as they are from the same family   and   of   the   same   village   and   they   want   to   live peacefully   in   the   society   and   to   maintain   their   future cordial relations, this Court is fully satisfied with regard to the genuineness of the compromise Annexure P­4, in Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025. 15. MMO No. 988 of 2025. 15. As per the stand taken by the parties, they are not strangers, but, are from the same family and residents of same village. The respondent No. 2 categorically stated that   petitioner   No.   1   is   her   brother­in­law   (Jeth), petitioners No. 2, 3 and 4 are her sister­in­law (Jethanies). From this fact, it can be said that they are from the sme family and when she categorically stated that on account of trivial dispute, she had lodged the FIR. In such situation, when the parties had decided to live together peacefully, after   resolving   all   their   disputes,   their   efforts   must   be 11 2025:HHC:39634 acknowledged by this Court, by accepting the compromise entered on, between the parties. 16. The   primary   purpose   of   law   is   to   maintain peace   and   harmony   in   the   society. The   petitioners­ appellants and respondent No. 2­complainant have buried all their disputes, by compromising the matter. This Court is fully satisfied with the genuineness of the compromise Annexure P­4. 17. Considering all these facts, Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025,   as  well   as,  Criminal  Appeal   No.   12   of   2025,  are allowed and FIR No. 69/2022 dated 21.02.2022, registered under Section 3(1)(zc) of the SC&ST (POA) Act, with Police Station Balh, District Mandi, H.P., as well as, judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.08.2025, passed by learned trial Court are ordered to be quashed and set aside. The bail bonds and surety bonds, so furnished, are ordered to be discharged. 18. The   compromise   deed,   Annexure   P­4,   in   Cr. MMO No. 988 of 2025, and the statements of the parties, recorded today, shall form part of the judgment. 12 2025:HHC:39634 19. Pending   miscellaneous   applications,   if   any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge 19th November, 2025 (Pramod)