Dhram Chand Vs. CBI Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 2 of 2025 Reserved on: 9.10.2025 31.10.2025 Present: Mr Ashwani Kaundal, Advocate, for the applicant/appellant. Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, Special Public Prosecutor, for the respondent-CBI. Cr. MP No. 3397 of 2025 The applicant/appellant has filed the present application for seeking suspension of the sentence awarded by the learned Special Judge (CBI), Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide order dated 28.7.2025. It has been asserted that the applicant has an arguable case in his favour, and the very purpose of filing the appeal would be frustrated by not suspending the sentence. The learned Trial Court had ignored the contradictions, embellishments and improvements in the prosecution’s case. The First Information Report was not signed by the informant, and the investigation was conducted without a proper FIR. Copy of Jamabandi and scheduled declaration do not fall within the meaning of valuable security, and the conviction of the petitioner under Section 467 of IPC is bad in law. The applicant had not received any amount, and he had not caused any loss to the Bank. No order authorising Madan Lal Thakur (PW18) to carry out the investigation was placed on record. The prosecution sanction is not proper, and no record was produced to prove that a proper record was produced before the sanctioning authority. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be allowed and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court be suspended during the pendency of the appeal. 2. The application is opposed by filing a reply asserting that an FIR was lodged stating that Mr A.S. Bodh, the then Branch Manager, PNB, Dhalpur Branch, in connivance with some unknown bank officials and private persons, sanctioned/recommended/facilitated/disbursed crop loans (KCC) based on forged/fake revenue loan documents and non-encumbrance certificates. A loss of ₹1.83 crores was caused to the Bank. The applicant, in connivance with A.S. Bodh and other accused, had availed a crop loan of ₹5.00 lacs based on a forged Nakal Jamabandi and charge creation report. ₹4,97,000/- was disbursed in the savings bank account of the applicant, which was withdrawn by him. The handwriting expert (GEQD) has given a positive opinion regarding the loan document submitted by the applicant. The applicant was charge- sheeted with other persons and was convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 3. I have heard Mr Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the applicant and Mr Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent-CBI. 4. Mr Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the applicant, submitted that the applicant has a fair chance of acquittal in the present case. The appeal is likely to take some time for its disposal. The very purpose of filing the appeal would be frustrated by the non-suspension of the sentence. Therefore, he prayed that the present application be allowed and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court be suspended. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aasif alias Pasha Vs. State of U.P. 2025:INSC:944 in support of his submission. 5. Mr Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public Prosecutor, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly sentenced and convicted the applicant. The applicant is a beneficiary of the fraud committed by A.S. Bodh and other co-accused. He prayed that the present application be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. It was submitted that the applicant was on bail during the trial and he did not misuse the liberty extended to him; therefore, he is entitled to the bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Hasmat, (2004) 6 SCC 175: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1757: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 741 that the mere fact that the accused was on bail during the trial and he had not misused his liberty is no reason to suspend the sentence. It was observed at page 177: “8. The learned Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, by a judgment dated 24-10-2001, had found the accused-respondent guilty. Criminal Appeal No. 100- DB of 2002 was filed by the respondent. The fact that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused-respondent was on parole goes to show that initially, the accused-respondent was not given the benefit of suspension of execution of the sentence. The mere fact that during the period of parole, the accused has not misused the liberties does not per se warrant suspension of execution of the sentence and grant of bail. What was really necessary to be considered by the High Court was whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of the sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view.” 8. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo a fixed term sentence, and such a sentence should be suspended as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. This Court dealt with a similar argument in CrMP no. 4659 of 2023 titled Raju vs State, decided on 27.06.2024 and held that the fixed term sentence up to three years can be suspended as a matter of right, but the accused has to show a fair chance of acquittal for serious offences. It was observed: “13. Therefore, in the case of a short-term sentence of three years provided in the statute, bail is the rule and jail is the exception. However, in serious offences, the Court has to consider the circumstances of the case and the likelihood of early disposal of the case. Where the case is not taken up expeditiously and the person has spent more than half of the sentence, the person is entitled to be released on bail.” 9. This order was assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.10110/2024 titled Raju vs State decided on 05.08.2024. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was not inclined to admit the SLP, and it was dismissed as withdrawn. It was observed: “1. After arguing the case for some time and on our expressing reservations in entertaining the Special Leave Petition, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the said Petition. 2. The permission as sought is granted. 3. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn.” 10. It was held in Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 551 that the Court should consider the gravity of the offence while considering an application for bail under Section 389 of Cr. P.C. It was observed: “21. Suspension conveys postponement or temporarily prevents a state of affairs from continuing. According to Black's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition), the word “suspend” means, inter alia, to interrupt; postpone; or defer. Black's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition) describes the word “suspension” to mean, inter alia, an act of temporarily delaying, interrupting or terminating something. Attributing the same meaning to the word “suspend” as pointed out above, the New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998 Edition) describes suspending as temporarily preventing from continuing or being enforced or given effect or deferring or delay an action, event or judgment. 22. Thus, when we speak of suspension of sentence after conviction, the idea is to defer or postpone the execution of the sentence. The purpose of postponement of sentence cannot be achieved by detaining the convict in jail; hence, as a natural consequence of postponement of execution, the convict may be enlarged on bail till further orders. 23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction. Once the accused is found guilty, the presumption of innocence is erased. In the same manner, if the accused is acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further fortified. 24. From a perusal of Section 389 CrPC, it is evident that save and except the matter falling under the category of sub-section (3) neither any specific principle of law is laid down nor any criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the convict and further, having a judgment of conviction erasing the presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence till contrary recorded by the court of competent jurisdiction, and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine distinction between the prayer for bail at the pre-conviction as well as the post- conviction stage viz. Sections 437, 438, 439 and 389(1) CrPC.” 11. It was further held that while deciding the application for suspension of the sentence, the Court should consider whether the applicant has a fair chance of acquittal. It was observed: 33. Bearing in mind the aforementioned principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately, the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has a fair chance of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, based on which the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.” 12. A similar view was taken in Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1641, wherein it was observed: “10. One would have expected the High Court to hear an application under Section 389 of the Cr. P.C. for suspension of sentence to examine whether, prima facie, there was anything palpable on the record to indicate if the accused had a fair chance of overturning the conviction. Xxxx 12. Taking into account the fact that the High Court has not adverted to any of the relevant factors for considering the case for suspension under Section 389 and keeping in mind the antecedents, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in suspending the sentence.” 13. This position was reiterated in Dashrath Singh v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1967, wherein it was observed: It would be proper and appropriate for the High Courts to be mindful of the law laid down in this context by this Court in its decisions, such as “Angana v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 3 SCC 767” and the more recent “Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary Etc. (2023) 6 SCC 123” (particularly, paragraph 33 thereof). 14. It was held in (NCT of Delhi) v. Lokesh Chadha, (2021) 5 SCC 724: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 704: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 178, that while granting bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C., the Courts are liberal and apply the principle that bail is a rule and jail is an exception; however, in case of post-conviction bail, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise.. It was observed: “10. At this stage, we will refer to the decision of a two-judge Bench of this Court in Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P. [Preet Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 897] where Indira Banerjee, J., speaking for the Court, observed as follows: (SCC p. 655, para 35) “35. There is a difference between the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre- trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC, and the grant of bail, post- conviction. In the earlier case there may be a presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post- conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception, once there is a conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong, compelling reasons for the grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC.” 15. This position was reiterated in Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842, wherein it was observed: “7. Even on a cursory perusal, the High Court's order shows complete non-application of mind. Though a detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on bail applications, yet a Court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but an exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The Court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. 8. There is a need to indicate in the order the reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted, particularly where an accused was charged with having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the Courts dealing with applications for bail to consider, among other circumstances, the following factors before granting bail, they are: 1. The nature of the accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction, and the nature of supporting evidence; 2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of a threat to the complainant; 3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non- application of mind, as was noted by this Court in Rama Govind Upadhyay. Sudarshan Singh(2002) 3 SCC 598, Puran v.Rambilas(2001) 6 SCC 33 and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528.” 16. It was further held that the suspension is to be granted by recording the reasons, and it is impermissible to release the accused simply because the appeal was not likely to be heard soon. It was observed: “9. We have already referred to the mandate under Section 389 Cr. P.C. that the order passed invoking the said provision should reflect the reason for concluding that the convicts are entitled to get their sentence suspended and consequential release on bail. In the decision in State of Haryana v. Hasmat (2019) 5 SCC 373: 2019 INSC 377, this Court held that in an appeal against conviction involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302, IPC, the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail should be considered with reference to the relevant factors mentioned thereunder, though not exhaustively. On its perusal, we are of the opinion that factors like the nature of the offence held to have been committed, the manner of their commission, the gravity of the offence, and also the desirability of releasing the convict on bail are to be considered objectively and such consideration should reflect in the consequential order passed under Section 389, Cr. P.C. It is also relevant to state that the mere factum of sufferance of incarceration for a particular period, in a case where life imprisonment is imposed, cannot be a reason for invocation of power under Section 389 Cr. P.C. without referring to the relevant factors. We say so because there cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that disposal of appeals against conviction (especially in cases where life imprisonment is imposed for serious offences), within a short span of time, may not be possible in view of the number of pending cases. In such circumstances, if it is said that disregarding the other relevant factors and parameters for the exercise of power under Section 389, Cr. P.C., the likelihood of delay and incarceration for a particular period can be taken as a ground for suspension of sentence and to enlarge a convict on bail, then, in almost every such case, favourable invocation of said power would become inevitable. That certainly cannot be the legislative intention, as can be seen from the phraseology in Section 389 Cr. P.C. Such an interpretation would also go against public interest and social security. In such cases, giving preference over appeals where the sentence is suspended, in the matter of hearing or adopting such other methods, making an early hearing possible could be resorted to. We shall not be understood to have held that, irrespective of inordinate delay in consideration of the appeal and long incarceration undergone, the power under the said provision cannot be invoked. In short, we are of the view that each case has to be examined on its own merits and based on the parameters, to find out whether the sentence imposed on the appellant(s) concerned should be suspended during the pendency of the appeal and the appellant(s) should be released on bail.” 17. Therefore, the applicant can be released on bail if it is shown that he has a fair chance of acquittal. 18. It was submitted that the sanction obtained by the CBI is not proper. This submission will not help the petitioner. Section 19 of the Protection of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) provides that no Court shall take cognisance of the offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant. It is nobody’s case that the petitioner is a government servant. The petitioner claimed that he is an agriculturist and he applied for an agricultural crop loan. Therefore, the applicant does not fall within the definition of a public servant, and he is not entitled to the benefit of the prosecution sanction. 19. It was submitted that the applicant has not forged any of the documents. The report of handwriting analysis shows that his signatures were found only on the scheduled declaration form, ration card, voter card, loan application, interview-cum-assessment form, simplified confidential report, hypothecation agreement and declaration regarding the agricultural land. As per the CBI, the copy of the Jamabandi and, charge creation report were forged. The signatures of the applicant do not appear on these documents, and he was wrongly held guilty of forging the documents. This submission will not help the applicant. Learned Trial Court had found that the applicant had applied for the loan. He had submitted the forged documents with his loan application. These findings are supported by the report of the handwriting expert, who found the signatures of the applicant on various loan documents. The jamabandi and the charge creation report did not bear the signatures of the person by whom they were purported to be signed. Therefore, the applicant had prima facie used the forged documents as genuine and was prima facie rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 471 of the IPC. Thus, the fact that the applicant had not forged these documents will not help him. 20. It was submitted that the copy of Jamabandi does not fall within the definition of a valuable security. This submission is not acceptable. Valuable security has been defined under Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code as a document which is or purports to be a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released. The Jamabandi shows the name of the person who is liable to pay the land revenue to the State and is in possession of the land. It carries with it a presumption of correctness. Therefore, a legal right to pay the land revenue to the State is created by the entry in the copy of the Jamabandi, and a right to remain in possession is also confirmed by the entry in the Jamabandi. Thus, the submission that the entry in the Jamabandi does not fall within the definition of a valuable security cannot be accepted. 21. It was submitted that the FIR is not signed, and the investigation is bad. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Calcutta High Court in A.W. Khan v. State, 1962 SCC OnLine Cal 12: AIR 1962 Cal 641: (1962) 2 Cri LJ 751 that the absence of the signatures on the FIR is an irregularity, which does not vitiate the proceedings. It was observed at page 643: “10. On this document, Mr Mitter first says that the signature of A.K. Roy, Sub-Inspector of the Detective Department, does not comply with section 154 of the Cr PC which requires that the signature must be by the person giving the first information. Therefore, he contends that there should have been a signature by Idrish Ali, the father of the victim girl. There are two answers to this argument of Mr. Mitter. The first answer is that this document, Exhibit 33, on the form of First Information Report, does not stand by itself or alone, but the petition to the Home Minister, which is signed by Idris Ali, is to be read as part of it. That being so, the lack of signature of the informant on the Be First Information Report cannot be put forward as a ground of objection. If both the formal document of the First Information Report and the petition to the Home Minister signed by Indris Ali are taken together as expressly said in the endorsement in the First Information Report, quoted above, the so called absence of the signature of the informant is cured by his signature appearing on the petition to the Home Minister, annexed to it the second answer to Mr. Mitter's argument is that absence of signature to the First Information Report by the informant is not necessary to the extent that its absence will vitiate and nullify such report A Division Bench of Lort Williams and S.K. Ghose, JJ. in the case of Mani Mohon Ghose v. Emperor, 35 Cal WN 623: (AIR 1931 Cal 745) lays down that; “If an information relates to the commission of a cognizable offence, it is a first information admissible in evidence as such, although the police officer may have neglected to record it in accordance with law.” 11. At p. 628 (of Cal WN): (at p. 748 of AIR) of the report, the learned Judge delivering the decision of the Division Bench observed: “The conditions as to writing in Sec. 154 of the Code are merely procedural. If there is an ‘information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence’, it falls under Section 154 and becomes admissible in evidence as such, even though the police officer may have neglected to record it in accordance with law. Owing to this neglect in particular cases, the Courts have laid down from time to time that the information which starts the investigation is the real first information under section 154 and should be treated in evidence as such. It does not depend on the sweet will of the police officer, who may or may not have recorded it. But the condition as to the character of the statements is really two- fold; first, it must be information, and, secondly, it must relate to a cognizable offence on the face of it and not merely in the light of subsequent events. It was never meant to be laid down that any sort of information would fall under Sec. 154, so long as it was the first in point of time.” 12. This disposes of Mr Mitter's objection on this ground.” 22. A similar view was taken by Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajoo v. State of M.P., 2002 SCC OnLine MP 559: (2003) 5 MP LJ 60: 2003 Cri LR (MP) 219, wherein it was observed at page 64: “18. Now we shall proceed to consider the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant. The first contention he has raised is that the FIR, which has been lodged by PW-1 Pappu, has not been signed by him; hence, the same is not admissible, being in deviation from section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention at a glance appears to be attractive, but, on deep scrutiny found to be devoid of any force. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under: — “154.Information in cognizable cases. — (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) xxxxxxxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxxxxxxx” (emphasis supplied). It is well settled in law that an FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and has a limited use. It can be used to either contradict or corroborate the maker thereof in the manner provided under the Evidence Act. The real purpose of the FIR is to set the criminal law in motion and to confront for the purpose of finding out any contradiction. We may refer with profit to the decision of the Apex Court in this regard. Hasib v. The State of Bihar, (1972) 4 SCC 773: AIR 1972 SC 283. Thus, merely the FIR was not signed is in itself no ground to discard it. 19. Non-obtaining of a signature is a procedural irregularity, but it cannot overturn the prosecution. This proposition was specifically dealt with by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of A.W. Khan v. The State, AIR 1962 Cal. 641, in which Their Lordships in para 7 of the judgment have held that absence of signature to the First Information Report by the informant is not necessary to the extent that its absence will vitiate and nullify such report. If there is information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, it falls under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and becomes admissible in evidence as such, even though the Police Officer may have neglected to record it in accordance with law. The information which starts the investigation is the real first information under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and should be treated as evidence as such. The reliance was placed by their Lordships on the case of Mani Mohan Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal. 745. 20. The Division Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Ratanchand Radhakisondas v. State, AIR 1960 Bom. 146 in para 4 has held as under:— “Now, the admissibility of a first information report depends not on the fact that it is signed by the person making it, but on the fact a first information report given in writing or taken down by a police officer would be a part of the official record as the substance of such information is to be entered in a book kept by the station officer in the form prescribed and that may attract the operation of the provisions of section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. See Emperor v. Chittar Singh, ILR 47 All. 280 : (AIR 1925 All 303). The condition as to its being reduced to writing and that it shall be signed by the person giving it seems to us to be a mere matter of procedure, and failure to observe the procedure as to signature would not make the information given, if it is reduced to writing, inadmissible.” 22. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that FIR was duly lodged by PW-1 Pappu and the same has been proved in accordance with the law. There is no suggestion with regard to the non- signing of FIR in the cross-examination, and, therefore, it does not render a fatal blow to the prosecution’s case. In this context, it will be relevant to mention that, under section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, a legal presumption would be that the official act must have been duly performed. The pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Sonelal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1978) 4 SCC 302: AIR 1978 SC 1142 may be seen.” 23. Thus, the absence of signatures on the FIR will not entitle the applicant to an acquittal. 24. It was submitted that the investigation was conducted without any permission. This submission will not help the applicant. It is undisputed that the co-accused is an employee of the Punjab National Bank. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar, (2020) 20 SCC 531 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 89: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 395 that CBI does not require any permission to carry out the investigation in respect of the employees of the Central Government, Bank, Central Government undertaking, etc. It was observed at page 547: “19…Such a consent may not be necessary regarding the investigation by the Special Police Force (DSPE) in respect of specified offences committed within the Union Territory and other offences associated therewith. That may be so, even if one of the accused involved in the given case may be residing or employed in some other State (outside the Union Territory) including in connection with the affairs of the State/local body/corporation, company or bank of the State or controlled by the State/institution receiving or having received financial aid from the State Government, as the case may be. Taking any other view would require the Special Police Force to comply with the formality of taking consent for investigation even in relation to specified offence committed within the Union Territory, from the State concerned merely because of the fortuitous situation that part of the associated offence is committed in other State and the accused involved in the offence is residing in or employed in connection with the affairs of that State. Such an interpretation would result in an absurd situation, especially when the 1946 Act extends to the whole of India and the Special Police Force has been constituted with a special purpose for the investigation of specified offences committed within the Union Territory, in terms of a notification issued under Section 3 of the 1946 Act.” 25. This position was reiterated in State v. A. Satish Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 15, wherein it was observed: “28. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to Resolution No. 4-31-61-T dated 01.04.1963 of the Ministry of Home Affairs establishing the Central Bureau of Investigation. Going by the said resolution dated 01.04.1963, it provides the function of the CBI in cases where public servants under the control of the Central Government are involved either themselves or with the State Government servants and/or other persons.” 26. It was submitted that the appeal of the applicant is not likely to be heard soon, and the applicant is entitled to bail. This submission cannot be accepted. This Court has the Roster to hear the criminal appeal for the year 2024, and the appeals of the year 2025 are also likely to come up for hearing pretty soon. In any case, the applicant has the right to approach the Court, in case it is found out that his appeal is not being listed for hearing. However, the sentence cannot be suspended by presuming that the applicant’s appeal is not likely to be taken up for hearing soon. 27. In Aasif v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1644, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court should normally suspend a fixed term of sentence, and when it is not suspended, every endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merit; otherwise very purpose of filing the appeal would be frustrated. In the present case, the appeal is likely to come up for hearing soon, and the Court will make every endeavour to dispose of the appeal because the applicant is undergoing incarceration. In case it is found out that the Court is unable to hear the appeal due to the lack of the Roster, the applicant is free to approach the court. 28. No other point was urged. 29. In view of the above, the present application fails, and it is dismissed. 30. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of the application and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits. Cr. Appeal (C-SB) No. 2 of 2025 31. Record has been received. List the matter for final hearing expeditiously, keeping in view the fact that the appellant is in jail. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 31st October, 2025 (Chander)