- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 947 OF 2023 (SC-ST) BETWEEN: SRI. C.B.NAGESH S/O MUGAIAH @ JOGAIAH @ BYATETHIMMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT SRINIVASA NILAYA, SAPTHAGIRI EXTENSION, 6TH CROSS, T.P.KAILASA ROAD, TUMAKURU TOWN - 572 102. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. V.B.SIDDARAMAIAH, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, M.S.BUILDING, DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU - 560 001. 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER TUMAKURU DISTRICT, MINI VIDHANA SOUDHA, DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR ROAD, TUMAKURU - 572 101. Digitally signed by MADHUSHREE H Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER TUMAKURU SUB-DIVISION, MINI VIDHANA SOUDHA, DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR ROAD, TUMAKURU - 572 101. 4. SRI. MUNIGOWDA S/O LATE MUDDAIAH, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 5. SRI. GANGANNA S/O. LATE BYRAPPA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 6. SMT. GANGAMMA W/O LATE VENKATARAVANA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 7. SRI. SRINIVASA S/O LATE VENKATARAVANA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 8. SRI. SURESHA S/O LATE VENKATARAVANA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 9. SRI. BYRAPPA S/O. LATE VENKATARAVANA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 10. SRI. PAPEGOWDA S/O LATE BYRAPPA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 11. SMT. HUCHAMMA W/O LATE THIMMANNAGOWDA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 12. SRI. SRINIVASA S/O LATE THIMMANNAGOWDA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 13. SRI. MURTHY S/O LATE THIMMANNAGOWDA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, 14. SRI. MUNIYAPPA S/O LATE VENKATAPPA, MAJOR, AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, ALL THE RESPONDENTS NO.4 TO 14 ARE R/AT CHOLAPURA VILLAGE, KEMBALALU POST, HEBBUR HOBLI, TUMAKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT - 572 120. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SWETHA KRISHNAPPA, AGA FOR R1-R3; SRI. R.KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R4-R14) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 24.05.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT IN W.P.NO.19945/2022, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO) This appeal lays a challenge to an order dated 24.05.2023 in W.P.No.19945/2022 whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellant herein has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by stating in paragraphs No.5, 6 and 7 as under:- “5. In the present case on hand, there is a delay of 42 years in initiating action. The authorities below have rightly examined the delay and laches in moving the application. The judgments cited supra clearly indicates that on the ground of gross delay and laches, the application made by the grantee or by the legal heirs under Section 5(2) of the 'PTCL Act' requires to be rejected. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited judgment has held that where statute does not provide for limitation, the authorities and State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 is by itself would act as an impediment. Thus, without exception and coming across various rules of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of power/jurisdiction under statute where no limitation is stipulated. The law on the point of delay and laches to invoke the provisions of PTCL Act is well settled by catena of judgments. 6. In the present case on hand, I would find that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time. In that view of the matter, the application filed by petitioner seeking resumption and restoration of granted land on the ground that the transfer is in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act is not at all maintainable since the same is not filed within a reasonable period. Both the authorities have taken cognizance of gross delay and have rightly rejected the petition. 7. In view of discussion made supra, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The writ petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, stands dismissed.” - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 2. Suffice to state that the learned Single Judge has referred to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs. State of Karnataka and another1 and also Vivek M. Hinduja vs. M. Aswatha2, to hold that there is a delay of 42 years in initiating the action. We are also of the view that the authorities below had rightly examined the delay and laches in moving the application. 3. We have already reproduced the conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge in paragraph No.6 to hold that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time. If that be the basis for the learned Single Judge to dismiss the writ petition, we agree with the said conclusion. 4. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to the fact that there is an amendment which has been effected in the Karnataka 1 (2020) 14 SCC 232 2 (2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, whereby sub-clauses (c) and (d) have been incorporated in Section 5 (1) of the said Act is concerned, suffice to state that the said amendments have been considered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.A.No.210/2023 dated 25.11.2024 and the conclusion drawn by the co-ordinate Bench in paragraph No.4.4 onwards is the following manner:- “4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub- clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 "(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section." 4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings. 4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (Para 22) - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner- appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:7570-DB WA No. 947 of 2023 6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as above, the judgment and award of the learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly disposed of.” 5. In view of the position of law, the present appeal being without merit is dismissed. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE MH/- List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9