IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No.600 of 2025 Decided on : 26.05.2026 Registrar Maharishi Markandeshwar Medical College. ...Appellant Versus Dinesh Kumar …Respondent. Coram Hon’ble Mr. G. S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Ms. Sneh Bhimta, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Aakash Thakur, Advocate. Bi pin Chander Negi, Judge By way of the present petition, a challenge has been laid to the judgment dated 11.12.2024 in CWP No.5947 of 2024, titled Registrar, Maharishi Markandeshwar Medical College and Hospital (MMU) Vs. Dinesh Kumar, passed by the learned Single Judge, affirming the award passed by the HP Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, Shimla, dated 19.01.2024. 2. In the case at hand, vide notification dated 22.06.2018, a Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter for the purpose of brevity 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes -2- referred as “Act”) qua the termination of service of the present respondent by the appellant was received by the H.P. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla. The reference was with respect to the legality of the aforesaid termination and the relief to which either party was entitled. 3. The respondent herein had claimed to have commenced his service career with the appellant from July 2014. As per the respondent, his oral illegal termination had happened on 08.04.2017. In the claim petition, it had been averred by the respondent that he had proceeded on leave on 18.01.2017, as he had fallen seriously ill. When he reported back on duty on 08.04.2017, he was not allowed to join his services and his services were terminated without notice, retrenchment compensation, necessary compliance of Section 25-F of the Act. Besides the aforesaid, in the claim petition, violations of Sections 25-G and 25-H were also raised. 4. In the response filed by the appellant before the Industrial Tribunal, preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, the respondent being not a workman, non- joinder of necessary party, the appellant not being an industry were raised. On merits, it was alleged that -3- respondent was an outsourced contractual employee, engaged through a contractor. Further, it was averred in the reply filed by the appellant that the respondent had been missing from duty since 18.01.2017 without any intimation or leave. Hence, there arose no occasion for termination of his service on 08.04.2017. In the rejoinder filed, contents of the claim petition were being reiterated. Based on the aforesaid pleadings, following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the termination of the petitioner w.ef. 08.04.2017 is violative of the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged? If so, what relief the petitioner is entitled to? OPP.... 2. Whether the claim is not maintainable as alleged, if so, its effects thereto? OPR… 3. Whether the petitioner is not a workman under the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged, if so, its effect thereto? OPR…. 4. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary party as alleged, if so, its effect thereto? OPR... 5. Whether the claim is not maintainable as the respondents college does not fall under the provisions of industry as defined in the Act, as alleged, if so, its effect thereto? OPR... 6. Relief. 5. Post framing of issues, evidence on behalf of both -4- the parties were led. The respondent had appeared as the sole witness in support of the contentions being raised in the claim petition and similarly one Shri Ajay Singhal, representative of the appellant, had appeared as the sole witness on behalf of the appellant. 6. On a consideration of the relevant case law, the Labour Court held the respondent to be a “Workman” in terms of Section 2(s) of the Act and the appellant was held to be an “Industry” in terms of the Act. 7. Based on the pleadings i.e. claim petition and the reply filed thereto, it is evident that the respondent had worked continuously from July 2014 till 18.1.2017. In order to establish that the respondent was not an employee of the appellant and had been engaged by a contractor, the appellant had placed on record appointment letter Exhibit RW1-B-identity card, Exhibit RW1/C and documents pertaining to the release of salary for two months (marked RX-1 and RX-2). The aforesaid evidence was correctly ignored by the Labour Court as what had been placed on record were only photocopies. The same had not been proved in accordance with law. Originals thereof had never been produced. The alleged contractor who it was contended -5- had engaged the respondent was never produced as a witness, hence there was no material on record to suggest that the respondent had been engaged by a contractor and his salary was also being paid by the said contractor. 8. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, once it was established on record that the respondent from July 2014 till 18.1.2017 had completed more than 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination, therefore compliance of Section 25-F was a mandatory imperative before terminating the services of the respondent. It is an admitted position in the case at hand that services of the respondent had not been terminated by either issuance of a notice or payment of retrenchment compensation. 9. Other than the aforesaid, the contention of the appellant before the Labour Court was that the respondent had abandoned duty. The said fact was required to be proved by the appellant. No notice had been issued by the appellant to the respondent asking him to resume duty after he left the same. For the alleged serious misconduct of absence from duty, no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the respondent. To the contrary the -6- respondent has placed on record medical certificate (Ex.PW-1/B) issued by the Medical Officer Incharge (Senior Resident, Department of Orthopaedics of the appellant), as per which he had remained under treatment from 27.02.2017 to 03.03.2017 and thereafter with effect from 03.03.2017 to 06.04.2017. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, the plea of abandonment had correctly been rejected by the Labour Court. 10. The Labour Court observed that conspicuous by absence was compliance with respect to Sections 7 and 12 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. A categorical finding was returned in this respect qua the appellant not possessing requisite registration under the aforesaid Act. Besides the aforesaid, the Labour Court returned a categorical finding to the effect that the contractor, who is stated to have engaged, the respondent did not possess a license issued by the competent authority to deploy contract labour, as no evidence in this respect had been placed on record. 11. As has already been stated supra, Ajay Kumar, the alleged contractor who is stated to have engaged the services of the respondent, was never produced as a witness -7- neither was any effort made by the present appellant to array him as a party before the Labour Court, more so when an issue in this respect had been framed. From a perusal of the issues, it is evident that onus to prove that the claim petition was bad for non-joinder lay on the appellant and the said issue was decided against the appellant. 12. Insofar as violation of Section 25-H is concerned, a categorical finding had been returned by the Labour Court in view of the admission made in the reply to the claim petition, wherein it had been admitted that the duties of the respondent had been assigned to some other employee as the post/duty in the absence of the employee (respondent) leaving the job without intimation could not be kept vacant. 13. The aforesaid findings returned have not been interfered with by the learned Single Judge while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No infirmity has been pointed out by the counsel for the appellant on account of which interference in the concurrent findings returned by the Courts below would call for interference. 14. Thus, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has not erred in any manner in -8- dismissing the writ petition and we do not find any plausible reason to take a different view. Resultantly, the Letters Patent Appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) (Bipin Chander Negi) Chief Justice Judge 26th May, 2026 (vs/Gaurav Rawat)