1 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.770 of 2025 Date of Decision : 13.11.2025 Bakshi …… Applicant Versus Kishori Lal and another …… Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Applicant : Mr. Mukul Sood, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. R.K. Bawa, Senior Advocate with Mr. Abhinav Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Arun, Advocate, vice Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate, for respondent No.2. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The present application has been filed, seeking condonation of delay 02 years, 06 months and 10 days in filing the second appeal against the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022, passed by the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. 3. The appeal, in the case at hand, was decided by the First Appellate Court on 28.07.2022. In the application filed seeking condonation of delay, it has been averred by the applicant that as advised by his counsel, he was not required to attend each and every date before 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) the First Appellate Court and further the applicant had been told by his Counsel that he would be informed of the pending appeal. As per the applicant, it is only when his son asked the applicant to append his signatures on the Vakalatnama to be filed in the Execution Petition in pursuance to the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022 that he became aware of the fact that the first appeal stood decided. Thereafter, certified copy of the judgment was applied for. On receipt of the same, a Counsel was engaged in the month of October, 2024 for filing an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court. However, on account of paucity of funds, for payment of Court Fee, the appeal could only be filed in the month of April, 2025. 4. In replies, the respondents have submitted that after dismissal of the first appeal on 28.07.2022, an Execution Petition bearing No.21 of 2023 had been filed in the Executing Court. Notices in the same were issued to the Judgment Debtor/present applicant for 03.01.2023. On the said date, the Judgment Debtor had appeared before the Executing Court. The relevant zimini order, copy of the summon and the certified copy of the Execution Petition have been placed on record. Other than the aforesaid, it has been submitted that besides the applicant, there was another Judgment Debtor, i.e., one Shri Vinay Kumar. The said Vinay Kumar had filed RSA No.318 of 2022 against the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022. In the same, the applicant had been impleaded and he had specific knowledge of the appeal being filed against the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022. RSA No.318 of 2022 filed by Vinay Kumar, 3 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) present proforma respondent had been dismissed by this Court on 14.05.2025. Just prior to the dismissal of the appeal in the month of April, 2025, the present appeal along-with an application for condonation of delay had been filed. 5. At the very outset, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP (C) No.17575 of 2023 title Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced herein below: “Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet”. 6. Other than the aforesaid it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 for the legal propositions laid therein qua law of limitation. “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in 4 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to 7 legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.” 7. Admittedly, the delay in the case at hand is of 02 years, 06 months and 10 days. The length of delay is immaterial. The condonation of delay is a discretionary power. Exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of cause shown and the degree   of its acceptability thereof. The expression “sufficient cause” is to be duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. 5 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part (Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81). 8. The Court must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer a judgment reported as Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v. Union of India and Another, 2023 (10) SCC 531. The relevant extract of the same are as under: “…...Of course, the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an ‘explanation’ from an ‘excuse’. Although people tend to see ‘explanation’ and ‘excuse’ as the same thing and 8 struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an ‘excuse’ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 6 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) 9. “Want of Diligence” or inaction can be attributed to a litigant when something is required to be done by him is not done. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer to Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao, (2009) 11 SCC 183 :- “Want of ‘diligence’ or ‘inaction’ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent.” 10. Unlike an appeal filed in the Court High Court, which post admission goes into a cold store and is subsequently listed in due course as per its seniority, in the appeal before the First Appellate Court, dates of hearing are periodically fixed and the parties or theirs counsel are expected to appear on those dates and keep track of their case. The process is known as “adjournment of hearing”. Since, in the case at hand, the applicant did not keep track of his own case before the First Appellate Court, “want of diligence”, can be attributed to the applicant. (In this respect, reference can be made to Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321. 11. In pursuance to the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022, execution proceedings had been preferred by respondent No.1. In the same, the present applicant had appeared through a Counsel on 03.01.2023. Hence, it can safely be said that on 03.01.2023, the applicant was definitely aware of the fact that the appeal had been dismissed by the First Appellate Court, on 28.07.2022. Thereafter, regularly appearance on behalf of the applicant was being put in the 7 ( 2025:HHC:38964 ) pending execution proceedings. Besides the aforesaid, RSA No.318 of 2022, laying challenge to the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2022 had been preferred by proforma respondent No.2 and the same was dismissed on 14.05.2025. 12. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances of the case, it can safely be said that the explanation offered by the present applicant seeking condonation of delay, is a lame excuse and does not qualify the parameters of “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay, in the case at hand. In view thereof, the present application, being devoid of any merit, is dismissed. 13. In view of dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the appeal also stands disposed of, so also, the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Bipin Chander Negi) November 13, 2025 (KS) Judge