IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.481/2019 Date of Decision: 19th November, 2025. Anant Ram .....Appellant Versus Devi Ram (Deceased) through LRs and Ors. …..Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant: Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. B.L. Soni, Advocate, for respondents No.1(a) to 1(c). Respondent No.2 proceeded against ex parte. Name of respondent No.3 stands deleted. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The appellant, by filing this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), has assailed the judgment and decree dated 30.07.2019, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Mandi, District Mandi, HP in Civil Appeal No.18/2004; 10/2017/2004, affirming the judgment and decree dated 24.12.2003, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Court No. 2, Mandi, Distrcit Mandi, H.P., in Civil Suit No.475/99/98. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter in this judgment, the parties shall be referred in the same manner in which they were referred before learned trial Court. The facts giving rise to the present second appeal are that the the appellant, as plaintiff, instituted a suit for declaration and 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 permanent injunction against the respondent no.1 and proforma respondents. The subject matter of the suit is the land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 269/469, Khasra No. 1200 and 1201, Kita 2, measuring 4-13-14 situated in Mauja Kummi, Hadbast No. 230, Illaqua Balh, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi, H.P. This suit land is recorded in the joint ownership of the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff's case is that the suit land was previously owned by Sh. Chura and Sh. Mansa, sons of Sh. Nag, who agreed to sell it to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 6000/-. An earnest money of Rs. 5000/- was paid at the time of the agreement, with the balance of Rs. 1000/- to be paid upon registration of the sale deed. 3. A written agreement to this effect was executed on 30.9.1980, and possession of the entire suit land was allegedly handed over to the plaintiff on the same date, since when he claims to be in continuous possession. It is averred that Sh. Mansa Ram executed a sale deed for his share in favour of the plaintiff as per the agreement, but Sh. Chura resiled from the agreement and sold his share to the defendant, Devi Ram, vide a sale deed dated 15.6.1981. The plaintiff contends that the defendant, being a resident of the same village and the suit land being near his house, had full knowledge of the plaintiff's possession and the prior agreement. The sale deed in favour of the defendant is characterized as a mere paper transaction, with the defendant never having taken possession. 3 4. Upon learning of the sale to the defendant, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance against Chura and Devi Ram, which was decided on 20.5.1987. The suit was dismissed on the technical ground of the plaintiff's failure to plead readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, although all other issues were decided in the plaintiff's favour. The plaintiff further avers that based on the revenue entry arising from the sale deed in favour of the defendant, partition proceedings were initiated before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, who ordered partition on 17.4.1993. 5. The plaintiff filed an appeal against this order before the Sub-Divisional Collector, who stayed further proceedings, including delivery of possession, on 20.10.1994, and this appeal remains pending. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant attempted to take forcible possession on 5.9.1998. The foundation of the present suit is the plaintiff's claim that his continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession since 30.9.1980 is hostile to the knowledge of the defendant and his predecessors, and has matured into title by way of adverse possession, warranting a declaration and injunction. 6. The defendant no.1 resisted the suit by raising preliminary objections of res judicata, estoppel, and limitation, and contended that the suit was filed to prolong the partition proceedings. On merits, the defendant denied that Chura had 4 agreed to sell the land to the plaintiff, though he admitted the plaintiff's purchase of Mansa Ram's share. The defendant asserted that he has been in possession of his purchased share since the execution of the sale deed and that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the plaintiff's alleged agreement. The defendant specifically denied that the plaintiff was put in possession or that he has acquired title by adverse possession. The defendant also highlighted that the judgment in the specific performance suit was affirmed by the District Judge and the High Court. 7. The plaintiff filed a replication, reiterating the plaint's averments and denying the defendant's contentions. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the ld. trial court on 10.5.2010 as follows:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is liable to be declared as owner in possession of the ½ share of the suit land recorded in the name of the defendant no.1 by way of adverse possession as alleged? OPP 2. Whether revenue entries qua the suit land in the name of the defendant is liable to be declared null and void as alleged? OPP 3. whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP 4. Whether the suit is barred by principle of res judicata? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to institute the present suit? OPD 6. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD 7. Relief. 8. The plaintiff’s suit for declaration and injunction was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 24.12.2003. His first appeal was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court on 5 16.07.2007. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiff filed a Regular Second Appeal before this Court. 9. This Court, vide judgment and order dated 06.01.2017, admitted the appeal and subsequently remanded the matter to the First Appellate Court with a specific direction. This Court held that the courts below had failed to appreciate the binding finding on possession in Ex.PW2/B. The operative direction was to re-examine the plaintiff’s prayer for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction in the light of the judgment Ex.PW2/B, which conclusively established the plaintiff’s possession. 10. Pursuant to the remand, the learned First Appellate Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 30.07.2019, once again dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff, feeling aggrieved by the said judgment which he contends is in contravention of this Court's remand order, has approached this Court by way of the instant Regular Second Appeal. 11. Although the present Regular Appeal was admitted by order dated 09.11.2023 on the substantial questions of law No. 1 to 5. only Substantial Question of Law No. 3 has been pressed. The same is set out hereinbelow for the sake of clarity and ready reference:- “When in the opinion of Lower Appellate Court defendant-respondent was entitled to lead additional evidence, was not it incumbent for Lower Appellate Court to have afforded due and adequate opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence to such additional evidence 6 and denial whereof has resulted in grave prejudice to plaintiff-appellant resulting in miscarriage of justice and being opposed to principles of natural justice vitiating the impugned judgment and decree?” 12. Heard Counsels for the parties and perused the impugned judgements. 13. In the present Case, the learned First Appellate Court committed a grave procedural illegality that strikes at the very root of the principles of natural justice and fair trial. The court allowed the application filed by the respondent under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC, thereby taking on record additional documentary evidence pertaining to the partition proceedings. However, it proceeded to rely upon these documents to non-suit the appellant without affording him any opportunity whatsoever to rebut, challenge, or lead evidence in contradiction to the contents and legal implications of these documents. 14. The law on this point is sacrosanct and well-settled. In the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Billa Jagan Mohan Reddy vs Billa Sanjeeva Reddy (1994) 4 SCC 659. The relevant extract whereof has been reproduced herein under: “It is settled law that, if the documents are found to be relevant to decide the real issue in the controversy, and when the court felt that interest of justice requires that the documents may be received, exercising the power under Order 4 1, Rule 27 CPC the appellate court would receive the documents and consider their effect thereof. When such is the position, when the 7 documents are sought to be produced in the trial court, before the arguments are completed, normally they may be received; an opportunity given to prove them and rebuttal if any and their relevance and effect they may have, be considered in deciding the issues arising in the controversy. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not justified in refusing to condone the delay and to receive the documents.” 15. In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 2403, it has been held: “The Karnataka High Court had, however, not complied with provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. which require that an Appellate Courts should be satisfied that the additional evidence is required to enable them either to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It had recorded no reasons to show that it had considered the requirements of Rule 27, Order 41, of the C.P.C. we are of opinion that, the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it, an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence. 31. The result is that we allow these appeals and set aside the Judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court and direct it to decide the cases afresh on evidence on record, so as to determine the market value of the land acquired on the date of the notification under Section 16 of the Bangalore Act. It will also decide the question, after affording parties opportunities to lead necessary evidence, whether the judgment, sought to be offered as additional evidence, could be admitted.“ 8 16. This principle has been emphatically reiterated and applied by this Court. In Neelam Rai vs. Surjit Kumar & Ors. (AIR 2011 HP 39), it was held that the right to lead evidence is a reciprocal right. If one party is permitted to lead additional evidence, the opposite party must, as a corollary, be granted a right to lead rebuttal evidence. Denying this right creates an imbalance and prejudices the case of the party against whom such evidence is taken on record. 17. The procedural flaw committed by the learned First Appellate Court is further illuminated by the judgment of this Court in Badi Ram Vs. R.S. Company (AIR 2002 HP 150). Relevant extract whereof is reproduced herein below:- “19. In view of the ratio of the above cited Judgments of the Supreme Court, we have no hesitation to hold that even if the Court finds that it is able to pronounce the judgment on the basis of evidence on record, it may permit the additional evidence to fill in some inherent lacuna or apparent defect so that it may pronounce the Judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Applying this ratio to the facts of the present case, the inherent lacuna or defect was that the plaintiff failed to place on record the certificate of its registration with the Registrar of Firms. It was specifically averred in the plaint that plaintiff is a registered firm known as M/s. R. S. Company, Jeory, but this fact was not specifically denied In the written statement. While preferring preliminary objection that the suit was not maintainable In the present form. It was not stated that the plaintiff firm was not a registered firm. Even the statement of Surender Pal, 9 PW1, one of the partners of the plaintiff firm that it was registered, was not rebutted by adducing evidence by the defendant, despite several opportunities granted to him. The certified copy of the registration certificate filed along with application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC prima facie shows that the firm was registered as far back as on 24-11-1960. 20. In these facts and circumstances on record, the District Judge has rightly allowed the application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence in respect of its registration. But the District Judge was not right in straightaway admitting the document in evidence. He was also not right in not affording any opportunity to the defendant to give evidence in rebuttal. The proper course for him was to allow the application and set-aside the findings of the trial Court on issues Nos. 1 and 3 and thereafter remand the case to the trial Court for decision afresh after giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to adduce evidence in respect of its registration with the Registrar of Firms and to give further opportunity to the defendant in rebuttal. Since the trial Court had not decided the other issues, on merits, the remand was required to be made under Order 41, Rule 23, CPC.” 18. The principles enunciated in Badi Ram regarding the right to rebuttal are inviolable, the mode of implementation must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. Where the matter is already before the First Appellate Court in a limited remand, and the only requirement is to provide an opportunity for rebuttal of additional evidence, it would be 10 procedurally inefficient and contrary to the interests of justice to relegate the parties back to the trial court. 19. For all the reasons herein above, the impugned judgment and decree is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the matter is remanded back to the learned First Appellate Court with the following specific directions:- “(i) The court shall afford the appellant a full and effective opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence, both oral and documentary, specifically addressing the additional evidence (partition proceedings documents) that was taken on record under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. (ii) After providing such opportunity and considering the rebuttal evidence, if any, the court shall proceed to decide the appeal afresh, strictly in accordance with the limited scope outlined in this Court's remand order dated 06.01.2017, focusing particularly on the binding nature of the finding in Ex.PW2/B regarding the appellant's possession.” 20. In view of the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, the present appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. The parties are directed to appear before the learned First Appellate Court on 18.12.2025. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 19th November, 2025 (Gaurav Rawat/TB)