2025:CGHC:7626 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1168 of 2019 Bhuneshwar Dhruw S/o Ramsingh Dhruw Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Murmura, Police Station Panduka, District Gariyaband Chhattisgarh ----Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Of Police Station Magarlod, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent (Cause title is taken from the CIS) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant : Shri Govind Dewangan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Atanu Ghosh, Dy GA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 12.02.2025 1. Present appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment dated 22.06.2019, passed by the learned Special Judge, FTC (POCSO), Dhamtari, District-Dhamtari (CG) in Special Criminal Case No.141 of 2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of the IPC RI for one year with fine of Rs.200/-, in default of payment of fine, additional SI for one Cra 1168 of 2019 2 month Under Section 366 of the IPC RI for 3 years with fine of Rs.300/-, in default of payment of fine, further SI for 3 months Under Section 376(2) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 RI for 10 years with fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of fine, additional SI for 6 months. (All the sentences are directed to run concurrently) 2. Brief facts of the case are that, PW11, father of the victim lodged a missing report, Ex.P33 on 11.11.2018, alleging in it that his minor daughter is missing since 02.11.2018, and her whereabouts could not be traced out despite her search in nearby places, and at his relatives’ house. On the basis of his written complaint, FIR Ex.P34 has been registered against un-known persons for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC. During the investigation, the victim was recovered on 11.11.2018 from the house of appellant, and recovery Panchnama Ex.P6 was prepared in presence of the witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to the Community Health Centre, Magarlod, where PW4 Dr Sharada Thakur has medically examined the victim and gave her report Ex.P15. No external injuries have been found on the body of victim, and the doctor has opined that hymen was ruptured but she opined that she cannot give definite opinion about the rape is done or not. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared and handed over to the Police for their FSL examination. With respect to age and date of birth of the victim, the Police has seized the School Register Ex.P3C from Cra 1168 of 2019 3 the Government Primary School, Kardichoti vide seizure memo Ex.P3C, original register Ex.P3 was returned back to the School. The underwear of the victim has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.P7, Spot map Ex.P10 was prepared by the patwari, and Ex.P20 was prepared by the Police. The appellant was arrested on 11.11.2018, and he too was sent for his medical examination to the Community Health Centre, Magarlod, where he was medically examined by PW5, Dr Keerti Kumar Singh, who gave his report vide Ex.P15, and found that the appellant is able to perform sexual intercourse. The vaginal swabs and underwear of the victim, as well as of the appellant have been sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, from where Ex.P31 FSL report was received, according to which, no semen and sperm was found on the sent articles. Statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of the CrPC, statement of the victim under Section 164 of the CrPC have been recorded and after completion of investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 3. Learned trial court has framed charges against the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC, and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Appellant abjured his guilt and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish the charges against the appellant, prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 of the CrPC of the appellant has been recorded in which he denied the Cra 1168 of 2019 4 material appearing against him, pleaded innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 5. After appreciation of oral, as well as documentary evidence on record, trial Court has passed the order of conviction and sentenced as mentioned in earlier part of this judgment. Hence the appeal by the appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which cannot be made basis to convict the appellant in the offence in question. There is no cogent and clinching evidence with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim that on the date of incident she was minor and less than 18 years of age. The School record produced by the prosecution has not been proved in accordance with law, and its author has not been examined, and the basis on which the entries have been made in it have also not been produced by the prosecution. There is no Kotwar Register, Birth Certificate, or Ossification Test Report, produced by the prosecution, to prove age of the victim. Therefore, in absence of any cogent, and clinching evidence, it cannot be held that the victim was minor on the date of incident. He would further submit that the victim being a major girl, having love affair with the appellant, she herself eloped with him, and resided for a considerable period with him, without raising any objection, and without Cra 1168 of 2019 5 any protest. There is no sign of any struggle on her body, and she engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant. Since the conduct of the victim itself is suspicious, and it appears from the evidence that she was a consensual party in making physical relation with the appellant, no offence of either kidnapping, or rape which made out against the appellant, and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned State counsel would oppose learned counsel for the appellant, and would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt but for minor omissions, and contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses are fully reliable, which can be made basis to convict the appellant for the offence in question. The School register has been proved by PW1, who is the In- charge Head master of the School, and from the School Register, the victim is found to be minor on the date of incident. She was not competent to give her opinion yet the appellant took her with him, and made physical relation with her. Even though there is no injury found on the body of the victim, that itself is not sufficient to hold that the prosecution case is doubtful, because in every case, the injury may not have been found on the body of the victim, and it depends upon the facts of each case. From the evidence of victim, the guilty of the appellant has been proved which does not require any corroboration by any other evidence, and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant for the alleged and it is liable to be dismissed. Cra 1168 of 2019 6 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. The 1st question arises in the case is, whether the victim was minor, and below the age of 18 years on the date of incident or not. With respect to age of the victim, prosecution has mainly relied upon the School Admission and Discharge Register Ex.P3C, obtained from the Government Primary School, Kareli Chhoti, Block-Magarlod, District- Dhamtari, which is sought to be proved by PW1-Devendra Kumar Sahu, In-charge Head Master of the School. He stated in his evidence that the Police has seized the School Register vide seizure memo Ex.P2, and after retaining the attested true copy, the original Register Ex.P3 was returned back to the School. According the School Register, the date of birth of the victim is 31.12.2000. 10. In cross-examination, he stated that at the time of admission of the victim in the School, he was posted as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in the said school. At the time of admission of the victim, the entries in the School Register have not been made by him but they were made by the then Head Master of the School. He could not tell as to whether any certificate with respect to the date of birth of the victim has been produced in the school, or not at the time of her admission in the school. He also cannot say as to whether her parents have got recorded her date of birth by reducing the actual age. Cra 1168 of 2019 7 11. From evidence of the above witness, it is quite vivid that he is not the author of the School Register, and who made the entries in the Register is not there. 12. The admissibility of School Register is dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judicial pronouncements, and held that in absence of any material on which date of birth of a person recorded in the School Register, the same is not admissible, particularly in view of the fact that author of the same has not been examined. 13. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs State of UP and Others reported in 2006 (5) SCC 584 Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the following in Para 26: In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [(1988 Supp. SCC 604], this Court held: “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded." (emphasis supplied) 14. In case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, the Hon'ble Supreme Cra 1168 of 2019 8 Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 15. In paragraphs 40, and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded......... 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for Cra 1168 of 2019 9 obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the victim although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 16. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. Cra 1168 of 2019 10 XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a) (i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. Cra 1168 of 2019 11 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 17. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : Cra 1168 of 2019 12 “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of Cra 1168 of 2019 13 physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. Cra 1168 of 2019 14 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 18. The victim, PW7 has stated that her date of birth is 31.12.2000. In cross-examination, she stated that her parents have not got prepared her birth certificate, and even her birth has not been registered anywhere. 19. PW11, father of the victim has stated in his evidence that date of birth of his daughter is 31.12.2000 but in cross-examination he stated that he could not remember his own date of birth. He also did not know the date of his marriage. The victim is his youngest daughter. She did not know as to after how many years of his marriage the victim has born. Birth of the victim has got registered at Gram Panchayat. He had given the birth register certificate to the Police with respect to the date of birth of the victim. He denied the suggestion that at the time of admission of victim in the school he has not produced the birth certificate. He further denied that at the time of recording of her Police statement, he disclosed date of birth of the victim as 01.12.2000. 20. PW6, mother of the victim stated in her evidence that her daughter is presently aged about 18 years. In cross-examination, she stated that she did not know as to when she got married, and she did not know about the date of birth of her children. She further stated that the School Cra 1168 of 2019 15 teachers were used to come to the house and get their names of their children recorded and by that process, their children have got admitted in the school. Her daughter also got admitted in the school by the same process. She also admitted that the date of birth of the victim has been recorded in the School Register by the teacher on their own. She has not got recorded the birth of the victim in the Gram Panchayat or in Kotwari Register, and the date of birth of her daughter has been recorded in the School Register on assumption. 21. From all these evidences with respect to date of birth and age of the victim, there is no cogent, and clinching evidence which corroborates the fact that the victim was minor, below 18 years of age on the date of incident. 22. In view of evidence of PW6, mother of the victim, and PW11, father of the victim, as also the School record Ex.P3C, it would not be safe for this Court as to hold that the prosecution has proved the fact that the victim was minor, and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. Yet, the learned trial Court has held her minor. 23. So far as the offence of kidnapping, and rape are concerned, I again examined the evidence available on record. 24. PW7, the victim has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant. On the last year when she had gone to a marriage function at village Dhursa, she has been introduced to the appellant, and after the Cra 1168 of 2019 16 marriage function, she returned back to her house. Thereafter, the appellant came to her house to take her with him. The appellant took her to his village Murmura, and made physical relation with her. When she protested, he gave threatening to her. When she requested to leave her at her parents’ house, he assured her that he will marry her. When the appellant had gone to his work, his parents left the victim at her parents’ house at village Choti Kareli, and she stayed with her parents for one night, and on the next day, appellant again took her to his house at village Murmura. She made a complaint to the parents of the appellant, and asked them to send her back to her parents’ house but they assured that they will keep the victim as their daughter-in-law. Appellant kept the victim for three days at his house and made physical relation with her, and thereafter, Police persons came there, and took away the victim with them . In cross-examination, she stated that she disclosed the threatening given by the appellant in the Police statement Ex.D1, and if it is not there, she could not tell the reason. After the statement that when the parents of the appellant left her to her parents house, and after one day, appellant again took her with him; if it is not there in her Police statement Ex.D1, she could not tell the reason. She admitted that after convening the village meeting, the parents of the appellant left her at her parents’ house but she denied that on the next day she again had gone to the house of the appellant on her own will. She voluntarily stated that the appellant took her with him. She further admitted that when father of the appellant Cra 1168 of 2019 17 made telephonic call to her father, he requested him to send her back. She also admitted that father of the appellant had asked her father to take her back. She further admitted in her evidence that while making physical relation with the appellant, she had not given any nail scratch mark or made any assault upon the appellant. 25. From the evidence of the victim it appears that the appellant had taken the victim with him which was well within the knowledge of the parents of both the parties, there was conversation between them with respect to keeping the victim as their daughter-in-law. A village meeting was also convened. 26. From the 161 CrPC statement of the victim Ex D1, it appears that when the victim met the appellant in a marriage function at village Dhursa, they exchanged their mobile numbers, and used to talk with each other regularly. The appellant proposed her that he is loving her, and wanted to marry with her. When the appellant called her, she, without informing her family members, had gone with the appellant. Both of them had gone to village Panduka by bus from where they had gone to Lahar and ultimately had gone to the appellant’s village Murmura by walking. The appellant kept her with him up to 11.11.2018, and thereafter, Police persons came there. 27. From the 164 CrPC statement of the victim Ex D2, it reveals that after marriage function of village Dhursa, they used to talk with each other by mobile phone, and on 01.11.2018, she herself had gone to the Cra 1168 of 2019 18 house of appellant at village Murmura but the members of his family left her back at her house. She again had gone to village Murmura on 02.11.2018, and stayed there for about three days, and when father of the appellant made a telephonic call to her father for taking her back, then, her father stated that he has already made Police report, and thereafter, they fled away from the house and went to jungle. She made physical relation with the appellant on her own will from 02.11.2018. She confessed her guilt and stated that she herself has taken the appellant with her, and it is the appellant, who was not interested to go with her. 28. From these two pieces of evidence Ex.D1 and D2, and from her deposition before the Court, there is material discrepancies, and contradictions in the evidence and in view of that, she cannot be put into the sterling witness as required for holding conviction of the appellant in the offence in question. 29. PW6 mother of the victim and PW11 father of the victim are the witnesses to the effect that when they could not find the victim in their house, they lodged her missing report. PW6 mother of the victim stated that after about 7 days, when the victim came back to their house, she disclosed the incident. She also stated that her daughter has not disclosed any incident to her. She admitted that after the village meeting, her daughter was sent back to her house. Thereafter, she again went to the house of the appellant. The same statement was made by PW11, father of the victim. Cra 1168 of 2019 19 30. PW4, Dr Sharda Thakur, who medically examined the victim has not found any external injuries on her body. It is also not the case of the victim that she protested or tried to come out from the clutches of the appellant when he tried to make physical relation with her. There is no sign of any struggle found on her body. From all these evidences, and further looking to the conduct of the victim, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case of kidnapping and rape committed upon the victim beyond reasonable doubt. 31. As the fall out of aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent, clinching and corroborative evidence against the appellant to convict him in the alleged offence. 32. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of her evidence, then it will not be safe to rely upon the said version of the victim. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. In the case at hand, the prosecution has not succeeded to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. Cra 1168 of 2019 20 33. For the foregoing discussion, appeal is allowed. Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.06.2019 is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 12.11.2018, and he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 34. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one reliable surety in the like amount before the Court con[cerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 35. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) JUDGE padma