1 2025:CGHC:29307-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1210 of 2018 1 - Kamal Nayaran Deshmukh S/o Lal Singh Deshmukh Aged About 24 Years R/o B. R. P. Colony, Maroda, House No. 268, Near Bajrang Bali Mandir, Police Station Newai, District Durg Chhattisgarh, ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Anda District Durg Chhattisgarh, ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri Sushil Dubey, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Shri RS Marhas, Additional Advocate General with Shri Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal & Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, JJ Judgment on Board (01/07/2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. This Criminal Appeal preferred by the accused/appellant under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 30.6.2018 passed by the KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Date: 2025.07.03 12:35:49 +0530 2 1st Additional Judge to the Court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg in ST No.41/2017 by which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of the IPC RI for life with a fine of Rs.100/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for 6 months Under Section 201 of the IPC RI for 3 years with a fine of Rs.100/-in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for one month. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 28.7.2016 at village Kuthrel, PS Anda, District Durg, the appellant has forcibly strangulated the deceased namely, Sahodra Bai and caused her death, and in order to screen himself from the offence, the appellant has dismembered the body parts of the deceased and thereby committed the offence. 3. Further case of the prosecution is that on 30.7.2016, husband of the deceased namely, Shriram (PW-2) has lodged a missing report (Ex.- P/7) at Police Station Newai stating that his wife is missing from 27.7.2016. On the same day i.e. 30.7.2016, Sheetal Das (PW-7) has lodged a report that a female trunk was found near Bhutra Tank at village Kuthrel. A merg was lodged at Police Station Anda, District Durg and on the basis of merg report, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.-P/76) was registered. The FIR was registered by (PW-27) NS Tripathi vide Ex.-P/154. Thereafter on the same day i.e. 30.7.2016, inquest (Ex.- 3 P/10) was prepared. On 31.7.2016, at about 8.00 hours recovery Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.-P/45, pursuant to which one right leg which was cut from thigh with silver anklet, one white coloured plastic bag etc. were recovered, which was proved by Nihal Singh (PW-9). On the same day i.e. 31.7.2016 at about 8.10 hours another recovery Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.-P/46 pursuant to which one plastic white coloured bag was found which contained left leg which was cut from thigh with silver anklet. Immediately thereafter on the same day i.e. 31.7.2016 at about 8.15 hours, recovery Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.-P/44 pursuant to which one female head, left hand which was cut from shoulder having ‘Mauli’ thread and artificial bangles, one nose ring, a Sari having green and yellow stripes, two empty bottles of Goa brand (one without lid), one black underwear etc. were recovered, vide seizure memo Ex.- P/47 which was proved by (PW-9) Nihal Singh. Vide seizure memo the aforesaid recovery was effected from the place of the incident i.e. village Bhanpuri, Konari Khar, near culvert. 4. Inquest of head, both legs and hands was conducted vide Ex.-P/42. The dismembered parts of the trunk of the body were sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi (PW-22) and he gave his report Ex.-P/61 opining that the dead body is in moderate stage of decomposition, evidence of neck compression is present and the body is in decapitate state which is 4 postmortem in nature. Age of the deceased is opined to be 40 ± 5 years. Head, neck and nose of the dismembered body were subjected to postmortem examination which was done by the same doctor vide Ex.-P/62. 5. The dead body of the deceased (including other parts of the body) was cremated. Thereafter on 1.8.2016, dead body identification Panchnama was prepared vide Ex.-P/3 which was identified by PW- 1 & PW-2 husband of the deceased, on the basis of bangles, anklet, sari and underwear. On the memorandum statement of the appellant, knife and one petticoat were recovered. The seized articles were sent to the FSL for examination and as per the FSL report, blood was found on Petticoat and blanket. 6. Call details of the mobile of the deceased and the appellant were seized vide Ex.-P/70 to Ex.-P/72. Fibula bone, clavical bone and teeth were sent to the FSL, Raipur for DNA test and vide DNA report (Ex.-P/100), it was reported that the said Fibula bone, clavical bone and teeth are of same person. 7. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 29 witnesses and exhibited 154 documents. 8. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above against which this Appeal has been preferred by the appellant. 5 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 302 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The incriminating circumstances relied upon by the trial Court are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 10. Per contra, learned State Counsel would support the impugned judgment of conviction and submit that the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 & 201 of the IPC. The appellant is not entitled for acquittal and the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and have gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 12. The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative relying on the postmortem report of Ex.-P/61 & 62 which is proved by (PW-22) Dr. Shivnarayan Manjhi, and we do not find any illegality in the said finding, as the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. 13. Now the next question would be whether the accused/appellant herein is the author of the crime in question. 6 14. In the present case, there is no direct evidence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles which constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra1 which must be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence and held in para-152 as under:- “152.A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : (AIR 1973 SC 2622) where the following observations were made: “certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 7 (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 15. In the present case, the trial Court has relied upon the following circumstances against the appellant for basing conviction:- (i) Motive of the offence. (ii) the dead body of the deceased was identified by PW- 1 & 2 on the basis of Sari, bangles, anklet & footwear. (iii) As per DNA report vide Ex.-P/100, the parts of the body were found to be of same person. (iv) Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, knife, petticoat etc, have been seized, however, the blood was found on Petticoat and Blanket (Articles J & N). (v) Call details of the appellant and the deceased have been proved by (PW-25) Sanjay Kumar Sahu which were found to be sharing same location at the time of offence. 16. We shall consider the aforesaid incriminating circumstances found proved by the trial Court one by one to find out whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellants for the offence under Section 302 & 201 of the IPC. Motive of offence 8 17. In order to prove the motive, statements of PW-1, PW-2 & PW-4 have been brought on record. However, on careful perusal of the statement of PW-1, it appears that she has turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. However, when the leading question was put to this witness, PW-1 has stated that her mother and the appellant had love relations (izse laca/k). PW-2 i.e. the husband of the deceased has also turned hostile. The prosecution has put leading questions in para-2 & 3 that his wife and the appellant had illicit relations, which was admitted by this witness. However, in para-4, he has refuted that the accused/appellant proclaims that he has relations with his wife. PW-4 has also turned hostile. From the above evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has not been able to clearly establish the motive of the offence. 18. As regards the second circumstance, it is the case of the prosecution that the dead body of the deceased was dismembered by the appellant. However, the dead body of the deceased was identified by PW-1 & PW-2 vide Ex.-P/3. Careful perusal of Ex.-P/3 shows that the aforesaid proceeding was not conducted by the Executive Magistrate in accordance with Section 9 of the Evidence Act and it was conducted by the Police Officer. PW-1 & PW-2 could not identify the dead body by seeing the photographs of the deceased, but the deceased was identified by bangles, anklet, Sari, towel 9 (Gamcha) and underwear. So far as clothes and jewellery are concerned, the same are not of a special quality and are available in the local market. Therefore, on the basis of identification that too after the body was cremated, it cannot be said that the body was rightly identified. Furthermore, the anklet which was identified by PW-1 & PW-2 was not similar article at the time of identification and as such, the identification of anklet by PW-1 & PW-2 is clearly doubtful. As such, merely on the basis of aforesaid Articles, it cannot be said that the dead body is proved to be of the deceased. {See : Ashish Batham Vs. State of MP, (2002) 7 SCC 317 & Pawan Kumar Vs. State of Haryana (2003) 11 SCC 241}. DNA Profiling 19. Fibula bone, clavical bone and teeth were subjected to DNA examination and vide DNA report (Ex.-P/100), the said fibula bone, clavical bone and teeth were of the same person, but no DNA test was conducted to establish that the same were of the deceased. 20. In the matter of Rama Nand and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh2, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in no uncertain terms that discovery of the dead body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Their Lordships further held that the ‘body’ doctrine is merely a rule of caution and not of law. It has also been held that where the dead 2 (1981) 1 SCC 511 10 body of the victim in a murder is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. But where the fact of corpus delicti or homicidal death is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, or by both, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Their Lordships observed as under:- “28. This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Or- dinarily, the recovery of the dead body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is suf- ficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English law, the find- ing of the body of the deceased was held to be essen- tial before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. “I would never convict,” said Sir Mathew Hale, “a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead.” This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when exe- cution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Dis- covery of the dead body of the victim bearing physi- cal evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in mur- der. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old “body” doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous mur- derer to escape with impunity simply because they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Sir Hale’s 11 enunciation has to be interpreted no more than em- phasising that where the dead body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfac- tory proof of the homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eyewitness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti i.e. ‘homicidal death’ is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and defini- tive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and abso- lute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be “proved”, if the court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probabil- ity, the victim has been murdered by the accused con- cerned. …” 21. The principle of law laid down in Rama Nand (supra) has been reiterated and followed by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramjee Rai and others v. State of Bihar3 and similar proposition has been made in the matter of Rishi Pal v. State of Uttarakhand4 following Rama Nand (supra) and it has been held that absence of corpus delicti is insignificant if cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of victim is adduced. The decision of the Supreme 3 (2006) 13 SCC 229 4 2013 Cri.L.J. 1534 12 Court in Rama Nand (supra) has further been followed in the matter of Sanjay Rajak v. State of Bihar5. 22. However, in S. Kaleeswaran Vs. State by the Inspector of Police Pollachi Town East Police Station, Coimbatore District, Tamilnadu6, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made exception to the rule of corpus delicti that if the entire chain is duly proved by cogent evidence, the conviction could be recorded even if the corpus is not found, but when as per the case of the prosecution, the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else, and it was held as under: - “14. … but when as per the case of the prosecution, the dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.” 23. At this stage, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that identification of the deceased made by bangles, Sari etc. is not in accordance with law and in order to identify the body of the deceased, DNA test ought to have been conducted by the prosecution and failure to conduct DNA test will vitiate the 5 (2019) 12 SCC 552 6 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1511 13 conviction recorded and sentences awarded to the appellant herein, has to be noted for consideration. 24. In the matter of Rambraksh alias Jalim v. State of Chhattisgarh7, the Supreme Court has held that the investigating officer did not take any attempt to conduct DNA analysis of bones to prove that the skeleton seized was that of Ramsevak and their Lordships have held that the prosecution has failed to prove the death of Ramsevak either homicidal or otherwise. 25. Similarly, in the matter of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra8, their Lordships of the Supreme Court referring to Sections 53-A and 164-A of the CrPC, held that DNA profiling has now become a part of the statutory scheme and for the prosecution to decline to produce DNA evidence would be a little unfortunate particularly when the facility of DNA profiling is available in the country, and observed in paragraphs 54, 55 & 56 as under: - “54. For the prosecution to decline to produce DNA evidence would be a little unfortunate particularly when the facility of DNA profiling is available in the country. The prosecution would be well advised to take advantage of this, particularly in view of the provisions of Section 53-A and Section 164-A of the CrPC. We are not going to the extent of suggesting that if there is no DNA profiling, the prosecution case cannot be proved but we are certainly of the view that where DNA profiling has not been done or it is held back from the trial court, an adverse consequence would follow for the prosecution. 7 (2016) 12 SCC 251 8 (2019) 12 SCC 460 14 55. In Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi)9 a separate opinion was delivered by Banumathi, J. and in para 455 of the Report it was held that DNA profiling is an extremely accurate way of comparing specimens and such testing can make a virtually positive identification. It was stated: “455.… DNA profiling is an extremely accurate way to compare a suspect’s DNA with crime scene specimens, victim’s DNA on the bloodstained clothes of the accused or other articles recovered, DNA testing can make a virtually positive identification when the two samples match. A DNA fingerprint is identical for every part of the body, whether it is the blood, saliva, brain, kidney or foot or any part of the body. It cannot be changed; it will be identical no matter what is done to a body. Even relatively minute quantities of blood, saliva or semen at a crime scene or on clothes can yield sufficient material for analysis. The experts opine that the identification is almost hundred per cent precise. Using this i.e. chemical structure of genetic information by generating DNA profile of the individual, identification of an individual is done like in the traditional method of identifying finger prints of offenders.” (emphasis supplied) 56. In the context of importance of scientific and technological advances having been made, we may recall the observation of this Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka10 in para 220 of the Report that “The matching of DNA samples is emerging as a vital tool for linking suspects to specific criminal acts.” 26. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pattu Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu11 has held that though a DNA test helps the courts immensely 9 (2017) 6 SCC 10 (2010) 7 SCC 263 11 (2019) 4 SCC 771 15 in determining reliability of identification of body of deceased, but rejected the contention that non-conducting of a DNA test and reliance on evidence regarding identification through superimposition is improper. It has been observed in paragraph 57 of the report as under: - “57. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the scientific evidence of PW 34 was rightly believed by the trial court as well as by the High Court, and strengthens the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 regarding the identification of the body. Though a DNA test would have helped the courts immensely in determining the reliability of the identification of the body of the deceased, in the presence of other reliable evidence on record in favour of the prosecution version on this aspect, we reject the contention that the non-conducting of a DNA test and the reliance on evidence regarding identification through superimposition is improper. This is all the more true since no material is forthcoming to the effect that the parents of the deceased were alive during the relevant period, so as to conduct comparative DNA tests.” 27. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of aforesaid parameters laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, it is quite vivid that though the skeleton of the deceased was seized, but, for want of DNA profile, the prosecution could not prove that the skeleton was that of the deceased Sahodra, as it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else. 16 28. As regards the fourth circumstance which has been found proved that pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant knife, blanket and petticoat etc were seized, but in the absence of blood grouping to establish that the blood found on the articles seized was same to that of the deceased, it is very difficult to connect the appellant with the crime in question, in the light of decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another12. 29. Lastly, the call details of the appellant and the deceased have been found to be proved by Sanjay Kumar Sahu (PW-25), who was posted as In-charge, Cyber Cell. However, no mandatory certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act has been brought on record, which was condition precedent in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal13 in which their Lordships resolving the dispute and the conflict raised in the matters of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh14 and Anvar P.V. Versus P.K. Basheer15 have clearly held that production of certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is mandatory only in case of secondary evidence where primary evidence is not laid or original is not produced. Their Lordships further held that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a 12 (2019) 7 SCC 781 13 (2020) 7 SCC 1 14 (2018) 2 SCC 801 15 (2014) 10 SCC 473 17 condition precedent to the admissibility of secondary evidence by way of electronic evidence as laid down in Anvar P.V. (supra) and incorrectly clarified in Shafhi Mohammad (supra). It was held as under: - “61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in Taylor v. Taylor16, which has been followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65- B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65- B(4) otiose.” Their Lordships also held that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced and this can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and / or operated by him. The reference was answered in paragraphs 73.1., 73.2. and 73.3. as under: - “73.1. Anvar P.V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno17, being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in 16 (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 17 (2015) 7 SCC 178: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 54 18 Shafhi Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 3-4-2018 reported as Shafhi Mohd. v. State of H.P.18, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled. 73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in para 24 in Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “… if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act …” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, …”. With this clarification, the law stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited. 73.3. The general directions issued in para 64 (supra) shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67-C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers.” 30. In the matter of Ravinder Singh @ Kaku Vs. State of Punjab19, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while following the decision of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (Supra) have held that oral evidence 18 (2018) 5 SCC 311 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 704 19 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 461 19 in place of certificate cannot be possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law. Their Lordships held that Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of law and observed as under:- “21. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible in the court of law. As rightly stated above, oral evidence in the place of such certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law.” 31. Returning to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) and Ravinder Singh @ Kaku (supra), though the call details of the appellant and the deceased were found proved by Sanjay Kumar Sahu (PW-25) vide Ex.-P/70, P/71 & P/72, but in view of the fact that Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is a mandatory requirement of law, in absence of certificate under the aforesaid provision, call details cannot be said to be proved. 32. 32. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the call details are of no use to the prosecution. 33. On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is established in the light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra) and, 20 therefore, the appellant is entitled for acquittal by extending him benefit of doubt. 34. In the result, the Appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under Section 302 & 201 of the IPC are set aside by giving him benefit of doubt and he is acquitted of the said charges. The appellant is in jail since 4.8.2016. He be released forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case. 35. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Judge Barve