Page No.# 1/12 GAHC030008022025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Arb.A./3/2025 M/s GSR Ventures Private Limited Through its authorized signatory K. Mohammed Rafi, S/o K.C. Imam Saheb, R/o Mallapur, Telengana VERSUS The State of Mizoram and 5 Ors. Represented by the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Mizoram, Public Works Department, Upper Khatla, Aizawl 2:The Engineer-in-Chief 3:The Chief Executive Officer 4:The Chief Engineer (Roads) 5:The Superintending Engineer 6:The Executive Enginee Advocate for the Petitioner : Ms. Snigdha Bhattacharjee Advocate for the Respondent : Addl. AG/GA, Mizoram Page No.# 2/12 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA ORDER 24.03.2026 Heard Ms. S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Ms. Lalnunhlui, learned Government Advocate for the State of Mizoram. 2. This is an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) against the impugned Judgment & Order dated 22.08.2025 passed by the Court of the District Judge, Aizawl in Arbitration Case No. 1/2023 under Section 34 of the Act, upholding the Arbitral Award dated 30.05.2022 passed in Arbitration Proceeding No. 4/2020. 3. The matter pertains to a dispute regarding payment of bills pertaining to the construction of the Tawngkolong to Longmasu Road 0.00 kmp - 27.50 kmp, at a cost of Rs. 11,22,50,464.54. 4. The dispute between the parties had been referred to a sole Arbitrator by the Order dated 12.03.2022 passed by this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 4/2019. As the appellant’s request for appointment of an Arbitrator to resolve their dispute between the parties was not being considered, the appellant had approached this Court by way of Arbitration Petition No. 4/2019, for appointment of an Arbitrator, in terms of the contract agreement executed between the parties. This Court vide Order dated 12.03.2022 allowed Arbitration Page No.# 3/12 Petition No. 4/2019 by appointing an Arbitrator. 5. The appellant thereafter filed a statement of claim containing 10 claims before the learned Arbitrator. The respondents also filed their statement of defence and counter claim before the learned Arbitrator. Claim No. 6 was later withdrawn by the appellant. 6. The learned Arbitrator thereafter passed the impugned Award dated 30.05.2022 in Arbitration Proceeding No. 4/2022, wherein it allowed all the claims of the appellant except for claim Nos. 1, 5, 7 & 8. The learned Arbitrator rejected the counter claim of the respondents. 7. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the claim Nos. 1, 5, 7 & 8, the appellant filed an application under section 34 of the Act, vide Arbitration Case No. 1/2023. With respect to the other 5 claims that had been allowed by the learned Arbitrator, the appellant filed Execution Case No. 15/2023. Execution Case No. 15/2023 was disposed of by the learned Executing Court, vide Order dated 11.08.2023. 8. The application filed under Section 34 of the Act, vide Arbitration Case No. 1/2023, was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Aizawl on 27.09.2023, on the ground that the Arbitral Award dated 30.05.2022 had been executed, vide Execution Case No. 15/2023. 9. The appellant being aggrieved by the rejection of his application under Section 34 of the Act by the learned District Judge, Aizawl, filed Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2023 before this Court under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act. Page No.# 4/12 10. The challenge made to the Arbitral Award and dismissal of the application under Section 34 of the Act in Arbitral Appeal No. 3/2023, was that the execution of the 5 claims that had been allowed by the Arbitral Award dated 30.05.2023, could not be a ground for dismissing the appellant’s application under Section 34 of the Act. Further, the learned District Judge, Aizawl had failed to realise that the claims of the appellant was severable and the dismissal of 4 claims out of the remaining 9 claims, could be challenged in appeal. 11. The 10 initial claims of the appellant before the Arbitrator were as follows:- “ll. The petitioner had made claims before the Arbitrator which are as follows:- "Claim No. 1: Rs. 12,25,17,638, for the work done by the claimant which has not been paid. Claim No. 2: Rs. 13,33,340/- towards the interest @18% per annum from the due date to the date of payment on account of delay in payment of RA bills. Claim No. 3: Refund of Rs. 21,22,055/- withheld from payment by the respondent under the garb of non- achievement of milestone. Claim No. 4: Rs. 5,19,84,356/- for loss of business/profit. Claim No. 5: Rs. 8,66,04,147/- on account of damages for onsite expenses incurred on plant and machineries including site staff during the extended period of contract. Claim No. 6: Rs. 5,19,84,356/- as damages for off-site expenses /loss of overheads during the extended period of contract. Claim No. 7: Rs. 3,30,24,100/- on account of damages due to loss suffered Page No.# 5/12 because of increase in the cost of material (other than re-enforcement steel, cement and POL) and labour during the extended period of contract. Claim No. 8: Rs. 23,87,921/- on account of damages due to loss suffered because of increase in the cost of POL during the extended period of contract. Claim No. 9: Release of security deposit amount of Rs. 53,31,855/-. Claim No. 10: Release of performance security amount of Rs. 26,65,928/-." 12. This Court allowed Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2023, vide Judgment & Order dated 21.05.2024, by holding that the learned District Judge would have to decide whether the rejected claims of the appellant were severable and stand alone claims. This Court further held at paragraph No. 36 of the Judgment & Order dated 21.05.2024 passed in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2023 as follows:- “36. In the present case, as the Arbitration Case No.4/2022 filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was dismissed only on the ground that the Arbitral Award had been executed vide Execution Case No.15/2023, this Court is of the view that the District Judge, Aizawl would have to take a decision, as to whether the challenge made in respect of the findings/decisions of the Arbitrator in respect of the rejected claims are severable and independent vis-a-vis the allowed claims, by giving reasons, keeping in view the above observations. If it holds that the challenge can be entertained under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it would have to further decide whether the rejection of claim nos. 1, 5, 7 & 8 are to be upheld or set aside. As the District Judge, Aizawl has not taken a decision on merits in Arbitration Case No.1/2023, the impugned order dated 27.09.2023 dismissing the Arbitration Case No.1/2023 is hereby set aside. The case is remanded back to the District Judge, Aizawl for taking a decision, keeping in Page No.# 6/12 view the observations made above.” 13. Subsequent to the Judgment & Order passed in Arbitration Appeal No. 3/2023, the matter was remanded back to the learned District Judge, Aizawl for taking a decision. The learned District Judge, Aizawl thereafter heard the parties and dismissed the application under Section 34, by holding that there was no infirmity in the learned Arbitrator rejecting the claimant’s claim Nos. 1, 5, 7 & 8 due to lack of evidence, inasmuch as, rejection of the appellant’s claims for failure to lead evidence could not be said to constitute patent illegality. The same was done vide Order dated 22.08.2025 in Arbitration Case No. 1/2023. 14. The appellant has now put to challenge the impugned Order dated 22.08.2025 passed in Arbitration Case No. 1/2023. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Arbitrator and First Appellate Court had overlooked material evidence, i.e., the appellant’s documents, even though the existences of the documents were not denied. All the evidence in the appellant’s documents were thrown out by the learned Arbitrator and the First Appellate Court without evaluation, on the grounds that the appellant did not prove the contents of the documents, though the documents spoke for themselves. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Arbitrator should have read the documents submitted by the appellant and could not have thrown them out and dismissed the claim of the appellant for want of evidence. In this regard, the learned counsel submits that the letters written by the appellant to the respondents should have been considered by the respondents, and the Page No.# 7/12 failure of the learned Arbitrator to do so, has otherwise overlooked crucial material evidence. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant thus submits that while the appellant does not seek re-appreciation of evidence, the evasive denial and non- consideration of the appellant’s documents by the Arbitrator was perverse. She accordingly submits that in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. NHAI reported in (2019) 15 SCC 131, the action of the arbitrator in not considering the appellant’s documents amounted to being in conflict with the public policy of India. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submits that there is no infirmity with the decision of the learned Arbitrator and that this appeal is not maintainable, as the grounds for challenging an Arbitral Award is not made out, in terms of Section 34/37 of the Act. 19. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 20. As can be seen from the above facts, the appellant’s grievance is basically to the effect that the learned Arbitrator has not considered the documents submitted by the appellant in respect of the rejected claims. On the other hand, the learned Arbitrator has clearly stated in paragraph Nos. 71, 113 & 124 of his Award that the appellant had refused to adduce any oral evidence to prove the contents of the said documents. 21. Paragraph Nos. 71, 113 & 124 of the Arbitrator’s impugned Award dated 30.05.2022 are reproduced herein below as follows:- Page No.# 8/12 “71. The claimant in support of the contention has referred to 15 (fifteen) documents as mentioned in Table C-7 of the SOC, out of which the respondents have admitted the existence and contents of the letter dated 27/08/2015 issued by the Executive Engineer and the reply of the Executive Engineer to the claimant's letter dated 01/10/2015, Existence of remaining 13 documents though has been admitted, the contents thereof have been denied by the respondents. As noticed above, the claimant refused to adduce any oral evidence to prove the contents of the said documents. 113. That being the position the burden was on the claimant to prove that he has executed the work worth the said amount and despite such execution he has not been paid. The measurement books produced before the Arbitral Tribunal, have also not supported the claim of the claimant. There is also no stipulation in the contract for entitlement of any amount for breach of the contract by the respondents. The said amount claimed by the claimant could have been proved by producing the evidence in support of the same, which the claimant has chosen not to do. No witness, as discussed above, has been adduced by the claimant in support of the claim made. Hence, the Claim No. 1 cannot be allowed. 124. Claim No. 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the claims on account of damages for onsite expenses; damages for offsite expenses /loss of overhead; damages due to the loss suffered because of increase in the cost of' materials etc; damages due to loss suffered because of increase the cost of POL, respectively, during the extended period of the contract.” 22. The learned Arbitrator in paragraph No. 103 of the Arbitral Award has also clearly observed that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit, does not amount to proof of its contents, unless the same is proved by the Page No.# 9/12 person who can vouchsafe for the truth of the same, if the same are disputed. In the present case, the record shows that the truth of the contents of the documents relied upon by the appellant had been denied by the respondents. As such, it was imperative on the part of the respondents to produce the author of the documents, who could have given evidence to prove the contents of the appellant’s documents, which were exhibited by the appellant. 23. Paragraph No. 103 of the Arbitral Award states as follows:- “103. Mere production and marking of a document as exhibit does not amount to proof of its content. The execution and the contents, if disputed, are to be proved by the person who vouchsafe for the truth of the same [Narbada Devi Gupta (Supra), Malay Kumar Ganguli (Supra) and Omprakash Barlin (Supra)]. In a claim for damages in a suit, such damages must be pleaded and proved by the party claiming it. Hence the burden is on the plaintiff when the damages are claimed [Draupadi Devi (Supra)].” 24. In the case of Malay Kumar Ganguly Vs. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and Others, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 221, the Supreme Court held at paragraph 37 as follows: “37. It is true that ordinarily if a party to an action does not object to a document being taken on record and the same is marked as an exhibit, he is estopped and precluded from questioning the admissibility thereof at a later stage. It is, however, trite that a document becomes inadmissible in evidence unless the author thereof is examined; the contents thereof cannot be held to have been proved unless he is examined and subjected to cross-examination in a court of law. The document which is otherwise inadmissible cannot be taken in evidence only because no objection to the admissibility thereof was taken.” Page No.# 10/12 25. In the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal and Another, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745, the Supreme Court held that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the Court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the “evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue”. 26. The facts enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs show that out of the 10 claims made by the appellant before the learned Arbitrator, 5 claims had been allowed while 4 claims had been rejected. Claim No. 6 was withdrawn by the appellant. It is interesting to note that while the appellant has taken a stand that the learned Arbitrator has not considered the appellant’s documents, the learned Arbitrator has allowed 5 claims of the appellant. Be that as it may, an application/appeal for setting aside an Arbitral Award can only be allowed, if the same comes within the grounds/conditions set out in Section 34 of the Act. In the present case, none of the grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the Act is attracted for setting aside a part of the Award. 27. In the case of MMTC Ltd. Vs. Vedanta Ltd. reported in (2019) 4 SCC 163, the Supreme Court held that interference under Section 37 of the Act cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the Award and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of that provision. 28. The issue of proving the contents of the appellant’s documents having already been decided by the learned Arbitrator with a reasoned order, we are Page No.# 11/12 not going into the said issue, as the same does not come within the grounds for setting aside a part of the Arbitral Award under Section 34 of the Act. Further, the contents of the appellant’s document had been denied by the respondent and thus such, the appellant had to adduce evidence to prove the contents of the said documents, which it did not do. 29. In the case of Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. State of Goa, reported in (2024) 1 SCC 479, the Supreme Court held that a great deal of restraint is required to be shown by the Courts, while examining the validity of an Arbitral Award, when such an Award has been upheld, wholly or substantially, under Section 34 of the Act. Frequent interference with Arbitral Awards would defeat the very purpose of the Act. 30. In the case of Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. Vs. Union of India, reported in (2023) 15 SCC 472, the Supreme Court has held that Section 37 of the Act grants narrower scope to the appellate Court to review the findings in an Arbitral Award, if it has been upheld or substantially upheld under Section 34 of the Act. 31. On considering the facts of this case, this Court does not find the Arbitral Award to be perverse or that it is not based on any evidence or reason. As the appellant did not adduce evidence to prove the contents of the appellant’s documents, there was no infirmity on the part of the learned Arbitrator in not accepting claim Nos. 1, 5, 7 & 8 of the appellant on the basis of unproven documents. No grounds for setting aside a part of the Award is made out by the appellant, attracting any condition/grounds provided under Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act. Page No.# 12/12 32. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant