ORDER : C.S. DIAS, J. 1. The petitioner is the accused in S.C.No.169 of 2020 on the file of the Court of Additional Sessions Court-I (Adhoc), Alappuzha, which arises out of Crime No.149 of 2018 registered by the Alappuzha Excise Range Office, Alappuzha, for allegedly committing the offences punishable under Sections 8 (c), 22(b) and 20(b) (ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act, in short). 2. The crux of the prosecution case is that, on 05.10.2018 at around 17.35 hours, while the 2 nd respondent was on patrolling duty and when he reached near the SBI ATM counter in front of the Alappuzha Railway Station, he found the petitioner, who on seeing the excise party, attempted to hide himself behind the ATM counter. On intercepting and questioning the petitioner, he stated that he went to Alappuzha to meet his girl friend, a French National. The 2 nd respondent informed the petitioner the right of being searched in front of a Gazetted Officer. However, the petitioner permitted the 2 nd respondent to conduct the search. In the search, 0.840 grams of MDMA and 20 grams of Ganja were seized from the petitioner. 3. I have heard; the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that, even if the allegations in Annexure A final report are taken on its face value, the same will not attract the offences charged against the petitioner. The petitioner has been falsely implicated in the crime. There is no material to substantiate the petitioner's culpability in the case. Therefore, even if the petitioner undergoes the ordeal of trial, there is no likelihood of him getting convicted. Hence, Annexure A final report may be quashed. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor seriously opposes the Crl.M.C. He submits that there are incriminating materials to substantiate the petitioner's culpability in the crime. The Investigating Officer has clearly mentioned the role of the petitioner in Annexure A final report. The fact that Annexure A final report was filed as early as on 25.11.2019 and the petitioner has filed this Crl.M.C. after a lapse of nearly six years proves the hollowness in the Crl.M.C. Going by the gravity of the allegations against the petitioner, this Court may not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The fact that Annexure A final report was filed as early as on 25.11.2019 and the petitioner has filed this Crl.M.C. after a lapse of nearly six years proves the hollowness in the Crl.M.C. Going by the gravity of the allegations against the petitioner, this Court may not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The contentions regarding violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the NDPS Act is a matter to be decided after the trial. Hence, the Crl.M.C. may be dismissed. 6. In India Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited and Others [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after exhaustively considering the earlier precedents on Section 482 Cr.P.C., has comprehensively enunciated the principles to be followed by the High Courts while exercising its inherent powers in an application to quash a criminal complaint /proceeding, in the following words: “12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few—Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 (Cri) 234] , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 ] , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [ (1996) 5 SCC 591 ] , State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [ (1996) 8 SCC 164 ], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [ (1999) 3 SCC 259 ] , Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 ] , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 ] , M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 ] . The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not” 7. Likewise, in Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [ (2021) 9 SCC 35 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphatically held that, once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the High Court should refrain from analysing the merits of the allegations as if exercising the appellate jurisdiction or conducting the trial. Likewise, in Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others [ (2021) 9 SCC 35 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphatically held that, once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the High Court should refrain from analysing the merits of the allegations as if exercising the appellate jurisdiction or conducting the trial. The inherent power to quash a criminal proceeding is an exception and not a rule. Although the power is quite broad and wide, it is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 8. It is also trite that though no statutory period of limitation is prescribed under Section 582 of BNSS/482 Cr.P.C., the litigant seeking to quash a proceeding must approach the Court within a reasonable time period; if not, he must convincingly address the reasons for the delay. At any rate, the litigant cannot approach this Court at his whim and caprice, merely because no period of limitation is prescribed in the statute. In such cases, the High Court can decline to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. 9. In the instant case, the prosecution alleges that the petitioner has committed the offences punishable under the NDPS Act, because 0.840 grams of MDMA and 20 grams of Ganja were seized from him. In Annexure A final report, the prosecution has cited 15 witnesses and produced materials to substantiate the petitioner's culpability in the crime. On the contrary, the petitioner contends that there is a violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the NDPS Act. Moreover, the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the crime. 10. On an overall consideration of the facts and the materials on record, I find that the allegations levelled against the petitioner, if taken on its face, prima facie, discloses the commission of the above offences. There is no explanation for the inordinate delay of six years in filing this Crl.M.C. Furthermore, the violation of Sections 50 and 52 are all matters that are to be decided by the Trial Court. With the cogent materials on record, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, to quash Annexure A final report. In the aforesaid circumstances, I dismiss the Crl.M.C., but by reserving the right of the petitioner to raise all the contentions before the Trial court, including filing of an application for discharge. In the aforesaid circumstances, I dismiss the Crl.M.C., but by reserving the right of the petitioner to raise all the contentions before the Trial court, including filing of an application for discharge. If such an application is filed, the Trial Court is directed to consider the application in accordance with law, untramelled by any observations made in this Order. The Trial Court is also directed to consider and dispose of S.C.No.169 of 2020 in accordance with law.