1 2025:CGHC:47972 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5012 of 2020 Purnendra Kumar Netam S/o Shri M. R. Netam, Aged About 40 Years, Working As Technical Assistant At Janpad Panchayat Sukma, P.S.- Sukma, District- Sukma, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner. versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Panchayat And Gramin Vikas Vibhag, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar Naya Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Collector Sukma, District- Sukma, Chhattisgarh 3. Chief Executive Officer Zilla Panchayat Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh 4. Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat- Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh 5. District Program Officer (MGNREGA) Sukma Zilla Panchayat Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents. (Cause title downloaded from CIS Periphery) For Petitioner : Mr. Navneet Yadav, Adv on behalf of Mr. A. K. Yadav, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 & 2/State : Mr. Ritesh Giri, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No.3 to 5 : Mr. Sudeep Verma, Advocate. Digitally signed by AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI DN: cn=AJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, ou=HIGH COURT, o=HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, st=Chhattisgarh, c=IN Date: 2025.09.24 10:46:10 +0530 2 SB : Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order on Board 18.09.2025 1. This petition under Article 226 has been filed by the petitioner for the following reliefs:- "10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire record pertaining to the present case 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 14-09- 2020 (Annexure-P-1) passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Sukma, District Sukma (CG) 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to pass any other order in favour of the petitioner as it may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case with cost." 2. The petitioner was appointed on the post of Technical Assistant at Janpad Panchayat Sukma by the respondent No.3 on contractual basis through appointment dated 22.10.2010 (Annexure-P/3) under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA). The petitioner was initially appointed for a period of one year and thereafter his services were extended from time to time. 3. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is questioning the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure-P/1), whereby, respondent No.3 has removed/ terminated the services of the petitioner from the post of Technical Assistant on the ground of negligence, misconduct and 3 insufficiency in work assigned to him. Before passing the impugned order, various show cause notices including last notice dated 01.09.2020 were issued to the petitioner whereby reply was sought prior to 07.09.2020, however, the petitioner did not file any reply to such notices. Subsequently, by the impugned order dated 14.09.2020 as per terms of appointment order and invoking Rule 11 (5) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Sewa (Samvida Niyukti) Niyam, 2012, by paying one month advance salary, petitioner was terminated from the service. Hence, this petition. 4. Shri Navneet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is clear violation of principle of natural justice as no departmental enuqiry was conducted before passing the impugned order and a stigmatic termination order has been passed by the respondent/Authorities. He submits that the impugned order has been passed during difficult phase of Covid pandemic which is not proper. He also placed reliance in the matter of Swati Priyadarshani Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh1 to submit that the termination of service of the employee for alleged negligence, misconduct or other disqualification would harm their future career so proper enquiry before termination is mandatory, however, no such procedure has been followed in this case. He further submits that said principle has been reiterated by the co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Praveen Goyal Vs. State 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2139 4 of CG and Ors 2 and also in the case of Rakesh Roshan Soj Vs. State of CG and Ors 3 . He lastly submits that the impugned order is not sustainable and same deserves to be set-aside/quashed and petitioner may be granted all consequential benefits along with backwages. 5. Mr. Ritesh Giri, Panel Lawyer and Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned counsel for the respective respondents would support the impugned order of termination and submit that sufficient opportunity has already been granted to the petitioner by giving various show cause notices and explanation has also been sought. It is further submitted that order of termination of service has been passed strictly in terms of appointment order as well as service rules which governs the concerned employee and Rule 11 (5) of the Rules 2012 empowers the Authority to terminate the contract appointment of employee by giving one month notice in advance or by paying one month salary in its place. 6. Learned counsel for respondents No.3 to 5 would fairly admits that in the impugned order of termination there are certain allegations with regard to negligence, misconduct and insufficiency of given work on the part of delinquent employee. He also admits that no departmental enquiry was conducted before termination of the petitioner. In view of such submission, learned counsel for the 2 2025:CGHC:17021 [WPS NO.2515/2024] 3 2025:CGHC:42212 [WPS NO.9269/2023] 5 respondents submit that impugned order is just and proper and this petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition carefully. 8. Undisputedly, the order of termination puts a stigma on delinquent employee and same affects his future career. In the present case, the impugned order dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure-P/1) has been passed on account of negligence, misconduct and insufficiency of work on part of the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that several show cause notices have been issued to the petitioner and last notice was issued on 07.09.2020 but no departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner before his removal from service. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (Supra) categorically held that even for contractual employee, if any stigmatic order is to be passed, it is to be passed after holding proper enquiry and after giving due opportunity of hearing to the concerned delinquent/employee. For the sake of brevity relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder :- "34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: “28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows : Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held 6 by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420 : 1953 SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1954) 1 SCC 572 : (1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh V. Union of India, [58 Bom LR 673 : AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is 7 sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. 8 Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Further, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Praveen Goyal (referred to above) and Rakesh Roshan Soj (referred to above) have considered the similar issue and 9 concluded that the principle of natural justice mandates that before taking any adverse action, especially termination, the affected party must be given a real and meaningful opportunity to be heard and also that in order to pass a stigmatic or cumulative order, the concerned Authorities are required to hold a departmental enquiry after giving due opportunity of hearing to delinquent/employee. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Swati Priyadarshini and also considering the view taken in the cases of Praveen Goyal and Rakesh Roshan Soj (referred to above), this Court is of the view that the impugned order has been passed without following the principles of natural justice and proper procedure has not been followed by the Authorities before passing such order. Hence, the impugned order dated 14.09.2020 (Annexure-P/1) is unsustainable and same is hereby quashed/set-aside. 12. However, respondent/Authorities are at liberty to hold proper enquiry/take suitable steps in accordance with law. 13. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Ajay Judge