[2025:RJ-JP:743] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4098/2018 The Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd., With Its Registered Office At 4Th Floor Nehru Sahkar Bhawan Bhawani Singh Road Jaipur ----Appellant Versus M/s Rampur Distillery, Bareli Road, Rampur ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Divanshu Gupta For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order 02/01/2025 1. Instant S.B. C.M.A. is preferred by appellant-Objector aggrived from judgment dated 22.10.2016 in civil misc. case No. 96/2009 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.3 under section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2. Office has pointed out that the instant civil misc. appeal is preferred after a delay of 553 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed. 3. Learned counsel for appellant submits that after passing of the order by trial court, the parties were negotiating for amicable settlement of the dispute between them and it has caused the delay. He also submits that appellant is a Government corporation and due to administrative exigencies, approval and decision takes time. He also submits that after approval from higher authorities, [2025:RJ-JP:743] (2 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] instant appeal was preferred before this Hon’ble Court and the delay is bona fide, which required to be condoned. He further referred the judgment in case of G. Ramegowda and Ors. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore MANU/SC/0161/1988 and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. Vs. Katiji and Ors. MANU/SC/0460/1987. He further submits that the award was passed on unstamped document and same is unexecutable, therefore, he has a valid ground to challenge the award. He also referred the judgment in case of Hindustan Steel Limited Vs. Dilip Construction Co. (1969) 1 SCC 597, Ram Paul Sharma Vs. State MANU/JK/0037/1990, Pradip Trading Co. Vs. The State of Bihar MANU/BH/0089/1974 (DB), and Khem Chand Vs. Union of India SCC Online Calcutta, 179 and Rikhabdas Vs. Ballabhdas and Ors. MANU/SC/0006/1961. At last, he submits that the trial court has issued an attachment warrant against the appellant for execution, therefore, the matter requires urgent consideration. 4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the material placed on record and also considered the judgments as referred by learned counsel for appellant. 5. There is a delay of 553 days in a matter relating to Arbitration and Conciliation Act. initially, an award was passed on 20.05.2006 and same was challenged before learned District Court. The trial court has dismissed the objection raised by present appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The appellant herein was well-aware about the award as same was passed in presence of the counsel for [2025:RJ-JP:743] (3 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] appellant. After dismissal of petition under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, instant appeal was preferred on 27.07.2018. A perusal further indicate that Arbitrator was appointed and matter was referred by present appellant itself, thereafter the claimants have filed claim petition. After following the procedure an award was passed. Learned trial court has considered the entire material while dismissing the objection petition of present appellant. 6. Learned counsel for appellant has referred two primary reasons firstly, the parties were engaged in negotiation and secondly time consumed for administrative approval whereas in application, it was mentioned that the counsel before the trial court has not informed appellant within time. The arguments and the reasons mentioned in the application are not in line and different. Herein, there is no record to justify that at what point of time the office of appellant came to know about impugned order about award and on which date, they have granted administrative approval to challenge the impugned order. A perusal further indicate that we are more than 18 years after passing the award on 20.05.2006. The purpose of Arbitration and Conciliation Act frustrates only because of such red-tapism and non-acceptance of award, particularly after dismissal of objection petition by the trial court. 7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. [2025:RJ-JP:743] (4 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] 8. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 9. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. [2025:RJ-JP:743] (5 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay. 10. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds. 11. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case [2025:RJ-JP:743] (6 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision. [2025:RJ-JP:743] (7 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] 12. In case of G. Ramegowda and Ors. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (supra) has laid down that delay shall be condoned, if there is a sufficient reason for condonation of delay. Similarly in other cases, same principle was followed. The appellant is required to satisfy the Court about sufficient ground for seeking condonation of delay but herein there is nothing on record except oral version, therefore, the ground mentioned by the counsel or in the application is not sufficient for condonation of delay of 553 days. 13. In case of Hindustan Steel Limited Vs. Dilip Construction Co. (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered an unstamped document and observed that same is a curable defect. Similarly, in case of Rikhabdas Vs. Ballabhdas and Ors. (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered Section 17 of the Stamp Act and set aside the order, so these two judgments are not helpful for the appellant in any manner. Similarly, other judgments are not helpful in condonation of delay. 14. Considering aforesaid, I am of the considered view that appellant has failed to show sufficient ground for condonation of delay and in failing to do so, the application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed. Similarly, on other ground application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as the defect pointed out is a curable defect and can be cured at any point of time during and after execution. 15. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed along with civil misc. appeal. [2025:RJ-JP:743] (8 of 8) [CMA-4098/2018] 16. Misc. application(s), if any, stands disposed of. 17. No order as to costs. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J MONU /08