1 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA M.A.C.M.A.Nos.1192 of 2016 and 261 of 2017 COMMON JUDGMENT: 1. Claiming compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- for the injuries sustained in a Motor Vehicle accident, one Bolledu Nanda Kishore (hereinafter referred to as “the claimant”) filed O.P.No.727 of 2009 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal- cum-I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District, Rajahmundry (for short “the MACT”) arraying driver and hirer (A.P.S.R.T.C), of the bus bearing Registration No.AP 5 W 5599 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”) as Respondent Nos.1 and 3 and Owner and Insurance Company of the offending vehicle as Respondent Nos.2 and 4. 2. Learned MACT under the impugned decree and order dated 19.04.2011 awarded a compensation of Rs.8,58,372/- against the driver and the A.P.S.R.T.C, who hired the offending vehicle, while dismissing the claim against the owner and the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle. M.A.C.M.A.No.1192 of 2016 3. M.A.C.M.A.No.1192 of 2016 is filed by the A.P.S.R.T.C. questioning the imposition of liability on A.P.S.R.T.C contending that the Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation. Further, disputed the quantum of compensation and annual income and multiplier adopted by the learned MACT apart 2 contending that the learned MACT failed to deduct the amount towards personal expenditure etc. of claimant. M.A.C.M.A.No.261 of 2017 4. M.A.C.M.A.No.261 of 2017 is filed by the claimant questioning the dismissal of claim against the owner and Insurance Company of the offending vehicle contending that the same is against the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a case between U.P.SRTC vs. Kulsum1. Further, claimant has prayed for enhancement of compensation. 5. There is no appeal by the owner and the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle obviously for the reason that, they are not loaded with any liability. 6(i). Owner and driver of the offending vehicle remained as ex parte before the learned MACT. 6(ii). Heard, Sri Vinod Kumar Tarlada, learned counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C., Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the claimant, and Sri Srinivasa Rao Vutla, learned counsel for the Insurance Company. 6(iii) Both the appeals are heard together. 1 (2011) 8 SCC 142 3 Case of the claimant: 7. On the fateful day i.e. on 12.02.2009 at about 03:45 P.M., while the claimant was about to board the offending vehicle at GIET College bus stop, Rajanagaram, the driver of the offending vehicle without observing boarding of the passengers, rashly moved the offending vehicle, whereby the offending vehicle ran over on the left leg of the claimant causing crush injury. 8. The claimant was hale and healthy; brilliant student; studying B.Tech(C.S.E); earning Rs.5,000/- per month by conducting tuitions. Soon after the accident, he was shifted to Safe Emergency Hospital at Kakinada, where he was treated up to 25.02.2009 and an operation was conducted and amputation was done to his left leg upto left lower limb. Again he was shifted to Medicity Hospitals, Hyderabad for further treatment and took treatment up to 01.04.2009. Due to the injuries and amputation to his left leg, the claimant became permanently disabled and his future became dark. He has spent Rs.2,45,000/- towards medical expenditure. Since the driver of the offending vehicle was negligent and responsible for the accident, the owner and the A.P.S.R.T.C. who hired the offending vehicle as well as Insurance Company are liable to pay the just and reasonable compensation jointly and severally. A case in Crime No.41 of 2009 was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle and he was charge sheeted. 4 Case of the A.P.S.R.T.C: 9. Claimant shall prove the pleaded accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, age, educational qualification, income on tuitions etc. The claim against the A.P.S.R.T.C is not tenable. In any event, the owner and the Insurance Company are liable to pay the compensation and negligence of the claimant cannot be ignored. Case of the Insurance Company: 10. The Claimant shall prove his age and earnings at Rs.5,000/- per month by attending tuitions and valid and effective policy issued by Respondent No.4 Insurance Company, compliance of conditions, valid and effective driving licence to the driver of the offending vehicle etc. The claimant shall prove the accident, negligence, nature and effect of injuries including the expenditure incurred for treatment etc. 11. Both the A.P.S.R.T.C. and the Insurance Company disputed the quantification of compensation claimed. Respondent No.3 / A.P.S.R.T.C. has invoked IMT endorsement No.44 by way of additional counter and submitted that the Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation, even if the offending vehicle is on hire. 12. On the strength of pleadings, learned MACT settled the following issues for trial: 5 1. Whether the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the A.P.S.R.T.C. Bus bearing registration No.AP 5W 5599 by it‟s driver the 1st respondent herein? 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation amount claimed? If so, from which of the respondents? 3. To what relief? 13. Evidence before the learned MACT: Description Remarks Oral evidence P.W.1: Bolledu Nanda Kishore Claimant P.W.2: B.S.S. Venkateswaralu Doctor who treated the claimant. P.W.3: Dr. M.V. Anand Doctor who treated the claimant. P.W.4: Nittala Venkateswara Rao Proprietor of Pharmacy P.W.5: M.N.S. Giri Owner of the ambulance R.W.1: B. Sailaja Senior Assistant, office of RTA, Rajahmundry Documentary evidence Ex.A1: Attested copy of F.I.R. in Cr.No.41 of 2009 of Rajanagaram Police Station. Ex.A2: Attested copy of wound certificate Ex.A3:Attested copy of M.V.I Report Ex.A4: Attested copy of charge sheet. Ex.A5: Medical bills for Rs.1,31,052.50/-. Ex.A6: Discharge summary issued by Safe Emergency Hospital, Kakinada. On behalf of the petitioner(s). 6 Ex.A7: Discharge summary issued by Medicity Hospital. Ex.A8: Photos with negatives (12 in number) showing amuputation of leg of the petitioner. Ex.A9: Attested copy of disability certificate issued by Medical Board, Government General Hospital, Kakinada. Ex.A10: Ambulance receipt for Rs.9,720/-. Ex.A11: Attested copy of Board of Intermediate Education, Andhra Pradesh, Pass Certificate cum Marks. Ex.A12: Attested copy of 2nd Year B.Tech. Marks Memorandum of B. Nanda Kishore. Ex.A13: Attested copy of Study certificate of 3rd year B.Tech of B.Nanda Kishore. Ex.X1: Attested copy of case sheet of Safe Emergency Hospital. Ex.X2: Attested copy of case sheet issued by Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad of B. Nanda Kishore. Ex.X3: Driving licence particulars of K. Srinu. Ex.B1: Attested copy of hire agreement in between Respondent Nos.2 and 3. Ex.B2: Copy of Insurance Policy No.151100/31/8/01/00002527 issued by Respondent No.1. On behalf of the Respondents. Findings of the learned MACT: 14(i). Claimant is injured and eye witness to the accident. His evidence coupled with entries in Ex.A1-F.I.R. is sufficient to believe the accident and negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 7 14(ii). Ex.A2-wound certificate, Ex.A6 and Ex.A7-Discharge summaries issued by the Safe Emergency Hospital, Kakinada and the Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad, Ex.X1 and Ex.X2-case sheets issued by the Safe Emergency Hospital and Medicity Hospital, indicating nature and effect of injuries as well as treatment undergone, evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, who attended the claimant during treatment are indicating the grievous nature of injuries and effect of injuries including medical expenditure etc. The claimant is entitled for Rs.1,31,052/- towards medical expenses, Rs.9,720/- towards ambulance charges, Rs.75,000/- towards pain and suffering, Rs.6,42,600/- towards permanent disability, in view of the disability at 85% and in all the claimant is entitled for Rs.8,58,372/-. 15. With regard to liability, the learned MACT by referring to a decision in P. Satyanarayana vs. Kesari Manevva and others2, K. Mathura Bai and others vs. A. Shiva Nageswara Rao and others3 and also a decision in Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., vs. Javvaji Bhaskar Rao and others4, where under Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari5 etc. case was referred and found that when the bus is hired by the A.P.S.R.T.C, the bus was put to schedule as per the trip sheet fixed by the concerned A.P.S.R.T.C officials and the driver was under the control of hirer / A.P.S.R.T.C. In such case, A.P.S.R.T.C alone would be liable to pay the 2 2009 (1) ALD Page 160 3 2004 (3) ALD Page 658 4 2010 ACJ Page 131 5 1997 ACJ 1148(SC) 8 compensation. Accordingly, dismissed the claim against the owner and the Insurance Company imposing the liability on the A.P.S.R.T.C. and its driver jointly and severally. Arguments in the appeal: For A.P.S.R.T.C: 16. While reiterating the grounds of appeal, learned counsel for the A.P.S.R.T.C. submitted that the legal position is settled by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case between U.P.S.R.T.C. vs. Kulsum (1 supra) as to liability of the Insurance Company. Therefore, the findings of the learned MACT are incorrect. The quantification done is also not rational. The negligence of the claimant and confusion created due to over boarding etc. are wrongly ignored by the learned MACT. For the Claimant: 17(i). All the respondents arrayed in M.V.O.P.No.727 of 2009 are liable to pay the compensation. 17(ii). Learned MACT ought to have awarded more compensation than what claimed and erred in taking the income of the claimant at Rs.3,500/- per month, when he was an engineering student. 17(iii). The compensation awarded is not just and adequate. 9 Arguments for the Insurance Company: 18. The legal position is settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as to liability of the Insurance Company. Therefore, the matter may be decided on merits. However, with regard to quantification, the claim is excessive and there is no proper basis placed for quantifying the compensation. 19. Perused the record. Thoughtful consideration given to the arguments advanced by all the parties. 20. Now the points that arise for determination in these appeals are: 1. Whether the pleaded accident dated 12.02.2009 has occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle? 2. What is the liability of the owner and the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle? 3. Whether the claimant is entitled for compensation, if so, what shall be just and reasonable compensation to which he is entitled? 4. Whether the impugned order and decree dated 19.04.2011 passed by the learned MACT as to fixing the liability on Respondent Nos.1 and 3 alone and awarding a compensation of Rs.8,58,372/- are sustainable in law or whether any interference is necessary, if so, to what extent? 5. What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.1192 of 2016? 6. What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.261 of 2017? 10 Point No.1; 21. Evidence of the claimant as PW.1 is clear as to the negligence. As rightly observed by the learned MACT, except suggesting want of care on the part of claimant and denying the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle, nothing important is elicited. The cross examination of PW.1 would show that a traffic guide was employed by the A.P.S.R.T.C. „35‟ students more tried to get into the offending vehicle even before stopped. Who is the traffic guide is not put to PW.1. 22. No evidence is adduced on behalf of the A.P.S.R.T.C. Its driver is not examined. Under Ex.A1-FIR, a case was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle and the charge sheet was laid against the said driver under Ex.A4. Reading of evidence of PW.1 and recitals in Ex.A1 and Ex.A4 would safely lead to infer and to conclude that the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle is cause for accident and the findings of the learned MACT on this point are fit to be accepted. Hence confirmed. Point framed is therefore answered in favour of the claimant. Point No.2: 23. There is no dispute about the ownership of Respondent No.2 in respect of the offending vehicle and that the same was insured with Respondent No.4. 11 There is no dispute about the policy being in force. Violations of conditions of the policy are not made out. 24(i). The objection of Insurance Company is that in respect of the hired vehicle, the physical possession and defacto ownership and the control of the vehicle will be with the operator i.e. A.P.S.R.T.C, who hired the vehicle. Hence they are liable to pay the compensation. The learned MACT also went the same premise with reference to certain judgments mentioned vide paragraph No.22 of the impugned judgment. Those are all the judgments prior to the judgment i.e. U.P.SRTC vs. Kulsum (1 supra). The learned MACT has relied on Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari (5 supra) Case. 24(ii) While explaining the findings in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari case with reference to interpretation of definition of “owner” under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and contrast with the definition of “owner” under Section 2(19) of the 1939 Act that, it would include the subject of a hire-purchase agreement etc. Hon‟ble Supreme Court in U.P.SRTC vs. Kulsum (1 supra) case clarified the issue. 24(iii). The judgments in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari (5 supra) Case and U.P.SRTC vs. Kulsum (1 supra), case, both are referred and discussed by the three judges bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. 12 Rajenderi Devi and Others6 case, wherein it is observed that Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari case has been distinguished and the same has no application in the light of the observation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in U.P.SRTC vs. Kulsum Case. Accordingly, it is found that the Insurance Company is liable and the defence as to absence of the principle of „Privity of contract‟ does not apply. The observation of the Hon‟ble Apex Court made in para Nos.4 to 9 of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajenderi Devi and Others (6 supra) found relevant to answer the objection of Insurance Company as well as the findings of the learned MACT and the contention of the A.P.S.R.T.C. as to liability of the Insurance Company. Hence they are extracted which are as follows: 4. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for all the parties, we are of the view that the judgment relied upon viz. Kailash Nath Kothari [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148], is itself distinguishable for the reason that the judgment itself records as follows : (SCC pp. 483-85, paras 3-4 & 7) “3. … The insurance company took the plea, in its reply to the claim petitions, that the bus at the time of the accident was under the control of the RSRTC, therefore, it was the liability of the RSRTC to pay compensation and the insurance company was not liable. It was further pleaded by the insurance company that the liability of the insurance company, in any event, was limited and its liability could not exceed Rs 75000 in respect of all the claim petitions arising out of one accident. … 4. … Issue No. 2 was also decided in favour of the claim petitioners but it was held that in the light of the terms of the policy of insurance and relevant provisions of the Act, the 6 (2020) 19 SCC 230 13 liability of the insurance company was limited, in respect of the accident, to a total amount of Rs 75,000 only. *** 7. … The learned counsel appearing for the insurance company, did not question the finding on Issue No. 2 and submitted that the specified amount had since been paid by the insurance company.” 5. In addition to this, the Court also held, relying upon the definition of “owner” in Section 2(19) of the Motor Vehicles Act (as it then stood), as follows : (Kailash Nath Kothari case [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148] , SCC pp. 487-88, para 17) “17. The definition of owner under Section 2(19) of the Act is not exhaustive. It has, therefore, to be construed, in a wider sense, in the facts and circumstances of a given case. The expression owner must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus. To confine the meaning of “owner” to the registered owner only would in a case where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability in case of an accident. The liability of the “owner” is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in each case as to on whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident.”(emphasis in original) In this view of the matter, it was therefore held that since the insurance company's liability was limited only to Rs 75,000 which had been paid, the insurance company would, on the facts of that case, not be liable to pay anything more. On this count, therefore, the amount payable beyond Rs 75,000 was mulcted on to the Corporation in that case. 6. In a subsequent judgment viz. U.P. SRTC v. Kulsum [U.P. SRTC v. Kulsum, (2011) 8 SCC 142 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 66 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 376] (“Kulsum”), this Court stated the question of law that arose for consideration as follows : (SCC p. 145, para 3) “3. The question of law that arises for consideration in the instant and connected appeals is formulated as under : if an insured vehicle (in this case a mini bus) is plying under an agreement of contract with the Corporation, on the route as per permit granted in favour of the Corporation, in case of an 14 accident, whether the Insurance Company would be liable to pay compensation or would it be the responsibility of the Corporation or the owner?” It then referred to the definition of “owner” under Section 2(30) [ “2. (30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;”] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and contrasted it with the definition of “owner” in Section 2(19) [ “2. (19) “owner” means, where the person in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;”] of the 1939 Act. 7. It then went on to distinguish Kailash Nath Kothari [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148] as follows : (Kulsum case [U.P. SRTC v. Kulsum, (2011) 8 SCC 142 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 66 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 376] , SCC pp. 148-49, paras 16 & 18) “16. In Kailash Nath Kothari [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148] , a question had arisen with regard to the liability of the insurance company, where the bus plied as per the contract with Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. However, the said case was dealing with the earlier Motor Vehicles Act of 1939. Taking into consideration the definition of “owner” as it existed then in Section 2(19) of the old Act, it has been held in para 17 as under : (SCC pp. 487-88) „17. The definition of “owner‟ under Section 2(19) of the Act is not exhaustive. It has, therefore to be construed, in a wider sense, in the facts and circumstances of a given case. The expression “owner” must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus. To confine the meaning of “owner” to the registered owner only would in a case where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer not be proper for the purpose of fastening of liability in case of an accident. The liability of the “owner” is vicarious for the tort committed by its 15 employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in each case as to on whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident. In this case, Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus could not ply the bus on the particular route for which he had no permit and he in fact was not plying the bus on that route. The services of the driver were transferred along with complete “control” to RSRTC, under whose directions, instructions and command the driver was to ply or not to ply the ill-fated bus on the fateful day. The passengers were being carried by RSRTC on receiving fare from them. Shri Sanjay Kumar was therefore not concerned with the passengers travelling in that bus on the particular route on payment of fare to RSRTC. Driver of the bus, even though an employee of the owner, was at the relevant time performing his duties under the order and command of the conductor of RSRTC for operation of the bus. So far as the passengers of the ill-fated bus are concerned, their privity of contract was only with the RSRTC to whom they had paid the fare for travelling in that bus and their safety therefore became the responsibility of the RSRTC while travelling in the bus. They had no privity of contract with Shri Sanjay Kumar, the owner of the bus at all. Had it been a case only of transfer of services of the driver and not of transfer of control of the driver from the owner to RSRTC, the matter may have been somewhat different. But on facts in this case and in view of Conditions 4 to 7 of the agreement (supra), the RSRTC must be held to be vicariously liable for the tort committed by the driver while plying the bus under contract of the RSRTC. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is, the person who has the right to hire and fire the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, is a rebuttable presumption.‟ *** 18. In our considered opinion, in the light of the drastic and distinct changes incorporated in the definition of “owner” in the old Act and the present Act, Kailash Nath case [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148] has no application to the facts of this case. We were unable to persuade ourselves with the specific question which arose in this and connected appeals as the question projected in these appeals was neither directly nor substantially in issue, in Kailash Nath case [Rajasthan SRTC v. Kailash Nath Kothari, (1997) 7 SCC 481 : 1997 ATC 1148] . Thus, reference to the same may not be of much help to us. Admittedly, in the said 16 case, this Court was dealing with regard to earlier definition of “owner” as found in Section 2(19) of the old Act.” (emphasis in original) 8. Finally, the insurance company was held liable stating:(Kulsum case [U.P. SRTC v. Kulsum, (2011) 8 SCC 142 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 66 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 376] , SCC p. 152, paras 29-31) “29. In the instant case, the driver was employed by Ajay Vishen, the owner of the bus but evidently through Clause 4.4 of the agreement, reproduced hereinabove, driver was supposed to drive the bus under the instructions of the conductor who was appointed by the Corporation. The said driver was also bound by all orders of the Corporation. Thus, it can safely be inferred that effective control and command of the bus was that of the appellant. 30. Thus, for all practical purposes, for the relevant period, the Corporation had become the owner of the vehicle for the specific period. If the Corporation had become the owner even for the specific period and the vehicle having been insured at the instance of original owner, it will be deemed that the vehicle was transferred along with the insurance policy in existence to the Corporation and thus the Insurance Company would not be able to escape its liability to pay the amount of compensation. 31. The liability to pay compensation is based on a statutory provision. Compulsory insurance of the vehicle is meant for the benefit of the third parties. The liability of the owner to have compulsory insurance is only in regard to third party and not to the property. Once the vehicle is insured, the owner as well as any other person can use the vehicle with the consent of the owner. Section 146 of the Act does not provide that any person who uses the vehicle independently, a separate insurance policy should be taken. The purpose of compulsory insurance in the Act has been enacted with an object to advance social justice.” 9. The law laid down in Kulsum case [U.P. SRTC v. Kulsum, (2011) 8 SCC 142 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 66 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 376] squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Also, the argument based on Clause 10, which states as follows, “10. The second party (bus owner) shall have full liability for any fault, negligence, accident, or other illegal acts of the driver and liability for payment of any compensation or other dues whatsoever in this regard shall be that of the owner of the bus 17 or Insurance Company under the Acts. In no case, the first party (petitioner Corporation) shall have any liability for fault, negligence, accident, or other illegal acts of the driver. In case any payment is made by the first party in compliance of any order of any Court, etc. the first party shall be authorised to recover the same.” is only between the Corporation and the bus owner and does not bind anybody who is not privy to the aforesaid agreement, least of all, the victim. 25. In view of the legal position cited vide Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajenderi Devi and Others (6 supra), the only view possible is that, the owner and the insurance company of the offending vehicle are liable to pay the compensation and that, A.P.S.R.T.C is not liable. Therefore, the findings of the learned MACT as to dismissal of the petition against Respondent Nos.2 and 4 require revamp and reversal. Point No.2 framed is answered accordingly in favour of the A.P.S.R.T.C and against the Insurance Company. Point No.3: Precedential Guidance: 26. A reference to parameters, for quantifying the compensation under various heads, addressed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court is found necessary, to have standard base in the process of quantifying the compensation, to which the claimant is entitled. (i) With regard to awarding just and reasonable quantum of compensation, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Baby Sakshi Greola vs. Manzoor Ahmad Simon 18 and Anr.7, arising out of SLP(c).No.10996 of 2018 on 11.12.2024, considered the scope and powers of the Tribunal in awarding just and compensation within the meaning of Act, after marshaling entire case law, more particularly with reference to the earlier observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in Kajal V. Jagadish Chand and Ors.8, referred to various heads under which, compensation can be awarded, in injuries cases vide paragraph No.52, the heads are as follows:- S. No. Head Amount (In ₹) 1. Medicines and Medical Treatment xxxxx 2. Loss of Earning Capacity due to Disability xxxxx 3. Pain and Suffering xxxxx 4. Future Treatment xxxxx 5. Attendant Charges xxxxx 6. Loss of Amenities of Life xxxxx 7. Loss of Future Prospect xxxxx 8. Special Education Expenditure xxxxx 9. Conveyance and Special Diet xxxxx 10. Loss of Marriage Prospects xxxxxx _________ Total Rs. …xxxxxx _________ (ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court in Yadava Kumar Vs. Divisional Manager, National Insurance Company Limited and Anr.,9 vide para No.10, by referring to Sunil Kumar Vs. Ram Singh Gaud10,as to application of multiplier method in case of injuries while calculating loss of future earnings, in para 16 referring to Hardeo Kaur Vs. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation11, as to fixing of quantum of 72025 AIAR (Civil) 1 82020 (04) SCC 413 92010(10)SCC 341 10 2007 (14) SCC 61 11 1992(2) SCC 567 19 compensation with liberal approach, valuing the life and limb of individual in generous scale, in para 17 observed that :- “The High Court and the Tribunal must realize that there is a distinction between compensation and damage. The expression compensation may include a claim for damage but compensation is more comprehensive. Normally damages are given for an injury which is suffered, whereas compensation stands on a slightly higher footing. It is given for the atonement of injury caused and the intention behind grant of compensation is to put back the injured party as far as possible in the same position, as if the injury has not taken place, by way of grant of pecuniary relief. Thus, in the matter of computation of compensation, the approach will be slightly more broad based than what is done in the matter of assessment of damages. At the same time it is true that there cannot be any rigid or mathematical precision in the matter of determination of compensation.” (iii). In Rajkumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and Another12 vide para No.19, the Hon‟ble Apex Court summarized principles to be followed in the process of quantifying the compensation after referring to socio economic and practical aspects from which, the claimants come and the practical difficulties, the parties may face in the process of getting disability assessed and getting all certificates from either the Doctors, who treated, or from the medical boards etc., it is observed that :- “…We may now summarise the principles discussed above : (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes 12 2011 (1) SCC 343 20 that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors…” (iv) In Sidram vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Anr.13 vide para No.40, the Hon‟ble Apex Court referred to the general principles relating to compensation in injury cases and assessment of future loss of earning due to permanent disability by referring to Rajkumar’s case, and also various heads under which compensation can be awarded to a victim of a motor vehicle accident. (v) In Sidram’s case, reference is made to a case in R.D. Hattangadi V. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd.14. From the observations made therein, it can be understood that while fixing amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. But, all these elements have to be viewed with objective standards. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in awarding speculation or fancy, though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. 13 2023 (3) SCC 439 14 1995 (1) SCC 551 21 Analysis of Evidence: Oral Evidence: 27. Claimant as PW.1 stated that, immediately after the accident he was taken to GSL Hospital, Rajanagaram, from there to Safe Emergency Hospital at Kakinanda and he was treated upto 25.02.2009. An operation was conducted and amputation was done to his left leg upto left lower limb. Again he was shifted to Medicity Hospitals, Hyderabad for further treatment and he took treatment up to 01.04.2009. After discharge, he was advised to take complete bed rest. Due to the amputation to his left leg, he became permanently disabled and he has incurred Rs.2,45,000/- towards medical expenses. His studies got affected and he had to engage an auto to go to the college. He lost his income and his family was forced to spend lot of money apart from losing hope of his bright future. 28. He has relied on Ex.A11-Board of Intermediate Education pass certificate, Ex.A12-II year B.Tech Marks Memorandum and Ex.A13-Study certificate of III year B.Tech in Godavari Institute of Engineering & Technology (GIET), Rajahmundry. 29. During the cross examination, it was suggested to him that he was not a regular B.Tech student. He wrote supplementary examinations of the I year B.Tech. His family got ration card and same is not produced. His father is a Pharmacist. There is no proof for claimant as to conducting tuitions and that the 22 accident occurred due to his negligence, medical bills are created for the purpose of the case. 30. PW.2 / B.S.S. Venkateswarulu, Consulting Surgeon of Safe Emergency Hospital stated that admission of claimant on 12.02.2009 with crush injury of left leg at the level of left knee joint. The injury is grievous in nature. Transfusion of compatable blood was advised. Operation was conducted and amputation of left lower limb was advised and above knee amputation with closure of stump was done. The claimant was discharged on 25.02.2009. 31. Ex.X1 is the case sheet. Ex.A2 is the wound certificate. Claimant was admitted in Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad. Wound debridement and skin grafting was done twice, Ex.X2 is the case sheet issued by the Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad. Ex.A5 Medical bills regarding Safe Emergency Hospital and the medicines covered by Ex.A5 are on prescription. The claimant has taken treatment from PW.2 even after discharge as out-patient. Artificial limb is necessary for the claimant. 32. Ex.A9 is the disability certificate and disability of claimant is permanent in nature, pertaining to that particular limb. He is a professor of Orthopaedic. The claimant has to change artificial leg once in 10 years. Ex.A6 is the discharge summary. His evidence based on Ex.X2-case sheet issued by Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad. It was suggested to him that the disability is only 50%, but not 85%. 23 33. PW.3 / Dr.M.V.Anand, Managing Director, Safe Emergency Hospital, Kakinada deposed about the admission of claimant in his hospital. Surgery conducted by himself, PW.2 and other team of doctors. He has stated about the amputation, bunch of medical bills and purchase of medicines covered by Ex.A5 for total value of Rs.1,35,052.50/- on prescriptions. During his cross examination he has stated that as per the case sheet injury sustained by the claimant was only one. As per Ex.A6 case sheet, the claimant was discharged against the medical advise. It was suggested to him that his evidence is biased. 34. PW.4 is one Nittala Venkateswara Rao, Proprietor of Pharmacy / Nittala Medicals. He has stated about Ex.A5 medical bills belonging to his establishment. Except suggesting that the bills are issued to help the claimant, nothing more is elicited. 35. PW.5 / M.N.S. Giri, Owner of the Ambulance. He has stated about the payment of Rs.9,720/- towards transportation and bill was under Ex.A10. 36. Documentary evidence:  Ex.A1-FIR is indicating registration of case under Section 338-IPC which suggested that injuries are grievous in nature.  Ex.A2 is the wound certificate reflecting that the detail of description of nature of wound etc. 24  Under Ex.A4 the driver of the offending vehicle was charge sheeted for the offences under Section 338 of IPC.  Ex.A6 is the discharge summary. PW.2 has stated about the contents of Ex.A6 as to admission in hospital etc.  Ex.A7 is the discharge summary issued by the Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad. PW.2 was deposed about the same with reference to case sheet etc. Evidence of PW.1 as to the treatment taken at Medicity Hospital, Hyderabad gets corroborated with Ex.A7.  Ex.A8, photograph is indicating the amputation of leg of the claimant.  Ex.A9 is the disability certificate issued by the Medical Board, Government General Hospital, Kakinada indicating disability at 85% above knee.  Ex.A10 is the bill / receipt for ambulance service at Rs.9,720/-.  Ex.A11 is the Board of Intermediate Education pass certificate indicating that the claimant passed in „A‟ grade with 815 marks.  Ex.A12 is the II year, B.Tech marks memorandum indicating that the claimant has passed.  Ex.A13 is the study certificate issued by the Godavari Institute of Engineering & Technology (GIET), Kakinada. 37. From the oral and documentary evidence on record, the inferences that can be drawn are: 1) Claimant suffered grievous injury. 25 2) Amputation was done to the left leg of the claimant upto left lower limb. 3) Claimant was studying engineering (B.Tech). 4) Claimant suffered 85% disability. 5) Claimant was treated at two hospitals i.e. Safe Emergency Hospital at Kakinada and Medicity Hospital at Hyderabad. 6) Claimant was shifted to Hyderabad through ambulance. 7) He was in treatment up to 01.04.2009. Thereafter also he advised bed rest, 8) There is loss of future prospects including Matrimonial bliss to the claimant. 9) Claimant falls under non earning group. 10) Claimant was pursuing education with bright record. 11) Claimant incurred medical expenses covered by Ex.A5 for Rs.1,31,052.50/-. 12) It may not be possible to retain all medical bills. 13) The attendant charges and the expenses incurred for staying, transportation etc. for both the claimant and attendants are matters of guess work and no meticulous evidence with mathematical certainty can be expected for all these things. 14) The disability although stated at 85% and since it is restricted to one limb, whether it can be taken at same limb for the entire body is a question. The Learned MACT has adopted 85% disability towards loss of income also. No tenable grounds are found to take a different view. 26 38. The income of claimant is notionally taken by the learned MACT at Rs.3,500/- per month, which can be seen from the para No.17 of the judgment. The claimant relied on a case between B. Ramulamma vs. M/s. Venkatesh Bus Union and another15, wherein the final year engineering student income was taken at Rs.12,000/- . 39. Further in the same para of the impugned judgment, the learned MACT has recorded and it was submitted for the claimant that his income may be taken at Rs.5,000/-. However, it was argued for the Insurance Company that the income shall be taken at only Rs.15,000/- per annum. Finally the learned MACT has adopted the income at Rs.3,500/-. The year of accident in the present case is 2009. Upon comparison of socio economical status of the year 2018 and upon considering the submissions made as to income before the learned MACT referred in the impugned orders, it is found that the income of the claimant can be notionally accepted safely at Rs.5,000/- as contended by the claimant which can be inclusive of future prospects but not Rs.3,500/- adopted by the learned MACT is low. 40. 85% of Rs.5,000/- comes to Rs.4,250/- and the same will come to Rs.51,000/- per year. The multiplier application as per Sarla Verma’s table is „18‟. Then the compensation that can be awarded under the head of disability at Rs.9,18,000/-. 15 2009(3)L.S. Page 173 (D.B.) 27 41. Under the head of pain and suffering compensation awarded by the learned MACT at Rs.75,000/- found fit for confirmation, for medical expenses the compensation awarded at Rs.1,31,052/- fit to be accepted but adding at least Rs.1,00,000/- is necessary towards future medical needs as artificial limb is to be procured and replaced for every 10 years as per evidence of PW.2. Towards transport expenditure compensation can be awarded at Rs.25,000/- Towards attendant charges, an amount of Rs.25,000/- can be safely awarded as compensation to the claimant in the factual scenario. Loss of income during the period of treatment etc. for a period of six months can be awarded at Rs.30,000/- (at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month). Towards extra nourishment an amount of Rs.25,000/- can be awarded as compensation. Towards loss of amenities, marital prospects etc. an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- can be awarded as compensation to the claimant. 42. In view of discussions made above and in the light of evidence and precedential guidance referred supra, the entitlement of claimant for compensation under various heads is as follows: Sl. No Head Granted by MACT Fixed by this Appellate Court 1. Medical Expenses Rs.1,31,052 /- Rs.1,31,052/- 2. Permanent disability Rs.6,42,600/- Rs.9,18,000/- 3. Loss of income during treatment Nil Rs.30,000/- 28 4. Pain and suffering Rs.75,000/- Rs.75,000/- 5. Future medical expenditure Nil Rs.1,00,000/- 6. a)Extra Nourishment Nil Rs.25,000/- b)Attendant Charges Nil Rs.25,000/- c)Transportation charges Rs.9,720/- Rs.25,000/- 7. Loss of amenities Nil Rs.1,00,000/- Total: Rs.8,58,372/- Rs.14,29,052/- 43. In view of the discussion made above, point No.3 is answered concluding that the claimant is entitled for compensation of Rs.14,29,052/-. Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimant is otherwise entitled:- 44. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in (1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others16, at para 21 of the judgment, that – 16 (2003) 2 SCC 274 29 “..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award “just” compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record.” (2) Kajal V. Jagadish Chand and Ors.17 at para 33, as follows:- “33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.” Point No.4 45. In view of the discussion made above and conclusions under Point Nos.2 and 3, fixing of liability on Respondent Nos.1 and 3 by the learned MACT found incorrect, whereas Respondent Nos.2 and 4 are held liable to pay the compensation and the compensation awarded at Rs.8,58,372/- with interest at 7.5% per annum by the learned MACT is found fit be enhanced to Rs.14,29,052/- with interest at 7.5% per annum. Point No.4 is answered accordingly. Point Nos.5 and 6: 46. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1 to 4, Point Nos.5 and 6 are answered as follows: In the result, M.A.C.M.A.No.1192 of 2016 and M.A.C.M.A.No.261 of 2017: (i) M.A.C.M.A.No.1192 of 2016 filed by appellant A.P.S.R.T.C. is allowed and the decree and order dated 19.04.2011 passed by the learned MACT in 172020 (04) SCC 413 30 O.P.No.727 of 2009 against the A.P.S.R.T.C. are set-aside and there shall be order and decree against the owner and the Insurance Company of the offending vehicle. (ii) M.A.C.M.A.No.261 of 2017 filed by the claimant is allowed enhancing the compensation from Rs.8,58,372/- to Rs.14,29,052/- with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till deposit or realization. (iii) Respondent Nos.2 and 4 before the learned MACT viz., the Owner and the Insurance Company are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation awarded. (iv) The claimant is liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced part of the compensation. (v) Time for deposit of compensation awarded is two months. (vi) If the A.P.S.R.T.C. deposited or paid any amount, entitled for return of the same from the amount deposited by the Insurance Company. (Vii) The claimant is permitted to withdraw the amount at once on deposit. (viii) No costs in the appeals. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed. ____________________________ A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J Date: 10.04.2025 Knr