-1- 2025:CGHC:12793 NAFR HIGH COURT of CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5307 of 2018 Lalit Mohan Bhagat S/o Late Shri Balak Ram Bhagat, Aged About 48 Years R/o Plot No. 103, Krishnavatika Colony, P.O. Boir District Janjgir Champa Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Agriculture Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Director, Director of Agriculture Labhandi, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Joint Director (Agriculture) Bilaspur Division Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Satish Pandey Posted As Additional Director (Finance) Department of Finance, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Ms. Zainab Vanak, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Advocate For State : Mr. Pramod Shrivastava, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 18.03.2025 1) The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 04.10.2016 (P/1) issued by the Under Secretary, (Agriculture), Raipur. 10.2 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authority to provide increment to Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE -2- the petitioner from July 2017. 10.3 To kindly grant any other writ/ writs, order/ orders, relief/ reliefs in favour of the petitioner, which the Hon'ble Court deemed fit & just in the facts and circumstances of the case, including awarding of the costs to the petitioner.” 2) Ms. Zainab Mustafa Vanak, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would make the following submissions:- A. In 2014, the petitioner was posted as Deputy Director in the office of Deputy Director (Agriculture), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa. The petitioner joined the said post on 15.04.2014. Earlier, one Manoj Kumar Chouhan was posted as Deputy Director and after his transfer, the petitioner was posted there. A direction was issued by the Additional Director (Agriculture), Raipur on 21.06.2012 to file a response to an audit report. B. A letter was issued by the Director (Agriculture), Raipur to the petitioner on 12.07.2014 to provide information with regard to the audit report pertaining to the year 2010-11. Vide order letter dated 12.07.2014, a departmental enquiry was contemplated against erring officials and the registration of FIR was also proposed. C. The petitioner deposited farmers’ shares with the department except Rs. 2.62 lakh, therefore, a show cause notice dated 10.10.2014 was issued by the Additional Secretary (Agriculture Department) to the petitioner for recovery of Rs. 2.62 lakh and 15 days were granted to file a reply. D. The petitioner deposited Rs. 2,62,176/- along with a letter dated 10.11.2014. Though the amount was deposited but there was some delay, therefore, a departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. E. Vide order dated 04.10.2016, the disciplinary authority inflicted a penalty of stoppage of one increment with a non-cumulative effect. An appeal was preferred but the same was dismissed. -3- F. Proper show cause notice was not issued and at the relevant time i.e. 2010-2011, the petitioner was not posted there, therefore, the order impugned is bad in law and the same is liable to be quashed. 3) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would oppose the submissions made by Ms. Vanak and submit that the petitioner was directed to deposit the farmers’ shares with the department within a period of 7 days vide letter dated 12.07.2014. He would further submit that the petitioner failed to comply with the order issued by the superior authority therefore a show cause notice was issued on 10.10.2014 and 15 days were granted to submit an explanation. He would further contend that the petitioner submitted his explanation after one month on 10.11.2014, wherein it was informed that the petitioner had deposited farmers’ shares with the department. He would also contend that comments were invited from the higher authorities, and thereafter, the penalty of stoppage of one increment with non-cumulative effect was passed. It is argued that the petitioner preferred an appeal before the State Government but the same was dismissed vide order dated 10.11.2017. He would further argue that the departmental appeal was not preferred within the prescribed limitation period. He would thus pray that this petition deserves to be dismissed. 4) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 5) From a perusal of the documents and the order (Annexure P/1), it is evident that the action with regard to the recovery of Rs. 33.10 lakhs was not taken seriously by the petitioner and Rs. 2.62 lakhs, farmers’ share was not deposited on due -4- time. It is also evident from the document that the said amount was deposited by the petitioner. The petitioner also failed to file a reply to the show cause notice within the given time frame. The petitioner has not placed on record a copy of the reply to the show cause. Further, the petitioner has not taken a plea that the procedure to inflict penalty was not followed by the disciplinary authority or that proper opportunity was not afforded. 6) The stand taken by the petitioner is that in the year 2010-11, he was not posted at Janjgir. The petitioner himself deposited Rs. 2.62 lakhs with the department and it proves the misconduct of the petitioner. He failed to explain his conduct and it was sufficient for the imposition of penalty. 7) The petitioner has not questioned the competency of the Disciplinary Authority in the instant petition. The petitioner has not taken the ground that the procedure to inflict the minor penalty has not been followed. It is also not a ground of the petitioner that principles of natural justice were not followed. 8) The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315], wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- -5- "10.The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. -6- 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co- delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." 9) From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 10) Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Deputy General Manager and others vs. Ajai Kumar Shrivastava reported in 2021(2) CGLJ 425, in para 25 to 29 observed and held as under:- 25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decisionmaking 3 1994(6) SCC 302 4 1995(1) SCC 216 5 -7- 1995(6) SCC 749 6 2017(1) SCC 768 7 2020(9) SCC 471 process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 27. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. -8- 28. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. 11) Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts in the light of S. Vasanthi (supra) & Ajai Kumar Shrivastava (supra), I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order impugned. Accordingly, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge NADIM