APHC010415532025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY,THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 8382/2025 Between: Naveen @ Yadla Naveen ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. D RAVI KUMAR REDDY Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the BharatiyaNagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity „the BNSS‟) by the Petitioner/Accused No.3, for granting of pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.376 of 2024 of Pattabhipuram Police Station, Guntur District, registered for the alleged offence punishable under Sections 143(2), 144(2)of 2 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short „the BNS‟) and Sections 3(1), 4(1), 5(1)(a), 7(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 06.12.2024 at about 5.00 P.M., the Inspector of Police, Pattabhipuram Police Station after getting credible information, ride the Tura International Spa Centre, Main Road, Lakshmi Nagar, Guntur which was run by accused No.1 who brought L.Ws.5 to 11 from various places of India as well as Hangkond, Thailand Countries for massaging to the men and with the help of accused Nos.2 to 4, induced L.Ws.5 to 11 towards prostitution to get illegal profits. Where the police rescued seven female persons and seized Rs.3,000/- cash and cash counter and arrested accused No.4 and filed case against accused Nos.1 to 4 under a cover of mediatornama duly attested by the mediators. CONTENTIONS OF THE COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: 3. Mr.K.Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.D.Ravi Kumar Reddy, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner has been falsely implicated in the present case and has not committed any offence as alleged. The Petitioner is the sole earning member of his family, and his arrest would cause irreparable hardship to his dependents. The Petitioner is willing to 3 abide by any condition that this Court may deem fit and proper for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Petitioner has got fixed abode. 4. It is further submitted that there is no recovery attributable to the Petitioner and custodial interrogation period was over and such custody is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Petitioner has cooperated with the investigation and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with the prosecution evidence. Therefore, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to grant pre-arrest bail to the Petitioner/Accused No.3 in the interest of justice. ARGUMENTS OF THE ASSISTANT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: 5. Per contra, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed granting of pre-arrest bail contending that the investigation is at a nascent stage and the custodial interrogation of the Petitioner is imperative for eliciting material facts. It is submitted that if the Petitioner is granted pre-arrest bail, there is a grave apprehension that he may not cooperate with the investigation and may evade the process of law. 6. It is further urged that the Petitioner is running spa centerand there exists a real likelihood of committing similar offences if released on bail. The prosecution also apprehends that the Petitioner may influence witnesses or tamper with evidence, thereby obstructing the fair and impartial investigation. In view of the seriousness of the allegations and the potential risk to the 4 integrity of the investigation, it is prayed that the instant bail application be dismissed. 7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. POINT FOR CONSIDERATION: 8. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of pre-arrest bail?” ANALYSIS: 9. This is the second pre-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner/accused No.3. Earlier, the learned Single Judge of this Court in Crl.P.No.6566 of 2025 on 11.07.2025 dismissed the pre-arrest bail application. There are no change of circumstances from the date of dismissing of the earlier pre-arrest application till the date of filing of this application. 10. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Rakesh BabanBorhade vs. State of Maharashtra and another1 at para No.8 observed thus: “8. Sub-section (1) of Section 438 has been amended by Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act 25 of 2005), by which old sub-section (1) has been substituted by new sub-sections (1), (1A) and (1B). The guiding factors for grant of anticipatory bail have been mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 438 itself. The 1 2015 SAR (Criminal) 156 5 Court would grant or refuse anticipatory bail after taking into consideration the following factors, namely:- (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, but should be granted only when a special case is made out and the Court is convinced that the accused would not misuse his liberty. After analysing various judgments and guidelines in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. MANU/SC/1021/2010: (2011) 1 SCC 694, this Court has enumerated the parameters that can be taken into consideration by the courts while dealing with the anticipatory bail.” 11. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Buddhikota Subha Rao2 at para No.7 observed thus: “7. Liberty occupies a place of pride in our socio-political order. And who knew the value of liberty more than the founding fathers of our Constitution whose liberty was curtailed time and again under Draconian laws by the colonial rulers. That is why they provided in Article 21 of the Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. It follows therefore that the personal liberty of an individual can be curbed by procedure established by law. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is one such procedural law. That law permits curtailment of liberty of anti-social and anti-national elements. Article 22 casts certain obligations on the authorities in the event of arrest of an individual accused of the commission of a crime against society or the Nation. In cases of undertrials charged with the commission of an offence or offences the court is generally called upon to decide whether to release him on bail or to commit him to jail. This decision has to be made, mainly in non-bailable cases, having regard to the nature of the crime, the circumstances in 2 1989 Supp(2) SCC 605 6 which it was committed, the background of the accused, the possibility of his jumping bail, the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on society and the possibility of retribution, etc. In the present case the successive bail applications preferred by the respondent were rejected on merits having regard to the gravity of the offence alleged to have committed. One such Application No. 36 of 1989 was rejected by Suresh, J. himself. Undeterred the respondent went on preferring successive applications for bail. All such pending bail applications were rejected by Puranik, J. by a common order on 6thJune, 1989. Unfortunately, Puranik, J. was not aware of the pendency of yet another bail application No. 995 of 1989 otherwise he would have disposed it of by the very same common Order. Before the ink was dry on Puranik, J.'s order, it was upturned by the impugned order. It is not as if the court passing the impugned order was not aware of the decision of Puranik, J.; in fact there is a reference to the same in the impugned order. Could this be done in the absence of new facts and changed circumstances? What is important to realise is that in Criminal Application No. 375 of 1989, the respondent had made an identical request as is obvious from one of the prayers (extracted earlier) made therein. Once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact- situation. And, when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. Between the two orders there was a gap of only two days and it is nobody's case that during these two days drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed reversing all earlier orders including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact-situation. In such cases it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one Judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. In such a situation the proper course, we think, is to direct that the matter be placed before the same learned Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the Court's time as a Judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It 7 will also result in consistency. In their view that we take we are fortified by the observations of this Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, ((1987) 2 SCC 684). For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no justification for passing the impugned order in the absence of a substantial change in the fact-situation. That is what prompted Shetty, J. to describe the impugned order as 'a bit out of the ordinary'. Judicial restraint demands that we say no more.” 12. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan3 at para 20 observed as follows: “20. The decisions given by a superior forum, undoubtedly, are binding on the subordinate fora on the same issue even in bail matters unless of course, there is a material change in the fact situation calling for a different view being taken. Therefore, even though there is room for filing a subsequent bail application in cases where earlier applications have been rejected, the same can be done if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. This is the limited area in which an accused who has been denied bail earlier, can move a subsequent application. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the accused that in view of the guarantee conferred on a person under Article 21 of the Constitution, it is open to the aggrieved person to make successive bail applications even on a ground already rejected by the courts earlier, including the Apex Court of the country.” 13. The allegation against the petitioner is that he is the Manager in a Spa Centre, where the prostitution was conducted with the active assistance of the other accused and victims. Granting of Anticipatory bail is neither protection nor a shield for those person against whom serious allegations of flesh trade are leveled and pre-arrest bail is not a license for commission of serious offences, as per the decisions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Gurbaksh Singh 3 (2005) 2 SCC 42 8 Sibbia v. State of Panjab 4and Sushila Aggarwal v. State of (NCT of Delhi)5. 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature and gravity of the allegations levelled against the petitioner, there are no merits for grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 15. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. However, as per the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, liberty is granted to the petitioner to surrender before the learned Jurisdictional Court concerned within one (01) week from this day, and move an appropriate application before the learned Jurisdictional Court concerned. The learned Jurisdictional Court concerned is directed to dispose of the said application in accordance with law, on its own merits by giving due and sufficient opportunity to the learned Public Prosecutor concerned, and pass appropriate orders within a reasonable time, as far as possible preferably in two (02) days. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 08.09.2025 S D P 4(1980) 2 SCC 565 5(2020) 5 SCC 1 9 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.8382 of 2025 Date:08.09.2025 S D P