1 2025:CGHC:1084-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1707 of 2018 1. Budhwar Singh S/o Late Manohar Singh Aged About 52 Years R/o- Village Hunkra P.S. Katghora, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2. Mangal Singh S/o Late Manohar Singh Aged About 48 Years R/o- Village Hunkra P.S. Katghora, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 3. Ganesh Ram Vidyaraj S/o Paras Ram Vidyaraj, R/o- Village Devgaon, P.S. Dipka, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh Through- Station House OfÏcer, P.S. Katghora, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. 2. Shiv Mangal S/o Budhram Aged About 45 Years Caste- Binjhwar, R/o- Village Hunkra, P.S. Katghora, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Mr. F.S. Khare, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. R.S. Patel, Advocate. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.01.10 14:48:46 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindar Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 08 . 01 .202 5 1. Heard Mr. F.S. Khare, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for respondent No. 1/State and Mr. R.S. Patel, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this CRMP and be pleased to quash impugned FIR Annexure A/1 dated 15.05.2018, in the interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners that the Ghasiram is the forefather of petitioners herein. He had two wife. The one wife was issue less and the second wife, namely, Ful Bai was having a son, namely, Dhajiram & Dhaniram. The Dhajiram having 03 son one Manohar (died), second son Ramayan (died) and third son Budhram. The petitioners No. 1 & 2 are son of Manohar and the complainant is son of Budhram. He also submits that after death of Ghasiram his property was partition among both wife. Since Maniyaro bai was issue less, therefore, she was looking after by father of petitioners No. 1 & 2, namely, Manohar. Since the 3 Manohar was looking after her, therefore, she executed a Will deed in favour of Manohar thereby she bequeathed the entire property of her vide Will deed dated 20.09.1988. 4. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that after death of Maniyaro Bai, on the basis of Will deed, the father of petitioners No. 1 & 2, namely, Manohar filed an application for mutation before the Tahsildar, Katghora. The Tahsildar registered the revenue case vide order dated 31.07.1989 and issued a further order for publication and for objection. After publication, the father of complainant, namely, Budhram and one Ramayan Singh were appeared. The statement of Manohar Singh was recorded. During pendency of revenue proceeding, by suppressing the fact, the Budhram, Ramayan and other person recorded their name in the property of Maniyaro Bai on 02.07.1990. On the basis thereof, the Tahsildar has vide order dated 10.02.1992 rejected the mutation case filed by Manohar. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that the father of petitioners No. 1 & 2, namely, Manohar filed an appeal before the Sub- Divisional OfÏcer, Katghora. The appeal was allowed vide order dated 13.012.1993 and matter was remitted back to Tahsildar for deciding the case on merit after giving opportunity to all the parties. He also states that, after remand, the Tahsildar heard the parties. The father of petitioners No.1 & 2, namely, Manohar submitted Will deed before the Tahsildar. The against parties were filed reply, but they did not appear and as such they were treated ex-party. The Tahsildar thereafter recorded the statement of Manohar, the witness of Will deed and writer of Will deed, namely, Shiv Balak Prasad. After perusal of statements and documents, the Tahsildar 4 vide order dated 27.11.1995 allowed the application of mutation in favour of Manohar (father of petitioners No. 1 & 2) and directed to record his name in the revenue record of property of Maniyaro having Khasra Nos.194, 240, 242, 335, 629/2 and 656/2 area 0.15, 0.10, 0.51, 0.25, 0.40 and 0.90 acres. The order of Tahsildar dated 27.11.1995 has became final because no appeal was preferred by Budhram father of complainant and Ramayan and other party. 6. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that on the basis thereof the father of petitioners No. 1 & 2, namely, Manohar became title holder and was in possession of the property of Maniyaro Bai. After his death the name of petitioners No. 1 & 2 and other legal heir of Manohar were recorded in the revenue record and possession is also of the petitioners No. 1 & 2. He also contended that the petitioners No. 1 & 2 for need of money sold the land Khasra No. 194. Thereafter, the petitioner No. 1 and one Budhwaro Bai sold the Khasra No. 335 area 12.50 dcml. vide registered sale deed dated 08.11.2016 to petitioner No. 3. He would submit that at time of acquisition some part of Khasra Nos. 240 and 242 was acquired by the government and the compensation was paid to petitioners No. 1 & 2. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that being aggrieved by payment of compensation to petitioners No. 1 & 2, the Shiv Mangal (complainant) filed a Civil Suit on 10.01.2017 before the learned C.J. Class-II, Katghora, District Korba for declaration of title and for partition. The proceeding of Civil Suit No. 3A of 2017 is being filed herewith as Annexure A/7. 5 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that the respondent No. 2, Shiv Mangal has filed the suit for partition without any right because his father Budhram is alive and during his life time the complainant has no right to claim partition. He further states that on 19.02.2018, respondent No. 2 made a complaint to Superintendent of Police by suppressing the all above facts mentioned in above preceding paras. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 filed the WPCR No. 162 of 2018 before this Court for seeking a direction to Police authority to registering the FIR. The respondent No. 2 has also suppressed the filing of civil suit and he did not disclose this fact in the writ petition. The writ petition has been disposed off by this Court vide order dated 14.03.2018 with a direction to concerned Police to investigate the matter in accordance with law. But, the Police without investigate the matter as directed by this Court, registered the FIR against the petitioners on 15.05.2018. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that after getting the knowledge above FIR the petitioners made a representation to Superintendent of Police, Korba for closing or staying the matter on the ground that the complainant already filed a civil suit before the competent Civil Court and since the name of petitioners No. 1 & 2 have been recorded as per order of Tahsildar dated 27.11.1995, therefore, allegation of forgery is false. The respondent No. 2 did not come to Court with a clear hands. He has suppressed the pending civil suit and orders passed by revenue authorities in the year 1993 & 1995. He also states that the father of respondent No. 2 was the party in the revenue cases. He is still alive and is remain silent, but his son i.e. complainant/respondent No. 2 is claiming right whereas he has no right to claim partition during lifetime his 6 father. The complainant/respondent No. 2 was never in possession of property, because as per revenue entries the petitioners No. 1 & 2 are in possession. The FIR has been lodged after passing the order by this Court. This Court has only directed to Police authority to investigate the matter and proceed in accordance with law, but the Police has first registered the FIR without investigate the matter. Hence, this petition. 10. On the other hand, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2 oppose the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 11. Learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2 does not file any return-afÏdavit in the present petition. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the prayers and pleadings made in the petition along with the annexures annexed in this petition. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC (now Section 528 of the BNSS) should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the 7 various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only 8 a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 9 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma & Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 1 held as under: “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:- “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is 10 such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution / complainant. It should be sufÏcient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufÏcient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the 11 complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the afÏrmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arisingt therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 15. In the matter of Paramjeet Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673, the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS) should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This 12 power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Randheer Singh vs. State of U.P., reported in (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal & Anr., reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C (now Section 528 of the BNSS). 17. From perusal of the documents, it is evident that the complainant/respondent No. 2 filed the WPCR No. 162 of 2018 before this Court for seeking a direction to Police authority to registering the FIR, but 13 the complainant/respondent No. 2 suppressed the fact that he also filed a civil suit before the competent Court. The Police without investigate the matter registered the FIR against the present petitioners on 15.05.2018 and against the said FIR, the petitioners made a representation to Superintendent of Police, Korba for closing or staying the matter on the ground that the complainant already filed a civil suit before the competent Court and since the name of of petitioners No. 1 & 2 have been recorded as per order of Tahsildar dated 27.11.1995, therefore, allegation of forgery is false. It is also evident that the respondent No. 2 was never in possession of property because as per revenue entries the petitioners No. 1 and 2 are in possession, therefore, the allegation of forgery as mentioned in the FIR and complaint is became false as per facts of the case because the name of petitioners No. 1 & 2 has been recorded after death of their father. The allegation made by the respondent No. 2 that the petitioners No. 1 & 2 have with help of revenue ofÏcer recorded their name is became false as per the fact that name of the father of petitioners No. 1 and 2 already recorded by the order of revenue authorities. Hence, the allegations made in the impugned FIR are absurd and do not constitute a cognizable offence. 18. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above- stated judgments (supra), we are of the considered opinion that the allegations made in the FIR are inherently improbable and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the petitioners herein. In the case in hand, malicious prosecution was instituted by respondent No. 2 against 14 the petitioners. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned FIR registered in Crime No.157 of 2018 on 15.05.2018 (Annexure A/1) at Police Station Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 34 of the IPC against the petitioners is hereby quashed. 20. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan