SUNDERLAL v. CENTRAL COALFIELDS LIMITED THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR
WPC/6403/2018 · 2025-02-27
Sri Ananda Sen
body2025
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 28874 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2025 DAILYLAW 28874 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S)No.6403 of 2018
----- Sunderlal, S/o Late Shyamlal, R/o village & P.O.-Makoli, P.S.- Chandrapura, District-Bokaro.
… Petitioner.
Versus
1. Central Coalfields Limited; a subsidiary of Coal India Limited, a Government of India Undertaking, having its registered Office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-Ranchi, P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director.
2. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-Ranchi, P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
3. Project Officer, Selected Dhori Open Cast Mines, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O.-Turiyo, P.S.-Bermo, District-Bokaro.
4. General Manager, Dhori Area, Dhori, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O.-Dhori, P.S.-Bermo, District-Bokaro.
… Respondents.
CORAM :
SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
------ For the Petitioner : Mr. A.K. Sahani, Advocate For C.C.L.
: Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate …...... 07 /27.02.2025: Heard the counsel for the petitioner. 2. Heard the counsel appearing on behalf of the C.C.L.
3. By filing this writ petition the petitioner has prayed to quash the dismissal order dated 14/19.11.2015 contained in Memo No. 2356, whereby the disciplinary authority has terminated the petitioner from services on the ground that he remained absent for more than two years which is a misconduct and has been proved in the departmental proceeding. He also challenges the appellate order dated 17.05.2016 by which the appeal preferred by the appellant has been dismissed. 4. The learned counsel Mr. A.K. Sahani, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner was suffering from Jaundice and fracture of his leg. He initially got his treatment in C.C.L. Hospital but thereafter for better treatment he had opted for private hospitals and after two years when he got cured, he came to join with his medical certificates but he was not allowed to join on the ground that he has remained absent
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unauthorizedly. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated and finally he was terminated from service. He further submits that the petitioner initially had gone for treatment and was treated in the hospital of the Central Coalfields Limited and thereafter in a private hospital. The fact that he was suffering from ailments could not have been disbelieved by the respondents as he initially was being treated in the hospital of the employer/respondents. Since he has got his treatment from private hospitals and not from the C.C.L. Hospital, the respondents have passed the impugned order. As per him the absence was not willful but was beyond the control of the petitioner. 5. The counsel appearing on behalf of the Central Coalfields Limited submits that the C.C.L. has a hospital and the petitioner after getting initial treatment had left the hospital and has taken treatment from outside sources without informing the authorities. He submits that even if the petitioner was suffering from any disease, he should have informed about the same to the authorities but in this case the petitioner did not inform and not even obtained any leave.
Since, the petitioner has not obtained any leave he has rightly proceeded against and has been dismissed as his absence is unauthorized. 6. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a departmental proceeding is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 37 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellant Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry office. By referring to
judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the
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function of the High Court to review on the findings and arrive at a different finding, as an Appellate Authority.
7. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can interfere. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: -
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment in the case of the State of Rajasthan and others vs. Bhupendra Singh, reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 1908 has reiterated the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Sree Rama Rao (Supra) and has held that the High Court should not reappreciate evidence led in the departmental enquiry. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580, has also held that if the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct, this Court by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the quantum of punishment. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under: -
14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional
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cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 9. Keeping these proposition of law in mind I am scrutinizing this writ petition. I have gone through the enquiry report and from perusal of the enquiry report, I find that the Enquiry Officer has also admitted the fact that the petitioner was suffering from Jaundice and had a fracture in his leg for which he initially got himself treated in C.C.L. Hospital. 10. Further the fact remains that the petitioner was absent for two years and it is also an admitted fact that the petitioner had not informed the authorities that he was absent and the reason of such absence. The allegation which is substantiated from the enquiry report is that without giving a proper information and without obtaining leave, he remained absent. 11. The punishment which has been imposed upon the petitioner is of termination.
I am of the opinion that when the Enquiry Officer has accepted that the petitioner was suffering from Jaundice and also with fracture of leg, the disciplinary authority could not have imposed the corporal punishment of termination. The punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct. Thus, I am inclined to allow this writ petition by setting aside the order of punishment dated 14/19.11.2015 whereby the petitioner has been terminated from service. He is directed to be reinstated
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forthwith. The period which he had remained absent will be treated to be in service for the purpose of his post retiral benefit. 12. So far as back wages is concerned, it is now well settled by
judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Phool Chand, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 299 that employee cannot claim back wages as matter of right on being reinstated. The employee has to come up with a positive plea that during the period when he was absent, he had not resorted to any alternative source of employment. If this plea is taken by the employee, then the employer has the chance to rebut the claim of the employee. However, in this case the petitioner has not mentioned anything in his petition as to whether he was gainfully employed during the period or not.
13. So far as payment of back wages is concerned a balance has to be maintained keeping in mind the interest of the employee and the employer as well. In this case, I find that the punishment imposed was too harsh and is shockingly disproportionate which needs to be set aside and an order of reinstatement to be passed.
14. Considering the aforesaid fact, in the interest of justice I direct the employer to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 5 lakhs by way of back wages.
15. This writ application stands allowed only to the aforesaid effect.
16. The order of reinstatement with back wages has been passed taking into consideration that the petitioner in normal course will retire sometime in the year 2028.
(ANANDA SEN, J.) Arpit/ AFR