Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:15215 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA LPA No. 501 of 2024 Decided on: 20.05.2025 State of HP and others ...Appellants. Versus Rajesh Kumar and others ....Respondents. Coram: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? For the Appellants: Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh Additional Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. Consideration in the present Letters Patent Appeal filed by the State is to the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.5825/2024 titled Rajesh Kumar and others vs. State of HP and others dated 08.11.2024, wherein three land owners as such had approached the Writ Court and the Writ Court issued directions to initiate acquisition proceedings, within four weeks under the relevant 2 statute for the land which has been utilized by the State for the construction of the road, namely, ‘Gumma- Bakhol Road’ in the year 1988-1989. 2. The plea of the State before the learned Single Judge, which has been repeated herein was that the petition was barred by delay and laches as well the land was made available by the petitioners on their own volition and with the clear understanding that they would not seek any compensation. 3. While placing reliance on the judgment in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2020) 2 SCC 569, Sukh Dutt Rattra vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 and (CWP No. 8647 of 2022), Ramanand and others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, the relief was granted by holding that there is nothing on record to show in the form of any documentary evidence that any understanding had been reached that no compensation would be claimed or paid and thus reliance was placed under Article 300A 3 of the Constitution of India that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. 4. Since the Counsel for the State has agitated that it was pleaded case as such of the petitioners that the land was utilized in the year 1988-1989 therefore, there was delay as such, the learned Single Judge should have kept in mind the judgment in State of Maharashtra vs. Digamber (1995) 4 SCC 683. 5. We have perused the writ record which would go on to show that the specific case as such of the petitioners was that the land which fell in village Mohal Pohal Hadbast No.170, has been utilized for construction of the road which had been made functional for public use since 2003 and reference was given of 00-10-40 hectares of the land owned by the petitioners which had been utilized and construction had started in the year 2001-2002. It is evident from the record that the said road became functional in the year 2003 onward and that in the year 2019, the State had initiated acquisition proceedings with respect to the 4 land owners whose land was utilized for the construction of the road from ‘Gumma-Bakhol road’ in Tehsil Kotkhai District Shimla, HP and paid compensation to some of the land owners. Reference was made to two Awards bearaing No. 3 of 2019 dated 26.02.2019 pertaining to village Phohal (Annexure P-2) and Award No. 6 of 2019 dated 18.03.2019 pertaining to village Gumma (Annexure P-3). In such circumstances, when similarly situated land owners had been granted compensation for the land utilized for the construction of ‘Gumma Bakhol road’ the plea taken was that the petitioners were also similarly situated. The name of person who had been paid compensation were Prakash Chand, Suresh Chauhan, Anant Ram, Ram Gopal etc., and on the basis of the same, legal notice dated 22.09.2023 (Annexure P-4) had been sent to the respondents-State for the same relief. Thereafter writ petition was filed on 24.06.2024 as the issue had not been addressed by the respondents. 5 6. The stand of the respondent-State as such in their reply was that the road length was 6 KMs and metalling and tarring of the road has also been carried out under NABARD funds and there was demand as such to provide road connectivity during the year 1988- 1989 to 1998-1999. The administrative approval and expenditure sanction for the construction of this road was received from the competent authority on 15.07.1987. The petitioners’ predecessors had surrendered their land voluntarily for the purpose of constitution of the road and no objection had been raised till filing of the writ petition. Therefore, the remedy, if any available to the petitioners, was to approach the competent Civil Court. 7. Regarding issue of similarity of other land owners having been granted the benefit of acquisition, it was averred that the other land owners had obtained orders from the Court by misrepresentation of facts and State was compelled to initiate acquisition proceedings in other cases and the policy of the State, prevalent at 6 that time was that the roads were to be constructed only on the gift of the land by the land owners. The plea taken was that because written consent or gift deed was not obtained, the petitioners cannot be permitted to take plea for compensation as such at this belated stage. 8. In the rejoinder (sic-replication), it was pointed out that the compensation in the Awards, which had been passed in favour of other land owners, had further been enhanced by the Reference Court and that in similar circumstances in Civil Writ Petition No. 1377 of 2019 titled Rajinder Singh vs. State of HP and others directions had been issued to initiate acquisition proceedings for the same road. The plea was taken that once the compensation for other land owners for the same road had been granted and no procedure had been adopted to acquire the land, the welfare State cannot divest the petitioners who are also similarly situated. 7 9. The State has not been able to rebut the fact that the appeal filed against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge in Rajinder Singh’s case (supra) has been dismissed on 25.03.2025 in LPA No. 114 of 2025. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under: “10. In aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or any other perversity in the impugned judgment. Therefore, appeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits. 11. We consider it fit to record that State is preferring the appeals despite dismissal of their similar appeals in identical matters. Such conduct is not in consonance with the Litigation Policy adopted by the State of HP which is causing wasting the time and energy of the State as well as the Court. It may invite imposing cost but taking lenient view, no cost is being imposed. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that it appears from the operative portion of the impugned judgment that direction has been given to acquire entire land of the petitioner mentioned in the Writ Petition, whereas, the land, which has been utilized for construction of road should have been directed to be acquired. 13. Contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is misconceived, because direction has been given to initiate acquisition proceedings with respect 8 to the land of the petitioner which has been utilized for construction of road and, therefore, there is no question of directing for acquisition of land which has not been utilized for the purpose of construction of road. However, for more clarification, it is observed that acquisition proceedings shall be initiated with respect to the land which has been utilized by the State for construction of road. 14. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed with direction that consequential action, in terms of judgment 24.9.2024, passed in CWP No.1377 of 2019, titled Rajinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, be taken within four weeks. Appeal stands disposed of alongwith pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.” 10. The issue of voluntary consent as such and that the onus would lie upon the State is the settled position of law in Civil Appeal No(s) 3189 of 2022, Kalyanai (Dead) through LRs and others vs. The Sulthan Bathery Municipality and others, wherein the Apex Court was dealing with a similar situation, wherein, land had been utilized for construction/ widening of bypass road and the landowners had been given assurance that they would get adequate compensation for their land utilized. The Supreme 9 Court held that the onus as such could not be shifted on the land owners qua the donation aspect which had been done by the High Court in that case. 11. Regarding the issue of delay as such as noticed above, the State had itself passed the Awards for similarly situated persons only in the year 2019 which would be clear from Annexure P-2 which pertains to village Pohal wherein the land of the petitioners is situated and their land was also acquired for the construction of ‘Guma Bakhol’ road and as such further compensation has been enhanced, as mentioned in the rejoinder (sic-replication). 12. Once the similarly situated land owners had been granted compensation by the State at the belated stage, we are of the considered opinion that the land owners whose land was also utilized for the construction of the same road, cannot be denied the same benefit. 13. In LPA No. 168 of 2025 titled State of HP and others vs. Surya Kant, decided on 16.05.2025 10 we have also taken the same view and therefore, we do not find any tangible reason to take a different view. The judgment in Digamber’s case supra is thus distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the case as the representation was filed immediately after the Awards were passed in the year 2019 and legal notice dated 22.09.2023 (Annexure P-4) was issued and having met no response from the State, the writ petition was filed in the year 2024. 14. In Letters Patent Appeal No. 68 of 2025, State of H.P. and others vs. Charan Dass decided on 01.03.2025 and Letters Patent Appeal No.183 of 2025, titled as State of H.P. & Ors. vs. Amar Singh decided on 21.04.2025, we have given detailed reasons as such, as to why no ground is made out to interfere in such matters, keeping in view the law settled by the Apex Court. 15. Keeping in view the above facts which also stand settled beyond the anvil of doubt as per the judgments noticed by the learned Single Judge, which 11 have also been considered by us, we do not find any plausible ground as such to take a different view then the one which has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 16. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the instant appeal is devoid of any merit, hence it is dismissed along with pending applications, if any. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice (Ranjan Sharma) Judge May 20, 2025. (cm Thakur)