RSA No.376 o IN THE Major Sudh Sharu Ram CORAM: Present: DEEPAK GU plaintiff of Appellate upholding the suit fi specific pe of suit land 2. order to before the 3.1 was execut and defend LRs), regar 76 of 1991 Page No.1 out of 19 THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND H ********** Sudhir Narula Versus Ram through its LRs and others HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK Mr. Gurpreet Singh Kahlon, Ad for the appellant. Mr. Manuj Chadha, Advocate Respondents. **** K GUPTA, J. Present Regular Second Ap f of the case against judgment d ate Court of Learned Additiona ing the judgment dated 24.11.1988 it filed by the plaintiff (appellant c performance of agreement to sel land situated in District Gurugram. Trial Court record was called to avoid confusion, parties shall be the Trial Court. Admittedly, an agreement to ecuted between plaintiff –Major Su fendant No.1 – Sharu Ram (respon egarding sale of suit land for con f 19 pages ND HARYANAAT CHANDIGARH **** RSA No.376 of 1991 Reserved on: 29.01.2025 Pronounced on: 04.02.2025 …. Appellant ….Respondents PAK GUPTA n, Advocate ate for the Appeal has been filed by the nt dated 21.09.1990 of the First ional District Judge, Gurugram, 1988 of the Trial Court, dismissing llant herein) seeking decree for sell dated 11.02.1981 in respect m. lled. Same has been perused. In ll be referred as per their status t to sell dated 11.02.1981 (Ex.P-6) Sudhir Narula (appellant herein) spondent No.1 herein through his consideration of 18,150/-. An 91 25 25 he irst m, ing for ect In tus 6) in) his An RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o amount of money. Ta to be 31.07 paid. Usua the effect executed money pai fails to exe have the ri Court. 3.2 several tim He also me executed a approachin he was no 31.07.1981 and that th have been getting the submits th ultimately the sale de return the land to his No.1 were performan the limitati 3.3 the agreem 76 of 1991 Page No.2 out of 19 t of 500/- was paid by the plaintiff . Target date for execution/ registr 1.07.1981, on which the remaining sual default clauses were also inco ect that in case the proposed vend ed and registered in his favour up t paid by him shall stand forfeited execute and get the sale deed reg e right to get the sale deed execut As per plaintiff, he approac l times to get the sale deed executed met the defendant No.1 on 24.6.1 ed and registered as the stipulat ching near but defendant No.1 Sh s not keeping good health and furt 981 as mentioned in the agreemen at the time for execution of the s een extended and that he (Sharu Ra the sale deed executed and regi s that thereafter, he remained tely, approached the defendant No le deed executed and registered b the money of 500/- informing that his sons by way of some family se ere impleaded as defendants No. ance was filed on 30.07.1984 i.e. itation period. Defendants contested the su reement to sell and defendant No f 19 pages intiff to defendant No.1 as earnest gistration of sale deed was agreed ining sale consideration was to be incorporated in the agreement to vendee fails to get the sale deed up to the target date, the earnest ted; whereas, in case the vendor registered, then the vendee will ecuted through the process of the roached the defendant - vendor uted in his favour but was put off. 4.6.1981 for getting the sale deed ulated date of 31.07.1981 was Sharu Ram told the plaintiff that further assured that the date of ment had no meaning whatsoever he sale deed shall be deemed to Ram) shall have no objection for registered at any time. Plaintiff ned on active army duty and t No.1 on 26.07.1984 for getting d but defendant No.1 offered to that he had already given the suit ily settlement. Sons of defendant No.2 to 6. The suit for specific i.e. the last date before expiry of e suit admitting the execution of t No.1 having received 500/- as est ed be to ed est or ill he or ff. ed as at of ver to for tiff nd ing to uit nt ific of of as RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o earnest mo execution perform hi Registrar o and willing office of Su waited for Defendant deed was submitted and so, agreement partitioned by virtue o 3.4 parties was been ready plaintiff, w that the e these mate affirmed th 4. below, it is time is not and that de be ground mentioning the time w that failure the earnes 76 of 1991 Page No.3 out of 19 t money but submitted that 31.07 ion and performance of agreemen his part of contract, as he did no ar on that day, though defendant illing to perform his part of contra of Sub-Registrar on 31.07.1981 for for the plaintiff whole of the d ant No.1 further denied that last d as ever extended as is claimed ted that amount of 500/- paid as e there was no question of s ent. It was also submitted tha ned between defendant No.1 and h e of a judgment and decree dated 0 Necessary issues were frame was taken on record. Trial Court fo eady and willing to perform his pa who had committed the breach e earnest money stood forfeited. aterial issues, the suit was dismiss d these findings. Assailing the aforesaid concu it is contended by learned counsel not the essence of the contract fo at delay in filing the suit for specific und to reject the claim. It is fu ning of some date or time in an ag e was the essence of the contract ilure to execute the agreement to s rnest money to have been forfeit f 19 pages 1.07.1981 was the last date for ent to sell but plaintiff failed to d not appear in the office of Sub- ant Sharu Ram was always ready ontract and had appeared in the for executing the sale deed and e day but he never turned up. ast date for execution of the sale ed by the plaintiff and further as earnest money stood forfeited f specific performance of the that the suit land was already nd his sons - defendants No.2 to 6 ted 01.05.1984. amed. Evidence produced by the rt found that the plaintiff has not is part of contract and it was the ach of contract. It was also held ted. Based upon the finding on missed. The First Appellate Court oncurrent findings of the Courts sel for the appellant-plaintiff that for sale of immovable property ecific performance in itself cannot is further contended that mere agreement does not mean that ract. Still further, it is contended to sell by 31.7.1981 simply meant rfeited but it did not mean that for to - dy he nd up. ale er ed he dy o 6 he ot he eld on urt rts at rty ot re at ed nt at RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o agreement Courts belo the right judgments this appeal 5. counsel fo interferenc Courts belo perform hi filed just on for specific declined th accordingly 6. parties and 7. total sale c dispute tha sale conside the execut default clau in his favou the vendor vendee wa process of borne by th date on wh to expire. 76 of 1991 Page No.4 out of 19 ent was deemed to have been below have failed to appreciate th ht perspective, prayer is made nts and to decree the suit of the a peal. Refuting the aforesaid conten l for the respondents-defendants rence in the concurrent findings o below to the effect that the plaintif his part of contract. It is specific st on the last date before the expiry cific performance and, therefore, d the discretionary relief of spec ingly made for dismissal of the appe This Court has considered t and has appraised the entire record Execution of the agreement le consideration of 18,150/- is not that only an amount of 500/- nsideration) was paid as earnest m ecution of the sale deed was fixed clauses, in case the vendee failed avour, the earnest money was to b ndor failed to execute and get the s was given the right to get the sal s of the Court and in that eventualit by the vendor. The suit has been fi n which the limitation to file the sui re. f 19 pages een cancelled. Contending that e the factual and legal position in de to set aside the impugned he appellant-plaintiff, by allowing ntentions, it is argued by learned ants that there is no scope for gs of the facts recorded by the intiff was not ready and willing to cifically pointed out that suit was xpiry of limitation for filing the suit , the Courts below have rightly specific performance. Prayer is ppeal. ed the submissions of both the cord carefully. ent to sell dated 11.2.1981 for not in dispute. It is further not in (approx.2.75 % of total agreed st money and the target date for fixed as 31.07.1981. As per the iled to get the sale deed executed to be forfeited; whereas, in case the sale deed registered, then the sale deed executed through the uality, all the expenses were to be en filed on 30.07.1984 i.e. the last suit for specific performance was at in ed ing ed for he to as uit tly is he for in ed for he ed se he he be ast as RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o 8. approached executed b defendant registered have been as per the plaintiff ha letter, the defendant sale deed e 9. the time w were consi under :- “17. immo and deem limit. 18. whic The p told could mean betw plain educ who say t 76 of 1991 Page No.5 out of 19 Plaintiff claims that prior to ched the vendor defendant severa d but he was put off. It is als ant on 24.6.1981 for getting th red but defendant had assured that een extended and that he will exec the convenience of the plaintiff. f has relied upon a letter dated 26 there is a reference of the me ant No.1 on 24.6.1981 and that def ed executed at any time convenient The above-said contention ap e was not the essence of the con onsidered by the First Appellate C 17. In any case, where time is not es mmovable property, the prospective nd willing to perform his part of the eemed that time will extend it could b imit. Here 31.7.1981 were stipulated hich the parties were to perform thei he plaintiff now claims that he appro old him that he was not keeping we ould get the sale deed executed a eaning thereby that the time wa etween the parties in this case was laintiff is a senior officer of the India ducated person. Apart from himself ho could state that the time was exte ay that oral evidence of an intereste f 19 pages to 31.7.1981 i.e. target date, he veral times to get the sale deed s also claimed that he met the g the sale deed executed and that 31.7.1981 may be deemed to xecute the sale deed on any date tiff. To prove this assertion, the d 26.6.1981 (Ex.P-7). In the said meeting between plaintiff and defendant had assured to get the ient to the plaintiff. n apart from the contention that contract of sale of the property, te Court and it was observed as t essence of the contract of sale of tive vendee must always be ready the contract and even if it is to be uld be extended only to a reasonable lated as the last date before or on their respective part of the contract. pproached the defendant No.1 who well and he should take it that he d any time even after 31.7.1981, was extended. The agreement was reduced to writing Ex.P.6. The Indian Army and he must be a well- elf, he has not examined any person extended by Sharu Ram. Suffice it to rested person cannot cut much ice. he ed he nd to te he aid nd he at ty, as of dy be ble on ct. ho he , nt he - on to ce. RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o State furth made sepa appe 19. writt heav Ram defen execu a cas retai but n time whic Sharu A pe proo rathe accor the l Why rathe creat not, the p sha 20. It ordin own or at and t 76 of 1991 Page No.6 out of 19 tatement made by the plaintiff in h urther his case. If time was actually ade in that behalf on the reverse o eparate piece of paper? That is a q ppellant. 9. Ex.P.7 which purports to be a ritten by the plaintiff to defendant S eavily. In this letter, he referred to a m on 24.6.1981 and other exigencie efendant had told that plaintiff coul xecuted in his favour according to his case where plaintiff-appellant cleverl etain a typed copy of letter allegedly ut never insisted on getting a writin ime by the defendant. There is in hich Ex. P.7 purports to be a copy, w haru Ram. Plaintiff's stand is that the person of his status and education roof of posting the letter by ordina ather interesting to note that a co ccording to the plaintiff’s case but he he letter by registered post or at le hy a copy should have been retaine ather leads to very strong suspicions. reated by way of evidence. Such acts ot, give insight into the real facts and he party concerned although this cru all not take the plaintiff anywhere an 0. It will be easiest thing for a party to rdinary post and to produce copy th wn sic. and convenience. Unless it is s at least compelling circumstance th nd the copy of its true copy, it will not f 19 pages in his own favour orally would not ally extended why a writing was not se of the agreement Ex.P.6 or on a a question for which the plaintiff- e a copy of letter dated 26.6.1981 nt Sharu Ram has been relied upon to a meeting with defendant Sharu ncies including a reference that said could come and have the sale deed his convenience at any time. Here is verly enough thought it necessary to dly written by him to the defendant riting made regarding extension of fact no proof that any letter, of y, was actually written by plaintiff to the letter was sent by ordinary post. tion will certainly be aware that no dinary post shall be required. It is a copy of the letter was retained he did not think it proper to send t least under certificate of posting. ained is again a circumstance which ons. It appears that Ex.P.7 has been acts of overdoing, more often than and bring to fore the cleverness of crude attempt of creating evidence e and must fail him. rty to say that a letter was posted by y thereof prepared according to its t is shown by documentary evidence ce that a letter was actually written not further case of such party.” ot ot a - 81 on ru aid ed is to nt of of to st. no is ed nd ng. ich en an of ce by its ce en RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o 10. Appellate C 26.6.1981 Defendant any such le behalf eve rightly obs 24.6.1981 endorseme paper rega it does not letter by o thereof wi through reg 11. ignored Ex. has also be Ram had a target date plaintiff, he and on tha case was appeared o 12. have rightl perform h contract. 13. findings of based on 76 of 1991 Page No.7 out of 19 It is thus clear from the above ate Court that though the plaintiff 81 (Ex.P-7) but the same was simp ant- Sharu Ram examined as DW ch letter. He has further denied th ever met him in June, 1981. Lear observed that in case plaintiff 81 as is claimed by him, there w ement on the back of the agreem regarding the extension of time, but not appeal to the reason that the by ordinary post for the extension f with him and will not send suc h registered post or under certificat In the above circumstances, d Ex.P-7 and have rightly disbelieved o been found by the Courts below ad appeared in the office of Sub-Re date fixed for execution of the agre he had moved an application Ex that, order Ex.D-1 was passed by th as called several times but the ed on that date. In the above said facts and cir ightly concluded that the plaintiff his contract and that it is the ct. Apart from above, High Co s of the facts recorded by the Court on the evidence, even on the f 19 pages bove-said observations of the First ntiff relied upon the letter dated simply sent by the ordinary post. DW-3 has denied having received d that plaintiff or anybody on his Learned first Appellate Court has tiff had met the defendant on re was no reason not to get an reement Ex.P-6 or on a separate , but this was not done. Similarly, the plaintiff will simply send the sion of time and will keep a copy such an important letter either ficate of posting. , the Courts below have rightly eved the version of the plaintiff. It elow that defendant No.1- Sharu Registrar on 31.07.1981 i.e. the agreement. After waiting for the n Ex.D-2 for marking his presence by the Sub-Registrar, as per which he plaintiff i.e. vendee had not d circumstances, the Courts below tiff was not ready and willing to the plaintiff, who breached the Court cannot interfere in the ourts below including the findings the ground of the same being irst ed st. ed his as on an ate rly, he py er tly . It ru he he ce ich ot ow to he he gs ing RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o erroneous, may be ma wherein it “9.Th inter Secti Proce of in unde was CPC a Sec 41. Second a to the High C in appeal by High Court o namely : (a) the decis some custom law; (b) the decis some mater usage having (c) a substa procedure p Procedure 1 other law fo may possibly in the decisio 76 of 1991 Page No.8 out of 19 ous, however, gross are inexcusab e made to Randhir Kaur vs. Prith in it has been held by the Hon’ble Su The first and the foremost questio nterference in second appeal in Punj ection 41 of the Punjab Act. Prior to rocedure vide CPC (Amendment) Act, f interference in second appeal un nder the Code of Civil Procedure as it as on similar grounds. Section 41 of PC as it existed prior to 1-4-1977 read Section 41 of Punjab Act nd appeals—(1) An appeal shall lie igh Court from every decree passed l by any Court subordinate to the rt on any of the following grounds, ecision being contrary to law or to stom or usage having the force of ecision having failed to determine aterial issue of law or custom or ving the force of law; bstantial error or defect in the re provided by the Code of Civil re 1908 [V of 1908], or by any w for the time being in force which sibly have produced error or defect cision of the case upon the merits; 100 oth bod for sha dec sub the (a) or law (b) det or u (c) pro any for pro dec f 19 pages usable. In this regard, reference ithvi Pal Singh (2019) 17 SCC 71, le Supreme Court as under :- stion arising in respect of scope of Punjab and Haryana is governed by r to amendment in the Code of Civil Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1-2-1977, the scope l under the Punjab Act as well as as it existed before the amendment 1 of the Punjab Act and Section 100 reads as under: Section 100 of CPC 100. Second Appeal.-- (1). Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds, namely: (a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. ce , of by ivil pe as nt 00 re he aw eal ery urt of aw of to aw he by in ve he RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o (2) An appe from an appe 10. Chan inter same Ame Secti XX 15. jurisd on t inexc inclu jurisd error 16. inter evide woul cons purch not a 17. appe willin plea attor cou 76 of 1991 Page No.9 out of 19 ppeal may lie under this section appellate decree passed ex parte. (2) Sec pas The effect of the Constitution Ben handrika, (2016)6 SCC 157 is that i nterference within the Punjab and Ha ame as the Code of Civil Procedu mendment. The provisions of Sectio ection 100 CPC are in pari materia. XX XX XX A perusal of the aforesaid jud urisdiction in second appeal is not to i n the ground that findings are nexcusable the error may seem to b nclude the findings on the basis o urisdiction to interfere in the second rror in law or procedure and not mere In view of the above, we find nterfere with the findings of fact vidence merely because the High Co ould be a better view. The lear onsidered the absence of clause in urchase land on behalf of the Plainti ot appeared as witness. A perusal of the findings record ppellate court has returned a finding illing to perform the contract and t lea that they were not aware that ttorney holder. Therefore, the finding ourt cannot be said to be contra f 19 pages (2) An appeal may lie under this Section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. Bench judgment in Pankajakshi vs. at in second appeal, the scope of d Haryana High Court would be the cedure existed prior to the 1976 ection 41 of the Punjab Act and of XX XX judgments would show that the o interfere with the findings of fact re erroneous, however, gross or to be. The findings of fact will also sis of documentary evidence. The nd appeal is only where there is an erely an error on a question of fact. ind that the High Court could not act recorded after appreciation of h Court thought that another view learned first appellate court has in the first power of attorney to aintiff; the fact that the plaintiff has corded show that the learned first ding that the plaintiff was ready and nd that the defendants cannot take hat Dhanwant Singh was power of dings recorded by the first appellate ntrary to law which may confer his ee vs. of he 76 of he act or lso he an ct. ot of ew as to as irst nd ke of ate fer RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o jurisd recor 18. that issue inter defec any prod Cour fact attor 14. SCC 166, interferenc High Court compelling appreciate In the case Court had a trial Court even on appreciatio High Court Appellate C 15. (SC) 459, willingness specific per two Court 76 of 1991 Page No.10 out of 1 urisdiction on the High Court to inte ecorded by the first appellate court. Learned counsel for the responden hat the first appellate court has fail ssue of law which may confer juri nterfere with the findings of fact nor efect in the procedure provided by ny other law for the time being in roduced error or defect in the decisio ourt was not within its jurisdiction t act only for the reason that plaintif ttorney in favour of Dhanwant Singh.” Similarly, in Navaneethamm , it has been held by the H rence with the concurrent findings ourt under Section 100 CPC must be lling reasons. In any case, the High iate the evidence just to replace the case before the Hon’ble Supreme ad appreciated the evidence and co urt that the suit was not barred b assuming that another review iation of same evidence, that shou ourt, as it cannot be said that ate Court was based on no material. In Kamal Kumar vs. Premlat , Hon’ble Supreme Court observe ness is the most important issue erformance of contract. The said ourts below on the appreciation of 19 pages interfere with the findings of fact dents have not raised any argument failed to determine some material jurisdiction on the High Court to nor there is any substantial error or the Code of Civil Procedure or by in force which may possibly have cision on merits. Therefore, the High on to interfere with the findings of intiff has failed to prove power of gh.” mal vs. Arjuna Chetty (1996) 6 e Hon’ble Supreme Court that ings of the Courts below by the st be avoided unless warranted by High Court is not expected to re- e the findings of the Lower Courts. eme Court, the Lower Appellate d confirmed the conclusion of the ed by limitation. It was held that view was possible on the re- hould not have been done by the at the view taken by the First rial. ata Joshi and others, 2019 AIR erved that issue of readiness and sue for considering the grant of said issue having been held by the ion of the evidence against the act nt rial to or by ve igh of of ) 6 at he by - rts. ate he at - he irst IR nd of he he RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o plaintiff, su case, Hon’b “10. form tions cific contr Seco part part fact, tent manc whet to th will c what plain othe so, o 11. In tory lief A Civil the p denc ercis perfo facts 12. In into ed a 76 of 1991 Page No.11 out of 1 f, such finding is binding being esse on’ble Supreme Court had held as u 10. It is a settled principle of law that ormance is a discretionary and equi ions, which are required to be gone in ific performance, are First, whether ontract between the parties for sale econd, whether the plaintiff has been art of contract and whether he is still art as mentioned in the contract; Th act, performed his part of the contrac ent and in what manner he has perfo ance was in conformity with the hether it will be equitable to grant th o the plaintiff against the defendant ill cause any kind of hardship to the hat manner and the extent if such re laintiff; and lastly, whether the plain ther alternative relief, namely, refun o, on what grounds. 1. In our opinion, the aforementioned ory requirements (See Sections 16 (c) ief Act, 1963 and the forms 47/48 of ivil Procedure). These requirements he parties in their respective pleading ence in accordance with law. It is only rcise its discretion and accordingly gra erformance depending upon the ca acts. 2. In the case at hand, we find that t nto these questions in the light of plea d a categorical finding against the of 19 pages essentially question of fact. In this as under : hat the grant of relief of specific per- equitable relief. The material ques- ne into for grant of the relief of spe- er there exists a valid and concluded sale/purchase of the suit property; een ready and willing to perform his still ready and willing to perform his ; Third, whether the plaintiff has, in tract and, if so, how and to what ex- erformed and whether such perfor- the terms of the contract; Fourth, nt the relief of specific performance ant in relation to suit property or it the defendant and, if so, how and in ch relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any efund of earnest money etc. and, if oned questions are part of the statu- (c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Re- 8 of Appendix A to C of the Code of nts have to be properly pleaded by dings and proved with the aid of evi- only then the Court is entitled to ex- y grant or refuse the relief of specific case made out by the parties on at the two Courts below have gone pleadings and evidence and record- the plaintiff holding that the plain- his r- s- e- ed ty; his his in x- r- th, ce r it in he ny , if u- e- of by i- x- ific on ne d- n- RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o tiff tract perfo suit l relief as ag 13. I failed contr most of th low o this C cline unde the a or/an by th The above 16. the appella Court has performan Singh vs. wherein it and the pla contract, th held that judiciously, performan sale consid 76 of 1991 Page No.12 out of 1 was neither ready and nor willing ract and, therefore, he was not entitl erformance of the contract against t uit land. It was also held that the plain elief of refund of earnest money beca s agreed between them. 3. In other words, both the Courts b ailed to prove his readiness and willin ontract. The issue of readiness and ost important issue for considering t f the contract and the same having b ow on appreciation of evidence again his Court. It being essentially a quest lined to again appreciate the entire ev nder Article 136 of the Constitution. he appellant was also not able to po r/and illegality in the finding so as to y this Court.” ove said authority is fully applicable Proceeding further, the conte pellant that once suit has been file has no discretion and is required ance has no merit. Learned cou Hari Singh(Dead) through L.Rs a in it was held that when agreement e plaintiff is found to be ready and ct, the relief for specific performan hat discretion under Section 20 usly, soundly and reasonably. Not t ance despite execution of agreem nsideration is proved and the plain of 19 pages ling to perform his part of the con- ntitled to claim the relief of specific st the defendants in relation to the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any because it was liable to be adjusted rts below held that the plaintiff has illingness to perform his part of the and willingness, in our view, is the ng the grant of specific performance ing been held by the two Courts be- against the plaintiff, it is binding on uestion of fact, this Court is not in- re evidence while hearing the appeal ion. It is more so when we find that o point out any material perversity s to call for any interference therein able to the facts of present case. ontention of learned counsel for n filed within limitation, then the red to pass a decree for specific counsel has referred to Sughar .Rs and others (2021) 17 SCC 705, ent is found to be duly executed and willing to perform his part of mance cannot be denied. It was 20 is required to be exercised ot to grant the decree for specific reement to sell is proved and part laintiff is always ready and willing n- ific he ny ed as he he ce e- on n- eal at ity ein for he ific ar , ed of as ed ific art ing RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o to perform situation, favour of th discretion amendmen been subst retrospecti 17. facts of the below that contract an the said co is based up 18. been filed has been fi Factual po execution a has been f limitation. circumstan performan 19. and others, that the la years back However, t properties. and therefo not of the 76 of 1991 Page No.13 out of 1 orm the contract would encourage the balance should tilt in favo of the defendant executing the agre ion judiciously. Hon’ble Supreme ment to the Specific Relief Act 1 ubstituted. It was held that thoug ectively but can be a guide on discr I am afraid that the cited aut f the present case, as it has been co that plaintiff was not ready and w ct and this Court finds that there is d concurrent finding of facts recorde d upon proper appreciation of evide Apart from above, the Court c iled within the reasonable time afte en filed just on the last date before t l position is not in dispute to the ion and registration of the sale dee en filed on 30.07.1984 i.e. on the ion. The question is that whether stances, plaintiff deserves to be g ance? In the case of Saradamani Ka hers, 2011 AIR SC (Civil) 812,Hon’ble e law that ‘time was not essence o back, when prices were stable er, these days there is galloping inc ties. Market values of properties a erefore, there is an urgent need to r he essence in contracts. It wi of 19 pages age dishonesty and that in such a favour of the plaintiff, rather in agreement to sell while exercising eme Court also referred to the t 1963 by which Section 10 has hough the same is not applicable iscretionary relief. authority is not applicable to the n consistently found by the Courts nd willing to perform his part of e is no justification to interfere in orded by the Courts below, which vidence. urt cannot ignore that suit has not after the target date and rather,it ore the expiry of limitation period. the effect that target date for deed was 31.07.1981 and the suit the last date of the expiry of the ther in the above said facts and be granted the relief of specific ni Kandappan Vs. S. Rajalakshmi n’ble Supreme Court has observed ce of contract’ was evolved long le and inflation was unknown. g increase in prices of immovable es are no longer stable or steady to revisit the principle that time is t will be apt to reproduce the h a in ing he as ble he rts of in ich ot ,it od. for uit he nd ific mi ed ng n. ble dy is he RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o observation referring to (1997) 3 SC “27. of th prop Vaira mem Ther not o also relat chan price refer case the p 76 of 1991 Page No.14 out of 1 ations made by Hon’ble Supreme ng to a decision in K.S. Vidyanada 3 SCC 1, which read as under: - 27. A correct perspective relating to t f the essence of the contract in c roperty, is given by this court in K.S airavan - (1997) 3 SCC 1 (by Jeevan ember of the Constitution Bench in C "It has been consistently held by t early English decisions, that in the to immovable property, time is n unless specifically provided to t properties in India, it is well-know up sharply over the last few d .........We cannot be oblivious to th and continuous rise in the value large scale migration of people fro by inflation. Indeed, we are incline evolved by courts that time is no the case of immovable properties values were stable and inflation relaxed, if not modified, particular properties. It is high time, we do so herefore there is an urgent need to ot of the essence in contracts relatin lso explain the current position of elating to immovable property ma hanged circumstances arising from rices. We do not propose to undertak eferring the matter to larger bench a ase that time is the essence of the c he principles in Chand Rani and other of 19 pages reme Court in this regard after nadam and others Vs. Vairavan, to the question whether time is not in contracts relating to immovable K.S. Vidyanadam and Others vs. van Reddy J. who incidentally was a in Chand Rani. This Court observed: by the courts in India, following certain the case of agreement of sale relating is not of the essence of the contract to that effect. In the case of urban nown that their prices have been going w decades - particularly after 1973. o the reality and the reality is constant alues of urban properties - fuelled by e from rural areas to urban centres and clined to think that the rigor of the rule s not of the essence of the contract in ties - evolved in times when prices and tion was unknown - requires to be cularly in the case of urban immovable o so." (emphasis supplied) to revisit the principle that time is lating to immovable properties and of law with regard to contracts made after 1975, in view of the om inflation and steep increase in rtake that exercise in this case, nor ch as we have held on facts in this he contract, even with reference to her cases. Be that as it may. ter an, ot ble vs. s a ain ing act an ing 73. ant by nd ule in nd be ble is nd cts he in or his to RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o 28. T reite 20. deceased) Court) 3361 three years to file the s observed a “38. locat Beng phen finds (supr 76 of 1991 Page No.15 out of 1 8. Till the issue is considered in an eiterate what has been suggested in (i) Courts, while exercising discretio should bear in mind that when th for taking certain steps or for co must have some significance and cannot be ignored. (ii) Courts will apply greater scruti whether the purchaser was `ready the contract. (iii) Every suit for specific perform because it is filed within the perio limits stipulated in the agreement which are not filed immediately that limitation is three years does 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obta year period is intended to assist example, where the major part of t the vendor and possession performance, where equity shift Taking similar view in the case ed) through LRs Vs. A.M. Krishna 3361, Hon’ble Supreme Court held ears does not mean that purchaser the suit and obtain specific perform ed as under: - 38. In this case, we cannot overlook ocated in the industrial town of Hosur engaluru. The Court is obliged to henomenal rise in the price of real e inds support from case reported in supra). To quote this Court “we cann of 19 pages an appropriate case, we can only in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra) : retion in suits for specific performance, n the parties prescribe a time/period, r completion of the transaction, that and therefore time/period prescribed rutiny and strictness when considering eady and willing' to perform his part of formance need not be decreed merely eriod of limitation by ignoring the time ent. Courts will also `frown' upon suits tely after the breach/refusal. The fact oes not mean a purchaser can wait for obtain specific performance. The three sist purchasers in special cases, as for t of the consideration has been paid to ion has been delivered in part shifts in favour of the purchaser.” case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (since shnamurthy, 2022 AIR (Supreme d that the fact that limitation is aser can wait for one or two years formance. Hon’ble Supreme Court ok the fact that the suit property is osur located about 30/40 kms. from d to take judicial notice of the eal estate in Hosur. The proposition d in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan cannot be oblivious to reality – and nly ce, od, at ed ing of ely me its act for ee for to art ce me is ars urt is om he ion an nd RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o the r prop to ur 39. insign was was Perfo S. Ra judgm 76 of 1991 Page No.16 out of 1 he reality is constant and continuo roperties -fuelled by large scale migr o urban centres and by inflation.” 9. Mr. Venugopal argued that th nsignificant amount of Rs.10,001/- as as Rs.15,10,000/-. Having paid an in as not entitled to discretionary erformance, as observed by this Cou . Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18. T udgment of this Court is set out herein “37. The reality arising from this ec be ignored in deciding cases rela steep increase in prices is a circum to grant the relief of specific perfo not take steps to complete the sal vendor has not been responsible fo purchaser can no longer take shel not of essence inperformance o property, to cover his delays, lach The precedents from an era, w holding that time is not of the es immovable properties, may no principle laid down therein is circumstances that existed when longer exist. In these days of immovable properties, to hold th money of say about 10% of the months or four months as the peri that time should be the essence, w result in injustice. Adding to the cases relating to specific performa routinely take two to three decad owner agreeing to sell a property rupees ten thousand as advance deed a quarter century later by of 19 pages inuous rise in the values of urban igration of people from rural areas t the Plaintiff had only paid an as advance when the consideration n insignificant amount the Plaintiff nary equitable relief of Specific Court in Saradamani Kandappan v. . The relevant paragraph of the reinbelow:- is economic change cannot continue to relating to specific performance. The rcumstance which makes it inequitable erformance where the purchaser does sale within the agreed period, and the le for any delay or non-performance. A shelter under the principle that time is e of contracts relating to immovable laches, breaches and “non-readiness”. , when high inflation was unknown, e essence of the contract in regard to no longer apply, not because the is unsound or erroneous, but the en the said principle was evolved, no of galloping increases in prices of d that a vendor who took an earnest the sale price and agreed for three period for performance, did not intend ce, will be a cruel joke on him, and will the misery is the delay in disposal of rmance, as suits and appeals therefrom cades to attain finality. As a result, an erty for rupees one lakh and receiving nce may be required to execute a sale r by receiving the remaining rupees an as an ion tiff ific v. he to he ble es he . A is ble s”. n, to he he no of est ree nd ill of om an ing ale es RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o 21. AIR (Suprem Vidyanadam 76 of 1991 Page No.17 out of 1 ninety thousand, when the prop ofrupees.” 40. As argued by Mr. Venugopal, t after three years, just before exp also a ground to decline the Respo of Specific Performance for purc Venugopal’s argument finds suppo in P.R. Deb and Associates v. Sun Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (1997) 3 Tammanasa (2003) 10 SCC 390, Az 17 SCC 27; Saradamani Kandappa 18. 41 & 42 Xxxxxxxx……. 43. In Saradamani Kandappan (su while exercising discretion in su Courts should bear in mind that w for taking certain steps or for co must have some significance and cannot be ignored; (ii) the Cour strictness when considering wheth to perform his part of the contra Performance need not be decree the period of limitation, by igno agreement. The courts will also fr immediately after the breach/refu years does not mean that a purch to file a suit and obtain Specific Pe intended to assist the purchaser where the major part of the co vendor and possession has bee where equity shifts in favour of the In the case of P. Daivasigam preme Court) 5009,after referring t adam and others (supra) and Sarad of 19 pages property value has risen to a crore al, the fact that the suit had been filed expiry of the period of limitation, was espondent Plaintiff the equitable relief purchase of immovable property. Mr. pport from the judgments of this Court . Sunanda Roy (1996) 4 SCC 423; K.S. 97) 3 SCC 1; Manjunath Anandapa v. 0, Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani (2009) appan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC n (supra), this Court reiterated that (i) suits for Specific Performance, the at when the parties prescribed a time r completion of the transaction, that and therefore time/period prescribed ourts will apply greater scrutiny and hether purchaser was ready and willing tract and (iii) every suit for Specific creed merely because it is filed within ignoring time limits stipulated in the o frown upon suits which are not filed refusal. The fact that limitation is three urchaser can wait for one or two years c Performance. The three year period is aser in special cases, as for example consideration has been paid to the been delivered in part performance, f the purchaser.” igamani Vs. S. Sambandan, 2022 ing to decisions in the case of K.S. aradamani Kandappan (supra), it re led as lief r. urt .S. v. 09) CC (i) he me at ed nd ing ific hin he led ree ars is ple he ce, 22 .S. , it RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o has been between li dismissing performan exercise u not dismiss but severa Section 20 judicial prin 22. another, 20 2½ years a by Hon’ble “In th on th of ag stam mont accor agree situa perf 23. applying th view that p the relief o filed the su sale deed i petty amo was paid. 76 of 1991 Page No.18 out of 1 en held by Hon’ble Supreme Co n limitation and delay and lache ing a suit, even if the plaintiff is ance, while delay operates to d e under Section 20 of the Specific missed on account of limitation. It veral aspects have to be considered 20 of the Specific Relief Act ex l principles, sound and reasonable. In the case of Alagammal a r, 2024(1) RCR (Civil) 502,suit for s rs after the target date fixed in the ’ble Supreme Court as under: - In the case before us, it is not mere d n the part of the plaintiff for 2 1/2 yea f agreement which required him to tamp papers and then ask for exe onths. Further, the delay is coupled ccording to the defendants, three t greement and the date of suit notice ituation where it would be inequitab erformance to the plaintiff.” (Emphas In view of the legal positi g the same to the facts of the pre at plaintiff – appellant has been rig lief of specific performance, having e suit three years after the target d ed i.e. on the last date of limitatio mount of approximately 2.75% of id. In these circumstances, it will of 19 pages Court that there is distinction ches. Limitation is a ground for f is otherwise entitled to specific to determine the discretion and cific Relief Act, even if the suit is . It was held further that not one ered when the court, in terms of t exercises discretion, guided by le. al and others Vs. Ganesan and for specific performance was filed n the agreement. It was observed re delay. It is a case of total inaction 2 years in clear violation of the terms to pay the balance, purchase the execution of sale deed within six led with substantial rise in prices — ee times — between the date of tice. The delay has brought about a uitable to give the relief of specific hasis supplied) osition discussed as above and present case, this Court is of the n rightly held to be not entitled to ving regard to his conduct, who get date fixed for execution of the ation. The Court also notices that % of the total sale consideration will not be a sound exercise of ion for ific nd t is ne of by nd led ed ion ms he six — of t a ific nd he to ho he at ion of RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA No.376 o discretion the appell referred by Supreme C Act is requi 24. Rajesh Kum upon K.S. V Kandappan 25. well as fact interfere in below, wh evidence a for any int of any mer February Renu 76 of 1991 Page No.19 out of 1 ion so as to grant the relief of spec pellant-plaintiff. Even in the cas d by ld. counsel for the appellant e Court that the discretion under S equired to be exercised judiciously, Same view was also taken by Kumar vs. Anand Kumar others, K.S. Vidyanadam’s case, Azhar Sult ppan’s case. On account of the entire discu factual aspects, this Court does not re in the concurrent findings of fac which are found to be based u ce and the legal position. There is no interference. As such, holding the merit, the same is hereby dismissed ry 04, 2025 Whether Speaking/ reasoned Whether Reportable of 19 pages specific performance in favour of case of Sughar Singh (Supra), lant, it has been held by Hon’ble er Section 20 of the Specific Relief sly, soundly and reasonably. by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ers, (2024) SCC 981 after relying r Sultana’s case and Saradamani discussion as above of the legal as not find any scope whatsoever to f facts as recorded by the Courts ed upon proper appreciation of is no perversity or illegality calling g the present appeal to be devoid ssed. (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Yes Yes of a), ble lief in ing ani as to rts of ing oid RENU 2025.02.04 17:14 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh