1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1128 of 2019 1 - Raju Tandi S/o Keshbo Tandi Aged About 34 Years R/o House No. 22, Block - K. B. S. U. P. Colony, Amlidih, Police Station - New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - S. H. O. Police Station - New Rajendra Nagar, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh ---- Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Pushkar Sinha, Advocate For State : Mr. Devesh G. Kela, P.L. Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Judgment on Board 19.06.2025 Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 16.04.2019 passed by the First Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional Sessions VISHAKHA BEOHAR Digitally signed by VISHAKHA BEOHAR 2 Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Sessions Trial No.208/2018, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one year Under Section 201 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for one month (Both sentences were directed to run concurrently) 2. Brief facts of the case as projected by the prosecution are that complainant/PW-1- Pradeep Niyal lodged a report at Police Station New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur regarding the death of his sister, Deepa Tandi (hereinafter called as 'deceased') stating therein that his sister/deceased was residing with her husband/appellant herein at BSUP Colony. On 17.07.2018, he received a call from the nephew of the accused that deceased has died due to heart attack. Upon receiving the said information, he proceeded to the house of the accused and saw the dead body of the deceased lying on a bed where he noticed injury marks over the body of the deceased and on the suspicion that 3 deceased died due to injuries, he lodged a report. Based on the above report, FIR (Ex.P-25) was registered against the appellant. Merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P-1 and spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-9. Inquest proceeding was conducted vide Ex.P-3 where it emerged that due to a domestic dispute, appellant has allegedly murdered the deceased by tying both her legs with her dupatta, restraining her hands with his knees and strangulating her with an electric wire and falsely informed the family members that the death of deceased occurred due to heart attack. Thereafter, dead body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination which was conducted by PW-9 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, who has proved the postmortem report Ex.P-13. According to postmortem report, cause of death of the deceased was due to compression of neck and chest. However, evidence of smothering is also present. Memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P-6, pursuant to which, one black colour scarf (dupatta) and one yellow colour electric wire were seized vide Ex.P-7. During investigation, nails and blood sample of the deceased, as well as, the nail clippings of the accused/ were preserved. After that, seized samples were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for its examination. Based on the advice for conducting a DNA analysis, the blood sample of the accused was collected from Central Jail, Raipur and the report confirmed the presence of the appellant’s DNA under the fingernails of the deceased. 4 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. After completion of investigation, appellant was charge- sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused/appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed the offence. 4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses and brought on record 30 documents and articles A-1 to A-6 (photographs of deceased). In his defence, appellant examined himself as DW-1 and another witness i.e. DW-2 Jyotika Tandi. 5. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the accused/appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to bring home the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and only on the basis of conjectures and surmises the trial Court held the appellant guilty. According to him, case of the prosecution is not based on direct evidence, but based on circumstantial evidence, however, the prosecution has not been able to build up the chain of circumstantial evidence so complete which excludes all other 5 hypothesis of guilt of any other person and points out to the guilt of the appellant alone. He would further submit that there are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. He would also submit that the prosecution has not been able to prove motive of the offence and that there is no sufficient evidence available on record to connect the appellant with the crime in question. Hence, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the appellant may be acquitted of the charges leveled against him. 7. Learned counsel for the State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has brought home the offence against the appellant and has proved the case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and thus, the appellant has rightly been convicted and sentenced for the aforesaid offences. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature? 10. In this regard, Pradeep Niyal (PW-1), brother of the deceased & Suraj Niyal (PW-2) father of the deceased, have stated that on 18.07.2018 at about 7:00 to 7:30 a.m., they received a phone call from the sister of the accused, who informed them that deceased 6 has died due to a heart attack. Thereafter, they along with their family members immediately went to the spot and saw the deceased lying on a bed and her face was covered with a cloth and when they removed the cloth, they found that blood was oozing from the mouth and nose of the deceased, and that there were black marks on her neck as well as visible injuries on her shoulder and back. Upon inquiring about the cause of death, the accused told them that deceased has died due to a heart attack. After that, looking to the injuries over the body of the deceased and on suspicion, they informed the matter to the police regarding unnatural death of the deceased. Thereafter, police came to the spot and merg intimation was recorded vide Ex.P-1 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-3 and dead body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination. Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal (PW-9) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. During examination, she observed the following external injuries on the body of the deceased:- 1. Below the nose, on the mouth, around the mouth, and on the right cheek, multiple nail scratch marks were present in a cuspidate (half-chord) shape. Small abrasions were also found on the lower border of the lips and under both eyes. 2. Pressure abrasions were present on the toe and below the toe on the right foot, each measuring approximately 0.5 cm in diameter. 3. On the neck, a horizontal pressure abrasion was present over the thyroid cartilage, about 7 cm below the tonsils, extending outward and backward. On the right side, the mark was found 6 cm below the right angle of the mandible and 8 cm below the right mastoid. On the left side, the mark 7 extended to 4 cm below the left angle of the mandible and 8 cm below the left mastoid. The mark was continuous across the back of the neck, except on the right side, where it was absent between the mastoid and the posterior hairline. The width of the pressure abrasion was uniformly 2 cm, with a dark red base. An additional linear pressure abrasion, measuring 4 cm, was observed on the left side of the neck, connecting with the above-mentioned pressure abrasion below the right angle of the mandible. 4. A contusion measuring approximately 5 cm x 8 cm was found on the inner side of the upper right arm. Another contusion measuring about 1.5 cm was present on the ulnar border (inner side) of the right forearm, and a circular contusion of 0.5 cm diameter was noted on the right elbow. 5. On the left arm, there were contusions measuring 7 cm x 5 cm on the inner side of the upper arm, 7 cm x 5 cm on the ulnar border of the forearm, and 0.5 cm in diameter on the left elbow. 6. Pale imprint marks were present on the outer sides of both ankles. 7. A contusion measuring 4 cm x 4 cm was present on the right shoulder, and multiple small contusions were also observed. 8. Left dorsum of hand (back side of palm) Multiple contusions were present on all sides. 9. There was a small laceration on the inner left side of the upper lip and a small laceration on the inner right side of the lower lip. This witness has stated in his note that all the contusions were red and blue in colour. Internal injuries :- 1. Contusions measuring 2 cm x 2 cm, 2 cm x 2 cm and 1 cm x 1 cm were present on the right fontanel eminence, centre of forehead and occipital protuberance below the scalp respectively. Subdural hemorrhage was present on the left occipital lobe and cerebellum. The brain was congested and edematous. 2. The third and fourth ribs on the right side were broken and about 200 ml of blood was present in 8 the right thoracic cavity. Blood and mucus were present in the trachea. A small laceration was present on the right lung below the third rib. On cutting the heart, frothy blood was present on both sides. The rest of the chest structures were intact. 3. All structures of the throat were swollen and contusion was present inside the pressure abrasion. 4. Hyoid bone was contused and fractured on left side. 5. A partial fracture was present on the body of C-5 vertebra with contused margins. All other structures were intact. 11. According to the Doctor, the injuries found on the body of the victim were antemortem. Evidence of asphyxia and venous congestion due to strangulation of the throat, chest and mouth were present on the dead body. In his opinion, the cause of death of deceased was strangulation of the throat and chest, although there is evidence of strangulation of the mouth, and that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature and he has duly proved the postmortem report Ex.P-13. However, on the contrary, appellant in his defence has stated that when he and his mother came to the house at 7:00 in the morning, they tried to wake up the deceased, but she did not wake up. Thereafter, they called the doctor and doctor told them that deceased died due to heart attack. It is pertinent to mention here that in support of his case, appellant neither examined the Doctor nor mentioned the name of the doctor who told him that deceased died due to heart attack. Hence, it is not 9 proved that deceased died due to heart attack and on the contrary, the evidence on record conclusively establishes that the death of the deceased was not natural, rather, it was caused by compression of the neck and chest, along with obstruction of the mouth, resulting in asphyxia. The learned trial Court, relying upon the postmortem report (Ex.P-13), the statement of Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal (PW-9) and the evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 12. Now, the question would be, whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question? 13. Case of the prosecution is not based on direct evidence but it is based on circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles to constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been narrated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1 , in which it was observed in paragraph 153 as under :- “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the 1 (1984) 4 SCC 116 10 following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra2 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 14. It is an admitted fact that the accused- Raju Tandi and the deceased- Deepa Tandi, were husband and wife, residing at BSUP Colony, Block No. K-22, Amlidih, under Police Station New Rajendra Nagar, Raipur and their daughter- Ambima Tandi, lived with her maternal grandparents in Katoratalab, Raipur. Prosecution 2 (1973) 2 SCC 793 11 witnesses, including Pradeep Niyal (PW-1), Suraj Niyal (PW-2), and Bhoomi Niyal (PW-3), testified that appellant and deceased initially had a cordial relationship, but after some time, some dispute arose between them and they used to quarrel with each other on petty issues. Likewise, Mithila Sagar (PW-4), Rama Sarkar (PW-5), and Sarojini (PW-7), neighbours, have also admitted that appellant and deceased used to quarrel with each other and sometimes, they used to pacify their dispute. Furthermore, Jyotika Tandi (DW-2), appellant’s mother, also admitted that relationship between the appellant and deceased was not good. Thus, from the statements of above witnesses, it is quite vivid that there was dispute between the appellant and deceased and their relations were not good. 15. It is an admitted fact in this case that on the evening of 16.07.2018, the appellant and deceased visited the house of PW-2 Suraj Niyal and they returned home at around 8:30 p.m. When appellant and deceased reached at Suraj Niyal’s house, he (Suraj Niyal) asked for Rs. 100 from the appellant for the purpose of buying shoes and paying the school fees of the accused’s daughter, who resides with him. Then, appellant told the deceased to provide the money to PW-2 Suraj Niyal and the said fact has also been admitted by the appellant in his statement. In his memorandum (Exhibit P-06), the accused stated that while he along with deceased was returning to home, on way, quarrel took place with regard to the money given to PW-2 Suraj Niyal and after reaching the home around 8:30 p.m., deceased cooked food for 12 him, but went to bed without eating, upon which, an argument ensued between them and in which, she abused him. However, on the contrary, in his defense, appellant has that deceased had refused to cook and he had gone to his mother’s house at around 8:30 p.m. Thus, from the above circumstances, it can be inferred that on the date of incident, after reaching the home, there was quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased. 16. Admittedly, appellant and deceased were husband and wife and they were living in the same room together and no other relatives were residing with them at that time, which is evident from the statements of Mithila Sagar (PW-4), Rama Sarkar (PW-5), and Sarojini (PW-7), neighbours and Jyotika Tandi (DW-2), appellant’s mother. The appellant was under obligation to explain as to how and in what circumstances, his wife found dead in the room on the date of incident where he was also present. 17. Now, the question would be, whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act is applicable or not? Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under:- “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101 of the Evidence Act, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 of the Evidence Act which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially 13 within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 18. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under:- “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49(B).”Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save 3 AIR 1956 SC 404 14 in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar4 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain I not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused. 20. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab5, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the 4 (2021) 10 SCC 725 5 AIR 1956 SC 460 15 application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar6 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 22. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of principles laid down by their Lordships in the above referred matters, it is quite clear that on the date of incident, appellant and deceased were in the same room and at that time, quarrel took place between them, as is evident from the above witnesses and on the next day, dead body of the deceased was found in the room where appellant and deceased were staying, as is evident from Ex.P-3 (inquest proceedings), which spells out that dead body of deceased was 6 AIR 1974 SC 778 16 lying in the state of dead on the bed inside the room. Furthermore, the accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, claimed that on the date of incident, when he returned from the house of PW-2 Suraj Niyal, he told the deceased to cook food and when she refused, he had gone to his mother’s house at 8:30 p.m and slept there and on the next day, when one boy Sunny informed him over mobile, then he returned to his home at 7:00 am where he came to know about the death of the deceased. However, on the contrary, in his statement, DW-1 appellant, has stated at 10:00 pm, deceased called him and he went to his home and at that time, food was not cooked/ready, so he again went to his mother’s house. As against this, DW-2 Jyotika Tandi has stated that on the date of incident, appellant came to her house and after having dinner slept there and next day, when appellant went to his house to bring clothes, then appellant told her that deceased is not waking up. Then she along with appellant went to the spot and saw the deceased lying dead. However, this witness (DW-2) has nowhere stated in her statement that one Sunny came to her house and informed about the statement. Thus, from the statement of DW-1/appellant and DW-2 Jyotika, it is evident that there are material contradictions and omissions in their statements and their statements do not corroborate with each other. Therefore, the defence taken by the appellant is not reliable and trustworthy. That apart, PW-5 Smt. Rama Sarkar testified that on the date of incident, she saw the accused at his doorstep around 10:30 p.m., with 17 deceased, meaning thereby, deceased was seen lastly with accused on the date of incident. Therefore, the appellant was under obligation to offer explanation as to how and in what circumstances the deceased found dead in the room where both of them were present, but he has failed to offer such explanation in his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. This apart, Dr. Snigdha Jain (PW-9) testified that the injuries found on the neck and feet of the deceased were caused with the electric wire and dupatta seized from the accused’s house and that, the pale marks present on the feet also matched the soft material of the seized dupatta, supporting the prosecution's theory. Moreover, during investigation, Blood samples and fingernail scrapings of the deceased and the accused were collected and Dr. Apollina Ekka (PW-11A), Senior Scientific Officer, has confirmed, through DNA analysis, that the accused’s DNA was present under the fingernails of the deceased, indicating a struggle, which shows that appellant is the author of the crime in question. 23. DNA evidence plays an important role now a days and as such it is having a prominent evidence and it has to be accepted in order to corroborate the same with the other evidences. 24. In the matter of Mukesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in 2017 (6) SCC, the DNA evidence has been elaborately considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while considering the various pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Supreme Court of United States. The relevant paragraphs of 18 the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:- “456. We may usefully refer to Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., Reprint 2009-by P. Ramanatha Aiyar which explains DNA as under: "DNA-Deoxyribonucleic acid, the nucleoprotein of chromosomes. The double-helix structure in cell nuclei that carries the genetic information of most living organisms. The material in a cell that makes up the genes and controls the cell. (Biological term) DNA fingerprinting-A method of identification especially for evidentiary purposes by analysing and comparing the DNA from tissue samples. (Merriam Webster)" In the same Law Lexicon, the learned author refers to DNA identification as under: DNA identification-A method of comparing a person's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) - a patterned chemical structure of genetic information with the DNA in a biological specimen (such as blood, tissue, or hair) to determine if the person is the source of the specimen. Also termed DNA fingerprinting; genetic fingerprinting (Black's, 7th Edn., 1999) 457. DNA evidence is now a predominant forensic technique for identifying criminals when biological tissues are left at the scene of crime or for identifying the source of blood found on any articles or clothes, etc. recovered from the accused or from the witnesses. DNA testing on samples such as saliva, skin, blood, hair or semen not only helps to convict the accused but h also serves to exonerate. The sophisticated technology of DNA fingerprinting makes it possible to obtain conclusive results, Section 53-A CrPC is added by the Code of Criminal Procedure 19 (Amendment) Act, 2005. It provides for a detailed medical examination of accused for an offence of rape or attempt to commit rape by the registered medical practitioners employed in a hospital run by the Government or by a local authority or in the absence of such a practitioner within the radius of 16 km from the place where the offence has been committed by any other registered medical practitioner. 215. In District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne89, Roberts, C.J. of the Supreme Court of United States, while referring to the DNA test, stated as follows: (SCC OnLine US SC) "DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices. The Federal Government and the States have recognised this, and have developed special approaches to ensure that this evidentiary tool can be effectively incorporated into established criminal procedure usually but not always through legislation. * * * * * Modern DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known before. Since its first use in criminal investigations in the mid-1980s, there have been several major advances in DNA technology, culminating in STR technology. It is now often possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a suspect with near certainty. While of course many criminal trials proceed without any forensic and scientific testing at all, there is no 20 technology comparable to DNA testing for matching tissues when such evidence is at issue." 218. This Court had the occasion to consider various aspects of DNA profiling and DNA reports. K.T. Thomas, J. in Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram 90 c observed: (SCC p. 316, para 10) "10. We may remember that Section 112 of the Evidence Act was enacted at a time when the modern scientific advancements with deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as well as ribonucleic acid (RNA) tests were not even in contemplation of the legislature. The result of a genuine DNA d test is said to be scientifically accurate....' 219. In Pantangi Balarama Venkata Ganesh v. State of A.P.91, a two-Judge Bench had explained as to what is DNA in the following manner: (SCC pp. 617-18, paras 41-42) "41. Submission of Mr Sachar that the report of DNA should not be relied upon, cannot be accepted. What is DNA? It means: 'Deoxyribonucleic acid, which is found in the chromosomes of the cells of living beings is the blueprint of an individual. DNA decides the characteristics of the person such as the colour of the skin, type of hair, nails and so on. Using this genetic fingerprinting, identification f of an individual is done like in the traditional method of identifying fingerprints of offenders. The identification is hundred per cent precise, experts opine.' There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that there is a need of quality control. Precautions are required to be taken to ensure preparation of high molecular g weight DNA, complete digestion of the samples with 21 appropriate enzymes, and perfect transfer and hybridization of the blot to obtain distinct bands with appropriate control. (See article of Lalji Singh, Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad in DNA profiling and its applications.) But in this case there is nothing to show that such precautions were not taken. 42. Indisputably, the evidence of the experts is admissible in evidence in terms of Section 45 of the Evidence Act. 1872. In cross-examination. PW 46 had stated as under: 'If the DNA fingerprint of a person matches with that of a sample, it means that the sample has come from that person only. The probability of two persons except identical twins having the same DNA fingerprint is around 1 in 30 billion world population." 220. In Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, which was a case of a young girl who was raped and murdered, the DNA reports were relied upon by the High Court93 which were approved by this Court and it was held thus: (Santosh Kumar case, SCC p. 772, para 71) "71. We feel that the trial court was not justified in rejecting the DNA report, as nothing adverse could be pointed out against the two experts who had submitted it. We must, therefore, accept the DNA report as being scientifically accurate and an exact science as held by this Court in Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram90. In arriving at its conclusions the trial court was also influenced by the fact that the semen swabs and slides and the blood samples of the appellant had not been kept in proper custody and had been tampered with, as already indicated above. We are of 22 the opinion that the trial court was in error on this score. We, accordingly, endorse the conclusions of the High Court on Circumstance 9." 228. From the aforesaid authorities, it is quite clear that DNA report deserves to be accepted unless it is absolutely dented and for non-acceptance of the same, it is to be established that there had been no quality control or quality assurance. If the sampling is proper and if there is no evidence as to tampering of samples, the DNA test report is to be accepted. 229. In order to establish a clear link between the accused persons and the incident at hand, the prosecution has also adduced scientific evidence in the form of DNA, fingerprint and bite mark analysis.” 25. In light of the aforementioned pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the blood samples and fingernail scrapings were duly analyzed by the DNA expert. It was found that the accused’s DNA was present under the fingernails of the deceased. Accordingly, based on the scientific analysis conducted by the officer, the appellant was identified as the author of the crime in question. 26. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the above chain of circumstances is complete and leads only to the conclusion that it was the appellant, who caused the death of the deceased and he alone committed the murder of the deceased, as the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles which constitute the 'panchsheel' of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the 23 Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and the learned trial Court, upon due and proper appreciation of the evidence led before it, has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the accused-appellant is the perpetrator/author of the crime in question, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. 27. In the result, the appeal being without any substance is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 28. The Registry of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing, informing him that he is at liberty to assail this judgment before Hon'ble Supreme Court by preferring an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the aid and assistance of the Chhattisgarh High Court Legal Services Committee or that of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Vishakha