- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI WRIT PETITION NO. 19390 OF 2019 (GM-CPC) C/W WRIT PETITION NO. 28392 OF 2019 (GM-CPC) IN WP No. 19390/2019 BETWEEN: 1. SMT. CHINNAMMA, WIFE OF LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, 2. RAMESH, SON OF LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, BOTH ARE RESIDING AT KONASANDRA VILLAGE, JIGINI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BENGALURU DISTRICT - 562 106. …PETITIONERS (BY SMT. VIJAYASHREE M, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. KEMPANNA, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. REVANNA, SON OF LATE KENCHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RESIDING AT KONASANDRA VILLAGE, JIGINI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK - 562 106, BENGALURU DISTRICT. Digitally signed by MEGHA MOHAN Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 2. SMT. LAKSHMAMMA, WIFE OF LATE SAMPANGI, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, R/AT LINGAPURA VILLAGE, JIGINI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK - 562 106, BENGALURU DISTRICT. 3. SMT. SHANTAMMA, D/O LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, R/AT BHATTARAHALLI VILLAGE, BELTHUR POST, HOSUR TALUK KRISHNAGIRI DISTRICT, TAMIL NADU - 635 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. K.R. KRISHNAMURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR R1; R2 - SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED; VIDE ORDER DATED 31.07.2019, NOTICE TO R3 HELD SUFFICIENT) THIS W.P IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.1.2019 ON IA NO.12 IN O.S.NO.255/2016 ON THE FILE OF CIVIL JUDGE SENIOR DIVISION AND JMFC, AT ANEKAL WHICH IS AT ANNEXURE-G AND ETC., IN WP NO. 28392/2019 BETWEEN: REVANNA, S/O LATE KENCHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, RESIDING AT KONASANDRA VILLAGE, JIGANI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 BENGALURU DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER (BY SRI. K.R. KRISHNAMURTHY, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT. CHINNAMMA, W/O LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, 2. RAMESH S/O LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, RESPONDENT NO.1 AND 2 ARE RESIDING AT KONASANDRA VILLAGE, JIGANI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BENGALURU DISTRICT. 3. SMT. LAKSHMAMMA, W/O LATE SAMPANGI, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, RESIDING AT LINGAPURA VILLAGE, JIGANI HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK, BENGALURU DISTRICT. 4. SMT. SHANTAMMA, D/O LATE AJJAPPA, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, RESIDING AT BHATTARAHALLI VILLAGE, BELTHUR POST, HOSUR TALUK, KRISHNAGIRI DISTRICT, TAMIL NADU STATE. ...RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. VIJAYASHREE M, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. KEMPANNA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2; R3 AND R4 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS W.P. FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 THE CONSTITUTION PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 20.4.2018 PASSED BY THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AT ANEKAL IN O.S.NO.255/2006 WHEREIN THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE HELD THAT THE PANCHAYATH PALUPATTI DATED 9.6.1968 IS IN ADMISSIBLE (PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A) AND FURTHER BE PLEASED TO PERMIT THE D-1 TO MARK THE PANCHAYATH PALUPATTI DATED 9.6.1968 AS EXHIBIT (PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-D) AND ETC., THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI ORAL COMMON ORDER The plaintiffs have filed I.A.No.12 under Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C., seeking amendment of the plaint. The defendants had filed an application to mark the partition deed dated 09.06.1968 as an exhibit. Both the applications filed by the plaintiffs and the defendants are dismissed. Aggrieved by the order dismissing the application filed under order VI rule 17 of the CPC, W.P.No.19390/2019 is filed and the defendants have filed W.P. No.28392/2019. The trial Court has disposed off both - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 the applications by way of a common order and this Court is also disposing of the writ petitions by way of a common order. 2. The plaintiffs had filed the suit seeking partition. The suit is filed in the year 2006. The amendment came to be filed in the year 2018. According to the plaintiffs, there is a compromise between the plaintiffs and defendants dated 14.08.2013. In view of the said compromise, the suit came be disposed of. According to the plaintiffs, as per the partition, both of them have sold the properties. The Court has observed that initially the suit is filed in the year 1999 and later on it is transferred and re-numbered as O.S No.255/2006. The case is posted for the cross-examination of DW.1. Earlier sufficient time was consumed to consider the document produced by the defendants. Plaintiffs contend that there is partition under the partition deed dated 14.08.2013. However, after lapse of five years, the plaintiffs have filed this application for amendment. The defendants had denied the partition deed dated 14.08.2013. Further, the plaintiffs have produced the copy of the partition deed, which is an unregistered document. The Court observes that as per the recitals of document, there was a partition in the year 1968 and in the properties that were - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 allotted to the father of plaintiff No.2, the properties have been divided between the plaintiffs and defendants under the document dated 14.08.2013. Now the plaintiffs have relied upon the partition deed dated 14.08.2013. Being the partition deed an unregistered document, it is not admissible in evidence. Hence, no purpose would be served by the proposed amendment and accordingly, dismissed the application. When it comes to the defendants' case, where they wanted to mark the partition deed dated 09.06.1968 as an exhibit, the court has taken an objection that it is an unregistered document and it cannot be marked. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submits that no prejudice would be caused, if the amendment is allowed and basing on the document of the year 2013, both the parties have sold the properties and it goes to the root of the matter. In the interest of both the parties, the Court ought to have allowed the amendment. Mere delay cannot be a reason to reject the application for amendment. Learned counsel Smt.Vijayashree M., appearing for the learned counsel Sri.Kempanna had relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 Builders Private Limited and Anr.1 Learned counsel submits that in paragraph No.70, extracted hereunder, the Court had laid certain guidelines, when the Courts can allow the amendment: "70. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus: (i) Order II Rule 2 CPC operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The plea of amendment being barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived. (ii) All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word "shall", in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC. (iii) The prayer for amendment is to be allowed (i) if the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties, and 1 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 729. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 (ii) to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side and (c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). (iv) A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless (i) by the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration, (ii) the amendment changes the nature of the suit, (iii) the prayer for amendment is malafide, or (iv) by the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 (v) In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. (vi) Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed. (vii) Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation. (viii) Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. (ix) Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. (x) Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated of facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed. (xi) Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed. (See Vijay Gupta v. Gagninder Kr. Gandhi & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1897)". 4. Learned counsel submits that when the document is very much essential for adjudication of disputes between the parties, the Court ought to have allowed the same. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the defendants submits that the document is of the year 2013 and this application is filed in the year 2018. When an application is filed - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, the party has to say why the application is filed at a belated stage and no such explanation is forthcoming from the plaintiffs and the Court had rightly dismissed the application. When it comes to the application that is filed by the defendants i.e., to mark the partition deed dated 09.06.1968, it is submitted that though it is an unregistered document, still it can be looked into for collateral purpose. He submits that on the ground that it is a unregistered document, the Court has rejected the same. He relied on the judgement of the Apex Court in case of Yellapu Uma Maheswari & Another vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao & Others2. He relied on paragraph Nos.15 and 16, which reads as under: "15. It is well settled that the nomenclature given to the document is not decisive factor but the nature and substance of the transaction has to be determined with reference to the terms of the documents and that the admissibility of a document is entirely dependent upon the recitals contained in that document but not on the basis of the pleadings set up by the party who seeks to introduce the document in question. A thorough reading of both 2 (2015) 16 SCC 787. - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 Exts. B-21 and B-22 makes it very clear that there is relinquishment of right in respect of immovable property through a document which is compulsorily registrable document and if the same is not registered, it becomes an inadmissible document as envisaged under Section 49 of the Registration Act. Hence, Exts. B-21 and B-22 are the documents which squarely fall within the ambit of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and hence are compulsorily registrable documents and the same are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the factum of partition between the parties. We are of the considered opinion that Exts. B-21 and B-22 are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition. 16. Then the next question that falls for consideration is whether these can be used for any collateral purpose. The larger Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chinnappareddigari Peda Mutyala Reddy v. Chinnappareddigari Venkata Reddy has held that the whole process of partition contemplates three phases i.e. severancy of status, division of joint property by metes and bounds and nature of possession of various shares. In ą suit for partition, an unregistered document can be relied upon for collateral purpose i.e. severancy of title, nature of possession of various shares but not for the primary purpose i.e. division of joint properties by metes and bounds. An unstamped instrument is not admissible in evidence even for collateral - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 purpose, until the same is impounded. Hence, if the appellant-defendant want to mark these documents for collateral purpose it is open for them to pay the stamp duty together with penalty and get the document impounded and the trial court is at liberty to mark Exts. B-21 and B-22 for collateral purpose subject to proof and relevance". Relying on this judgment, learned counsel submits that the whole purpose of partition contemplates three phases i.e., severancy of status, division of joint property by metes and bounds and nature of possession of various shares. In a suit for partition, an unregistered document can be relied upon for collateral purpose i.e., severancy of title, nature of possession of various shares but not for the primary purpose i.e., division of joint properties by metes and bounds. He submits that for the collateral purpose, this document can be marked in the light of the judgements of the Hon'ble Apex Court. In response to that, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submits that the purpose for which he wants to mark the document is for the main purpose and it cannot be termed as a collateral purpose and the documents cannot be marked and the Court had rightly dismissed the petition. - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 6. Having heard the learned counsel on either side, perused the material on record. First coming to the application filed under Order VI Rule 17, by virtue of this amendment, they want to place before the court, the new pleading with regard to the partition deed dated 09.06.1968 and according to them, basing on the said partition, the plaintiffs and defendants have sold the properties but absolutely there is no whisper why from 2013 to 2018, the plaintiffs did not file any application. Admittedly this is a suit of 1999. In those circumstances, the judgment that is relied on by the learned counsel in Life Insurance Corporation of India case referred supra will not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to amend their plaint in a suit of 1990 in the year 2018 and the trial Court was right in dismissing the application. When coming to the application of the defendant, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the party can rely on the document for the collateral purpose i.e., severancy of title, nature of possession of various shares but not for the primary purpose and as such, the said document can be marked for the collateral purpose only. Accordingly, this Court is passing the following: - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:2046 WP No. 19390 of 2019 C/W WP No. 28392 of 2019 ORDER 1. Accordingly, the Writ Petition No. 19390/2019 is dismissed and the Writ Petition No. 28392/2019 is allowed by setting aside the order dated 20.04.2018 passed in O.S.No.255/2006 by the Senior Civil Judge at Anekal and the petitioner is permitted to mark the document i.e., the partition deed dated 09.06.1968 for the collateral purpose. 2. All IAs., in these Writ Petitions shall stand closed. SD/- (LALITHA KANNEGANTI) JUDGE KA List No.: 1 Sl No.: 10 CT: BHK