2025:HHC:29199 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.   : 1289 of 2024 Reserved on    : 3  rd   June, 2025 Decided on  : 29 th   August, 202 5 Sandeep Kumar …Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Romesh   Verma,   Senior Advocate   with   Mr. Sumit Sharma, Advocate. For the respondent : Mr. Rohit   Sharma,   Advocate General. Virender Singh, Judge Petitioner Sandeep Kumar has filed the present petition,   under   Section   528   of   the   Bharatiya   Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), against the judgment and dated 25.11.2024, passed by the Court   of   learned   Special   Judge,   Hamirpur   (hereinafter referred to as the learned ‘trial Court’) in Sessions Trial No.22 of 2024, on the ground that on 27.0.1.2024, FIR No.18/2024, dated 27.01.2024, under Section 3(1)r & 3(1) (s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:29199 of Atrocities) Act (hereinafter referred to as the SC & ST Act)  read with Sections 323, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal   Code   (hereinafter   referred   to   ast   the   IPC),   was registered   with   Police   Station   Sadar,   Hamirpur   against Anju Bala and her daughter Ashima, on the complaint of one Sunil Kumar, who, at the relevant time, was President of Gram Panchayat. 2. According to the petitioner, complainant Sunil Kumar moved a written complaint, which is Ext.P­1/PW­1, before Police Station, Nadaun, alleging therein that there was a ‘Mundan Ceremony’ in his house. On that day, when he was washing utensils near Shani Dev Temple, accused Anju Bala and her daughter Ashima, came there on the Scooty and started fighting and arguing with him. They had uttered the words ‘Jullaha Pradhan’ and other caste based aspersions. 3. During   investigation,   provisions   of   Sections 323, 506, and Section 34 IPC were omitted and charge sheet was prepared and submitted before the learned APP Nadaun for scrutiny. After conducting scrutiny, the charge 3 2025:HHC:29199 sheet was   returned  to  the  I.O.,  by  pointing   out  certain shortcomings. 4. In view of the observations, so made by learned APP, the I.O. recorded fresh supplementary statement of Sunil   and   Rajat   on   13.04.2024,   whereas,   learned   APP never   advised   the   I.O.,   to   record   the   supplementary statement   of   the   complainant. When   the   draft   charge sheet was forwarded by the learned APP to learned Public Prosecutor (petitioner), the same was put before him on 3.5.2024 and he had made observations by pointing out that the I.O. has not followed the basic provisions of SC & ST Act. 5. It is the further case of the petitioner that the draft   charge­sheet   was   returned   to   the   I.O.,   by   the petitioner, by making certain observations/shortcomings. Instead of removing the shortcomings, the I.O. again put up   the   charge­sheet   before   the   petitioner   and   no satisfactory   explanation   was   given   by   the   I.O.   to   the quarries raised by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner observed that let the judicial verdict may be taken after 4 2025:HHC:29199 doing the needful since the charge sheet was to be filed within the time frame under SC & ST Act. 6. Thereafter, after the trial, vide judgment dated 25.11.2024, the learned trial Court, however, acquitted the accused, but, certain observations have been made against the   petitioner. Relevant   paragraphs   41   to   44   of   the judgment reproduced as under:­ 41. Before parting, I would like to point out the conduct of the prosecution and the Investigating Agency during the investigation and preparation of challan. During the course of arguments, ld. counsel for the accused referred to the different inconsistent   statements   of   the   complainant, recorded at the time of investigation. Ld. defence counsel has also put questions to the I.O. (PW.6) in this regard. The I.O. (PW.6) admitted that the statements   of   the   complainant   were   recorded lateron in the office Then, he voluntarily stated that   objection   was   raised   by   the   prosecution department,   so   his   statements   were   recorded again. At the time of arguments, I had put query to Ld. Public Prosecutor in this regard and have perused the police file regarding the statements of the complainant. 42. On perusal of the police file, it was revealed that after investigation draft chargesheet in this case   was   prepared   on   23.03.2024   and   it   is mentioned in the case diary of that date, that challan will be got checked from the prosecution department. Thereafter, two other supplementary   statements   of   the   complainant were recorded on 13.04.2024 and 17.05.2024. These   statements   are   elaborated   one   and inconsistent   with   the   F.I.R.   and   his   previous supplementary statement recorded on 07.02.2024. There   are   also   material 5 2025:HHC:29199 improvements in these statements. Generally the Investigating   Agency   after   completion   of   the investigation   prepares   draft   chargesheet   and present   the   same   before   the   prosecution department for scrutiny/opinion on shortcomings. The prosecution department after applying   its   mind   re­verifies   the   shortcomings and if required, advise for further investigation. The prosecutor is expected not to involve in the investigation   process   and   only   advise   for shortcomings. If further investigation is guided, that   is   to   be   conducted   and   supplementary chargesheet is to be filed accordingly. 43. In the present case, the F.I.R. was lodged on 27.01.2024 and the present incident was only pertaining to caste related abuses, given by the accused. After   the   F.I.R.,   supplementary statement of the complainant was recorded on 07.02.2024   and   draft   chargesheet   was prepared on 23.03.2024. Since, the occurrence was   only   regarding   caste   related   abuses,   so there was no occasion to record statements of the   complainant   regarding   the   incident repeatedly. However, the I.O. recorded two more elaborated   statements   of   the   complainant   on 13.04.2024 and 17.05.2024. These statements are inconsistent with the previous statement of the   complainant   and   contains   improvements, which defeats the very purpose of Section 157 of Indian   Evidence   Act   and   Section   160   of Bharatiya   Sakshya   Adhiniyam,   as   the   same diminishes the corroborative value of F.I.R. As per   deposition   of   I.O.   these   statements   were recorded on the opinion of prosecution. To get record   the   statement   in   particular   manner, amounts to creation of evidence unnecessarily and itself an offence. If such is the situation, this is  gross  misconduct  on the part  of the  Public Prosecutor. This   court   at   this   stage   does   not deem   it   appropriate   to   pass   any   adverse remarks   against   the   said   prosecutor   without giving him opportunity of being heard. Therefore, in the interest of justice and fair play, let a copy of   this   judgment   be   sent   to   the   Addl. Chief 6 2025:HHC:29199 Secretary (Home) to conduct an enquiry in this regard   under   intimation   to   this   court   and proceed further in accordance with law for such a misconduct on the part of Public Prosecutor. 44. It is also not expected from the Investigating Agency   to   comply   with   all   the   unwarranted directions   given   by   the   prosecution   blindly, because the role of the investigating agency is to collect evidence and not to create evidence, as it has been done in the present case. Therefore, copy   of   this   judgment   be   also   sent   to   the Superintendent   of   Police,   Hamirpur   with   the direction to direct the Investigating Officers not to comply with the unwarranted directions of the prosecution to ensure fair investigation. 7. When   put   to   notice,   the   police   has   filed   the status report, disclosing therein, that on the complaint of Sunil Kumar, FIR No.18/2024, dated 27.01.2024, under Sections 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC & ST Act, was registered with Police   Station   Hamirpur,   in   which,   the   police   has conducted   the   investigation   and   submitted   the   charge sheet. The learned trial Court has taken the cognizance and after recording the prosecution evidence, the accused were acquitted vide judgment dated 25.11.2024. 8. Along   with   the   petition,   the   petitioner   has annexed   the   observations   made   by   the   learned   APP   on 5.4.2024, when the charge sheet was produced before  him and the observations made by the petitioner on 3.5.2025, 7 2025:HHC:29199 when the charge sheet was again submitted before him for scrutiny. 9. Hon’ble   apex   Court   in   a   recent   judgment   in Civil Appeal No.2453 of 2011, titled as State of Punjab &   another   versus   M/s   Shikha   Trading   Co.,   has mandated that the remarks adverse in nature, should not be passed in ordinary circumstances, or unless absolutely necessary, which is further qualified by, being necessary for   proper   adjudication   of   the   case   at   hand. Relevant paragraphs 14 to 19.3.2, are reproduced, as under:­ 14. Further, we notice the directions of the High Court not to be in the light of settled principles of law, for the order does not qualify the tests laid   down   by   this   Court   in  State   of   UP   v. Mohammad   Naim (four­Judge   Bench),   in regards to passing remarks against a person, whose conduct is being scrutinised before them i.e.,   “whether   the   party   whose   conduct   is   in question   is   before   the   Court   or   has   an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct, justifying the remarks; whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral   part   thereof,   to   animadvert   on   that conduct.” 15. These   principles   stand   reiterated   and followed  in  various  judgments   such   as  R.  K. Lakshmanan   v.   A.K.   Srinivasan  (three­Judge Bench);  S.K.   Viswambaran   v.   E.   Koyakunju (two­ Judge Bench);  Samya Seet v. Shambhu Sarkar5  (three­Judge Bench);  State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan 6 (three­ 8 2025:HHC:29199 Judge Bench) and K. G. Shanti v. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd and Ors7 (two­Judge Bench). 16. It is apparent from record that, neither was the officer made party to the dispute, nor was he   given   an   opportunity   to   show   cause,   and further, nothing on record reflected the officer holding   an   animus   against   the   respondent, before   such   adverse   directions   were   passed against him. 17. By way of this appeal, we have been asked to  exercise  powers,  inherent   in this  Court,  to expunge remarks reproduced supra against the said officer, from record. It would be appropriate to consider the various principles in respect of passing adverse remarks against an officer­ be it judicial, civil (as in the present case) or police or army personnel, and expunction thereof. 18. The   three   principles   laid   down   in  Naim (supra) deal with what is required of the court, prior to, finding it fit to pass adverse remarks. 18.1 It has been reasserted time and again that remarks   adverse   in   nature,   should   not   be passed   in   ordinary   circumstances,   or   unless absolutely necessary which is further qualified by, being necessary for proper adjudication of the case at hand 8. 18.2 Remarks by a court should at all times be governed by the principles of   justice,   fair   play   and   restraint   9. Words employed   should   reflect   sobriety,   moderation and reserve. 10 18.3 It should not be lost sight of and per contra, always be remembered that such remarks, “due to the great power vested in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar  (1986) 2 SCC 569, two­Judge Bench; Abani Kanta Ray v. State of Orissa  (1995) Supp (4) SCC 169, two­ Judge  Bench;  A.M. Mathur  v.  Pramod   Kumar Gupta  (1990) 2 SCC 533; two­Judge  Bench 9 Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, (1987) 1 SCC 227; three­Judge Bench 10 K.G Shanti (supra) our robes, have the ability to jeopardize and compromise independence of judges”; and  may “deter officers and  various 9 2025:HHC:29199 personnel in carrying out their duty”. It further flows   therefrom   that   “adverse   remarks,   of serious   nature,   upon   the   character   and/   or professional competence of a person should not be passed lightly”. 19. Keeping the above principles in mind, the power to expunge remarks may be exercised by the High Court and this Court: – 19.1   With   great   caution   and   circumspection, since it is an undefined power; 19.2 Only to remedy a flagrant abuse of power which   has   been   made   by   passing   comments that are likely to cause harm or prejudice; 19.3 In respect of High Courts exercising such power, it has been observed: 19.3.1 The High Court, as the Supreme Court of revision, must be deemed to have power to see that   courts   below   do   not   unjustly   11  E. Koyakunju  (supra)   12  Dr. Raghubir   Saran   v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1; two­Judge Bench Dr. Raghubir   Saran  (supra)   and   without   any lawful   excuse   take   away   the   character   of   a party or of a witness or of a counsel before it. 19.3.2 Though in the context of Judicial officers, this Court has observed that “The role of High Court is also of a friend, philosopher and guide of judiciary subordinate to it. The strength of power is not displayed solely in cracking a whip on   errors,   mistakes   or   failures;   the   power should be so wielded as to have propensity to prevent and to ensure exclusion of repetition if committed   once   innocently   or   unwittingly. “Pardon the error but  not its repetition”. This principle would apply equally for all services. The power to control is not to be exercised solely by wielding a teacher's cane. 10. Perusal of the judgment, passed by the learned trial   Court,   no   where   demonstrates   that   before   passing 10 2025:HHC:29199 observations against the petitioner, an opportunity of being heard   was   given   to   him,   so   that,   he   could   explain   his position. In the absence of any adherence to the principle of natural justice, the mere fact that the scrutiny note, has been made by the petitioner, though, in discharge of his official   duties,   is   too   short   to   give   an   occasion,   to   the learned   trial   Court,   to   make   such   observations   against him, whereas, there are no findings against the petitioner that he had acted in mala fide manner or he has exceeded his powers, by making the observations/pointing out the shortcomings, in the draft challan. 11. 11. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP(C) No.15191 of 2022,  titled as  Dushyant Mainali versus Diwan Singh Bora & Another. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment are reproduced as under:­ “5. There is no necessity to reiterate that even the   Courts,   including   a   highest   court   of   the Country,   are   bound   by   principle   of   natural justice. Nobody can be condemned unheard. 6. We are of the considered view that the approach   of   the   High   court   in   making   the observations   against   the   appellant   without giving   him   any   opportunity   of   being   heard   is totally unsustainable in law.” 11 2025:HHC:29199 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeraj Garg versus Sarita Rani and Others, (2021) 9 Supreme Court Cases 92,  has   emphasized   on   the   need   for   judicial   restraint. Relevant   paragraphs   11   to   18   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced as under:­ 11. The judgment of this Court in A.M. Mathur Vs. Pramod Kumar Gupta, delivered by Justice K Jagannatha Shetty, elaborates on the need to avoid   even   the   appearance   of   bitterness. The Court observed that, “13…The   duty   of   restraint,   this   humility   of function   should   be   constant   theme   of   our judges. This quality in decision making is as much   necessary   for   judges   to   command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial   restraint   in   this   regard might be better called judicial respect, that is respect by the judiciary…” 12. The importance of avoiding unsavory remarks in   judicial   orders   as   per   established   norms   of judicial propriety has also been succinctly noted in Abani Kanta Ray Vs. State of Orissa  by Justice J.S. Verma, in the following words, “….Use   of   intemperate   language   or   making disparaging   remarks   against   anyone,   unless that be the requirement for deciding the case, is inconsistent with judicial behaviors. Written words   in   judicial   orders   are   for   permanent record which make it even more necessary to practice   self  restraint   in   exercise   of   judicial power while making written orders.” 13. The   principles   laid   down   as   above,   have been quoted with approval and applied by this Court   in   several   subsequent   judgments, including for a Judge Bench in  Samya Sett Vs. Shambhu   Sarkar   and   Another. In   this   case Justice   C.K.   Thakker,   writing   for   the   Court opined that the adverse remarks recorded were 12 2025:HHC:29199 neither necessary for deciding the controversy raised before the Court nor an integral part of the judgement, and accordingly directed deletion of those remarks. 14. The proposition of law laid down by Justice S.K. Das on behalf of the Four Judges Bench in Mohammed   Naim  (Supra)   on   recording   of adverse remarks has been approved in a catena of decisions since 1964. It was also cited by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in A.N. Perera Vs. D.L.H. Perera and  Ors. where Abdul Kadir J. speaking  for the Bench approved  of  the tests laid down by this Court and concluded that the judge’s comments against the petitioner in that case were thoroughly unwarranted under each of those tests. 15. While it is of fundamental importance in the realm of administration of justice to allow the judges  to discharge  their functions  freely and fearlessly and without interference by anyone, it is   equally   important   for   the   judges   to   be exercising restraint and avoid 5 (2005) 6 SCC 767 6 1982 SCC SL SC 20 unnecessary remarks on the conduct of the counsel which may have no bearing on the adjudication of the dispute before the Court. 16. Having   perused   the   offending   comments recorded in the High Court judgments, we feel that   those   could   have   been   avoided   as   they were   unnecessary   for   deciding   the   disputes. Moreover,   they   appear   to   be   based   on   the personal perception of the learned Judge. It is also apparent that the learned Judge did not, before recording the adverse comments, give any opportunity   to   the   Appellant   to   put   forth   his explanation. The remarks so recorded have cast aspersion   on   the   professional   integrity   of   the appellant. Such  condemnation  of  the   Counsel, without giving him an opportunity of being heard would be a negation of the principles of audi alteram partem. The requisite degree of restraint and sobriety expected in such situations is also found to be missing in the offending comments. 13 2025:HHC:29199 17. The tenor of the remarks recorded against the appellant will not only demean him amongst his   professional   colleagues   but   may   also adversely impact his professional career. If the comments   remain   unexpunged   in   the   court judgments, it will be a cross that the Appellant will have to bear, all his life. To allow him to suffer thus, would in our view be prejudicial and unjust. 18. In   view   of   the   forgoing,   we   are   of   the considered opinion that the offending remarks recorded   by   the   learned   judge   against   the appellant should not have been recorded in the manner   it   was   done. The   appellant   whose professional conduct was questioned, was not provided any opportunity to explain his conduct or   defend   himself. The   comments   were   also unnecessary for the decision of the Court. It is accordingly   held   that   the   offending   remarks should be recalled to avoid any future harm to the   appellant’s   reputation   or   his   work   as   a member   of   the   Bar. We   therefore   order expunction   of   the   extracted   remarks   in paragraphs 4,5,6, and 7 of this judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of with this order. 13. Judging   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the present case, in the light of the aforesaid judgments read with the observations, made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that on the basis of the scrutiny note, so made by the petitioner, in discharge of his official duties,   the   findings/observations,   made   by   the   learned 14 2025:HHC:29199 trial Court, do not sustain in the judicial scrutiny of this Court. 14. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, by expunging the remarks, as made by the learned trial Court, in paragraphs 41 to 44 of the judgment.   Pending application(s), shall also stand disposed of accordingly. ( Virender Singh ) Judge August 29, 2025 (ps)