Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1 2025:CGHC:49499
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5039 of 2025
Order reserved on 26/06/2025
Order delivered on 26/09/2025 1 - Sanjay Kumar S/o Ghasiya Ram Aged About 31 Years R/o Village Negerdih Post Kirit Tehsil Shivrinarayan District - Janjgir - Champa (C.G.) 2 - Bijai Kashyap S/o Jagdish Kashyap Aged About 33 Years R/o Kashyap Para, Ward No. 16 Gram Batha, Post Semarsai Batha, P.O. Lormi District - Mungeli (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Principal Secretary State Of Chhattisgarh (Representing Cabinet State Of Chhattisgarh Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar , Nawa Raipur Tehsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of School Education Mahanadi Bhawan Atal Nagar New Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Director Department Of Public Education Chhattisgarh Through Its Director First Floor C- Block Indrawati Bhawan Atal Nagar , Naya Raipur Tehsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 4 - District Education Officer Raipur Tehsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 5 - Assistant District Project Officer Office Of District Education Officer , Raipur Tahsil And District- Raipur (C.G.)
---- Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sourabh Sharma and Ms. Harneet Kaur Khanuja, Advocates For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. S.P. Kale, Additional A.G. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.09.26 19:52:21 +0530
2 For respective Respondent(s) : Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Mr. Amrito Das, Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, Mr. Rupendra Dewangan and Mr. Govind Dewangan, Advocates
Hon'ble
Shri Justice R
avindra Kumar Agrawal
C.A.V. Order
1. The petitioners have filed the instant petition against the order dated 30-04-2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by Respondent No. 2, and for quashing of absorption proceeding initiated pursuant to the order dated 30-04-2025 and to further direction to the authorities to fill up the post of Assistant Teacher/Science/Laboratory in accordance with the Rules of 2019, and prayed for the following reliefs:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions to quash the order dated 30.04.2025 (Annexure P/1) Colly. Passed by the respondent No.2, which is based on decision of cabinet and also declare the decision of cabinet is against the statutory Rules of 2019. 10.2. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the entire proceeding of absorption initiated on the basis of impugned order dated 30/04/2025 and declaring the constitution of Committee for scrutinization/absorption by order dated 09/06/2025 (Annexure P/2) as illegal.
10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions
commanding
the
official respondent to fill up the vacancies of direct recruitment in the post of Assistant Teacher Science/Laboratory strictly in accordance with Rules of 2019 in a fair and transparent manner. 10.4 Any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the cost of the petition may be given.”
3
2. The facts in brief are that the State Government has framed the
“Chhattisgarh School Education Services (Educational and Administrative Cadre) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2019” (in short “Rules of 2019”) to control the recruitment and service conditions of the teachers in the School Education Department. Rule 6 of the Rules of 2019 provides the method of recruitment. Schedule-II of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2019 provides that the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) has to be filled up by 100% direct recruitment. The post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) is a Class-III post having pay matrix Level-06, and the minimum educational qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) is Higher Secondary with Biology/Mathematics, as provided in Schedule-I of Rule 5 of the Rules of 2019. On 30-04-2025, the State Government, in a Cabinet meeting, took a decision for the absorption of Assistant Teachers (B.Ed. qualification holder) whose services have been terminated by the order dated 02-04-2024, passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in WPS No. 3541/2023 (Bhuneshwar Sahu v. Union of India and Others). By virtue of said Cabinet decision, the State Government has started proceeding to absorb the 2621 terminated B.Ed. Qualification holder Assistant Teachers against the vacant 4,422 posts of Assistant Teacher Science/Laboratory by relaxing the educational qualification with the condition that they should pass the Higher Secondary examination in Maths/Science within 03 years.
The petitioners have the requisite qualification for the post of Assistant Teachers (Science/Laboratory), and by the action of the State
4 Government, their chance of appointment to the said post would be hampered. Hence, this petition. 3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, as per Rule 6 and Schedule-II of Rule 6, the post of Assistant Teacher Science/ Laboratory is to be filled up by 100% direct recruitment. The State Government, by its cabinet decision dated 30-04-2025, has relaxed the minimum qualification to two counts, i.e. (1) the terminated teachers will be adjusted against the post of direct recruitment and the Assistant Teachers from Arts/Commerce subjects are also given 03 years additional time to pass the Higher Secondary examination in Science/Maths subject. Pursuant to the cabinet decision dated 30-04-2025, the order dated 09-06-2025 is issued, by which the counselling process is started. The rules of 2019 are framed by invoking the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 6 of the Rules 2019 provides the method of recruitment for the post of Assistant Teacher. Schedule-II of Rule 6 provides that the posts are 100% direct recruitment posts. Entry No. 35 in Schedule-II of Rule 6 provides that the post of Assistant Teachers (Science/Laboratory) is a 100% direct recruitment post. As per Entry No. 2 of Schedule-III of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2019, the minimum qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) is Higher Secondary Examination passed with Biology/Mathematics subject. The Statutory rules provide the minimum qualification and method of recruitment for the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory). These rules were neither modified, nor amended, nor relaxed by the cabinet. The
5 candidates, who have been terminated by the order passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, have been adjusted by the policy decision of the State against the statutory rules. There is no vested right upon the candidates to claim appointment, but by virtue of the policy decision, they are being adjusted to the post of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory). He would further submit that the impugned order was passed in the name of the Hon’ble Governor. Rule 21 of the Rules 2019 provides the relaxation clause; however, by applying this provision, the relaxation has been made, which is wrongly interpreted by the authorities. The Statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, and the rules cannot be relaxed by the Hon’ble Governor. He would also submit that by the executive decision, the petitioners are deprived of their chance of appointment.
The State Government is required to secure a fair and transparent selection process as per the applicable rules. The petitioners are waiting for a long time and preparing for the recruitment examination, but the subject decision of the cabinet would affect the chance of appointment of the petitioners. He would rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of U.P. v. Anand Kumar Yadav” 2018 (13) SCC 560 and submits that the two issues of locus and making the candidates as the party respondents in the petition, raised by the respondents, have been answered. On the date when the petitioners filed the writ petition, they were unaware of the candidates who were being appointed. He would also rely upon “State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha” AIR 2025 SC 1318, “SK Naushad Rahaman v.
6 Union of India” 2022 (12) SCC 1, “Ashok Ram Parhad and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others” AIR 2023 SC 1591: 2023 (18) SCC 768 and the order dated 24-01-2017 passed by this Court in WPS No. 5780/2016 (Smt. Shitala Diwan v. State of Chhattisgarh and others). The impugned order is not the decision of the Hon’ble Governor, but it is a decision of the cabinet. Under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the order/policy has to be issued by the Hon’ble Governor. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Hon’ble Governor has passed the order relaxing the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the interference of this court is required. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposed and submits that the petitioners do not come under the purview of aspirants. From the mark sheet of the petitioners annexed to the petition, they are over the cut of age. They do not come between the prescribed age and are not under the zone of consideration. In the service law, no one can challenge any
order who is not eligible. Rule 6 provides the method of recruitment. The adjustment of the terminated candidates is being done in the non- advertised post. The rules applicable to the advertised posts. Therefore, the petitioners have no right to challenge the cabinet decision. Rule 20 of the Rules 2019 provides the interpretation of the rules, and the interpretation of the State Government is final. The question is whether the schedule can exclude what has already been mentioned in Rule 6 and whether clause 2 comes within the purview of that Rule, has been rightly interpreted by the State Government, and
7 the cabinet has taken a decision. Rule 8 of the Rules 2019 provides the relaxation clause in the age limit. The present petition is not a Public Interest Litigation, and the decision taken by the cabinet, the petitioner cannot challenge the same. 5. Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned counsel for the intervenors, would submit that the petition has been filed challenging the policy decision of the State Government, and the Court can interfere only when the policy decision is arbitrary and without any foundation. When the intervenors applied for the post of Assistant Teachers, the qualification was B.Ed. as prescribed in the Rules of 2019. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that the qualification of B.Ed. It cannot be the requisite qualification for Assistant Teachers, and it would require a D.Ed. qualification. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, in WPS No. 3541/2023 and other bunch of petitions, has also struck down the said qualification of Assistant Teacher. By that time, the intervenors have been appointed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Naveen Kumar & Others v. Union of India and Others, set the cut-off date of 11-08-2023 and said that the services of those employees who were appointed before 11-08-2023 would be protected. The services of the employees were protected under the right of equity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed another order with respect to the teachers whose services were affected and whose services were protected; they should undergo training. The employees whose services have been affected were not guilty of any misconduct or any departmental action. The matter of termination of 2160 Assistant Teachers was placed
8 before the State Government, and the State Government, constituted a committee on 03-01-2025, to examine the representation of the affected Assistant Teachers.
The State Government has considered from every angle of the matter and ultimately reached to a conclusion that the services of the employees can be protected. The posts of Assistant Teacher and Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) are different, and the requisite qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, is D.Ed., and for the Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is Higher Secondary (Biology/Maths) because they do not teach and only look after the laboratories. About 350 candidates do not have the requisite qualification. The State Government, in view of protecting the services, out of 4422 posts of Assistant Teachers (Science/Laboratory), decided to accommodate the 2621 affected candidates on unadvertised posts. In view of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the cabinet decision was taken. He would also submit that the judgment of Anand Kumar Yadav (supra) is not applicable in the case. It was the case of Shiksha- Mitra; they did not have the requisite qualification, and they could not be appointed as a teacher. The NCT guideline applies only to the Assistant Teachers who are imparting teaching, but not to the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). In the Anand Kumar Yadav’s case, the entire post of Shiksha-Mitra was converted into Assistant Teachers. To protect the interests of the affected employees, the State Government had taken a policy decision. The policy decision cannot be challenged in a service matter. More than 2000 posts are still lying
9 vacant even after accommodation of the affected teachers. It is the State’s prerogative as to whether the vacant posts are to be filled or not. The petitioners have not impleaded the Assistant teachers who have been appointed, and schools have been allotted to them.
He would rely upon the judgment of “Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village and Others”, 2025 SCC Online SC 1209 and would submit that the court can examine the decision-making process and not substitute the decision under consideration with its own decision. In the present case, the decision has been taken by the cabinet after considering several factors and objects. They are accommodating those employees who have been terminated in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and no harm would be caused to the petitioners. The petitioners are not the persons aggrieved because the petition is against the statute, and they are claimed to be aspirants who are likely to participate in the selection process. He would further rely upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of M.P. v. Yashwant Trimbak” 1996 (2) SCC 305. 6. Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the intervenor, adopting the submissions made by learned State counsel and would submit that the Rules of 2019 are not challenged and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. The power to relax the Rules is with the Governor in the Rules of 2019 itself, and the said rule is not challenged. Since, by virtue of the impugned order, the appointment of all the 2621 candidates would be affected, and therefore, they are the necessary parties to the petition. He would rely upon the judgment of
10 Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Tej Prakash Pathak and others v. Rajasthan High Court and others” 2025 (2) SCC 1 and submit that the legal rights of the petitioners should be infringed, and then only they can challenge the impugned action in the writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. 7. Mr.
Amrito Das, learned Counsel, appearing for the other intervenors, would submit that there was a committee constituted, the committee submits its proposal and recommendation, and then the cabinet decision is taken. All the business of the government is transacted in the name of the Hon’ble Governor. Merely because of the reason that the Governor has not put his signature, not a ground to raise a doubt on the said order. It’s a cabinet decision to accommodate the 2621 B.Ed. qualification holder Assistant Teachers, who are terminated. It is not the case that the petitioners are unknown as to who the candidates are. There was no error on the part of the Assistant Teachers who were terminated, and they were terminated because of the defective rules. As per Schedule-III of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2019, the qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher is given in Annexure-I. The entire annexure is being taken from the NCTE regulations and put in the annexure of the Rules, so that it may be changed time to time in accordance with the NCTE regulations. The intervenors are B.Ed. qualified, they applied and were selected in the selection process. The cabinet decided that the terminated Assistant Teachers are to be adjusted in the vacant post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). The total cadre strength of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is 8927, out of which
11 4422 posts are vacant, and 2621 candidates are to be adjusted as per the cabinet decision. This is the compassion shown by the government to adjust them in the vacant post of Assistant Teachers (Laboratory). The compassionate appointment policy is also an exception to the general rule of appointment. It was also given by a policy decision of the government. If the state government takes a decision to compensate the candidates, it cannot be said to be arbitrary. He would also rely upon the case of “Tinku v. State of Haryana and Others”, 2024 SCC Online SC 3292.
If the decision of the government has a reasonable basis under a policy, which may be an exception to the general rule, framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, it cannot be said to be contrary. If the government makes a decision, the petitioners cannot challenge that the posts are being reduced, because the government has the discretion to fill the number of posts. The absorption of Shiksha Karmi has not been challenged because at that time, the right of appointment to the post of Assistant Teachers was to be affected. That absorption was also done under a policy. The status of 2621 candidates is as such that they were selected, working, removed by the government because of the fault of government, and many have resigned from different places; many did not participate in different places, many had expanded their families. It is just like a compassionate appointment. In the present case, there is no allegation that the regulation of NCTE is violated. The candidates who have not possessed the requisite qualification, the government gave them time to obtain the requisite qualification, and if they failed to
12 obtain it, they will be removed; thus, there is no arbitrariness. The petitioners are not the persons aggrieved because the petitioners are not claiming any relief for themselves. It is like the PIL. There is non- joinder of necessary parties, and the candidates have not been made a party. The candidates who are terminated are known to everybody, but they have not been made as the party, not even in a representative capacity. He would further submit that the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is a non-teaching post and therefore the judgment of Anand Kumar Yadav (supra) is not applicable in the present case. In the Anand Kumar Yadav case, they were working as Shiksha-Mitra, and it was not compassion; and 100% posts have been considered as Assistant Teachers.
It is further submitted by him that the conjoint reading of Article 166 of the Constitution of India and Rule 21 of the Rules of 2019, it is clear that the power of Rule 21, along with the compassion of the government, they took a decision. The petitioners do not have any locus to challenge the policy decision. The petitioners themselves have pleaded in para 8.9 that the chance of the petitioners being appointed would be affected; thus, the chance would not be a right to be appointed. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 9. The claim of the petitioners in the present petition that the recruitment on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) should be filled up by direct recruitment under the Rules of 2019 in a fair and transparent
13 manner, however, in the garb of Cabinet decision the State Government is going to appoint the Assistant Teachers, who have been terminated by virtue of the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, thereby the B.Ed. qualification holder candidates have been excluded for appointment on the post of Assistant Teachers. Virtually, the petitioners are challenging the Cabinet decision and the order dated 20.04.2025 (Annexure P/1), whereby the terminated Assistant Teachers are being directed to be adjusted on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) by relaxing the minimum qualification prescribed for Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) in the Rules of 2019 and also the method of recruitment provided in it. The contention of the petitioners that, by the said action of the State Government, their right to be appointed on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) would be frustrated.
The contention of the respondents that, since the petitioners are not the aspirants and the adjustment of the terminated teachers are being made against unadvertised posts and it is the policy decision of the State to adjust them by relaxing the rules, cannot be questioned by them. It is the State prerogative to fill up the number of posts under the relevant rules. The respondents have also raised objection with respect to maintainability of the writ petition and non-joinder of the necessary parties, as the terminated candidates, for whom the Cabinet decision was taken, have not been made as a party respondent in the petition. 10. Another issue has also been raised by the petitioners that the order dated 30.04.2025 has been issued in the name of Governor, but it has
14 been signed by the Under Secretary, which cannot be considered to be an order of the Hon’ble Governor. It is relevant here to quote the order dated 30.04.2025, which reads as under:-
“कमांक एफ 2-19/2024/20-तीन मांत्रि-परिषद् द्वा त्रिनर्णय लिय गय त्रिक सीधी भती$ 2023 मां& त्रिनय'क्त 2621 बी.एड. अर्हतीधी सीर्हयक त्रि/क्षक लि1नक2 सी3वाए स्क6 त्रि/क्ष त्रिवाभग द्वा सीमांप्त क2 गई र्ह9, उनक< अतीत्रिवाभगय सीत्रिमांत्रिती क2 अन'/सी क3 त्रिबीन्द्' कमांक 1 सी3 5-
1. र्हटाय3 गय3 बी.एसी. अर्हतीधी 2621 सीर्हयक त्रि/क्षक@ क< सीर्हयक त्रि/क्षक त्रिवाज्ञान (प्रय<ग/) क3 ज्य मां& रिक्त 4422 पद्@ मां& सीमांय<लि1ती त्रिकय 1न।
2. सीमांय<1न ग9 त्रिवाज्ञात्रिपती पद्@ प त्रिकय 1ए।
3. क/वात्रिर्णज्य सीकय सी3 12वाE उत्तीर्ण सीर्हयक त्रि/क्षक@ क< त्रिनधीरिती अर्हती (12वाE गत्रिर्णती/त्रिवाज्ञान) प6र्ण कन3 र्ह3ती' तीन वाष क2 अन'मांत्रिती द् 1ए, सीथ र्ह इन अभ्यलिथय@ क< प्रय<ग/ कय क3 सीबीधी मां& एसी.सी.ई.आ.टा. क3 मांध्यमां सी3 02 मांर्ह क त्रिवा/3ष प्रत्रि/क्षर्ण त्रिद्य 1ए।
4. अन्य त्रिपछड़ा वाग क3 /3ष 355 अभ्यलिथय@ र्ह3ती' सीख्य3त्ती पद्@ क सीO1न त्रिकय 1ए।
5. सीमांय<1न क3 लिय3 लि1@ क2 प्रथत्रिमांकती इसी प्रक र्ह<ग:- I. ज्य क3 अन'सी6त्रिPती क्ष3@ क3 लि1@ मां& रिक्त पद्@ प। II. सीमांवाती$ लि1@ क3 रिक्त पद्@ प। III. तीत्पश्Pती अन्य लि1@ मां&, त्रिकय 1ए। अन'सी सीर्हयक त्रि/क्षक त्रिवाज्ञान (प्रय<ग/) क3 मांद्@ प सीमांय<1न क2 आगमां कयवार्ह त्रिकय 1ए।”
11. Along with the order dated 30.04.2025, the Cabinet decision has also been annexed, which is also made as a part of the writ petition. 15
12.
Pursuant to the order passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, total 2621 Assistant Teachers, who are having B.Ed. qualifications, have been terminated from their services by the State Government and they have made multiple representations to the State Government for redressal of their grievances, saying that they were not at any fault, and because of the fault in the Rules of 2019 made by the State Government, they have been terminated and then the State Government constituted a committee to examine the grievances of the terminated Assistant Teachers. On the recommendation and proposal made by the said committee, the Cabinet took a policy decision on 30.04.2025 that all the 2621 candidates shall be accommodated against total 4422 sanctioned vacant posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). It is worthy to mention here that the total sanctioned posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is
8927. The requisite qualification of the Assistant Teacher (Science/ Laboratory) is prescribed in Entry No. 2 of Schedule-III of Rule 8 of the Rules of 2019, which reads as under:- S.No. Name of Service/Post Minimum Age Limit Maximum Age Limit Minimum Educational/ Technical Qualifications Name of the Members of Selection Committee Remarks
2. Assistant Teacher (Science/ Laboratory) 21 years 35 years Passed Higher Secondary Examination with Biology/Mathematics subject (1) District Education Officer- Chairman (2) Principal, DIET- Member (3) Block Education Officer- Member (4) Assistant Director/Equivalent -Member Secretary (5) Principal, Government, Higher Secondary School-Member -
16
13. The method of recruitment is provided under Rule 6 of Rules of 2019, which reads as under:-
“6.
Method of recruitment.- (1) Recruitment to the service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be made by the following methods, namely:- (a) By direct recruitment through selection (competitive examination /interview) and Limited Departmental Examination; (b) By promotion of members of the service; (c) By transfer/deputation of persons who hold in a substantive capacity such posts in such services as may be specified in this behalf, (d) By absorption of person/persons who hold in such services and serve on any equivalent salary/post in any Government service. (2) The number of persons recruited under clause (a), (b), (c) or (d) of sub-rule (1) shall not at any time exceed the percentage shown in Schedule- II of the number of duty posts, as specified in Schedule-I. (3) Subject to the provisions of these rules, the method or methods of recruitment to be adopted for the purpose of filling any particular vacancy or vacancies in the service, as may be required to be filled during any particular period of recruitment and the number of persons to be recruited by such methods, shall be determined on each occasion by the Appointing Authority in consultation with the Commission/Government. (4) At the time of recruitment to the service the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Jan Jatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Arakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994 (No. 21 of 1994) and instructions issued from time to time, under this Act by the General Administration Department of the Government shall apply. (5) The newly appointed teachers will be included in E- (LB)/T-(LB) cadre seniority list on direct recruitment to the service.”
14. As per the Schedule-II of Rule 6 of the Rules of 2019, the posts of Assistant Teacher (Science/Laboratory) are 100% direct recruitment posts. 17
15. Rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of 2019 talks about interpretation and relaxation, which reads as under:-
“20. Interpretation. If any question arises in relation to the interpretation of these rules, it shall be referred to the State Government, whose decision thereon shall be final.
21. Relaxation. Nothing in these rules shall be construed to limit or abridge the power of the Governor to deal with the case of any person to whom these rules may apply, in such manner as may appear to it to be just and proper: Provided that the case shall not be dealt with in any manner less favorable to him than provided in these rules.”
16. The Rules of 2019 has been framed by exercising the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Governor acts on the aid and advise of the council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the constitution to act personally without the aid and advise of the council of Ministers, or against the aid and advise of the council of Ministers. The Governor can also exercise his discretion in harmony with his council of Ministers. 17. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the matter of “Vikram Singh Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, through- Principal Secretary and others” reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Chhattisgarh 1137 has held that:-
“30. The sole question for consideration is whether the aforesaid letter can be construed to be an approval/confirmation/consent
of
the
State Government for amendment of the Regulation of 2011 on the ground that the same has not been expressed in name of the Governor. 31. Article 166 of the Constitution provides for the conduct of Government business. It is useful to quote this Article:
18
“166. Conduct of business of the Government of a State.— (1) All executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.”
32. It will be appropriate now to take note of the decisions cited at the bar. 33. In Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar (supra), Hon'ble Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das observed that the decision of the appropriate Government to confirm the detention
order was communicated to the District Magistrate by a confidential letter signed by the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department. It was noted that under Rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by the Government of Bombay under Article 166 the Constitution, the Assistant Secretary was authorized to sign orders and instrument of the Government of Bombay. An argument was advanced that no valid order of confirmation was made in proper legal form at all and that a confidential communication from the Home Department to the District Magistrate cannot be regarded as an order under section 11(1) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (for short, the Act of 1950). It was observed that Section 11 (1) of the Act of 1950 required an executive decision as to whether the detention order should or should not be confirmed. But the Act is silent as to the form in which the executive decision, whether it is described as an order or an executive action, is to be taken. No particular form is prescribed by the Act at all and the requirements of the Act will be fully satisfied if it can be shown that the executive decision has in fact been taken. It was held that every executive decision need not be formally expressed and this is particularly so when one superior officer directs his subordinate to act or forbear from acting in a particular way, but when the executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or to be communicated it should normally be expressed in the form mentioned in Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India i.e., in the name of
19 the Governor. It was held that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.
Strict compliance with the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution gives an immunity to the order and that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an order made by the Governor. If, therefore, the requirements of that article are not complied with, the resulting immunity cannot be claimed by the State. This, however, does not vitiate the order itself. Observing so, it was held that while the Act of 1950 requires an executive decision, whether it is called an order or an executive action, for the confirmation of an order of detention under section 11 (1) the Act of 1950, does not itself prescribe any particular form of expression of that executive decision but omission to comply with the provision of Article 166 of the Constitution does not render the executive action a nullity. It was laid down that all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not under section 11 (1) of the Act of 1950. It having been established from the materials on record that such a decision was taken by the appropriate Government, the writ petition was dismissed. Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Chief Justice, agreed with the
judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das. 34. By the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Justice B.K. Mukherjea also, the writ petition was dismissed. Hon'ble Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar concurred with the view taken. 35. Dealing with the question relating to the order of confirmation not being expressed to be made in the name of the Governor, it was observed by Hon'ble Justice Mukherjea that Article 166(1) of the Constitution is confined to the cases where the executive action requires to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification or any other instrument. It was observed that Article 166(1) does not lay down how an executive action of the Government of a State is to be performed; it only prescribes the mode in which such act is to be expressed. The manner of expression is ordinarily a matter of form, but whether a rigid compliance with a form is essential to the validity of an act or not depends upon the intention of the legislature. It was held that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution are to be read together. While clause (1)
20 relates to the mode of expression of an executive order or instrument, clause (2) lays down the way in which such order is to be authenticated; and when both these forms are complied with, an order or instrument would be immune from challenge in a court of law on the ground that it has not been made or executed by the Governor of the State. Non-compliance with the provisions of either of the clauses would lead to the result that the order in question would lose the protection which it would otherwise enjoy, had the proper mode for expression and authentication been adopted. It was held that the order is not a nullity even though it has not been expressed to be made in the name of the Governor. 36. It needs to be mentioned at this juncture that there is a minority opinion expressed by Hon'ble Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan. 37.
In Kripalu Shankar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in the context of Article 166 of the Constitution that the functioning of the Government in a State is governed by Article 166 of the Constitution which lays down that there shall be a council of ministers with the Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions except where he is required to exercise his functions under the Constitution, in his discretion. Article 166 provides for the conduct of Government business. 38. In Kripalu Shankar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that Article 166(1) requires that all executive action of the State Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. This clause relates to cases where the executive action has to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification. It prescribes the mode in which an executive action has to be expressed. Noting by an official in the departmental file will not, therefore, come within this Article nor even noting by a Minister. Every executive decision need not be as laid down under Article 166(1) but when it takes the form of an order it has to comply with Article 166(1). Article 166(2) states that orders and other instruments made and executed under Article 166(1), shall be authenticated in the manner prescribed. While clause (1) relates to the mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the manner in which the order is to be authenticated and clause (3) relates to the making of the rules by the Governor for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government. It was also observed that notings in a notes file do not have behind them the sanction of law as an effective order. 39. In Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the event it appears from the order and the records produced before the court, if any occasion arises therefor that even if a valid
21
order is not authenticated in terms of clause (2) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the same would not be vitiated in law. Failure to authenticate an executive order is not fatal. The said provision is directory in nature and not mandatory. 40. In MRF Ltd. (supra), referring to Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1823, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Article 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India are only directory and not mandatory in character. It was also held that the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution which are framed for convenient transaction of the Government, has to be transacted in a just and fit manner in keeping with the said Business Rules and as per the requirement of Article 154 of the Constitution. It was further held that the Rules of Business framed under the Provisions of Article 166 (3) of the Constitution are mandatory and must be strictly adhered. Any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eyes of law. 41. In Sunil Kumar Vaish (supra), amongst others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that unless an order is expressed in the name of the Governor and it is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Governor. 42. In Jaipur Development Authority (supra), reiterating the decision in Kripalu Shankar (supra), it is stated that unless an order is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order made on behalf of the Government. The aforesaid observations were made in the context of a letter dated 06.12.2021 which was neither expressed in the name of the Governor nor was it authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules and that the letter merely indicated the discussion made by the Committee and the decision taken by the Committee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by no stretch of imagination, the same can be treated as a policy decision of the Government within the meaning of Article 166 of the Constitution. 43.
In Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra), it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business made under Articles 77(3) and 166(3) of the Constitution is the decision of the President or the Governor, respectively, and these articles do not provide for ‘delegation’. That is to say, that decisions made and actions taken by the Minister or officer under the Rules of Business cannot be treated as exercise of delegated power in real sense, but are deemed to be the actions of the President or Governor, as the case
22 may be, that are taken or done by them on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. It was further held that the requirements of the Rules of Business must be complied with in order to give validity to the action or decision taken. 44. While noticing that a Two-Judge Bench in MRF Ltd. (supra) had taken a view that provisions of Article 166(3) is mandatory whereas another Two-Judge Bench in Crawford Bayley & Co. v. Union of India, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 25, had accepted that the Rules of Business framed under Article 77 of the Constitution are directory and not mandatory, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had taken note of the judgment in R. Chitralekha (supra) and observed that MRF Ltd. (supra) was distinguishable on facts as that case dealt with rules pertaining to financial implications for which there were no provisions in the Appropriation Act, and so the rules required mandatory compliance. 45. This Court, in Rungta College of Engineering & Technology, Bhilai (supra), while dealing with the Chhattisgarh Engineering Snatak Pravesh Niyam, 2012 (for short, the Rules of 2012), observed that the Rules of 2012 was signed by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Technical Education and the same being not duly authenticated in the name of the Governor as mandated under Article 166(2) of the Constitution, the same cannot be held to be a valid statutory rule. 46.
Perusal of the judgments noted above would go to show that every executive decision need not be formally expressed, but when an executive decision affects an outsider or is required to be officially notified or communicated, it should be expressed in the name of the Governor. When there is compliance of the requirements of Article 166 of the Constitution, the same gives an immunity to the order to the extent that it cannot be challenged on the ground that it is not an
order made by the Governor. Omission to comply with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution does not render an executive action a nullity.”
18. The power of relaxation in the Rules of 2019 was given in Rule 21 of the Rules of 2019 to the Governor, who deal with the case of any person, to whom the rule may apply in such manner, as may appear to it to be just and proper. In exercise of the powers of Rule 21, the order has been passed on 30.04.2025 after a Cabinet decision, by which the rules with respect to the qualification and method have been relaxed and the terminated Assistant Teachers are considered for the post of
23 Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) and the time to obtain necessary qualification was granted by the said order dated 30.04.2025.
19. In the matter of “Old Jalukai Village Council” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Para 19 that:-
“19. He submitted that the issue of granting recognition to a village falls within the domain of the executive decision making. It is well settled that in exercise of the power of judicial review, a writ court can only examine the decision-making process, and not substitute the decision under consideration with its own decision. Therefore, once the state government/cabinet had taken a decision to keep recognition of the respondent no. 1 village in abeyance upon a consideration of several relevant factors, the High Court had committed a serious error by issuing a mandamus and directing the grant of a formal recognition order, more so, when the question as to whether the respondent no. 1 village falls within the ancestral land of the appellant is a disputed question of fact which needs proper examination at the ground level. The impugned decision, which was passed in the absence of the appellant was neither alive to the existence of such a dispute nor did it have the assistance of the material now being placed on record by the appellant.”
20. From bare perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it is quite vivid that the Court can examine the decision making process under the powers of judicial review, but should not substitute the decision under
consideration with its own decision. In the present case, the special committee was constituted comprising of 05 members, who are the Chief Secretary and Secretaries of different departments. After receiving their recommendation based on the number of vacant posts, the earlier appointments of terminated teachers, Rules of 2019, their qualifications, their termination on the basis of the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Court, their future prospects, etc. the State Government by its Cabinet decision decided
24 to accommodate them against 4422 vacant posts of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) and even after their accommodation, total 2161 posts are still vacant. Most of them are having requisite qualifications and about 350 candidates were not having requisite qualifications of Biology/ Mathematics subject, for which they have been granted 03 years time to get the requisite qualification obtained.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Devesh Sharma v. Union of India” order dated 08.04.2024, passed in CA No. 5068 of 2023 has observed in its order that:-
“As it appears that a large number of candidates with B.Ed. degree had already been appointed on the basis of eligibility criteria specified by the educational authorities, we do not think it to be equitable to effect their removal. We, accordingly hold that the judgment delivered by this Bench on 11th August, 2023 shall have prospective operation. But prospective operation of this judgment shall be only for those candidates who were appointed without any qualification or conditions imposed by any Court of Law to the effect that their appointment would be subject to final outcome of the case which might have had been instituted by them and such candidates were in regular employment without any disqualification and were appointed in pursuance of a notice of advertisement where B.Ed. was stipulated to be valid qualification. Services of only such candidates shall not be disturbed because of this judgment. We make it clear that this benefit is only for the candidates who were appointed prior to the date our judgment was delivered, on 11th August, 2023. Mere selection of such candidates or participation in the process will not entitle them for a benefit under our present order. Moreover, the candidates having B.Ed. qualification whose appointments we are protecting in this
judgment, will have to undergo a bridge course and we direct the educational authorities to device such course, which would be applicable for each state and union territory, within a period of one year from today. This course shall be only for those appointees who have been engaged with B.Ed. degree only in the subject-posts under conditions stipulated in the earlier part of this order. National Council for Teacher Education shall design such course under overall
25 supervision of the Ministry of Education, Union of India. Upon formulation of such course, the same shall be publicly notified and a timeframe shall also be given within which the respective candidates shall participate therein. Failure of any candidate to participate and complete the course within the timeframe to be given by the concerned educational authorities will invalidate the appointment of such candidate.”
22. The another objection raised by the respondents that the petitioners have no right to challenge the said Cabinet decision of the State Government, because they are not the persons aggrieved and only the aspiring candidates. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are aspiring candidates, but neither they were earlier appointed nor terminated and they claimed that their chance of appointment would be affected by the absorption of terminated Assistant Teachers. 23. In the matter of “Ayyub Khan Noor Khan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra and others” 2013 (4) SCC 465, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered this aspect in Para 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 20, which are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“9. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai MANU/SC/7106/2008 : AIR 2008 SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons. 10. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P.
MANU/SC/0845/2011 : AIR 2011 SC 3031, this Court held: The expression 'aggrieved person' denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition.
Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and
26 extent of complainant's interest and the nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant. 11. This Court, even as regards the filing of a habeas corpus petition, has explained that the expression, 'next friend' means a person who is not a total stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by one who is a complete stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal custody. (Vide: Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0009/1950 : AIR 1951 SC 41;Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration MANU/SC/0184/1978 : AIR 1980 SC 1579;Mrs. Neelima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0253/1987 : AIR 1987 SC 2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India MANU/SC/0058/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 280; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India MANU/SC/0059/1993 : AIR 1993 SC 284; and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0892/2012 : JT (2012) 10 SC 393). 12. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of the court. The right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new social rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system must be provided. Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved. The court must maintain strict vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of the process of court and that, "ordinarily meddlesome bystanders are not granted a Visa". Many societal pollutants create new problems of non- redressed grievances, and the court should make an earnest endeavour to take up those cases, where the subjective purpose of the lis justifies the need for it. (Vide: P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Anr.
MANU/SC/0083/1980 : AIR 1980 SC 856;Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/1886/2009 : (2010) 2 SCC 114;State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors. MANU/SC/0050/2010 : (2010) 3 SCC 402; andAmar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0596/2011 : (2011) 7 SCC 69)”
16. As Respondent No. 5 does not belong to the Scheduled Tribes category, the garb adopted by him, of serving the cause of Scheduled Tribes candidates who might have been deprived of their legitimate right to be considered for the post, must be considered by this Court in order to determine whether Respondent No. 5, is in fact, in a legitimate position to lay any claim before any forum, whatsoever. 20 . While dealing with the similar issue, this Court in Raju Ramsingh Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao
27 Bhiavapurkar and Ors. MANU/SC/3754/2008 : (2008) 9 SCC 54 held: We must now deal with the question of locus standi. A special leave petition ordinarily would not have been entertained at the instance of the Appellant. Validity of appointment or otherwise on the basis of a caste certificate granted by a committee is ordinarily a matter between the employer and the employee. This Court, however, when a question is raised, can take cognizance of a matter of such grave importance suo motu. It may not treat the special leave petition as a public interest litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is, in a proceeding of that nature, permissible for the court to make a detailed enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of the matter although it was initiated at the instance of a person having a private interest. A deeper scrutiny can be made so as to enable the court to find out as to whether a party to a lis is guilty of commission of fraud on the Constitution.
If such an enquiry subserves the greater public interest and has a far-reaching effect on the society, in our opinion, this Court will not shirk its responsibilities from doing so. (See also: Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 619)”
24. It is settled law that, the aspirants do not have indefeasible or vested right of appointment. In the matter of “State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha” AIR 2025 SC 1318, in Para 54, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-
“54. Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a policy decision. It has to be borne in mind that securing public employment is the dream of many, who put their heart and soul to prepare for it. Nowadays, aspirants undertake rigorous study sessions as well as training modules to equip themselves, which also comes at a heavy cost. That apart, since every process of recruitment necessarily involves substantial expenses which are borne from the public exchequer and at the same time the aspirants for the posts (who, as per their own estimation, have performed sufficiently well and therefore stand a good chance of being appointed upon figuring in the select list) cherish fond hopes of a bright and secure future, the law is clear that the policy decision not to carry the process forward must be taken bona fide, there has to be justifiable reason if the
28 process is abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker. This acts as a check on the employer's power deciding against not making any appointment from the select list despite availability of vacancy/vacancies on the advertised/notified public post(s). A writ court may, upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in such manner and make such directions as the facts and circumstances warrant.
We, therefore, do not find it acceptable that the aspirants, not having an indefeasible or vested right of appointment, do not also have the right to question any decision adverse to their interest affecting achievement of their goals to secure public employment. Whether, and to what extent, any relief should be granted, must depend on the facts of each case.”
25. In the matter of “Tinku v. State of Haryana and others” 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3292, in Para 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:-
“14. The very basis and the rationale, wherever such policies are framed for compassionate appointment is with an object to grant relief to a family in distress and facing destitution, and thus an exception is culled out to the general rule in favour of the family of the deceased employee. This is resorted to by taking into
consideration the services rendered by such employee and the consequent legitimate legal expectations apart from the sudden change in status and affairs of the family because of the unexpected turn of events, i.e. the loss of the sole bread earner.”
26. The aforesaid judgments are inserted here to consider the factors, under which the Cabinet decision has been taken to accommodate terminated Assistant Teachers to the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory). Since, the petitioners have no legal right to challenge the action of the State Government and the policy decision and it is the State prerogative to fill up the number of vacant posts, the judgment of
“State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha” 1974 (3) SCC 220 is relevant on this issue, and Para 9 is relevant to quote here:-
29
“9. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. this Court has pointed out in Dr. Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the Nalanda College [1962] (2) Suppl. S.C.R. 144. that in
order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.”
27. Another objection with respect to the impleadment of the terminated candidates is concerned, this Court does not find any sufficient reason to consider the objection for the reason that, on the date when the writ petition was filed, no appointment orders were issued to such candidates and it is the Cabinet decision is challenged in the writ petition. Had they been participated in the counseling or their names appears in the list of candidates, who have to accommodate on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory), they may be proper/necessary party, but at present this Court deem it appropriate not to dismiss the writ petition on this ground.
28.
Learned counsel for the petitioners would rely upon the judgment of
“Anand Kumar Yadav” (supra), but there are certain distinguishable
facts with the present case. In “Anand Kumar Yadav” case (supra), he candidates were Shiksha-mitras and all the Shiksha-mitras have been absorbed on the post of Assistant Teachers, who does not possess the requisite qualifications, yet they have been absorbed in the post of Assistant Teachers, which were the teaching posts, but in the present case, the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) is not the teaching post and even after their absorption in the post of Assistant Teacher
30 (Laboratory), number of vacant posts are still there and therefore, their right or chance of the appointment of the petitioners would not be affected. Therefore, no benefit can be granted to the petitioners from the judgment of “Anand Kumar Yadav” (supra).
29. From the aforesaid consideration, this Court is of the view that the
order dated 30.04.2025, which has been issued on the Cabinet decision to accommodate the 2621 terminated Assistant Teachers on the post of Assistant Teacher (Laboratory) does not suffer with any illegality or arbitrariness, and therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in the present writ petition, and the same is liable to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved