p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No.3829 of 2025 (An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena ..... Petitioner Represented by Adv. – Mr. Prateik Parija -versus- State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ..... Opposite Party Represented by Adv. – Mr. N. Moharana, Standing Counsel (Vigilance) CRLMC NO.3682 OF 2024 (An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) Prof. (Dr.) Trupti Rekha Swain ..... Petitioner Represented by Adv. – Mr. Prateik Parija -versus- State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ..... Opposite Party Represented by Adv. – Mr. N. Moharana, Standing Counsel (Vigilance) CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA p. 2 Date of Hearing: 27.02.2026 : Date of Judgement: 13.03.2026 A.K. Mohapatra, J. : 1. The Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC petitions have both approached this Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings against them in VGR No.62 of 2017 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017, registered for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”) read with Section 34 of the IPC, which is presently pending before the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack. 2. Since both the CRLMC applications arise out of the self-same FIR and involve a common set of facts and issues, they are heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. For the sake of convenience, the CRLMC No.3829 of 2025 has been taken as the lead matter. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE 3. A brief narration of the essential facts of the present case, shorn of unnecessary details, is as follows. Upon receiving information regarding alleged criminal misconduct and possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income of the Petitioners, the Vigilance Department initiated an inquiry and conducted searches at various locations. These included the Government residential quarters of the Petitioners, certain flats owned by them, p. 3 their office at the Department of Haematology in SCB Medical College and Hospital (“SCB MCH”), as well as other places connected with them. 4. The FIR records at Annexure-1 series reveal that, upon discovery of assets allegedly disproportionate to the known sources of income of the present Petitioners, a further preliminary inquiry was undertaken. It is relevant to note that the Petitioner in CRLMC No. 3829 of 2025, Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena, is the husband of the Petitioner in CRLMC No. 3682 of 2024, Dr. Trupti Rekha Swain. Both the Petitioners are Government servants, with Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena serving as the Head of the Department of Haematology at SCB MCH and Dr. Trupti Rekha Swain serving as Professor and Head of the Department of Pharmacology at the same institution. 5. The FIR further indicates that the Petitioners had neither submitted their property statements since joining Government service, nor had they obtained the requisite permission from the competent authority prior to acquiring certain assets. On the basis of the tentative preliminary calculation of the movable and immovable assets of the Petitioners and their expenditure, the Vigilance Department has alleged that the Petitioners are in possession of assets disproportionate to their known sources of income to the tune of Rs.4,00,32,026, which is stated to constitute approximately 219% of their known sources of p. 4 income. Accordingly, the present case was registered against the Petitioners under the aforementioned provisions of the PC Act and the IPC. 6. Aggrieved by their implication in the aforesaid offences and by the fact that the FIR, registered nearly eight years ago, has not yet culminated in completion of the investigation, the Petitioners have approached this Court seeking quashing of the present criminal proceedings. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 7. Heard Mr. Prateik Parija, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners. It is the firm stance of the Petitioners that the allegations in the FIR do not disclose any prima facie offence, that the inordinate delay in completion of the investigation violates their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that continuation of the present criminal proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. In support of the aforesaid position, the learned counsel for the Petitioners has advanced the following contentions; i) At the very outset, learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that in an earlier matter involving similar factual circumstances, this Court had quashed the criminal proceedings by judgment dated 16.04.2025 in CRLMC No.1628 of 2023 along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022. Referring to paragraphs 10, 11, 34 to 45, 52 and 53 of the said judgment, annexed as Annexure-2 series to CRLMC No.3829 of 2025, it was contended that the p. 5 present Petitioners stand on an even better footing than the petitioners in the aforesaid case. Accordingly, it was urged that the present Petitioners are entitled to similar relief. ii) Learned counsel further contended that both Petitioners have regularly submitted their property statements in accordance with the applicable service rules. Referring to the income computation reflected in the FIR (Annexure-1 series), it was submitted that the total income of the Petitioners from known sources has been shown as Rs.4,04,80,744/-, which, according to the learned counsel, exceeds the value of the assets and expenditure attributed to them. It was therefore contended that no case of disproportionate assets is made out. Learned counsel further submitted that, on the basis of the figures mentioned in the FIR itself, the Petitioners have surplus income of Rs.11,44,885/- and Rs.20,14,307/- respectively after accounting for their assets and expenditures. It was also contended that certain amounts received by Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain, the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3682 of 2024, from her relatives through her SBI account, though duly reflected in the income-tax returns filed before the authorities, have not been considered by the investigating agency. Likewise, an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- received as advance towards sale of an immovable p. 6 property at Bhubaneswar has also allegedly been ignored despite being reflected in the income-tax returns. iii) With specific reference to the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3682 of 2024, the learned counsel submitted that she has been implicated in the present case under Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that she is the wife of the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025. It was contended that the said Petitioner, Dr. Trupti Rekha Swain, was serving as Professor and Head of the Department of Pharmacology at SCB MCH during the relevant check period and possesses independent and lawful sources of income. In such circumstances, according to learned counsel, no element of common intention or abetment can be attributed to her so as to justify her implication under Section 34 of the IPC. iv) Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that a departmental proceeding had also been initiated against the Petitioner- Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain on the self-same allegations. It was contended that in the said proceeding the Petitioner was ultimately exonerated of all the charges. The competent authority, while passing the order of exoneration, observed that the Petitioner had not committed any illegality as alleged against him. It was further observed that non-submission of property statements is not uncommon in the case of doctors, and that the Petitioner p. 7 had subsequently submitted the property statements in accordance with the applicable service rules. v) Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that the computation of income reflected in the FIR suffers from serious inaccuracies. By way of illustration, it was pointed out that the income of the Petitioners from salary has been reflected as Rs.1,45,00,000/- instead of the actual amount of Rs.2,19,77,372/-. It was also contended that the income derived from the private medical practice of the Petitioners amounting to Rs.89,48,501/- has been completely ignored by the investigating agency. Additionally, the professional income of the Petitioners for the financial year 2017-18 (Rs.76,54,575/- and Rs.12,93,926/- respectively) has also not been taken into account, despite the fact that the FIR was registered in November 2017 and the said financial year falls within the ambit of the check period in the present case. vi) Continuing with the inconsistencies in the calculation of incomes and expenditures of the Petitioners by the Vigilance authorities, the learned counsel for the Petitioners pointed out that several other heads of income, including bank loans, house rent, advances received, agricultural income, interest on deposits, bonus received on bank deposits and LIC policies, BMT training income, VTP scholarship, honorarium, and p. 8 insurance pay-outs from SBI Life policies, have not been considered by the investigating agency while computing the income of the Petitioners. It was also contended that certain assets have been incorrectly valued. For instance, the registration fee of Rs.2,56,917/- paid by the vendor in respect of the properties reflected at serial nos. 1 and 6 of the balance sheet in Annexure-1 series has been wrongly attributed to the Petitioners. Similarly, the value of the house situated at Mahanadi Vihar (Plot No.114), which according to the applicable Vigilance circular should be Rs.7,20,000/-, has allegedly been arbitrarily shown as Rs.10,04,671/-. Learned counsel further submitted that the ancestral house mentioned at serial no.10 of the asset statement had been constructed by the father of the Petitioner prior to his entry into government service and therefore could not legally be included in the assets of the Petitioners. It was also contended that the educational expenditure of the Petitioners’ daughter amounting to Rs.1,20,00,000/- has been wrongly shown as personal expenditure even though the same was borne by the university through scholarship. In this regard, reliance was placed upon the detailed computation sheet and representations submitted by the Petitioners under Annexure-2 series in CRLMC No.3682 of 2024 and Annexure-3 series in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025. p. 9 vii) Addressing the computation of household expenditure, learned counsel submitted that both the Petitioners reside together as husband and wife and therefore the household expenditure cannot be calculated separately for each of them. It was contended that the deduction of 33% of income towards household expenditure from both Petitioners individually is arbitrary and devoid of logic. According to learned counsel, such deduction ought to have been made only once from the income of either of the Petitioners. viii) Learned counsel further submitted that had the Vigilance authorities correctly computed the household expenditure by deducting 33% of the income of Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena instead of that of his wife, the disproportionate assets would come to Rs.40,38,244/-, which is approximately 10% of the total income of the Petitioners. It was further contended that even this figure is not final since several legitimate sources of income have been ignored by the investigating agency, and upon proper inclusion of those amounts the alleged disproportionate assets would fall well below the permissible margin, which would clearly abolish the present case wrongly instituted against the Petitioners. ix) Lastly, placing reliance on several case laws, submitted that the claims of the Petitioners are supported by documentary evidence, including p. 10 the income-tax returns filed before the competent authorities. It was therefore contended that no offence as alleged in the FIR is made out against the Petitioners. Learned counsel further emphasised that despite the lapse of more than eight years since registration of the FIR, the Vigilance Department has failed to submit the final form. Such inordinate delay, according to learned counsel, seriously impairs the Petitioners’ right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the Petitioners have at all stages cooperated with the investigation and have furnished all relevant documents sought by the investigating agency, yet the investigation has remained inconclusive. CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE-VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT 8. Heard Mr. N. Maharana, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-Vigilance Department. Learned Standing Counsel has opposed the CRLMC applications and submitted that the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of cognizable offences warranting a thorough investigation. It is contended that the investigation is still in progress and that the materials collected thus far prima facie justify continuation of the criminal proceeding. Learned Standing Counsel therefore urged that the present CRLMC applications are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed. In support of the aforesaid p. 11 submissions, the learned standing counsel has advanced the following contentions; i) At the outset, learned counsel for the State-Vigilance Department submitted that upon receipt of allegations that the Petitioners had abused their official positions and extended undue favour to certain pharmaceutical companies by intentionally prescribing costly chemotherapy drugs to blood cancer patients treated under the OSTF scheme, Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.19 of 2017 was registered. In the course of investigation, a search was conducted on 22.11.2017 at the residential quarters of the Petitioners as well as other connected premises. Consequent upon the said search, the present case bearing Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017 was registered under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with Section 34 of the IPC on the allegation that the Petitioners were found in possession of assets disproportionate to their known sources of income to the extent of Rs.4,00,32,026/-. ii) Addressing the stage of investigation, learned counsel submitted that the investigation is presently at an advanced stage and is nearing completion. It was contended that the investigation has taken considerable time due to the necessity of collecting and scrutinising voluminous documents from multiple sources. Learned counsel submitted p. 12 that upon detailed examination of the materials collected thus far, the initially alleged disproportionate amount of Rs.4,00,32,026/- as reflected in the FIR has been revised to Rs.54,32,621.08. It was further submitted that such computation has been made after examining the net salaried income of both the Petitioners and after deducting 33% of the gross salary of the Petitioner in the second CRLMC application towards household expenditure, against the lawful income assessed by the Vigilance Department at Rs.3,76,45,650/-, which differs from the Petitioners’ claim that their lawful income amounts to Rs.4,04,80,744/-. Learned counsel submitted that the exact quantum of disproportionate assets can only be conclusively determined upon receipt and verification of certain remaining documents from the concerned authorities, and the final form would be submitted thereafter. iii) Learned standing counsel further submitted that since both the Petitioners are husband and wife and are public servants residing together in a common household, the Petitioner in the second CRLMC application, being the wife of the Petitioner in the first CRLMC application, has rightly been implicated as a co-accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. It was also contended that the FIR cannot be treated as an encyclopaedia of the entire case. According to learned standing counsel, one of the principal p. 13 reasons for the delay in completion of the investigation has been the delayed supply or non-supply of certain crucial documents from various sources. It was submitted that some documents are still awaited, which are essential not only for ensuring a fair investigation but also for establishing the prosecution case through documentary evidence attached as exhibits. iv) Learned standing counsel for the Vigilance Department further submitted that although the investigation has taken considerable time, such delay has occurred in the course of conducting a fair and comprehensive investigation and ultimately operates to the benefit of the accused. It was also contended that the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to delays in the investigative process. In such circumstances, it was argued that the Petitioners cannot be said to have suffered any real prejudice. v) Addressing the Petitioners’ contention that a similar proceeding with similar factual matrix was earlier quashed by this Court, the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance Department has stated that although the said judgment relates to Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.19 of 2017, and there is some overlap in the background facts and circumstances of both the cases, each criminal proceeding must be examined on its own facts and p. 14 circumstances. It was therefore contended that the present case cannot be quashed solely on the basis of the aforesaid judgment. vi) With regard to the Petitioners’ claim of violation of their inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance Department submitted that a qualitative distinction must be drawn between the accused’s right to fair trial and the right to speedy trial. According to learned counsel, the right to a speedy trial is relative in nature and the mere passage of time in the course of investigation does not automatically result in prejudice to the accused. It was contended that mere delay in completion of investigation cannot by itself justify the quashing of criminal proceedings. Learned standing counsel stated that while considering such a plea, the Court must balance the rights of the accused with the larger societal interest in prosecuting serious offences. It was argued that the right of an accused to a speedy trial cannot override the demands of public justice. vii) In support of his contention, the learned standing counsel for the State-Vigilance Department has relied on several case laws vis-à-vis; Niranjan Hermchandra Sashitttal and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2013) 4SCC 642; M/s Niharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (2021) SCCONLINE (SC) p. 15 315; Hussainara Khatoon & Others vs Home Secretary, Bihar & Others, reported in (1980 to 1995) 5 SCC 326; R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State Of Karnataka, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578; Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali vs the State (Govt, Of Net) Delhi, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 408. viii) Finally, In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned standing counsel for the State-Vigilance Department contended that a prima facie case of possession of disproportionate assets is clearly made out against the Petitioners and that the investigation is still in progress. It was therefore submitted that interference by this Court at this stage would be premature and contrary to the interests of justice. Accordingly, it was prayed that the present CRLMC applications be dismissed forthwith. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT 9. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the CRLMC petitions along with the FIR and other documents attached thereto. Perused the written submission filed by the Petitioners along with the objection filed by the Vigilance Department. 10. The Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC applications, who are husband and wife, are both medical professionals of considerable repute, engaged at SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, in the fields of p. 16 haematology and pharmacology respectively. In the year 2017, allegations were levelled against Petitioner-Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena that he had abused his official position by intentionally prescribing expensive chemotherapy drugs to 14 patients under the State-sponsored OSTF scheme, thereby showing undue favour. Pursuant to such allegations, searches were conducted by the Vigilance authorities at various premises connected with the Petitioners, following which Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017 came to be instituted against them. 11. It is the principal contention of the Petitioners that if a proper and accurate assessment of their income and expenditure is undertaken, no case under the alleged offences would be made out against them. The Petitioners have further assailed the continuation of the present criminal proceeding on the grounds of inordinate delay in completion of the investigation and the fact that, on an earlier occasion, a case arising out of a similar factual background had been quashed by this Court, with the Petitioners herein claiming to stand on a better footing than the petitioners in the said decision. The Vigilance Department, however, has stoutly opposed the Petitioners’ plea, primarily contending that a prima facie case of accumulation of assets disproportionate to known sources of income is clearly made out against the Petitioners. It is further submitted that mere delay in completion of investigation, by itself, does not constitute a valid ground for quashing the proceeding, particularly when the p. 17 nature of the offence has wider societal ramifications. The prosecution has also argued that cases of the present nature, being heavily dependent on documentary evidence, inevitably require considerable time for collection, scrutiny, and verification of the relevant materials. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that this Court is called upon to examine the sustainability of the relief sought by the Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC applications. 12. Before advancing further, it would be apposite to once again delineate the scope of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (erstwhile section 482 Cr.P.C). In this context, reference may be had to R.P Kapur’s case, reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-A of the erstwhile Cr.P.C (which is in pari materia with Section 482 of the Code and section 528 of the BNSS), observed that the inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Similarly in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551, the Hon’ble Apex Court further clarified that the inherent powers of the High Courts are to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Finally, in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC p. 18 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while cautioning against reckless exercise of such inherent powers and highlighting the impracticality of prescribing rigid guidelines circumscribing the exercise thereof, laid down the following non- exhaustive and illustrative scenarios in para 102 where a High Court may quash the impugned F.I.R or criminal proceeding; “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or p. 19 where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 13. Additionally, it is also fairly well-settled that the power to quash a criminal proceeding is to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and while exercising such power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct on its face. It has been repeatedly held that except in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering at the stage of investigation of offences (see Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401, and Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983). This Court is also aware that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, a mini- trial is to be avoided. Instead, the adjudication is to be restricted to the question as to whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as true on their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this regard, may be had to CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 379). Having said that, it must also be borne in mind that that primary object of the F.I.R is to set the criminal investigation into motion. Page 20 of 33 14. The F.I.R may not set out the every minute details of the case with unmistakable precision and it is definitely not to be considered an encyclopedia of all the facts and circumstances of the case on which prosecution relies, and, as such, the FIR is not considered a substantive evidence and its evidentiary value is limited to corroboration and contradiction of the evidences (see Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42, Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 342, and Bable Alias Gurdeep Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 181). Therefore, while considering an application for quashing of an F.I.R or a criminal Proceeding, the primary consideration to be borne in mind must always be to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 15. In the case at hand, one of the primary points of contention between the parties pertains to the delay in the completion of the investigation. The Petitioners have relied upon the right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution to challenge the prolonged investigation, whereas the Vigilance Department submits that the time taken is not abnormal in cases of this nature, which entail scrutiny of voluminous records. In this context, it would be apt to refer to Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 and Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of p. 21 Bihar, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, wherein it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law and that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just' and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. 16. The abovenoted settled position of law was again come up for discussion by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, once again recognised and reiterated that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 creates a right in an accused to be tried speedily, and, if such right is found to have been infringed, quashing of charges or conviction may be an appropriate relief. However, this is not the only course open, and having regard to the nature of the offence and other attending circumstances, the Court may pass such other appropriate orders as the interests of justice demands. Subsequently, in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578, the Constitution Bench reaffirmed the law laid down in A.R. Antulay (supra). Page 22 of 33 17. Consequently, in Pankaj Kumar vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117, the Hon’ble Apex Court, again taking note of a catena of judicial decisions governing the field, including the ones cited above, observed that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution and such a right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding by the police during investigations as well. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing test having regard to all attendant circumstances, and determine in each case as to whether the right to speedy trial has been denied. In the event the Court arrives at the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction may be quashed unless the court feels that, having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice [see paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of Pankaj Kumar’s case (supra)]. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar’s case (supra) quashed the criminal proceedings on account of “unwarranted prolonged investigations” that caused inordinate delay. It was held that; p. 23 “24. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles, enumerated above, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the appellant's constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is common ground that the first information report was recorded on 12-5- 1987 for the offences allegedly committed in the year 1981, and after unwarranted prolonged investigations, involving aforestated three financial irregularities; the charge-sheet was submitted in court on 22-2-1991. Nothing happened till April 1999, when the appellant and his deceased mother filed criminal writ petition seeking quashing of proceedings before the trial court. 25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay in investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for examining the said plea of the appellant. Apart from the fact that it would further protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would be served as learned counsel for the State very fairly stated before us that he had no explanation to offer for the delay in investigations and the reason why the trial did not commence for eight long years. Nothing, whatsoever, could be pointed out, far from being established, to show that the delay was in any way attributable to the appellant. *** 27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning the prolongation of investigation and the trial. The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period of four years in a case of this type and inordinate delay of over eight years (excluding the period when the record of the trial court was in the High Court), is manifestly clear. 28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the appellant has been denied his valuable constitutional right to a speedy investigation and trial and, therefore, criminal proceedings initiated against him in p. 24 the year 1987 and pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Latur, deserve to be quashed on this short ground alone.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vakil Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right and that excessive delay in investigation or trial would compromise the fairness of the trial itself. It was further clarified that speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Similarly, in Mahendra Lal Das vrs. State of Bihar and Ors, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 149 it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that delay beyond a reasonable period is not only detrimental to the accused but also undermines public confidence in the criminal justice system. Inordinate delay not only causes personal hardship to the accused but also societal harm by rendering the process of justice ineffective. It was further observed that; “7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with the p. 25 accused or used as a lever to pressurie and harass the accused as is alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case… 9. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to quash the proceedings against the appellant as permitting further prosecution would be the travesty of justice and a mere ritual or formality so for as the prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as regards the courts.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Likewise, in another instance of inordinate delay in conclusion of the trial, the Hon’ble Supreme court, in Santosh De Vs. Archana Guha & Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 421, while entertaining an appeal against the decision of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding, declined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court and observed that unexplained delay, of eight years in the said case, in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In the absence of any material to the contrary, the Court accepted the findings of the High Court that the delay of eight years was entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution, and, as such, dismissed the appeal. In Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 370, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that one of the mandates of Article 21 is that a person should not be disturbed except on sufficient grounds (para 18). The Hon’ble Court emphasised the need to balance the law enforcement powers of the State with the protection of citizens from p. 26 injustice and harassment, observing that while the State has a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished, it also owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed (see paras 19, 20 thereof). 21. In addition to the above, reference may also be had to one recent pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Anr. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2023 SC 102, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and quashed the impugned criminal proceeding, and held that: “24. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings. 25. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint. 26. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at the stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the accused has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of criminal proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for the court to expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating Authorities. 27. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the purpose of filing a complaint and initiating criminal proceedings must exist solely to meet the ends of justice, and the law must not be used as a tool to harass p. 27 the accused. The law, is meant to exist as a shield to protect the innocent, rather than it being used as a sword to threaten them. CONCLUSION 28. It must be noted that the High Court while passing the impugned judgment, has failed to take into consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the quashing of a criminal complaint must be done only in the rarest of rare cases, it is still the duty of the High Court to look into each and every case with great detail to prevent miscarriage of justice. The law is a sacrosanct entity that exists to serve the ends of justice, and the courts, as protectors of the law and servants of the law, must always ensure that frivolous cases do not pervert the sacrosanct nature of the law.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. Finally, very recently in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, reported 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with a criminal prosecution that had remained pending for an inordinately long period without meaningful progress in trial, largely attributable to prosecutorial and systemic delays. The appellant’s primary contention was that the prolonged pendency of the proceedings violated his fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Court, taking into consideration the pronouncement in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351, wherein it was held that the process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude, and CBI v. Mir Usman, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2066, along with its other p. 28 earlier decisions, surveyed the constitutional jurisprudence on speedy trial and held that inordinate and unexplained delay in conclusion of criminal proceedings, particularly where attributable to the State, renders the prosecution oppressive and violative of Article 21, and may warrant quashing of the proceedings notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations. The Court further emphasised that constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene where the criminal process itself becomes punitive by the passage of time. Relevant portion thereof is quoted hereinbelow: “19. ...When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close. …Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence. Page 29 of 33 *** 21…(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished. The direction above does not come based on this case alone. This Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. This Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2017. Despite the lapse of more than eight years, the investigation has yet to reach its logical conclusion. The Vigilance Department has sought to justify the prolonged duration of the investigation by contending that such time was necessary to ensure a fair and proper inquiry. This Court finds it difficult to accept such explanation, particularly when the final amount of disproportionate assets has not even been crystallised till date. It is an admitted position on behalf of the Vigilance Department, as reflected in their p. 30 objections filed in the present matter, that the earlier alleged quantum of disproportionate assets, to the tune of Rs.4,00,32,026, attributable to the Petitioners and quantified in the FIR, has later been reduced to Rs.54,32,621.08. Even this figure is not final, as the Vigilance Department has once again acknowledged that the definitive determination of the disproportionate assets would only be possible after obtaining and verifying certain documents from the concerned authorities. 24. The materials on record further indicate that throughout the prolonged course of investigation, the Petitioners have extended full cooperation to the investigating agency, and no circumstance has been brought to the notice of this Court to attribute the delay in conclusion of the investigation to the conduct of the Petitioners. Moreover, upon a prima facie consideration of the record, the inconsistencies and arbitrariness pointed out by the Petitioners in the computation of their income and expenditure, including the alleged omission of certain heads of income, do not appear to have been satisfactorily addressed by the Vigilance Department. The explanation offered by the Vigilance authorities in response to these contentions is limited to stating that the final disproportionate assets figure has not yet been determined, that 33% of the gross salary of only the wife-Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain has been considered towards the per capita expenditure of both Petitioners, and that the interest earned by the p. 31 Petitioners through MOD facilities would be taken into account only upon receipt of clarificatory documents from the concerned authorities. Apart from these statements, and the plea that the investigation in the matter is still underway, no other explanation to the satisfaction of this Court has been furnished to address the alleged discrepancies in the computation of income and expenditure as highlighted by the Petitioners. 25. So far as the implication of Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain (the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3682 of 2024 and the wife of the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025) is concerned, it prima facie appears that her involvement in the present case is founded solely on the fact that she is the spouse of Dr.Rabindra Kumar Jena, i.e. the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025. Furthermore, this Court notes that a matter involving a broadly similar factual background and allegations under the same provisions of law as involved in the present case had earlier come up for consideration before this Court in CRLMC No.1628 of 2022 along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022, which were allowed and the proceedings therein were quashed by the judgment of this Court dated 16.04.2025 primarily on the ground that no prima facie case was made out against the Petitioners therein. On a prima facie appreciation of the materials placed on record, it appears that the Petitioners in the present case stand on a similar footing to those who were granted relief by the aforesaid judgment dated 16.04.2025. Page 32 of 33 CONCLUSION 26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and upon due consideration of the factual matrix of the case, the materials available on record, as well as the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered view that no prima facie case of the alleged offences is made out from the uncontroverted allegations contained in the FIR insofar as the present Petitioners are concerned. Furthermore, having regard to the unexplained and inordinate delay in completion of the investigation despite the lapse of more than eight years since the registration of the FIR, and taking into account the fact that the case of the present Petitioners appears to be substantially covered by the earlier judgment of this Court dated 16.04.2025 rendered in CRLMC No.1628 of 2022 along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022, this Court finds no hesitation in holding that the present case falls squarely within the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), particularly the third illustration to para 102 thereof. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that permitting the criminal proceeding to continue any further would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law. As such, the present case appears to be a fit case for the exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which corresponds to 528 of BNSS. Page 33 of 33 27. Accordingly, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and to secure the ends of justice, this Court is inclined to and hereby quash the present criminal proceeding bearing VGR No.62 of 2017 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017, registered for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with Section 34 of the IPC, presently pending before the Court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, insofar as the present Petitioners are concerned. 28. The CRLMC applications are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. A. K. Mohapatra (Judge) Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 13th March, 2026/S.K.Sethi/P.A. Designation: Personal Assistant