1 2025:CGHC:11401 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA(C) No. 49 of 2021 Ku. Khushi @ Lovely Savare D/o Ashok Kumar Savare Aged About 10 Years Minor Through Her Natural Guardian Father And Next Friend Ashok Kumar Savare, S/o Mukutdhari, Savare, Aged About 33 Years, R/o Karwa, P.S. Jainagar, District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh, Now R/o Nayapara, Near Bijli Office, Nagar Panchayat Sirgitti, P.S. Sirgitti, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant/Claimant Versus 1. Jangbahadur S/o Kishun Sahu Aged About 27 Years R/o Laxmipur Ward No. 40 Ambikapur, P.S. Kotwali Chauki, Manipur, The. And District- Sarguja, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh. (Driver Of The Offending Vehicle Scorpio Bearing Registration No. C.G.15-B-5220), District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 2. Suryaprakash Sahu S/o Late Shri Ramnath Sahu R/o Bilaspur Road Manipur Chowk, P.S. Kotwali Chauki, Manipur, Tehsil And District- Ambikapur, Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. (Owner Of The Offending Vehicle Scorpio Bearing Registration No. C.G.-15-B-5220), District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 3. Divisional Manager, The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Branch Office- First Floor, Rama Trade Center, In Front Of Rajeev Plaza, Old Bus Stand Road, Bilaspur, Tehsil And District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. (Insurer Of The Offending Vehicle Scorpio Bearing Registration No. C.G. 15-B-5220), District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Ajeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 & 2 For Respondent No. 3 : : Ms. Seema Verma, Advocate Mr. Prasuunnjit Dutta, Advocate holding the brief of Mr. Sudhir Agrawal, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 07/03/2025 1. Heard on I.A. No. 01/2021, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI 2 2. The claimant/appellant is a minor, aged about 10 years. The natural guardian of the appellant / claimant has filed this appeal against the award passed by the IXth Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) in M.A.C.T. No. 745/2014 dated 12.02.2016 whereby compensation of Rs.4,26,000/- has been awarded with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization of the amount to the appellant/claimant. 3. The facts of the present case are that on 19.03.2014 at about 10.00 am, while the claimant/appellant was going back home by riding her kid's bicycle, Scorpio bearing registration No. CG15-B-5220, driven by respondent No. 1 in a rash and negligent manner, dashed the appellant. The appellant sustained simple injuries and was hospitalized for 24 hours only. At the time of the accident, the age of the appellant was 10 years. 4. The learned Tribunal after appreciating documentary and oral evidence awarded compensation to the claimant/appellant to the tune of Rs.4,26,000/- with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the realization. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant would submit that there is a delay of 1675 days in filing the present appeal. He would contend that the appellant is a child aged about 10 years and in the absence of any knowledge of the law of limitation, she could not prefer the appeal within the prescribed period. He would pray to condone the delay. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents would submit that the natural guardian of the appellant failed to explain the delay properly in the application. They would 3 contend that there is an inordinate delay of 1675 days in filing the instant appeal, therefore, the application may be rejected. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 8. Admittedly, the award was passed on 12.02.2016 and this appeal was preferred on 08.01.2021. In the application for condonation of delay, the natural guardian of the appellant stated that he was not aware of the proceedings of law and the law of limitation. It is further stated that he approached the local counsel and thereafter filed the appeal. The plea of Covid-19 outburst has also been taken in the year 2016. In the year 2016, there was no Covid-19 outburst. The award was passed on 12.02.2016, whereas the appeal was preferred on 08.01.2021. A perusal of the application moved by the natural guardian of the appellant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would show that the appellant has not explained the delay properly. 9. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 4 11.Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 10. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 5 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 11. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to 6 defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 12. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have 7 been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re- opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 14. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 15. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti