IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI FRIDAY ,THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 2031 OF 2024 Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India aggrieved by the order dated 28.08.2024 in I.A.No.1458 of 2023 in O.S.No.40 of 2023 on the file of the Court of the Principal District Judge, Kurnool, Kurnool District. Between: Pennera Nagaraju, S/o Late PenneraSankarappa, aged about 44 years Hindu, Business, R/o. Dhone Town, Nandyal District. ...Petitioner AND G.Ramesh, S/o G.Eswaraiah, Hindu, aged about 30 years. Business, R/o H.No. 1-37, Pendekanti Nagar, Banaganapalli Town and Mandal, Nandyal District. 1. 2. Shaik Minnalla Hussain, S/o S.Basha, Muslim, aged about 56 years. Business, R/o H.No. 1-205, U-Kothapalli Village, Ugranigundia Majira, Dhone Mandal, Nandyal District. 3. Kammari Nagaraju, S/o K.Sunkanna, Hindu, aged about 52 years. Business, R/o H.No.1-14-1, Thrivarna Railway Colony, Dhone Town and Mandal, Nandyal District. * / 4. Pennera Pamaiah, S/o late PenneraSankarappa, Hindu, aged about 52 years, Business, R/o H.No.2/50, Manne House, Opp Oniro School, Dhone Town and Mandal, Nandyal District. 5. Smt P.Ananthamma, W/o late PenneraSankarappa, Hindu, aged about 75 years. House-wife, R/o H.No.274/1, Sankarappa Industrial Compound, Datia Nagar, Udumulapadu Village, Dhone Town and Mandal, Nandyal District. ...Respondents lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all the further proceedings in O.S.No.40 of 2023, on the file of Principal District Judge, Kurnool. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI MURALI BABU DOMA Counsel for the Respondents: M/S. AYESHA AZMA S The Court made the following Order: /' APHC010392152024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) QMS 0/ [3310] FRIDAY ,THE TWENTY FIRST DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 2031/2024 Between: ...PETITIONER Pennera Nagaraju AND ...RESPONDENT(S) G Ramesh and Others Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.MURALI BABU DOMA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.AYESHA AZMAS The Court made the following Order: The Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved by the order dated 28.08.2024 passed in I.A.No.1458 of 2023 in O.S.No.40 of 2023 on the file of Principal District Judge, Kurnool (for short “trial Court”). Heard Mr.D.Murali Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner and 2. Ms.Ayesha Azma.S, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3. 3. On hearing, learned counsel for admittedly, the alleged contract of sale dated the petitioner submits that 17.11.2016 was executed by the 4'" respondent, who is 1^- defendant in the suit. The gift deed executed in favour of 4*^ respondent by the respondent is cancelled under Registered Cancellation deed bearing No.37/2018 dated 01.01.2018. As such, they added the S'" respondent as 2"o defendant in the suit. He further submits that subsequent to the cancellation deed. partition deed bearing No.40/2018 IS executed among the family members and Item dated 04.01.2018 i No.1 of the suit schedule property fell on the petitioner. Thus, the respondents conveniently made silent about the execution of the partition deed, which was immediately executed between the parties, after of filing the suit in the year 2023, neither the 4*^ respondent are owners of item No.1 of the cancellation and by the date respondent nor the 5‘^ suit schedule property. He further submits that the petitioner is the owner, as such; the petitioner is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings. But the trial Court without same, dismissed the petition though held that considering the 'if the proposed defendant is a subsequent purchaser under registered sale deed from the defendants, then he is having interest over the property and he can come on record and law will on record. If at all. the proposed party Is having any property, he has to file a separate suit come on record and that too for permit him to come interest with the subject matter of suit as he is not a proper and necessary party to adjudication of all disputes in between the plaintiffs and defendants”. He further submits that both the observations are diagonally opposite. W Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the trial Court erred in saying that the petitioner has to file a separate suit instead of adding as a party in the suit for specific performance. He further submits that the trial Court erred in holding that only person obtained sale deed can be added as party, even in a partition deed also the person will get title and hence, the petitioner is a proper and necessary party and as such dismissing the same is arbitrary. He further submits that the trial Court failed to note the fact that the plaintiffs who are the respondents 1 to 3, mentioned the execution of cancellation deed bearing No.37/2018, however conveniently suppressed the execution of partition deed bearing No.40/2018 only to obtain decree for specific performance against the property of the petitioner behind his back. He further submits that the trial Court erred in holding that even in the absence of the proposed defendant, the suit can be disposed of and as such he is not a proper and necessary party to the proceedings. He further submits that the trial Court by dismissing the petition paved a way to multiplicity of proceedings instead of deciding the title and other aspects in the suit for specific performance which is a comprehensive one. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner requests this Court to set aside the impugned order dated 28.08.2024 passed in I.A.No.1458/2023 in O.S.No.40/2023 and pass appropriate orders. 4. 4 5. To support his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in H.Anjanappa and others vs. A.Prabhakar and others^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: \ Order XXII Rule 10 CPC IS similar. Therefore, the principles applicable to Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, in order to bring a purchaser pendente lite on record, are applicable to Order I Rule 10 CPC. Under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, the Court is required to record a finding that person sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party. While Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC counters right upon the legal representative of a party to the suit to be impleaded with the leave of the Court and continue the litigation. While deciding an application under Section 146 and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, the Court IS not require to go in the controversy as to whether person sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party. If the person sought to be impleaded as party is legal representative of a party to the suit, It IS sufficient for the Court to order impleadment/su bstitution of such person. 58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge: First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to come on record, either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle; Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right; Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on record; Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit may be improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record; Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not being bound by the Judgment does not arise and consequently he would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he remains unrepresented; Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of interest in the property, as envisaged under Order XXII III. IV. VI. VII. VIII. ^2025INSC 121 5 Rule 10 CPC, can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit. ” Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Indian Overseas Bank vs. M.A.S. Subramanian and others^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held 6. as follows; “6. It is well settled that an agreement for sale in respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in favour of the purchaser under the agreement. In view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement for sale does not create any interest in the property. The only mode by which an immovable property worth more than Rs.lOO/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a sale deed duly registered in accordance with the Indian Registration Act, 1908. ” Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in Yogesh Goyanka vs. Govind and others^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as 7. follows: The fulcrum of the dispute herein concerns the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite who undisputedly had notice of. the pending litigation. At the outset. It appears pertinent to reiterate the settled position that the doctrine of lis pendens as provided under Section 52 of the Act does not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab-initio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers as subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending litigation and subject to any direction that the Court may pass thereunder. 16. 19. The Respondents herein assail the impleadment of the Appellant on the ground that he is not a bona fide purchaser as he had full knowledge of the pending litigation. While that is the admitted position, there exists no bar to the impleadment of transferees pendente lite with notice. Permitting the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite is, in each case, a discretionary exercise undertaken to enable a purchaser with a legally enforceable right to protect their interests especially when the transferor fails to defend the suit or where there is a possibility of collusion. ^ Civil Appeal Diary No.38616 of 2018 ^ 2024 INSC 510 6 21. On the other hand, the Appellant has a registered sale deed in his favor and has therefore seemingly acquired an interest in the Subject Land. Whether or not the consideration was paid, is a disputed question of fact that shall be determined by the Trial Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, including the fact that the trial has not progressed significantly, the Appellant herein, in the interest of Justice, is entitled to impleadment in the Underlying Suit in order to protect his interests, if any, in the Subject Land." 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance the decision of this Court between Golivi Ramanamma vs. Challa Lakshmi and others'’, wherein this Court held as follows: upon “15. The object of sub-rule 2 of Rule 10 of Order I, is to bring before the Court all persons, who are parties to dispute relating to the subject matter so that the dispute may be determined without delay, inconvenience and expenses of separate occasions. It is a settled principle of law that the rights of a subsequent purchaser of the property, pending suit, subservient to the rights of parties under the decree, which may be made in the suit. At the same time, one should not be oblivious that the subsequent purchasers claiming through the same vendor and the same property can be added as parties to the suit to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings. 16. A necessary party ought to be Joined as a party to the suit, and in whose absence, an effective decree cannot be passed by the Court. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made. ” are 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further placed reliance the decision of the Delhi High Court between Rajwanti Phogat Chand Sethi and others^, wherein it was held that: upon vs. Gian 11. It is thus clear that it is the original suit which is to be allowed to be continued under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC if there is an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest in the suit property during the pendency of suit and therefore the question of limitation does not arise.” 10. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued for grant of any relief in the present civil revision petition, submits that. Civil Revision Petition No.1336/2024 ^FAO 125/2018 & CM No.13169/2018 — 7 the petitioner has no title in respect of item No.1 in the suit schedule property. The alleged partition deed dated 04.01.2018 between the petitioner and the 5*'' respondent including his co-brothers is illegal and against the legal principles because of the involved property is not ancestral one and independent property of 5**^ respondent. She further submits that the alleged illegal partition deed dated 04.01.2018 is subsequent document to the suit agreement of sale dated 17.11.2016 and the said illegal partition deed is only creative document under collusion between the respondent Nos.4 and 5 and the petitioner including his co-brothers with mala fide intention to grab the legal rights of respondents/plaintiffs as per the terms of suit agreement dated 17.11.2016. She further submits that the respondents 4 and 5 are remained ex-parte to the suit proceedings. Hence, the alleged illegal partition deed is not legally binding on the respondents who are bonafide purchasers in respect of the suit schedule property under agreement of sale dated 17.11.2016 prior r to the alleged illegal partition deed dated 04.01.2018. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court between Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson and others^, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as 11. follows; 5.2 An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court ^ Civil Appeal Nos.5522-5523 of 2019 8 observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The tests are - (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. It is further observed and held that in a suit for specific performance the first test can be formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a right to the same relief against the party claiming to be a necessary party, relating to the same subject matter involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. It is further observed and held by this Court that in a suit for specific performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held that the parties claiming an independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for title and possession, which is impermissible. It is further observed and held that a third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit for specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. It is further observed and held by this Court that a third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. In paragraphs 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under: “15. As discussed hereinearlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. /4s noted hereinearlier, in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respdndents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they based their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted hereinearlier that in the event. Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Viiav Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha f(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision 9 clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. As discussed above, in the event any decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale In respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a decree for specific performance of the contracted property against Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of deed of sale In favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2 and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution. As noted hereinearlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the contracted property, a decree passed In such a suit shall not bind them and in that case. Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC. If they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the appellant or Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property. 16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in subrule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC “all the questions involved In the suit" it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiffappellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale Into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiffappellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. If passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier. Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added In the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. ” 3 10 7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for. The appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit for specific performance of the contract between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no. 1 against the wish of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the present appeals stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs." 12. On considering the submissions of both the learned counsels and upon perusing the entire material on record, this Court is of the opinion that, if the petitioner is having any interest with the subject matter of the suit property, he can file a separate suit. Therefore, this Court found no merit in the present civil revision petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 13. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. 14. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. Sd/- K KASIRAO ACHARI ASSISTANT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER //TRUE COPY// To, 1. The Principal District Judge, Kurnool, Kurnool District, (with records if any) One CC to Sri Murali Babu Doma, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to M/s Ayesha Azma S, Advocate [OPUC] The Section Officer, V.R. Section, High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Three CD Copies 2. 3. 4. 5. sree HIGH COURT DATED:21/02/2025 ORDER CRP.No.2031 of 2024 DISMISSING THE C.R.P. WITHOUT COSTS