2025:JHHC:15580 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Revision No. 1273 of 2023 --------- Yadvendra Singh, aged about 58 years, S/o Rukum Singh, resident of Q. No.190/C, Vidyalaya Marg, Ashok Nagar, PO-Ashok Nagar, PS- Argora, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand … … Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand through Vigilance … … Opp. Party --------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD ---------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Vishal Kumar Trivedi, Advocate Mr. Jai Mohan Mishra, Advocate For the Opp. Party : Md. Sahabuddin, SC-VII Mr. Suraj Prakash, AC to SC-VII ---------- C.A.V. on 9th May, 2025 Pronounced on 13/06/2025 1. The instant petition filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C is directed against the order dated 22.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1553 of 2023 in connection with Ranchi Vigilance PS Case No. 54 of 2016 corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.) Case No.57 of 2016 for the offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 whereby and whereunder, the application filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has been rejected. Factual Matrix: 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under: The petitioner had been made accused in Ranchi Vigilance P.S. Case No. 54 of 2016 which was instituted on 12.07.2016 on the basis of 2025:JHHC:15580 2 investigation report by the informant in P.E No.30 of 2013 dated 02.11.2013 alleging therein that the petitioner being the then Executive Engineer, Rural Works Department, Ramgarh-cum-Executive Engineer, NREP, Ramgarh has misused his post and earned excessive amount in respect of his income. It has further ben alleged that in comparison with the income of the petitioner, he has spent 77% excess amount of his income. It has further been alleged that the petitioner has spent Rs.62,69,600/- on construction of his house situated in Housing Co-operative Society Ltd., Ashok Nagar, Ranchi without being disclosed by him. On the basis of aforesaid premises, the instant case has been instituted against the accused petitioner Yadvendra Singh for the offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3. After investigation, a charge-sheet has been submitted against the petitioner for the offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. The petitioner filed an application for discharge being Misc. Criminal Application No. 1553 of 2023 before the learned trial Court (Special Judge) on the ground that the petitioner is innocent and has not committed any offence as alleged in the FIR. He has falsely been implicated in the instant case. 5. It is stated that complete data regarding his income i.e. Rs.1,33,55.596/- in total including salary but only Rs.94,41,575/- have been considered 2025:JHHC:15580 3 by the Vigilance Department without mentioning the reasonable basis as to why the Vigilance discarded the income shown by the petitioner and the same has been discarded by the Vigilance in arbitrary manner. Further his income from agriculture has also not been considered. 6. It has been stated that the petitioner's wife has sold the land which was being used for agriculture and the same has been mentioned in the sale deed also as well as Income Tax Return filed by the wife of the petitioner. Similarly, the income shown from Dairy has also not been considered whereas Animal Husbandry Medical Officer, Ranchi has given a certificate that wife of the petitioner was running a dairy, there were six milking cows in her dairy. That milk used to supply to one Rajhans Hotel, Puncha Bundu, Ranchi from the dairy of the petitioner's wife but the same has not been considered by Vigilance. 7. It has been stated that the income from the gift has not been considered by the Vigilance whereas the petitioner and his wife received gifts from the relatives and friends worth about Rs. 2,65,000/- on the occasion of wedding in the year 1989 and afterwards on several occasions like marriage anniversary of the petitioner, birthday of his children and several other occasions. The petitioner used to receive gifts from his relatives and friends. 8. It has further been stated that the income from the agreement for sale of land has been shown by the petitioner as Rs. 15,00,000/- but the Vigilance has considered only Rs. 10,00,000/- which was given by cheque as well as in cash which is evident from the agreement and Income Tax Return. The petitioner has given data of his total 2025:JHHC:15580 4 expenditure of Rs. 1,20,51,437/- but the vigilance has falsely and in very arbitrary manner shown total expenditure as Rs. 1,67,14,768/-. 9. It has been stated that on education, he spent Rs. 3,46,567/- but the vigilance has shown Rs. 4,83,967/- reasons best known to the Vigilance. The check period was till March, 2013 and the valuation and assessment of house and other things were done after the year 2015 and as such the expenditure done by the petitioner from April, 2013 onwards has also been included during investigation which is not the subject matter of the present case. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid ground the petitioner has prayed that he has no concern with the alleged commission of crime and, as such, no case is made out against him and he needs to be discharged. 11. The learned special Judge vide order dated 22.06.2023 had dismissed the aforesaid application for discharge. 12. The present petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 22.06.2023 has preferred the present revision petition. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner: 13. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order: (i) The ground has been taken that no case is being made out under Sections under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 if the entire material, as has been collected in course of investigation by the prosecuting agency, will be taken into consideration. 2025:JHHC:15580 5 (ii) The finding of the learned trial Court is perverse in the eye of law being non-application of judicial mind hence unsustainable in the eye of law; (iii) The ground has also been taken that the impugned findings and order of the learned trial Court suffer from an error of law and manifestly wrong and are grossly unjust, as such, the same deserves to be set aside. (iv) The learned trial Court while passing the impugned order had given a misconceived approach in as much as he had relied upon the allegations which were made in the F.I.R. without considering the materials provided by the petitioner which were on-record. (v) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has erroneously erred in not considering that the P.E. Report being P.E. No. 30 of 2013 dated 02.11.2013 on the basis of which the whole case is registered against the petitioner is not a part of either the FIR or the Case diary which makes the case of prosecution doubtful and shows a malafide approach of the prosecution. (vi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that the petitioner had given a complete data regarding his income being Rs. 1,33,55,596/- in total including salary but only Rs.94,41,575/- has been considered by the Vigilance without mentioning the reasonable bases as to why the Vigilance has arbitrarily discarded the income shown by the petitioner. 2025:JHHC:15580 6 (vii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider that the Vigilance has not considered the gifts received by the petitioner and his family on various occasions which is clearly mentioned in the Income Tax Returns filed by the petitioner as well as his wife without assigning any reason whatsoever. (viii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court failed to consider that income from the agreement for sale of land has been shown by the petitioner as Rs. 15,00,000/- but the vigilance has considered only Rs. 10,00,000/- which was given by cheque but the fact is that the petitioner has received Rs. 10,00,000/- from cheque and Rs.5,00,000/- in cash which is evident from the agreement and Income Tax Return. (ix) It has been contended that the learned trial Court failed to consider that the petitioner has given data of his total expenditure as Rs.1,20,51,437/- but vigilance has falsely and in very arbitrary manner shown total expenditure as Rs. 1,67,14,768/-. (x) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider that at the time of registration of the FIR the alleged difference in income and expenditure of the petitioner was about 77%, however, the Vigilance after submitting its Final Form has mentioned it to be about 82.31%, difference in numbers and figures by the Vigilance as well as the ACB clearly shows the ill motive behind the present case against the petitioner. 2025:JHHC:15580 7 (xi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider that the Vigilance has harped on expenditure of Rs. 62,69,629/- for expansion of his dwelling house by the petitioner which was assessed by the Vigilance in February, 2015 but it is important to mention here that at the time of purchase of the house, several parts that is ground floor, one room, bathroom, toilet, kitchen, veranda, sitting on first floor, were already there and the petitioner has made only expansion in the said house and the real expenditure is only Rs. 18,49,235/- till March, 2013 which would be evident from the investigation report of the Investigation Officer duly signed by him dated 22.08.2014. (xii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider the fact that the assessment valuation of the house was done in February, 2015 and the report included the expenditure of the petitioner till the year 2015 whereas the check period was of till March, 2013 which clearly shows the malafide intention and dubious investigation done by the Vigilance in order to create a malicious prosecution against the petitioner. (xiii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to take into account that the petitioner has already submitted data of his expenditure on the house from the year 2013 to 2015 to the Vigilance to receiving section of the ADG, vigilance on 27.06.2016 but the same has not been considered by Vigilance. (xiv) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to consider that in the entire investigation Vigilance failed to 2025:JHHC:15580 8 consider that check period was of till March 2013 and the valuation and assessment of house and other things were done after 2015 and as such the expenditure done by the petitioner from April 2013 onwards has also been included during investigation which is not the subject matter of the present case as the details given by the petitioner in the Form of A, B, C and D was till March 2013 should not be included in the investigation of present case. (xv) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that entire investigation undertaken by the Investigating Agency is silent on the aspect of other and alternate sources of income of the petitioner even though the petitioner had provided all such relevant documents to substantiate his claim which suggests that false implication cannot be ruled out. (xvi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that none of the alleged offences has been made out against the petitioner. (xvii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court neither considered nor discussed the evidence of witnesses in their entirety and miserably failed to adopt rationale approach to judge the evidences by their intrinsic worth and the uniformity of the witnesses. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with. 2025:JHHC:15580 9 Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State: 15. Mr. Md. Shahabuddin, learned State counsel, has taken the following grounds in defending the order impugned: (i) It has been contended that sufficient material has been surfaced in course of investigation to the effect that the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of alleged crime is there as would be evident from both the case diary and in the charge-sheet. (ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been rightly rejected. Further, there is no illegality or perversity or material irregularity in the impugned orders calling for any interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned trial Court has passed a well-reasoned order refusing to discharge the petitioner. (iii) On perusal of case record it is apparent that the investigating Officer at para-66 and 67 of the case diary, firstly tried to obtain the income tax details of the accused petitioner and his wife and tried to obtain details of income and assets of the petitioner and his wife accumulated through all legal sources. It has further been contended that at para-89 and 212 of the case diary the details of land purchased by the petitioner in the district-Reewa, Madhya Pradesh and a plot purchased in Ashok Nagar have come. It has further been contended that it would be evident from para-58 of the case diary that the petitioner has deposited an amount of Rs.2,10,702/- with the Society of Ashok Nagar for 2025:JHHC:15580 10 membership which was a mandatory condition for purchase of plot at Ashok Nagar, Ranchi. (iv) It has further been contended that a committee was constituted by Ministerial Secretariat and Vigilance Department, Jharkhand headed by the then Executive Engineer (Technical Cell) to assess the cost of construction of the said house at Ashok Nagar, which was computed at Rs.62,69,600/- as against Rs.18,00,000/- and odd shown by the petitioner. (v) It has been contended that paragraph-195 and 219 of the case diary provides for the details of expenses incurred by the petitioner in providing education to his son and two daughters and para-169 provides for the Life Insurance Scheme policies purchased by the petitioner and two other separate policies for his daughters to the tune of Rs.12,24,405/-. (vi) It has been contended that the claim of the petitioner to have agricultural incomes and the income earned by his wife through dairy is baseless which would be evident from para-323 of the case diary which shows the falsification of the claim of the petitioner. (vii) It has been contended that the petitioner any how managed to get false certificate with respect of having six cows in the name of his wife as para-339 of the case diary precisely states that there was no written permission to the accused petitioner or his wife to carry out any kind of dairy business. Further more, sale of such 2025:JHHC:15580 11 dairy product was also could not be established, which would be evident from para-281, 284 and 291 of the case diary. (viii) It has been contended that so far as the income of the petitioner with regard to agricultural income is concerned, it is false as during investigation it has come on record that though the petitioner owned nearly 4.96 acres of land, but the same was non-irrigated land and even when there was no income received by the petitioner as it would be evident from the para-394, 396, 407 and 408 of the case diary. (ix) It has been contended that the details with respect to the income from gift is false as the details with respect to the gift could not be verified as per para-379 of the case diary. 16. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned order to be interfered with. Analysis: 17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as also the case diary. 18. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are- (i) Whether the order dated 22.06.2023 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, can be said to suffer from an error? 2025:JHHC:15580 12 (ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not? 19. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together. 20. At this juncture it would be appropriate to consider the ambit and scope of the powers of the Court at the time of considering the discharge application. 21. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner. 22. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed. 2025:JHHC:15580 13 23. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. 24. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan”, (2014) 11 SCC 709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon'ble Apex Court has been observed as under:- “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether 2025:JHHC:15580 14 the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification. 33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously. 34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations. 2025:JHHC:15580 15 25. It has been further held in the case of “Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency”, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected by the trial Court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:— “18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.” 26. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in “State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap”, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:- “11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 2025:JHHC:15580 16 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken 2025:JHHC:15580 17 on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’” 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of “Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi)” , (2008) 2 SCC 561 wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:- “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 2025:JHHC:15580 18 12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder Singh”, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. 29. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also 2025:JHHC:15580 19 makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia”, (1989) 1 SCC 715. 30. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander”, (2012) 9 SCC 460, in the following words:— “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the 2025:JHHC:15580 20 Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence. 31. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once 2025:JHHC:15580 21 the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution. 32. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of “Sajjan Kumar v. CBI”, (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under: “21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is 2025:JHHC:15580 22 required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.” 33. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of “M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI”, (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above principles have been reiterated in para-17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of the report are quoted as under: “17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles: 17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 2025:JHHC:15580 23 17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court. 17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”. 17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. 17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused. 18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material 2025:JHHC:15580 24 produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi). 28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused. 29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him. 30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage? 31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.” 34. In the case of “Asim Shariff v. NIA”, (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the 2025:JHHC:15580 25 prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 35. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey”, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under: “27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous 2025:JHHC:15580 26 as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 36. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is 2025:JHHC:15580 27 sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 37. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 38. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 39. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not? 2025:JHHC:15580 28 40. It is evident from record that present petitioner is an accused in connection with Ranchi Vigilance P.S. Case No. 54/2016, corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.) Case No. 57/2016. On 19/02/2022 cognizance of the offence u/s 13 (2) r/w section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been taken against the present petitioner. 41. Further prosecution has alleged that the then Executive Engineer, Rural Work Department, Work Division, Ramgarh cum Executive Engineer, NREP, Ramgarh has misused his post and amassed disproportionate assets. During the check period with effect from year 1987 to 31.03.2013 his actual income was Rs. 95,47,119/- whereas his expenditure was Rs. 1,74,05,609/- and thereby he amassed disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31% to his known sources of income. 42. It is evident from the record that charge-sheet has been submitted under Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Vide order no. 53/J. dated 06/10/2017, the sanction for prosecution of accused-petitioner has been issued by the Principal Secretary cum Legal Remembrancer, Law Department, Jharkhand, Ranchi. 43. It would be apt to mention herein Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which runs as follows: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct— * * * 2025:JHHC:15580 29 (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.” 44. From perusal of the aforesaid Section it is apparent that a public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, if the said public servant or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his “known sources of income”. 45. Thus, it is evident that within the purview of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to public servant. 46. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu”, (2023) 6 SCC 768 while considering the core of the Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act as well as parameters of discharge has observed that the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the expression “known sources of income” and states that this expression means the income received from any lawful source and also requires that the receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance 2025:JHHC:15580 30 with any provisions of law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid case is being quoted as under “34. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act including Explanation thereto reads as under: “13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct— * * * (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.” 35. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the expression “known sources of income” and states that this expression means the income received from any lawful source and also requires that the receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. This Explanation was not there in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short “the 1947 Act”). Noticing this fact in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494], this Court has observed as under : (SCC p. 642, para 7) “7. A bare reading of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act shows that any act done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed Act, shall, insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the Act. It does not substitute Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. Section 30(2) is applicable ‘without prejudice to the 2025:JHHC:15580 31 application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897’. In our opinion, the application of Section 13 of the 1988 Act to the fact situation of the present case would offend Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which, inter alia provides that repeal shall not (i) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or (ii) affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture or punishment. Section 13, both in the matter of punishment as also by the addition of the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is materially different from Section 5 of the 1947 Act. The presumption permitted to be raised under the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) was not available to be raised under Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act. This difference can have a material bearing on the case.” 36. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act has the effect of defining the expression “known sources of income” used in Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act consists of two parts. The first part states that the known sources of income means the income received from any lawful source and the second part states that such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. 37. Referring to the first part of the expression “known sources of income” in N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P. [N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 454], this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 86-87, para 17) “17. ‘… 6. The emphasis of the phrase “known sources of income” in Section 13(1)(e) [old Section 5(1)(e)] is clearly on the word “income”. It would be primary to observe that qua the public servant, the income would be what is attached to his office or post, commonly known as remuneration or salary. The term “income” by itself, is elastic and has a wide connotation. Whatever comes in or is received is income. But, however, wide the import and connotation of the term “income”, it is incapable of being understood as meaning receipt having no nexus to one's labour, or expertise, or 2025:JHHC:15580 32 property, or investment, and being further a source which may or may not yield a regular revenue. These essential characteristics are vital in understanding the term “Income”. Therefore, it can be said that, though “income” in receipt in the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake the character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return he gets from his service, will be the primary item of his income. Other income which can conceivably be income qua the public servant will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft crime or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt from the “known source of income” of a public servant.’ [Ed. : As observed in State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 at p. 697, para 6]” 38. The above brings us to the second part of the Explanation, defining the expression “such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant” i.e. intimation by the public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or orders applicable to a public servant. 39. The language of the substantive provisions of Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before its amendment, Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act and Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act continues to be the same though Section 5(3) before it came to be amended was held to be a procedural section in Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464]. Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before it came to be amended w.e.f. 18-12-1964 was interpreted in C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], and it was observed: (C.S.D. Swami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], AIR pp. 10-11, paras 5-6) “5. Reference was also made to cases in which courts had held that if plausible explanation had been offered by an accused person for being in possession of property which was the subject-matter of the charge, the court could exonerate the accused from criminal responsibility for possessing incriminating property. In our opinion, those cases have no bearing upon the charge against the appellant in this case, because the section requires the accused person to 2025:JHHC:15580 33 “satisfactorily account” for the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Ordinarily, an accused person is entitled to acquittal if he can account for honest possession of property which has been proved to have been recently stolen [see Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The rule of law is that if there is a prima facie explanation of the accused that he came by the stolen goods in an honest way, the inference of guilty knowledge is displaced. This is based upon the well-established principle that if there is a doubt in the mind of the court as to a necessary ingredient of an offence, the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused. But the legislature has advisedly used the expression “satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must be on the word “satisfactorily”, and the legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance. 6. Another argument bearing on the same aspect of the case, is that the prosecution has not led evidence to show as to what are the known sources of the appellant's income. In this connection, our attention was invited to the evidence of the investigating officers, and with reference to that evidence, it was contended that those officers have not said, in terms, as to what were the known sources of income of the accused, or that the salary was the only source of his income. Now, the expression “known sources of income” must have reference to sources known to the prosecution on a thorough investigation of the case. It was not, and it could not be, contended that “known sources of income” means sources known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an accused person. Those will be matters “specially within the knowledge” of the accused, within the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution can only lead evidence, as it has done in the instant case, to show that the accused was known to earn his living by service under the Government during the material period. The prosecution 2025:JHHC:15580 34 would not be justified in concluding that travelling allowance was also a source of income when such allowance is ordinarily meant to compensate an officer concerned for his out-of-pocket expenses incidental to journeys performed by him for his official tours. That could not possibly be alleged to be a very substantial source of income. The source of income of a particular individual will depend upon his position in life with particular reference to his occupation or avocation in life. In the case of a government servant, the prosecution would, naturally, infer that his known source of income would be the salary earned by him during his active service. His pension or his provident fund would come into calculation only after his retirement, unless he had a justification for borrowing from his provident fund. We are not, therefore, impressed by the argument that the prosecution has failed to lead proper evidence as to the appellant's known sources of income. It may be that the accused may have made statements to the investigating officers as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case, and if the prosecution has failed to disclose all the sources of income of an accused person, it is always open to him to prove those other sources of income which have not been taken into account or brought into evidence by the prosecution.” (emphasis supplied) 40. Even after Section 5(3) was deleted and Section 5(1)(e) was enacted, this Court in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] has observed that the expression “known sources of income” occurring in Section 5(1)(e) has a definite legal connotation which in the context must mean the sources known to the prosecution and not sources relied upon and known to the accused. Section 5(1) (e), it was observed by this Court, casts a burden on the accused for it uses the words “for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account”. The onus is on the accused to account for and satisfactorily explain the assets. Accordingly, in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo 2025:JHHC:15580 35 Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] it was observed : (SCC pp. 204-205, paras 11-13) “11. The provisions of Section 5(3) have been subject of judicial interpretation. First the expression “known sources of income” in the context of Section 5(3) meant “sources known to the prosecution”. The other principle is equally well-settled. The onus placed on the accused under Section 5(3) was, however, not to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt, but only to establish a preponderance of probability. These are the well-settled principles : see C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7]; Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464] and V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P. [V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1762] The legislature thought it fit to dispense with the rule of evidence under Section 5(3) and make the possession of disproportionate assets by a public servant as one of the species of the offence of criminal misconduct by inserting Section 5(1)(e) due to widespread corruption in public services. 12. 12. The terms and expressions appearing in Section 5(1)(e) of the Act are the same as those used in the old Section 5(3). Although the two provisions operate in two different fields, the meaning to be assigned to them must be the same. The expression “known sources of incomes” means “sources known to the prosecution”. So also, the same meaning must be given to the words “for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account” occurring in Section 5(1)(e). No doubt, Section 4(1) provides for presumption of guilt in cases falling under Sections 5(1)(a) and (b), but there was, in our opinion, no need to mention Section 5(1)(e) therein. For, the reason is obvious. The provision contained in Section 5(1)(e) of the Act is a self-contained provision. The first part of the section casts a burden on the prosecution and the second on the accused. When Section 5(1)(e) uses the words ‘for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account’, it is implied that the burden is on such public servant to account for the sources for the acquisition of disproportionate assets. The High Court, therefore, was in error in holding that a public 2025:JHHC:15580 36 servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot be convicted of an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all possible sources of income. 13. That takes us to the difficult question as to the nature and extent of the burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. The expression “burden of proof” has two distinct meanings (1) the legal burden i.e. the burden of establishing the guilt, and (2) the evidential burden i.e. the burden of leading evidence. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused lies upon the prosecution, and that burden never shifts. Notwithstanding the general rule that the burden of proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in the case of certain offences, the burden of proving a particular fact in issue may be laid by law upon the accused. The burden resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not so onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is discharged by proof of a balance of probabilities. The ingredients of the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (e) are the possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the known sources of income for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. To substantiate the charge, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 5(1)(e), namely, (1) it must establish that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what were his known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and (4) it must prove, quite objectively, that such resources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once these four ingredients are established, the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the accused is able to account for such resources or property. The burden then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for his possession of disproportionate assets. The extent and 2025:JHHC:15580 37 nature of burden of proof resting upon the public servant to be found in possession of disproportionate assets under Section 5(1)(e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the Court in Jhingan case [V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1762] i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance of probability. That test was laid down by the court following the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C., in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions [Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462 (HL)]. The High Court has placed an impossible burden on the prosecution to disprove all possible sources of income which were within the special knowledge of the accused. As laid down in Swami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], the prosecution cannot, in the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of a public servant found in possession of resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. his salary. Those will be matters specially within the knowledge of the public servant within the meaning of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 106 reads: ‘106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.— When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.’ In this connection, the phrase the “burden of proof” is clearly used in the secondary sense, namely, the duty of introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden cast on the accused is well-settled. The accused is not bound to prove his innocence beyond all the reasonable doubt. All that he need to do is to bring out a preponderance of probability.” 47. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects and settled legal proposition this Court is now adverting to the impugned order. It appears that the learned trial Court has also taken in to consideration that in his statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C., witness namely, Jitendra Chaudhary, District Animal Husbandry Officer has stated that without spot verification, he issued wrong certificate in the name of Nilima 2025:JHHC:15580 38 Singh wife of Yadvendra Singh (present petitioner) to the effect that she has purchased six cows. 48. In order impugned it has been mentioned that Smt. Nilima Singh, wife of present petitioner has claimed that she runs dairy business. But vide letter no. 46 dated 25/03/2017, Sri B.P. Verma, the then Secretary, Ashok Nagar Society had to the Investigating Officer that the petitioner and his wife Nilima Singh were not allowed to run dairy business from their house no. 190C, School Road, Ashok Nagar (paragraph 339 of the case diary). Witnesses namely, Shivlal Prajapati (paragraph 403) and Ramsajivan Prajavati (paragraph-404) have not corroborated the statement of Nilima Singh, regarding her income from agriculture. 49. Allegedly, during the check period the actual income of accused- petitioner was Rs. 95,47,119/- whereas his expenditure was Rs. 1,74,05,609/- and thereby he amassed disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31% to his known sources of income. 50. Thus, this Court finds that there is specific allegation against the petitioner of having disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31% to his known sources of income and also there is specific allegation that the petitioner acquired disproportionate assets and could not give any satisfactory explanation regarding sources of disproportionate assets as such the explanations regarding the source for acquisition of such disproportionate assets given by him appears to be false during the investigation of the case. 2025:JHHC:15580 39 51. From perusal of case record, statements of witnesses as referred in the impugned order, materials available on record and in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are available on the record for framing of charge u/s 13 (2) r/w section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the present petitioner. 52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan”, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate Courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. 53. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial Court or the appellate Court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the 2025:JHHC:15580 40 proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. 54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI”, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction. 55. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu”,(supra) has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under: 81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant. This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court has completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused persons, compared with the information compiled by the investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability. This entire exercise has been justified on account of the investigating officer not taking into consideration the explanation offered by the public servant and also not taking into consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein. 82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability, the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as “groundless”. As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that the accused might have made statements before the investigating officer as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case. 83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it 2025:JHHC:15580 41 is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC. At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the prosecution is groundless.” 56. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that Hon’ble Apex Court while appreciating the legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) has categorically observed that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon prosecution at the stage of Section 239 Cr.PC. 57. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of power of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge 2025:JHHC:15580 42 is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. 58. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court. 59. Hence, on the basis of discussion made herein above, this Court is of the considered view that, there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 22.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1553 of 2023 in connection with Ranchi Vigilance PS Case No. 54 of 2016 corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.) Case No.57 of 2016. 60. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the order dated 22.06.2023, consequently, the instant criminal revision petition is hereby dismissed. 61. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Sudhir/- Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated:.13/06/2025 AFR