Page No.# 1/17 GAHC040005072024 2025:GAU-AP:1162 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./48/2024 Taba Techi Son of Shri Taba Topu, permanent resident of Pitapol, PO and PS Yazali, Lower Subansiri District, Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of AP and Anr represented by the PP of AP 2:Joram Nalo Age: 0 Occupation : Daughter of Joram Tajing C/o A.P. Agency Barapani Market Naharlagun PO and PS Naharlagun Papumpare District Arunachal Prades Advocate for the Petitioner : Dicky Panging, Tokge Darin,Rosy c Lowangcha,Kirmar Ado,Doge Lona,Marge D,D Tamuk Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, 1 P Tsering,A Perme,Wintet Sawin,Signal Yirang,William Yirang,Jumge Riram,Krishna Dubey,Lissing Perme Page No.# 2/17 B E F O R E HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE JUDGMENT &ORDER(Oral) 22.10.2025 Heard Mr. D. Panging, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Arunachal Pradesh and Mr. L. Perme, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 2. By filing this application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., 1973(now section 528 BNSS, 2023), the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the Charge- sheet and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 of the IPC in Sessions Case No. 12/2023 corresponding to ITA. WPS Case No. 77/2019. 3. The case set up by the prosecution is that on 27.09.2019, a written FIR was received from one Smti Joram Nallo, (respondent No. 2 herein), to the effect that on 17.12.2017 for the first time she met the accused Shri Taba Techi, (petitioner herein) at Panyor River Festival at Yazali and he used to call the complainant on many occasions and proposed to marry her informing that he is a widower and she has to take care of his 4 (four) children born out of his late wife. The constant proposal of the petitioner for marriage made her believe that he is a good person and finally she agreed the proposal. The petitioner asked her to stay with him at his residence at A-Sector, Itanagar and forced her to have sexual relationship with him on the promise that he will marry her in a formal way as per customary law. With the hope that the petitioner will keep his promise to marry her, the respondent No. 2 could not resist to have sexual relationship with him. Accordingly, she stayed with the petitioner since March, 2018. Page No.# 3/17 When the petitioner delayed the formal marriage, the respondent No. 2 asked him to meet and talk with her parents regarding finalisation of their marriage. It is alleged that the petitioner has brutally assaulted the respondent No. 2 and her belongings were thrown out of the room, saying that he will not marry her and chased her away for the reason that the respondent No. 2 has asked the petitioner to meet her parents for finalisation of their marriage. However, she managed to gather her belongings and continued to stay in the room. Thereafter, the petitioner shifted to his brother’s house and came back to the room and brutally beaten her by punching and kicking without any reason and forced her to say that she was his time pass girlfriend or he would keep assaulting. It is also alleged that the petitioner has tried to damage the vehicle of the respondent No. 2 and thereafter, lodged an FIR against her with a false allegation that the respondent No. 2 has taken away his licensedrevolver and she had threatened to harm him. However, no case was registered as the revolver was recovered from his cupboard by his maid. On 26.07.2019, a meeting was conducted by the family members to finalise whether he would marry her or not. In the meeting, shockingly the petitioner has stated before the elders and the family members that he would marry her if she would agree to have sex with him every day. Thereafter, threatened her to get out of his life and also to murder her. The effort for settlement had miserably failed.The above acts of the petitioner, it is alleged, shows his intention to cheat and raped her on false promise of marriage from the very beginning of the relationship. 4. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, a case was registered being Itanagar Women Police Station Case No. 77/2019 under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC. On completion of the investigation, a Charge-sheet was filed on 25.02.2021 Page No.# 4/17 against the petitioner under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC. The Sessions Court Yupia framed the charges against the petitioner under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC on 12.03.2024 and the case being Sessions Case No. 12/2023 is pending trial before the learned Sessions Court, Yupia. 5. The present petition is filed praying for quashing of the Charge-sheet and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner on the ground that the Charge- sheet was submitted without any material on record for the alleged offences and the order dated 12.03.2024 framing charges against the petitioner was passed without taking into consideration the fact that by the own admission of the respondent No. 2 that they have lived as husband and wife for more than a year and the respondent No. 2 had made a conscious decision to have sexual relationship with the petitioner on the petitioner’s promise to marry her, which at best can be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. 6. Mr. Panging, learned counsel submits that after the death of the wife of the petitioner, the petitioner having 4 (four) children to look after, happened to meet the respondent No. 2 on being requested by her to buy lottery tickets. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 exchanged their phone numbers and started keeping in touch with each other and slowly developed a relationship. The petitioner having developed a relationship with the respondent No. 2 had told her that he is a widower and has 4 (four) young daughters having a very big family and if the petitioner was fine with that and willing to take care of the petitioner’s daughters then they can start a family together, which was agreed by the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 is a divorcee. Accordingly, both the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 started to stay together as a husband and wife since the month of March, 2018 in the house of the petitioner located Page No.# 5/17 at A-Sector, Itanagar. 7. He submits that in the early part of 2019, the relationship of the petitioner with respondent No. 2 started turning sour on account of her nature of doubting the petitioner of having affairs with other women and had alleged that the petitioner had a relationship with the wife of the petitioner’s elder brother and also alleged that he was having a affair with one of his ZPM colleagues and used to pick up fights and quarrel with the petitioner, which had severe affect on the mental health of the petitioner’s young daughters. The aggressive behaviour of the respondent No. 2 continued to such an extent that on the death anniversary of the petitioner’s first wife, the respondent No. 2 got so drunk and created a scene to the embarrassment of the petitioner in front of his family and young daughters. The respondent No. 2 used to pick up fight over trivial issues which had created a dent in the relationship and it was no longer possible for the petitioner to have a happy and healthy relationship with the respondent No. 2 because of her nature and accordingly, a Mel was conducted in the month of July, 2019 to settle the matter amicably. However, same could not be settled on account of the threatening by the respondent No. 2 and her father to the family of the petitioner that they would lodge an FIR against the petitioner if the petitioner does not marry the respondent No. 2. Thereafter, the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 started living separately and the FIR dated 27.09.2019 was lodged by the respondent No. 2 alleging falsely that the petitioner has committed an offence of rape under the false promise of marriage, cheating, mischief, voluntary causing hurt to extort confession and criminal intimidation of dire consequences of life. 8. Mr. Panging, learned counsel submits that the case has been registered against the petitioner without considering the fact that same has been filed by Page No.# 6/17 the respondent No. 2 just to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner on account of their relationship getting broken up. The FIR clearly reveals that the respondent No. 2 made a conscious decision to enter into a sexual relationship with the petitioner and stayed together as husband and wife for more than a year. 9. Mr. Panging, learned counsel submits that that perusal of the FIR dated 27.09.2019 and the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. reveals that the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 developed a relationship and there was a conscious decision by respondent No. 2 to enter into a sexual relationship with the petitioner on the alleged promise of the petitioner to marry her at a later date and this aspect of the matter was completely not considered by the learned Trial Court while framing the charges against the petitioner. As the respondent No. 2 stayed together with the petitioner as husband and wife for more than a year, therefore, no charges could have been framed against the petitioner under Sections 376 and 417 of the IPC. 10. Mr. Panging, learned counsel submits that consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact and this aspect of the matter was given a total go by the learned Trial Court while framing the charges against the petitioner. 11. During the course of hearing, Mr. Panging, learned counsel while placing the deposition of the respondent No. 2 before the Court, submits that no where the respondent No. 2 stated that the petitioner has sexually assaulted or raped her. He submits that it is a settled proposition of law that the FIR and the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not a reliable piece of evidence. The deposition of the respondent No. 2 does not reveal any offence of rape as has been alleged in the FIR and the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Page No.# 7/17 Therefore, Mr. Panging, learned counsel submits that the action impugned, particularly framing of charges under Sections 376 & 417 of the IPC is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. And as such, prays for quashing of the Charge-sheet dated 25.02.2021 and the consequential, criminal proceedings of Sessions Case No. 12/2023 under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC, may be set aside and quashed. 12. In support of his submissions, Mr. Panging, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases: (i). Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtraand Anr., reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608. (ii).Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191. 13. Ms. T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly submits that a mere promise of marriage does not constitute rape unless made with fraudulent intent to induce consent. She submits that in the present case, the respondent No. 2 has alleged that she had entered into a sexual relationship with the petitioner solely for the reason that he had promised to marry her and the relationship continued for a year and was broken when the promise for marriage was not fulfilled. The main allegation of the respondent No. 2 is that had it not been for the promise of marriage made by the petitioner, she would have never entered into a physical relationship with him and considering that this was done by cheating, the same amounts to rape. 14. She submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a mere fact that the physical relationship was established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to rape in every case. In order for the offence of rape to be Page No.# 8/17 made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. She submits that materials reveal that it would be a case of consensual relationship from the beginning and if the allegation is accepted, it does not appear that the initial promise to marry was in bad faith and due to turning of the relationship sour between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2, the said promise to marry could not be fulfilled. Therefore, she submits that there appears to be no ingredients of Sections 376 & 417 of the IPC against the petitioner. 15. In support of her submission, Ms. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nitin B. Nikhare vs. the State of Maharashtra &Anr., in Crl. A. No. 000307/2025, decided on 21.01.2025, to submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. In order for the offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. 16. On the other hand, Mr. L. Perme, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, submits that since the petitioner has entered into a sexual relationship with Page No.# 9/17 the respondent No. 2 after being promised to marry with a fraudulent intent to induce consent, the act of the petitioner is clearly an offence under Section 376 of the IPC. He submits that framing of charge is based on the prima facie view of the learned Trial Court as the materials prima facie reveal the commission of an offence under Sections 376/417/323/ 427/506 of the IPC. Therefore, the framing of charge cannot be said to be based on no materials. 17. Mr. Perme, learned counsel submits that the learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied on the deposition of the respondent No. 2 on the ground that there is no statement with regard to rape in her deposition before the Court, to which he submits that same is a matter of trial and it is the duty of the prosecution to establish/prove the case before the Trial Court. 18. Above apart, he submits that whether there was any intention to deceive the respondent No. 2 from the very inspection of his promise is a matter to be decided or to be looked into at the time of trial. Therefore, while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to conduct a mini trial. The learned Trial Court has framed the charges after going through the statement made by witnesses as well as the materials on record and accordingly, finding prima facie case, the charges were framed against the petitioner and the charges are required to be proved only during the trial on the basis of evidence that may be laid by the parties. Therefore, no case is made out in the present proceeding for exercising the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceedings and as such present petition may be dismissed. 19. Mr. Perme, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case ofCentral Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh, (2023) SCC Online SC 379relied on by the coordinate Bench Page No.# 10/17 of this Court in the case of Rishabh Sarma vs. the State of Arunachal Pradesh, reported in 2023 Supreme (Gau) 688, to project that the High Court cannot conduct a mini trial and/or the High Court cannot consider the quashing applications as if it is against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C,the Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. 20. Due consideration has been extended to the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 21. An FIR was lodged by the respondent No. 2/victim on 27.09.2019 before the Itanagar Women Police Station against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner has committed an offence of rape under the false promise of marriage, cheating, mischief, voluntary causing hurt to extort confession and criminal intimidation. On receipt of the F.I.R., a case was registered being Itanagar Women Police Station Case No. 77/2019 under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC. On completion of the investigation, a Charge-sheet was filed on 25.02.2021 against the petitioner under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC. The Sessions Court Yupia framed the charges against the petitioner under Sections 376/417/323/427/506 IPC on 12.03.2024 which is pending trial before the learned Sessions Court, Yupia. 22. As noted above the present application is filed praying for quashing of the Charge-sheet and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner on the ground that the Charge-sheet was submitted without any material on record for the alleged offences and the order dated 12.03.2024 framing charge against the petitioner was passed without taking into consideration the fact that by the own Page No.# 11/17 admission of the respondent No. 2 that they have lived as husband and wife for more than a year. The respondent No. 2 had made a conscious decision to have sexual relationship with the petitioner on the petitioner’s promise to marry her, which at best can be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. 23. It appears that after the death of the wife of the petitioner, the petitioner who is having 4 (four) daughters, happened to meet the respondent No. 2 and exchanged phone numbers and started keeping in touch with each other and developed a relationship. The petitioner having developed a relationship with the respondent No. 2, proposed to start a family together, which was agreed/accepted to by the respondent No. 2. Accordingly, both the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 started to stay together as a husband and wife since the month of March, 2018 in the house of the petitioner located at A-Sector, Itanagar. 24. After staying together for more than a year, it appears that the relationship of the petitioner with respondent No. 2 started turning sour on account of various alleged reasons and used to pick up fights and quarrel between them which has created a dent in their relationship and the relationship was no longer possible to continue. It appears that a Mel was conducted to settle the matter amicably. However, same could not be materialised due allegations and counter allegations from both sides. Thereafter, the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 started living separately. 25. Perusal of the record reveals that both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 initially decided to start the life together by staying together and to marry in future. The petitioner appears have promise to marry the respondent No. 2. On such promise, the respondent No. 2 made a decision to enter into a sexual Page No.# 12/17 relationship with the petitioner and stayed together as husband and wife for more than a year. The FIR and the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. reveals that the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 developed a relationship and there was a conscious decision by respondent No. 2 to enter into a sexual relationship with the petitioner on the alleged promise of the petitioner to marry her at a later date. 26. The deposition of the respondent No. 2 before the learned Trial Court, does not reflects that the petitioner has sexually assaulted or raped her, however, the FIR and the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. does so. As the deposition of the respondent No. 2 does not reveal any offence of rape as has been alleged in the FIR and the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C, prima facie, it would not be possible to establish the offence of rape against the petitioner. 27. Although, there may be a promised made by the petitioner to marrythe respondent No. 2 on future date, consent given by the respondent No. 2 to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she has decided to start the life together by staying together on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It has been observed by the judicial pronouncements that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. 28. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, which is reproduced hereunder: “14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise Page No.# 13/17 to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 509, this Court held: “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 (“Deepak Gulati”): “21.There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…” 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act”. 29. In the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, which is reproduced hereunder: “18. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46, this Court was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, had given consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was held thus:- "21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual Page No.# 14/17 intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.” 30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nitin B. Nikhare (supra) has held which is reproduced hereinbelow: “5. On the other hand, the prosecution's case is that the prosecutrix entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant solely for the reason that he had promised to marry her and this relationship continued for some time and was broken when the promise of marriage was not fulfilled. In other words, the main allegation of the prosecutrix is that had it not been for the promise of marriage made by the appellant she would have never entered into a physical relationship with him and considering that this was done by cheating, the same amounts to rape. 6. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. In order for the offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations.” 31. Regard being had to the submission of Mr. Perme, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini trial and/or the High Court cannot consider the quashing applications as if it is against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial, it is true that at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, Page No.# 15/17 while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C,the Court is not permissible to conduct a mini trial.However, the observation in the case of Aryan Singh, (Supra)relied by him pertains to a case wherein the High Court in the judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme court has held that it was not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at the stage and the other reason was that the High Court has held that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Therefore, the High Court has been held to be erred in observing at that stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. It has been held that whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at that stage and the same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. Thus, in my view above case law relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 would not come to the aid of the respondent No. 2. 32. Coming back to case in hand, the case of theprosecution is that the respondent No. 2entered into a sexual relationship with the petitioner solely for the reason that he had promised to marry her and this relationship continued for more than a year and was broken when the promise of marriage was not fulfilled. In other words, the main allegation is that had it not been for the promise of marriage made by the petitioner she would have never entered into a physical relationship with him and considering that this was done by cheating, Page No.# 16/17 the same amounts to rape. 33. It appears that the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 had decided to start their life together and stayed in the house of the petitioner for more than a year and entered into sexual relationship as husband and wife on the promise of the petitioner to marry in future date.The respondent is a grown-up and mature lady. She accepted to live and stay together out of love with the petitioner. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that they are yet to be married formally. All these circumstances lead this court to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to have sexual intercourse with the petitioner and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact. 34. As noted above, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. In order for the offence of rape to be made out, two conditions need to be satisfied i.e. that the promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that the false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations. Thus, in my considered view present case appears to be a case of a consensual relationship from the beginning. Even if the case of the respondent No. 2 is accepted, it does not appear that the initial promise to marry was in bad faith and it was only due to the subsequent circumstances that prevented fulfilment of alleged promise to marry which the relationship turned sour which has given rise to filing of the present case. Page No.# 17/17 35. In view of the discussion made herein above and the reasons thereof, I am of the considered view that respondent No 2 has failed to, prima facie, show commission of rape and cheating. Thus, case registered, charge-sheeted and framing of charges under sections 376/417, IPC, 1860 against the petitioner cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed. Consequently, the charges under sections 376/417, IPC, 1860 is quashed. However, trial be continued on the charges under 323/427/506 of IPC, 1860. 36. Criminal petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant