RSA-1647-1992 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA 1. RSA-1647 Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs. Bant Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others 2. RSA-1652 Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs. Bant Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others 3. RSA-2178 Bant Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs CORAM : HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Present: Mr. S.S.Rangi, Advocate and Mr. Didar Singh, Advocate for the appellant (in RSA for the respondent Mr. G.S.Punia, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Harveen Kaur, Advocate for the appellant for the respondent 1992 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH -.- Reserved on: Pronounced on 1647-1992 (O&M) Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs. VERSUS Bant Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others 1652-1992 (O&M) Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs. VERSUS Bant Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others 2178-1992 (O&M) Singh (deceased) through LRs. & Others. VERSUS Rakha Singh (Deceased) through LRs HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Mr. S.S.Rangi, Advocate and Mr. Didar Singh, Advocate for the appellant (in RSA Nos. 1647 and 1652 of 1992) for the respondents (in RSA No.2178 of 1992) Mr. G.S.Punia, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Harveen Kaur, Advocate for the appellants (in RSA No.2178 of 1992) for the respondents (in RSA Nos. 1647 and 1652 of 1992). -.- -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Reserved on:-15.09.2025 Pronounced on : 18.09.2025 ….Appellants ....Respondents ….Appellants ....Respondents ….Appellants ....Respondents HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Nos. 1647 and 1652 of 1992) (in RSA No.2178 of 1992) (in RSA No.2178 of 1992) (in RSA Nos. 1647 and 1652 of 1992). - TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 MANDEEP PANNU,J. 1. The above plaintiff-Rakha Sing 2178 of 1992 filed by defendants concurrent findings of the courts below. Since all these appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree, they are being disposed off by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status before the trial cou Facts of the case 2. The case of the plaintiff Rakha Singh, as pleaded in the plaint, was that he filed a suit for possession of land measuring 18 kanals 14 marlas out of a total land measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan, Tehsil Samrala. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree dated 09.01.1979 passed in Civil Suit No.374 of 1978 titled Ujjaggar Singh and others vs. Fatta alias Fateh Singh, decided by Shri G.S. Sewak, Sub Judge I Class, Samrala, as being null, void, collus land situated at village Bhanglan was ancestral, joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendants being inherited by their father Fateh Singh from his own father Sob 3. The plaintiff also sought possession of another land measuring 7 kanals 13 marlas out of land measuring 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana. His plea was that the said property was acquired by Fateh Singh from joint Hindu family Hindu family property. It was thus claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to joint 1992 (O&M) MANDEEP PANNU,J. The above-mentioned three Regular Second Rakha Singh i.e. RSA No.1647 and 1652 of 1992 filed by defendants-Bant Singh and others, are directed against the ent findings of the courts below. Since all these appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree, they are being disposed off by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status before the trial court. Facts of the case The case of the plaintiff Rakha Singh, as pleaded in the plaint, was that he filed a suit for possession of land measuring 18 kanals 14 marlas out of a total land measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan, Tehsil Samrala. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree dated 09.01.1979 passed in Civil Suit No.374 of 1978 titled Ujjaggar Singh and others vs. Fatta alias Fateh Singh, decided by Shri G.S. Sewak, Sub Judge I Class, Samrala, as being null, void, collusive and not binding upon his rights. According to him, the suit land situated at village Bhanglan was ancestral, joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendants being inherited by their father Fateh Singh from his own father Sobha Singh. The plaintiff also sought possession of another land measuring 7 kanals 13 marlas out of land measuring 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana. His plea was that the said property was acquired by Fateh Singh from joint Hindu family funds, and therefore the same also partook the character of joint Hindu family property. It was thus claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to joint -2- three Regular Second Appeals, two filed by RSA No.1647 and 1652 of 1992 and third i.e. RSA No. Bant Singh and others, are directed against the ent findings of the courts below. Since all these appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree, they are being disposed off by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status The case of the plaintiff Rakha Singh, as pleaded in the plaint, was that he filed a suit for possession of land measuring 18 kanals 14 marlas out of a total land measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan, Tehsil Samrala. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree dated 09.01.1979 passed in Civil Suit No.374 of 1978 titled Ujjaggar Singh and others vs. Fatta alias Fateh Singh, decided by Shri G.S. Sewak, Sub Judge I Class, Samrala, as being ive and not binding upon his rights. According to him, the suit land situated at village Bhanglan was ancestral, joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendants being inherited by their father The plaintiff also sought possession of another land measuring 7 kanals 13 marlas out of land measuring 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana. His plea was that the said property was acquired by Fateh Singh from funds, and therefore the same also partook the character of joint Hindu family property. It was thus claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to joint - Appeals, two filed by RSA No. Bant Singh and others, are directed against the ent findings of the courts below. Since all these appeals arise out of the same judgment and decree, they are being disposed off by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status The case of the plaintiff Rakha Singh, as pleaded in the plaint, was that he filed a suit for possession of land measuring 18 kanals 14 marlas out of a total land measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan, Tehsil Samrala. The plaintiff challenged the judgment and decree dated 09.01.1979 passed in Civil Suit No.374 of 1978 titled Ujjaggar Singh and others vs. Fatta alias Fateh Singh, decided by Shri G.S. Sewak, Sub Judge I Class, Samrala, as being ive and not binding upon his rights. According to him, the suit land situated at village Bhanglan was ancestral, joint Hindu family and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendants being inherited by their father The plaintiff also sought possession of another land measuring 7 kanals 13 marlas out of land measuring 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana. His plea was that the said property was acquired by Fateh Singh from funds, and therefore the same also partook the character of joint Hindu family property. It was thus claimed that the plaintiff was entitled to joint TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 possession therein also. injunction restraining the property on the basis of the decree dated 09.01.1979. parties was given showing that Sobha Singh had two sons, namely Fatta alias Fateh Singh and Khiali alias Khial Singh. Fatta Singh (plaintiff), Pritam Singh (defendant No.4), Jawala Singh (defendant No.3), Ujjagar Singh (defendant No.2) and Bant Singh (defendant No.1). who was residing at Durgapur, West Bengal, in connection business, pleaded that the defendants had procured a collusive decree dated 09.01.1979 from Fatta Singh when the latter was more than 100 years old and not in a sound disposing mind. The decree was stated to be the outcome of fraud and misrepresentation, as the suit was filed on 19.12.1978 and without any service of summons, Fateh Singh was shown to have appeared and filed a written statement. It was pleaded that such a decree could not deprive the plaintiff of his legitimate share. It was further stated that the mutation No.941 was got sanctioned by the defendants in connivance with the revenue authorities behind the back of the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded that he had no knowledge of the decree till 05.08.1986, when on visiting the r he learnt about the decree and obtained its certified copy on 08.08.1986. Thereafter, cause of action accrued to him to file the suit. plaintiff sought possession of 18 kanals 14 marla situated at village Bhanglan and 7 kanals 13 marlas out of 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana, along with relief of permanent injunction. 1992 (O&M) possession therein also. The plaintiff further prayed for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from transferring or alienating the suit property on the basis of the decree dated 09.01.1979. parties was given showing that Sobha Singh had two sons, namely Fatta alias Fateh Singh and Khiali alias Khial Singh. Fatta Singh was survived by five sons Singh (plaintiff), Pritam Singh (defendant No.4), Jawala Singh (defendant No.3), agar Singh (defendant No.2) and Bant Singh (defendant No.1). who was residing at Durgapur, West Bengal, in connection business, pleaded that the defendants had procured a collusive decree dated 09.01.1979 from Fatta Singh when the latter was more than 100 years old and not in a sound disposing mind. The decree was stated to be the outcome of fraud and isrepresentation, as the suit was filed on 19.12.1978 and without any service of summons, Fateh Singh was shown to have appeared and filed a written statement. It was pleaded that such a decree could not deprive the plaintiff of his legitimate s further stated that the mutation No.941 was got sanctioned by the defendants in connivance with the revenue authorities behind the back of the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded that he had no knowledge of the decree till 05.08.1986, when on visiting the revenue office after the riots of November 1984, he learnt about the decree and obtained its certified copy on 08.08.1986. Thereafter, cause of action accrued to him to file the suit. plaintiff sought possession of 18 kanals 14 marla situated at village Bhanglan and 7 kanals 13 marlas out of 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana, along with relief of permanent injunction. -3- The plaintiff further prayed for a decree of permanent defendants from transferring or alienating the suit property on the basis of the decree dated 09.01.1979. The pedigree table of the parties was given showing that Sobha Singh had two sons, namely Fatta alias Fateh Singh was survived by five sons—Rakha Singh (plaintiff), Pritam Singh (defendant No.4), Jawala Singh (defendant No.3), agar Singh (defendant No.2) and Bant Singh (defendant No.1). The plaintiff, who was residing at Durgapur, West Bengal, in connection with his transport business, pleaded that the defendants had procured a collusive decree dated 09.01.1979 from Fatta Singh when the latter was more than 100 years old and not in a sound disposing mind. The decree was stated to be the outcome of fraud and isrepresentation, as the suit was filed on 19.12.1978 and without any service of summons, Fateh Singh was shown to have appeared and filed a written statement. It was pleaded that such a decree could not deprive the plaintiff of his legitimate s further stated that the mutation No.941 was got sanctioned by the defendants in connivance with the revenue authorities behind the back of the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded that he had no knowledge of the decree till evenue office after the riots of November 1984, he learnt about the decree and obtained its certified copy on 08.08.1986. Thereafter, cause of action accrued to him to file the suit. On these averments, the plaintiff sought possession of 18 kanals 14 marlas out of 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan and 7 kanals 13 marlas out of 38 kanals 6 marlas situated at village Gharkhana, along with relief of permanent injunction. - The plaintiff further prayed for a decree of permanent defendants from transferring or alienating the suit The pedigree table of the parties was given showing that Sobha Singh had two sons, namely Fatta alias Fateh Rakha Singh (plaintiff), Pritam Singh (defendant No.4), Jawala Singh (defendant No.3), The plaintiff, with his transport business, pleaded that the defendants had procured a collusive decree dated 09.01.1979 from Fatta Singh when the latter was more than 100 years old and not in a sound disposing mind. The decree was stated to be the outcome of fraud and isrepresentation, as the suit was filed on 19.12.1978 and without any service of summons, Fateh Singh was shown to have appeared and filed a written statement. It was pleaded that such a decree could not deprive the plaintiff of his legitimate s further stated that the mutation No.941 was got sanctioned by the defendants in connivance with the revenue authorities behind the back of the plaintiff. The plaintiff pleaded that he had no knowledge of the decree till evenue office after the riots of November 1984, he learnt about the decree and obtained its certified copy on 08.08.1986. On these averments, the s out of 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan and 7 kanals 13 marlas out of 38 kanals 6 marlas TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 4. Upon notice, defendants appeared and contested the claim. By way of written statement, it was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present form and was barred by limitation. It was alleged that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands, as he was also known as Devinder Singh, which fact he concealed. The defendants asserted that they were owners in possession of 86 kanals 10 marlas at village Bhanglan and 38 kanals 6 marlas at village by virtue of decree dated 09.01.1979. It was pleaded that Fatta alias Fateh Singh had further executed a val grandsons Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Kashmira Singh sons of (defendant No.2). favour. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff 22–25 years earlier when his father Fateh Singh had given him purchase a truck. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled at Durgapur and carried on a flourishing transport business owning about 4 he was now harassing the defendants without any concern for the suit property. It was denied that the properties in suit were joint Hindu family properties. The property at village Gharkhana was pleaded to have been purchased out of self acquired funds and was separate property of Fateh Singh. The decree of 09.01.1979 was stated to be legal and valid. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit was prayed for. 5. The plaintiff filed replication denying the assertions of the defendants. He specifically denied execution of the Fateh Singh had five sons, one of whom was the plaintiff, and thus he was entitled to 1/5th share in 1992 (O&M) pon notice, defendants appeared and contested the claim. By way of itten statement, it was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present form and was barred by limitation. It was alleged that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands, as he was also known as Devinder Singh, which fact he The defendants asserted that they were owners in possession of 86 kanals 10 marlas at village Bhanglan and 38 kanals 6 marlas at village by virtue of decree dated 09.01.1979. It was pleaded that Fatta alias Fateh Singh er executed a valid registered Will dated 04.01.1984 in favour of his grandsons Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Kashmira Singh sons of (defendant No.2). The property covered under the W It was also pleaded that the plaintiff had separated from the family about 25 years earlier when his father Fateh Singh had given him purchase a truck. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled at Durgapur and carried on a flourishing transport business owning about 4- he was now harassing the defendants without any concern for the suit property. It was denied that the properties in suit were joint Hindu family properties. The property at village Gharkhana was pleaded to have been purchased out of self ired funds and was separate property of Fateh Singh. The decree of 09.01.1979 was stated to be legal and valid. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit The plaintiff filed replication denying the assertions of the defendants. He specifically denied execution of the Will dated 04.01.1984 and reiterated that Fateh Singh had five sons, one of whom was the plaintiff, and thus he was entitled to 1/5th share in the estate. It was asserted that Fateh Singh was merely an -4- pon notice, defendants appeared and contested the claim. By way of itten statement, it was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present form and was barred by limitation. It was alleged that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands, as he was also known as Devinder Singh, which fact he The defendants asserted that they were owners in possession of 86 kanals 10 marlas at village Bhanglan and 38 kanals 6 marlas at village Gharkhanna by virtue of decree dated 09.01.1979. It was pleaded that Fatta alias Fateh Singh ill dated 04.01.1984 in favour of his grandsons Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Kashmira Singh sons of Ujjagar Singh The property covered under the Will was duly mutated in their had separated from the family about 25 years earlier when his father Fateh Singh had given him ₹40,000 to purchase a truck. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled at Durgapur and carried on a -5 trucks. Having become wealthy, he was now harassing the defendants without any concern for the suit property. It was denied that the properties in suit were joint Hindu family properties. The property at village Gharkhana was pleaded to have been purchased out of self ired funds and was separate property of Fateh Singh. The decree of 09.01.1979 was stated to be legal and valid. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit The plaintiff filed replication denying the assertions of the defendants. dated 04.01.1984 and reiterated that Fateh Singh had five sons, one of whom was the plaintiff, and thus he was entitled the estate. It was asserted that Fateh Singh was merely an - pon notice, defendants appeared and contested the claim. By way of itten statement, it was pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the present form and was barred by limitation. It was alleged that the plaintiff had not come to court with clean hands, as he was also known as Devinder Singh, which fact he The defendants asserted that they were owners in possession of 86 Gharkhanna by virtue of decree dated 09.01.1979. It was pleaded that Fatta alias Fateh Singh ill dated 04.01.1984 in favour of his Singh ill was duly mutated in their had separated from the family about ₹40,000 to purchase a truck. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled at Durgapur and carried on a come wealthy, he was now harassing the defendants without any concern for the suit property. It was denied that the properties in suit were joint Hindu family properties. The property at village Gharkhana was pleaded to have been purchased out of self- ired funds and was separate property of Fateh Singh. The decree of 09.01.1979 was stated to be legal and valid. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit The plaintiff filed replication denying the assertions of the defendants. dated 04.01.1984 and reiterated that Fateh Singh had five sons, one of whom was the plaintiff, and thus he was entitled the estate. It was asserted that Fateh Singh was merely an TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 agriculturist and had no independent source of income to acquire separate property. 6. On the basis of pleadings, the trial 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 7. In support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and further examined Surjit Singh (PW2), Kartar Singh (PW3), Karampal Singh (PW5), Jarnail Singh (PW6) and Jaswant Singh (PW7). He tendered into evidence documents Ex.P1 to E 8. On the other hand, the defendants examined Sharad Kumar (DW1), Ujjagar Singh (DW2), Dail Singh (DW3), Rajinder Singh (DW4), Surinder Singh 1992 (O&M) agriculturist and had no independent source of income to acquire separate property. On the basis of pleadings, the trial C Whether the suit-land is ancestral j coparcenary property? OPP Whether the decree dated 09.01.1979 is null and void? OPP Whether Fatta alias Fateh Singh executed a valid 04.01.1984 in favour of Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Kashmira Singh? If so, its effect? Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his act and conduct? OPD Whether the suit is within limitation? OPD Whether the plaintiff got separated from the family and was given ₹40,000, and if so, its effect? OPD Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the suit as prayed for? OPP Whether the plaintiff is entitled to prayed for? OPP Relief. n support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and further examined Surjit Singh (PW2), Kartar Singh (PW3), Karampal Singh (PW5), Jarnail Singh (PW6) and Jaswant Singh (PW7). He tendered into evidence documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P25 and then closed his evidence. On the other hand, the defendants examined Sharad Kumar (DW1), Singh (DW2), Dail Singh (DW3), Rajinder Singh (DW4), Surinder Singh -5- agriculturist and had no independent source of income to acquire separate property. Court framed the following issues: land is ancestral joint Hindu family and coparcenary property? OPP Whether the decree dated 09.01.1979 is null and void? OPP Whether Fatta alias Fateh Singh executed a valid Will dated 04.01.1984 in favour of Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Kashmira Singh? If so, its effect? OPD Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his Whether the suit is within limitation? OPD Whether the plaintiff got separated from the family and was ₹40,000, and if so, its effect? OPD s entitled to possession of the suit-land Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as n support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and further examined Surjit Singh (PW2), Kartar Singh (PW3), Ujjagar Singh (PW4), Karampal Singh (PW5), Jarnail Singh (PW6) and Jaswant Singh (PW7). He x.P25 and then closed his evidence. On the other hand, the defendants examined Sharad Kumar (DW1), Singh (DW2), Dail Singh (DW3), Rajinder Singh (DW4), Surinder Singh - agriculturist and had no independent source of income to acquire separate property. ourt framed the following issues: oint Hindu family and Whether the decree dated 09.01.1979 is null and void? OPP ill dated 04.01.1984 in favour of Balbir Singh, Rulda Singh and Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the suit by his Whether the plaintiff got separated from the family and was land relief of injunction as n support of his case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and Singh (PW4), Karampal Singh (PW5), Jarnail Singh (PW6) and Jaswant Singh (PW7). He x.P25 and then closed his evidence. On the other hand, the defendants examined Sharad Kumar (DW1), Singh (DW2), Dail Singh (DW3), Rajinder Singh (DW4), Surinder Singh TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 (DW5), Balbir Singh (DW6), Bhupinder Singh (DW7) and Banarsi Das (DW8), and thereafter closed their evidence. Findings Of The Trial Court 9. After hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence, the trial court recorded the following findings that the property situated at village Bhanglan had originally belonged to Sobha Singh reference to exhibits P15, P16 and P24, it was held that Fateh Singh stepped into the shoes of his father and thus the property partook the character of ancestral and coparcenary property. Since the parties did not reference to naksha haqdarwar of village Bhanglan, it was held that the suit property at village Bhanglan was joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. As regards the property at village had failed to prove that it was acquired out of joint Hindu family funds. It was thus treated as separate property of Fateh Singh, who was competent to deal with it in any manner he liked. 10. On the issue of decree dated 09.01.1979, it was held as Karta was not competent to suffer a decree depriving one coparcener (plaintiff) of his legitimate share in the ancestral property. Hence, the decree was declared null and void qua the property at village valid qua the property at village dispose of his separate property. 11. On the issue of and proved in favour of Balbir Singh, Radha Singh and Kashmir Singh. 1992 (O&M) (DW5), Balbir Singh (DW6), Bhupinder Singh (DW7) and Banarsi Das (DW8), hereafter closed their evidence. Findings Of The Trial Court After hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence, the trial court recorded the following findings that the property situated at village Bhanglan had originally belonged to Sobha Singh and devolved upon his son Fateh Singh. By reference to exhibits P15, P16 and P24, it was held that Fateh Singh stepped into the shoes of his father and thus the property partook the character of ancestral and coparcenary property. Since the parties did not reference to naksha haqdarwar of village Bhanglan, it was held that the suit property at village Bhanglan was joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. As regards the property at village Gharkhanna, the trial court held that the had failed to prove that it was acquired out of joint Hindu family funds. It was thus treated as separate property of Fateh Singh, who was competent to deal with it in any manner he liked. On the issue of decree dated 09.01.1979, it was held as Karta was not competent to suffer a decree depriving one coparcener (plaintiff) of his legitimate share in the ancestral property. Hence, the decree was declared null and void qua the property at village Bhanglan valid qua the property at village Gharkhanna, as Fateh Singh was competent to dispose of his separate property. On the issue of Will dated 04.01.1984, it was held to be duly executed and proved in favour of Balbir Singh, Radha Singh and Kashmir Singh. -6- (DW5), Balbir Singh (DW6), Bhupinder Singh (DW7) and Banarsi Das (DW8), After hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence, the trial court recorded the following findings that the property situated at village Bhanglan had and devolved upon his son Fateh Singh. By reference to exhibits P15, P16 and P24, it was held that Fateh Singh stepped into the shoes of his father and thus the property partook the character of ancestral and coparcenary property. Since the parties did not own any other land, and by reference to naksha haqdarwar of village Bhanglan, it was held that the suit property at village Bhanglan was joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. , the trial court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that it was acquired out of joint Hindu family funds. It was thus treated as separate property of Fateh Singh, who was competent to deal with it in On the issue of decree dated 09.01.1979, it was held that Fateh Singh as Karta was not competent to suffer a decree depriving one coparcener (plaintiff) of his legitimate share in the ancestral property. Hence, the decree was declared Bhanglan. However, the same was held , as Fateh Singh was competent to dated 04.01.1984, it was held to be duly executed and proved in favour of Balbir Singh, Radha Singh and Kashmir Singh. - (DW5), Balbir Singh (DW6), Bhupinder Singh (DW7) and Banarsi Das (DW8), After hearing the parties and appreciating the evidence, the trial court recorded the following findings that the property situated at village Bhanglan had and devolved upon his son Fateh Singh. By reference to exhibits P15, P16 and P24, it was held that Fateh Singh stepped into the shoes of his father and thus the property partook the character of ancestral and own any other land, and by reference to naksha haqdarwar of village Bhanglan, it was held that the suit property at village Bhanglan was joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. plaintiff had failed to prove that it was acquired out of joint Hindu family funds. It was thus treated as separate property of Fateh Singh, who was competent to deal with it in that Fateh Singh as Karta was not competent to suffer a decree depriving one coparcener (plaintiff) of his legitimate share in the ancestral property. Hence, the decree was declared held , as Fateh Singh was competent to dated 04.01.1984, it was held to be duly executed TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 12. Consequently, the suit was partly decreed. It was ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to joint possession to the extent of 1/5t measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhangla 09.01.1979 was held null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff to that extent. However, the suit in respect of 38 kanals 6 marlas of land at village the prayer for injunction restraining defendants from alienating the said property was dismissed. Findings of the Lower Appellate Court 13. Feeling aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, two appeals we one by defendants Bant Singh and others and the other by plaintiff Rakha Singh. Both these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10.04.1992. The lower appellate court observed that the parties are re sons of Fatta alias Fateh Singh son of Sobha Singh. Admittedly, they had landed property in the villages Bhanglan and G he, being one of the coparceners, was entitled to his share in t property. The defendants, on the other hand, denied the correctness of the pedigree table set up by Rakha Singh and asserted that the suit property was not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property and that the decree dated 09.01.1979 w suffered. These were the rival pleadings noticed by the 14. Upon hearing the parties, the both learned counsel agreed that Daya Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He was succeeded by his three sons, namely Nathu, Naraian and Sobha, each of them having 1/3rd share in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land by way of 1992 (O&M) Consequently, the suit was partly decreed. It was ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to joint possession to the extent of 1/5t measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhangla 09.01.1979 was held null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff to that extent. However, the suit in respect of 38 kanals 6 marlas of land at village the prayer for injunction restraining defendants from alienating the said property Findings of the Lower Appellate Court Feeling aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, two appeals were filed before the one by defendants Bant Singh and others and the other by plaintiff Rakha Singh. Both these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10.04.1992. The lower appellate court observed that the parties are re sons of Fatta alias Fateh Singh son of Sobha Singh. Admittedly, they had landed property in the villages Bhanglan and Gharkhana. The case of the plaintiff was that he, being one of the coparceners, was entitled to his share in t property. The defendants, on the other hand, denied the correctness of the pedigree table set up by Rakha Singh and asserted that the suit property was not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property and that the decree dated 09.01.1979 w suffered. These were the rival pleadings noticed by the Upon hearing the parties, the Lower Appellate Court both learned counsel agreed that Daya Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He was succeeded by his three sons, namely Nathu, Naraian and Sobha, each of them having 1/3rd share in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land by way of -7- Consequently, the suit was partly decreed. It was ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to joint possession to the extent of 1/5th share in the land measuring 92 kanals 14 marlas situated at village Bhanglan. The decree dated 09.01.1979 was held null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff to that extent. However, the suit in respect of 38 kanals 6 marlas of land at village Gharkhana and the prayer for injunction restraining defendants from alienating the said property Feeling aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree passed by re filed before the Lower Appellate Court one by defendants Bant Singh and others and the other by plaintiff Rakha Singh. Both these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10.04.1992. The lower appellate court observed that the parties are real brothers inter se, being sons of Fatta alias Fateh Singh son of Sobha Singh. Admittedly, they had landed arkhana. The case of the plaintiff was that he, being one of the coparceners, was entitled to his share in the joint Hindu family property. The defendants, on the other hand, denied the correctness of the pedigree table set up by Rakha Singh and asserted that the suit property was not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property and that the decree dated 09.01.1979 was rightly suffered. These were the rival pleadings noticed by the Lower Appellate Court. Lower Appellate Court concluded that both learned counsel agreed that Daya Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He was succeeded by his three sons, namely Nathu, Naraian and Sobha, each of them having 1/3rd share in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land by way of - Consequently, the suit was partly decreed. It was ordered that the h share in the land . The decree dated 09.01.1979 was held null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff to that extent. and the prayer for injunction restraining defendants from alienating the said property Feeling aggrieved by the above said judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court, one by defendants Bant Singh and others and the other by plaintiff Rakha Singh. Both these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment dated 10.04.1992. al brothers inter se, being sons of Fatta alias Fateh Singh son of Sobha Singh. Admittedly, they had landed arkhana. The case of the plaintiff was that he joint Hindu family property. The defendants, on the other hand, denied the correctness of the pedigree table set up by Rakha Singh and asserted that the suit property was not joint Hindu as rightly concluded that both learned counsel agreed that Daya Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He was succeeded by his three sons, namely Nathu, Naraian and Sobha, each of them having 1/3rd share in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land by way of TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 jamabandi Ex.P7. sons, Jaimal, Fatta and Khiali, in equal shares, while the shares of Narain remained intact. It was further noticed that mutation Ex.P24 was on the record, and there was no disput Narain their shares had also fallen into the hands of Fatta, who also succeeded to the shares of his brothers Jaimal and Khiali. The lower appellate court observed that the land which thus came to Fatta to him by way of collateral succession and not directly through Sobha. It was explained that property inherited from collaterals such as brothers or uncles does not amount to ancestral property but remains the sep who inherits it, since it does not come to him directly from the common ancestor. Thus, only the 1/3rd share of Sobha Singh in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land, which on partition and consolidation had fallen to the share of Fatta, c ancestral in his hands, whereas the other land which came to him through collateral succession had to be treated as his separate property. This aspect, according to the appellate court, had been completely ignored by the trial court. Con was held that Fateh Singh had only 1/9th share in the land at village Bhanglan which could be termed as ancestral/joint Hindu family property, and since the plaintiff Rakha Singh was one out of five sons of Fateh Singh, his share therein would work out to only 1/54. It was, therefore, concluded that the decree dated 09.01.1979 was not binding upon Rakha Singh only to the extent of his 1/54th share in the land at village Bhanglan, and thus the decree in his favour could be passed only to that e accordingly modified. 1992 (O&M) jamabandi Ex.P7. On the death of Sobha, his 1/3rd share was inherited by his three sons, Jaimal, Fatta and Khiali, in equal shares, while the shares of remained intact. It was further noticed that mutation Ex.P24 was on the record, and there was no dispute between the parties that on the death of their shares had also fallen into the hands of Fatta, who also succeeded to the shares of his brothers Jaimal and Khiali. The lower appellate court observed that the land which thus came to Fatta from Nathu, to him by way of collateral succession and not directly through Sobha. It was explained that property inherited from collaterals such as brothers or uncles does not amount to ancestral property but remains the sep who inherits it, since it does not come to him directly from the common ancestor. Thus, only the 1/3rd share of Sobha Singh in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land, which on partition and consolidation had fallen to the share of Fatta, c ancestral in his hands, whereas the other land which came to him through collateral succession had to be treated as his separate property. This aspect, according to the appellate court, had been completely ignored by the trial court. Con was held that Fateh Singh had only 1/9th share in the land at village Bhanglan which could be termed as ancestral/joint Hindu family property, and since the plaintiff Rakha Singh was one out of five sons of Fateh Singh, his share therein d work out to only 1/54. It was, therefore, concluded that the decree dated 09.01.1979 was not binding upon Rakha Singh only to the extent of his 1/54th share in the land at village Bhanglan, and thus the decree in his favour could be passed only to that extent. The findings of the trial court on issues No.2 and 7 were accordingly modified. -8- On the death of Sobha, his 1/3rd share was inherited by his three sons, Jaimal, Fatta and Khiali, in equal shares, while the shares of Nathu and remained intact. It was further noticed that mutation Ex.P24 was on the e between the parties that on the death of Nathu and their shares had also fallen into the hands of Fatta, who also succeeded to the shares of his brothers Jaimal and Khiali. The lower appellate court observed from Nathu, Narain, Jaimal and Khiali came to him by way of collateral succession and not directly through Sobha. It was explained that property inherited from collaterals such as brothers or uncles does not amount to ancestral property but remains the separate property of the person who inherits it, since it does not come to him directly from the common ancestor. Thus, only the 1/3rd share of Sobha Singh in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land, which on partition and consolidation had fallen to the share of Fatta, could be treated as ancestral in his hands, whereas the other land which came to him through collateral succession had to be treated as his separate property. This aspect, according to the appellate court, had been completely ignored by the trial court. Consequently, it was held that Fateh Singh had only 1/9th share in the land at village Bhanglan which could be termed as ancestral/joint Hindu family property, and since the plaintiff Rakha Singh was one out of five sons of Fateh Singh, his share therein d work out to only 1/54. It was, therefore, concluded that the decree dated 09.01.1979 was not binding upon Rakha Singh only to the extent of his 1/54th share in the land at village Bhanglan, and thus the decree in his favour could be xtent. The findings of the trial court on issues No.2 and 7 were - On the death of Sobha, his 1/3rd share was inherited by his three and remained intact. It was further noticed that mutation Ex.P24 was on the and their shares had also fallen into the hands of Fatta, who also succeeded to the shares of his brothers Jaimal and Khiali. The lower appellate court observed , Jaimal and Khiali came to him by way of collateral succession and not directly through Sobha. It was explained that property inherited from collaterals such as brothers or uncles does arate property of the person who inherits it, since it does not come to him directly from the common ancestor. Thus, only the 1/3rd share of Sobha Singh in 49 bighas 7 biswas of land, which on ould be treated as ancestral in his hands, whereas the other land which came to him through collateral succession had to be treated as his separate property. This aspect, according to the sequently, it was held that Fateh Singh had only 1/9th share in the land at village Bhanglan which could be termed as ancestral/joint Hindu family property, and since the plaintiff Rakha Singh was one out of five sons of Fateh Singh, his share therein d work out to only 1/54. It was, therefore, concluded that the decree dated 09.01.1979 was not binding upon Rakha Singh only to the extent of his 1/54th share in the land at village Bhanglan, and thus the decree in his favour could be xtent. The findings of the trial court on issues No.2 and 7 were TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 15. As regards the property situated at village G Appellate Court that once it was found that Fateh Singh had ancestral land in one village and had no other source of income, then it should be presumed that the land purchased by him at village G that there was no legal the plaintiff himself had pleaded that his father Fateh Singh had purchased land at village Gharkhanna the record to show how the said evidence to prove that Fateh Singh had no source of income except the land at village Bhanglan given ₹40,000 to the plaintiff Rakha Singh to purchase a t amount Rakha Singh had started a transport business which had flourished into a fleet of 45 trucks. The court further observed that there was no material on the record to show what income Fateh Singh was deriving from the land at Bhangl so as to connect it with the purchase of land at evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested his firm intention to treat the land of village blending it with the joint estate. In view of these circumstances, it was held that the land at village Gharkhanna Hindu family/coparcenary property as alleged by Rakha Singh. Accordingly, the findings of the t 16. In the result, the appeal filed by Rakha Singh with regard to the land at village Gharkhanna 1992 (O&M) As regards the property situated at village G Appellate Court dealt with the contention raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff was found that Fateh Singh had ancestral land in one village and had no other source of income, then it should be presumed that the land purchased by him at village Gharkhana was also ancestral/joint family property. The court held that there was no legal warrant to support such a presumption. It was noticed that the plaintiff himself had pleaded that his father Fateh Singh had purchased land at Gharkhanna, but there was no documentary evidence such as a sale deed on the record to show how the said land had been acquired. There was also no evidence to prove that Fateh Singh had no source of income except the land at Bhanglan. On the contrary, it was proved that in 1967 Fateh Singh had ₹40,000 to the plaintiff Rakha Singh to purchase a t amount Rakha Singh had started a transport business which had flourished into a fleet of 45 trucks. The court further observed that there was no material on the record to show what income Fateh Singh was deriving from the land at Bhangl so as to connect it with the purchase of land at evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested his firm intention to treat the land of village Gharkhanna it with the joint estate. In view of these circumstances, it was held that the Gharkhanna was the personal property of Fateh Singh and not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property as alleged by Rakha Singh. Accordingly, the findings of the trial court to this effect were affirmed. In the result, the appeal filed by Rakha Singh with regard to the land Gharkhanna was dismissed. The appeal filed by Bant Singh and his three -9- As regards the property situated at village Gharkhana, the Lower dealt with the contention raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff was found that Fateh Singh had ancestral land in one village and had no other source of income, then it should be presumed that the land purchased by arkhana was also ancestral/joint family property. The court held warrant to support such a presumption. It was noticed that the plaintiff himself had pleaded that his father Fateh Singh had purchased land at , but there was no documentary evidence such as a sale deed on land had been acquired. There was also no evidence to prove that Fateh Singh had no source of income except the land at . On the contrary, it was proved that in 1967 Fateh Singh had ₹40,000 to the plaintiff Rakha Singh to purchase a truck, and with that amount Rakha Singh had started a transport business which had flourished into a fleet of 45 trucks. The court further observed that there was no material on the record to show what income Fateh Singh was deriving from the land at Bhangl so as to connect it with the purchase of land at Gharkhanna. There was also no evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested his Gharkhanna as joint family property by it with the joint estate. In view of these circumstances, it was held that the was the personal property of Fateh Singh and not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property as alleged by Rakha Singh. Accordingly, the rial court to this effect were affirmed. In the result, the appeal filed by Rakha Singh with regard to the land was dismissed. The appeal filed by Bant Singh and his three - Lower dealt with the contention raised by learned counsel for the plaintiff was found that Fateh Singh had ancestral land in one village and had no other source of income, then it should be presumed that the land purchased by arkhana was also ancestral/joint family property. The court held warrant to support such a presumption. It was noticed that the plaintiff himself had pleaded that his father Fateh Singh had purchased land at , but there was no documentary evidence such as a sale deed on land had been acquired. There was also no evidence to prove that Fateh Singh had no source of income except the land at . On the contrary, it was proved that in 1967 Fateh Singh had ruck, and with that amount Rakha Singh had started a transport business which had flourished into a fleet of 45 trucks. The court further observed that there was no material on the record to show what income Fateh Singh was deriving from the land at Bhanglan . There was also no evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested his as joint family property by it with the joint estate. In view of these circumstances, it was held that the was the personal property of Fateh Singh and not joint Hindu family/coparcenary property as alleged by Rakha Singh. Accordingly, the In the result, the appeal filed by Rakha Singh with regard to the land was dismissed. The appeal filed by Bant Singh and his three TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 brothers was partly accepted, and the judgment and decree modified to the extent that the decree for joint possession in favour of Rakha Singh in respect of the suit land at village Thus, the claim of Rakha Singh in respect of village Gharkhana s his entitlement in village 17. Feeling aggrieved, three RSAs have been filed by both the parties as detailed in para no (A) Contentions of learned counsel for the Bhanglan) 18. Learned counsel for the plaintiff, Rakha Singh, urged that there is no dispute about the pedigree table and the documentary history of title. It is that Daya Singh was the common ancestor and that belonged to him and was reflected in the Jamabandi (Ex.P7). On death of the ancestor, the land devolved in due course upon Sobha Singh and thereafter upon his son Fatta alias Fateh Singh (the father of the parties), and the re and consolidation entries (Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P16/A, Ex.P23 and naksha haqdarwar translations) corroborate this chain of succession. The plaintiff’s case, as repeatedly pleaded and proved, is that the suit land at village Bhanglan formed part of the ancestral holdings and therefore was joint Hindu family / coparcenary property of Fateh Singh and his sons; as a coparcener the plaintiff could not be deprived of his share by a decree obtained without his service or by collusive proceedings. It was documentary record and held the Bhanglan land to be ancestral and coparcenary in character. The appellate court erred in re 1992 (O&M) brothers was partly accepted, and the judgment and decree modified to the extent that the decree for joint possession in favour of Rakha Singh in respect of the suit land at village Bhanglan was restricted to 1/54th share only. Thus, the claim of Rakha Singh in respect of village Gharkhana s his entitlement in village Bhanglan was confined to his 1/54th share alone. Feeling aggrieved, three RSAs have been filed by both the parties as detailed in para no.1 of this judgement. (A) Contentions of learned counsel for the plaintiff (RSA No.1647) Learned counsel for the plaintiff, Rakha Singh, urged that there is no dispute about the pedigree table and the documentary history of title. It is that Daya Singh was the common ancestor and that belonged to him and was reflected in the Jamabandi (Ex.P7). On death of the the land devolved in due course upon Sobha Singh and thereafter upon his son Fatta alias Fateh Singh (the father of the parties), and the re and consolidation entries (Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P16/A, Ex.P23 and naksha haqdarwar translations) corroborate this chain of succession. The plaintiff’s case, as repeatedly pleaded and proved, is that the suit land at village Bhanglan formed of the ancestral holdings and therefore was joint Hindu family / coparcenary property of Fateh Singh and his sons; as a coparcener the plaintiff could not be deprived of his share by a decree obtained without his service or by collusive proceedings. It was submitted that the trial court rightly appreciated the documentary record and held the Bhanglan land to be ancestral and coparcenary in character. The appellate court erred in re-interpreting the same documents so as to -10- brothers was partly accepted, and the judgment and decree under challenge were modified to the extent that the decree for joint possession in favour of Rakha Singh was restricted to 1/54th share only. Thus, the claim of Rakha Singh in respect of village Gharkhana stood rejected, and was confined to his 1/54th share alone. Feeling aggrieved, three RSAs have been filed by both the parties as plaintiff (RSA No.1647) — (Village Learned counsel for the plaintiff, Rakha Singh, urged that there is no dispute about the pedigree table and the documentary history of title. It is admitted that Daya Singh was the common ancestor and that the landed estate originally belonged to him and was reflected in the Jamabandi (Ex.P7). On death of the the land devolved in due course upon Sobha Singh and thereafter upon his son Fatta alias Fateh Singh (the father of the parties), and the revenue records and consolidation entries (Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P16/A, Ex.P23 and naksha haqdarwar translations) corroborate this chain of succession. The plaintiff’s case, as repeatedly pleaded and proved, is that the suit land at village Bhanglan formed of the ancestral holdings and therefore was joint Hindu family / coparcenary property of Fateh Singh and his sons; as a coparcener the plaintiff could not be deprived of his share by a decree obtained without his service or by collusive submitted that the trial court rightly appreciated the documentary record and held the Bhanglan land to be ancestral and coparcenary in interpreting the same documents so as to - under challenge were modified to the extent that the decree for joint possession in favour of Rakha Singh was restricted to 1/54th share only. tood rejected, and Feeling aggrieved, three RSAs have been filed by both the parties as (Village Learned counsel for the plaintiff, Rakha Singh, urged that there is no admitted the landed estate originally belonged to him and was reflected in the Jamabandi (Ex.P7). On death of the the land devolved in due course upon Sobha Singh and thereafter upon venue records and consolidation entries (Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P16/A, Ex.P23 and naksha haqdarwar translations) corroborate this chain of succession. The plaintiff’s case, as repeatedly pleaded and proved, is that the suit land at village Bhanglan formed of the ancestral holdings and therefore was joint Hindu family / coparcenary property of Fateh Singh and his sons; as a coparcener the plaintiff could not be deprived of his share by a decree obtained without his service or by collusive submitted that the trial court rightly appreciated the documentary record and held the Bhanglan land to be ancestral and coparcenary in interpreting the same documents so as to TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 reduce the plaintiff’s share to 1/5 the revenue record (Jamabandi, khatauni, naksha haqdarwar) were not challenged by respondents and, in the absence of any reliable evidence showing an express partition, relinquishment or alienation by way o ancestral/coparcenary character must stand. In short, the plaintiff’s primary contention is that the nature of the Bhanglan property as ancestral joint Hindu family (co-parcenary) property is established by unimpeached re consolidation records and the concurrent finding in favour of the plaintiff by the courts below ought not to be disturbed. (B) Contentions of learned counsel for the defendants (RSA No.2178 and connected) 19. Learned counsel for the defendants contested the plaintiff’s case on several fronts. It was submitted that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff is not correct in material respects and that substantial portions of the land alleged to be ancestral, in fact, Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore must be treated as his separate property and not as ancestral coparcenary property. Further, reliance was placed upon the fact that the plaintiff long ago ac thereafter settled at Durgapur where he carried on an independent, prosperous transport business (now said to comprise many trucks and even a spare for his son). Learned counsel argued that this separation and a family arrangement inconsistent with coparcenary rights. The plaintiff had been living apart and had been provided for, and he cannot now be permitted to assert a full coparcenary share. It was also urged that 1992 (O&M) reduce the plaintiff’s share to 1/54th. Learned counsel stressed that the entries in the revenue record (Jamabandi, khatauni, naksha haqdarwar) were not challenged by respondents and, in the absence of any reliable evidence showing an express partition, relinquishment or alienation by way o ancestral/coparcenary character must stand. In short, the plaintiff’s primary contention is that the nature of the Bhanglan property as ancestral joint Hindu parcenary) property is established by unimpeached re consolidation records and the concurrent finding in favour of the plaintiff by the courts below ought not to be disturbed. (B) Contentions of learned counsel for the defendants (RSA No.2178 and Learned counsel for the defendants contested the plaintiff’s case on several fronts. It was submitted that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff is not correct in material respects and that substantial portions of the land alleged to be ancestral, in fact, came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession (from Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore must be treated as his separate property and not as ancestral coparcenary property. Further, reliance was placed upon the fact that the plaintiff long ago accepted ₹40,000 from his father to buy a truck and thereafter settled at Durgapur where he carried on an independent, prosperous transport business (now said to comprise many trucks and even a spare for his son). Learned counsel argued that this separation and a family arrangement inconsistent with coparcenary rights. The plaintiff had been living apart and had been provided for, and he cannot now be permitted to assert a full coparcenary share. It was also urged that -11- 4th. Learned counsel stressed that the entries in the revenue record (Jamabandi, khatauni, naksha haqdarwar) were not challenged by respondents and, in the absence of any reliable evidence showing an express partition, relinquishment or alienation by way of valid instrument, the finding of ancestral/coparcenary character must stand. In short, the plaintiff’s primary contention is that the nature of the Bhanglan property as ancestral joint Hindu parcenary) property is established by unimpeached revenue and consolidation records and the concurrent finding in favour of the plaintiff by the (B) Contentions of learned counsel for the defendants (RSA No.2178 and Learned counsel for the defendants contested the plaintiff’s case on several fronts. It was submitted that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff is not correct in material respects and that substantial portions of the land alleged to be came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession (from Nathu Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore must be treated as his separate property and not as ancestral coparcenary property. Further, reliance was placed upon the ₹40,000 from his father to buy a truck and thereafter settled at Durgapur where he carried on an independent, prosperous transport business (now said to comprise many trucks and even a spare-parts shop for his son). Learned counsel argued that this course of conduct established separation and a family arrangement inconsistent with coparcenary rights. The plaintiff had been living apart and had been provided for, and he cannot now be permitted to assert a full coparcenary share. It was also urged that the trial court’s - 4th. Learned counsel stressed that the entries in the revenue record (Jamabandi, khatauni, naksha haqdarwar) were not challenged by respondents and, in the absence of any reliable evidence showing an express f valid instrument, the finding of ancestral/coparcenary character must stand. In short, the plaintiff’s primary contention is that the nature of the Bhanglan property as ancestral joint Hindu venue and consolidation records and the concurrent finding in favour of the plaintiff by the (B) Contentions of learned counsel for the defendants (RSA No.2178 and Learned counsel for the defendants contested the plaintiff’s case on several fronts. It was submitted that the pedigree set up by the plaintiff is not correct in material respects and that substantial portions of the land alleged to be Nathu, Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore must be treated as his separate property and not as ancestral coparcenary property. Further, reliance was placed upon the ₹40,000 from his father to buy a truck and thereafter settled at Durgapur where he carried on an independent, prosperous parts shop course of conduct established separation and a family arrangement inconsistent with coparcenary rights. The plaintiff had been living apart and had been provided for, and he cannot now be the trial court’s TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 conclusion regarding the nature of certain parcels was vitiated by failure to appreciate that consolidation entries and collateral successions change the character of title and that the lower appellate court was correct to construe the documentary material as showing that only a limited portion of the land can legitimately be regarded as ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands. Finally, it was contended that where land devolved upon a person by collateral succession (i.e. from brothers or other property and should not be confused with property inherited directly from the common ancestor. FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether the suit land at Village Bhanglan is ancestral / joint Hindu family / coparcenary property 20. I have considered the riv the revenue entries and consolidation material placed before the trial court and reproduced on appeal (notably Ex.P7, Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P8, Ex.P9, Ex.P10, Ex.P16/A and the naksha haqdarwar translations). Two propositions are clear from the material and the pleadings. First, there is no dispute that the estate in village Bhanglan has a long pedigree in which Daya Singh and thereafter Sobha Singh figure as earlier pr that estate in right of inheritance. Second, the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiff stand unchallenged in any material particular by the defendants and no conclusive instrument of which would change the character of the relevant holdings. Absent such proof, the 1992 (O&M) conclusion regarding the nature of certain parcels was vitiated by failure to appreciate that consolidation entries and collateral successions change the character of title and that the lower appellate court was correct to construe the ocumentary material as showing that only a limited portion of the land can legitimately be regarded as ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands. Finally, it was contended that where land devolved upon a person by collateral succession (i.e. from brothers or other collaterals), that land ordinarily becomes his separate property and should not be confused with property inherited directly from the common ancestor. FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether the suit land at Village Bhanglan is ancestral / joint Hindu family / rcenary property. I have considered the rival contentions and the record, the revenue entries and consolidation material placed before the trial court and reproduced on appeal (notably Ex.P7, Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P8, Ex.P9, Ex.P10, A and the naksha haqdarwar translations). Two propositions are clear from the material and the pleadings. First, there is no dispute that the estate in village Bhanglan has a long pedigree in which Daya Singh and thereafter Sobha Singh figure as earlier proprietors and that Fateh Singh came to hold at least a portion of that estate in right of inheritance. Second, the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiff stand unchallenged in any material particular by the defendants and no conclusive instrument of partition or valid transfer was placed before the Court which would change the character of the relevant holdings. Absent such proof, the -12- conclusion regarding the nature of certain parcels was vitiated by failure to appreciate that consolidation entries and collateral successions change the character of title and that the lower appellate court was correct to construe the ocumentary material as showing that only a limited portion of the land can legitimately be regarded as ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands. Finally, it was contended that where land devolved upon a person by collateral succession (i.e. collaterals), that land ordinarily becomes his separate property and should not be confused with property inherited directly from the Whether the suit land at Village Bhanglan is ancestral / joint Hindu family / al contentions and the record, in particular the revenue entries and consolidation material placed before the trial court and reproduced on appeal (notably Ex.P7, Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P8, Ex.P9, Ex.P10, A and the naksha haqdarwar translations). Two propositions are clear from the material and the pleadings. First, there is no dispute that the estate in village Bhanglan has a long pedigree in which Daya Singh and thereafter Sobha Singh oprietors and that Fateh Singh came to hold at least a portion of that estate in right of inheritance. Second, the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiff stand unchallenged in any material particular by the defendants and no partition or valid transfer was placed before the Court which would change the character of the relevant holdings. Absent such proof, the - conclusion regarding the nature of certain parcels was vitiated by failure to appreciate that consolidation entries and collateral successions change the character of title and that the lower appellate court was correct to construe the ocumentary material as showing that only a limited portion of the land can legitimately be regarded as ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands. Finally, it was contended that where land devolved upon a person by collateral succession (i.e. collaterals), that land ordinarily becomes his separate property and should not be confused with property inherited directly from the Whether the suit land at Village Bhanglan is ancestral / joint Hindu family / in particular the revenue entries and consolidation material placed before the trial court and reproduced on appeal (notably Ex.P7, Ex.P4, Ex.P15, Ex.P8, Ex.P9, Ex.P10, A and the naksha haqdarwar translations). Two propositions are clear from the material and the pleadings. First, there is no dispute that the estate in village Bhanglan has a long pedigree in which Daya Singh and thereafter Sobha Singh oprietors and that Fateh Singh came to hold at least a portion of that estate in right of inheritance. Second, the revenue records relied upon by the plaintiff stand unchallenged in any material particular by the defendants and no partition or valid transfer was placed before the Court which would change the character of the relevant holdings. Absent such proof, the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 starting presumption must favour the coparcenary character where the documentary record points that way. 21. Ancestra by succession from his father or other lineal male antecedent and property which comes to him by devolution and not by his own independent act of acquisition and such property, while remaining coparceners have birth succession (i.e. from brothers or other collaterals) may in law have a different character and, depending on circumstances likewise property acquired by explicit purchase out of separate funds will be self acquired. But these are matters of fact and proof, the burden of establishing separate character, partition or valid alienation lies o Equally, mere physical separation of a son or payment of maintenance or money by a father without evidence of an express partition, agreement of relinquishment, or other clear outward acts evidencing a relinquishment of coparcenar sufficient to extinguish a son’s birth money to a son to enable him to take up an occupation or business, or the fact that the son thereafter resided elsewhere, will not ipso facto operate as a part a renunciation of his rights in the ancestral estate unless accompanied by cogent evidence of the family’s intention to effect a partition or relinquishment. 22. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court finds no reason to upset the concurrent conclusion of the courts below that part of the suit land at village Bhanglan forms part of the ancestral/coparcenary estate which devolved through the pedigree disclosed in Ex.P7 and subsequent consolidation 1992 (O&M) starting presumption must favour the coparcenary character where the documentary record points that way. Ancestral property is, ordinarily, that which has descended to a Hindu by succession from his father or other lineal male antecedent and property which comes to him by devolution and not by his own independent act of acquisition and such property, while remaining undivided, forms the joint family estate in which coparceners have birth-right shares. Property which comes to a person by collateral succession (i.e. from brothers or other collaterals) may in law have a different character and, depending on circumstances, may be treated as separate property, likewise property acquired by explicit purchase out of separate funds will be self acquired. But these are matters of fact and proof, the burden of establishing separate character, partition or valid alienation lies o Equally, mere physical separation of a son or payment of maintenance or money by a father without evidence of an express partition, agreement of relinquishment, or other clear outward acts evidencing a relinquishment of coparcenar sufficient to extinguish a son’s birth-right in ancestral holdings. A payment of money to a son to enable him to take up an occupation or business, or the fact that the son thereafter resided elsewhere, will not ipso facto operate as a part a renunciation of his rights in the ancestral estate unless accompanied by cogent evidence of the family’s intention to effect a partition or relinquishment. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court finds no t the concurrent conclusion of the courts below that part of the suit land at village Bhanglan forms part of the ancestral/coparcenary estate which devolved through the pedigree disclosed in Ex.P7 and subsequent consolidation -13- starting presumption must favour the coparcenary character where the l property is, ordinarily, that which has descended to a Hindu by succession from his father or other lineal male antecedent and property which comes to him by devolution and not by his own independent act of acquisition and undivided, forms the joint family estate in which right shares. Property which comes to a person by collateral succession (i.e. from brothers or other collaterals) may in law have a different , may be treated as separate property, likewise property acquired by explicit purchase out of separate funds will be self acquired. But these are matters of fact and proof, the burden of establishing separate character, partition or valid alienation lies on the party asserting it. Equally, mere physical separation of a son or payment of maintenance or money by a father without evidence of an express partition, agreement of relinquishment, or other clear outward acts evidencing a relinquishment of coparcenary rights is not right in ancestral holdings. A payment of money to a son to enable him to take up an occupation or business, or the fact that the son thereafter resided elsewhere, will not ipso facto operate as a partition or as a renunciation of his rights in the ancestral estate unless accompanied by cogent evidence of the family’s intention to effect a partition or relinquishment. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court finds no t the concurrent conclusion of the courts below that part of the suit land at village Bhanglan forms part of the ancestral/coparcenary estate which devolved through the pedigree disclosed in Ex.P7 and subsequent consolidation - starting presumption must favour the coparcenary character where the l property is, ordinarily, that which has descended to a Hindu by succession from his father or other lineal male antecedent and property which comes to him by devolution and not by his own independent act of acquisition and undivided, forms the joint family estate in which right shares. Property which comes to a person by collateral succession (i.e. from brothers or other collaterals) may in law have a different , may be treated as separate property, likewise property acquired by explicit purchase out of separate funds will be self- acquired. But these are matters of fact and proof, the burden of establishing n the party asserting it. Equally, mere physical separation of a son or payment of maintenance or money by a father without evidence of an express partition, agreement of relinquishment, or y rights is not right in ancestral holdings. A payment of money to a son to enable him to take up an occupation or business, or the fact that ition or as a renunciation of his rights in the ancestral estate unless accompanied by cogent evidence of the family’s intention to effect a partition or relinquishment. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court finds no t the concurrent conclusion of the courts below that part of the suit land at village Bhanglan forms part of the ancestral/coparcenary estate which devolved through the pedigree disclosed in Ex.P7 and subsequent consolidation TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 entries. The revenue documents by defendants by placing before the court any valid sale other documentary proof showing that the land was treated as separate or that the plaintiff had been validly divested of his reliance on the subsequent residence at Durgapur is not supported by evidence of an agreement of partition or of a deliberate family arrangement whereby t share. In the absence of such proof the law does not allow the plaintiff’s birth in ancestral property to be defeated by the mere fact of payment and physical separation. 23. That said, nothing in this conclusion prevents the appellate court from examining the precise extent of the ancestral portion and whether particular sub parcels came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession and hence should be treated otherwise. The lower a and collateral successions was directed to the question of quantum (i.e. the precise share that can be said to be ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands) and not to the basic proposition that some po coparcenary. 24. On this, l appellate court gravely erred in reducing the plaintiff’s share from 1/5th, as held by the trial court, to 1/54th share concurrently held the property at Village Bhanglan to be ancestral/coparcenary in nature, and once that finding has attained finality, the plaintiff, being one of the five sons of Fateh Singh, is entitled to 1992 (O&M) entries. The revenue documents are cogent and consistent and were not impeached by defendants by placing before the court any valid sale other documentary proof showing that the land was treated as separate or that the plaintiff had been validly divested of his coparcenary interest. The defendants’ reliance on the ₹40,000 said to have been advanced to the plaintiff and on his subsequent residence at Durgapur is not supported by evidence of an agreement of partition or of a deliberate family arrangement whereby t share. In the absence of such proof the law does not allow the plaintiff’s birth in ancestral property to be defeated by the mere fact of payment and physical That said, nothing in this conclusion prevents the appellate court from examining the precise extent of the ancestral portion and whether particular sub parcels came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession and hence should be treated otherwise. The lower appellate court’s careful perusing of the consolidation entries and collateral successions was directed to the question of quantum (i.e. the precise share that can be said to be ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands) and not to the basic proposition that some portion of the Bhanglan holdings was ancestral and On this, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the lower appellate court gravely erred in reducing the plaintiff’s share from 1/5th, as held by the trial court, to 1/54th share only. It was argued that both courts below have concurrently held the property at Village Bhanglan to be ancestral/coparcenary in nature, and once that finding has attained finality, the plaintiff, being one of the five sons of Fateh Singh, is entitled to nothing less than 1/5th share in the -14- are cogent and consistent and were not impeached by defendants by placing before the court any valid sale-deed, partition deed, or other documentary proof showing that the land was treated as separate or that the coparcenary interest. The defendants’ ₹40,000 said to have been advanced to the plaintiff and on his subsequent residence at Durgapur is not supported by evidence of an agreement of partition or of a deliberate family arrangement whereby the plaintiff renounced his share. In the absence of such proof the law does not allow the plaintiff’s birth-right in ancestral property to be defeated by the mere fact of payment and physical That said, nothing in this conclusion prevents the appellate court from examining the precise extent of the ancestral portion and whether particular sub parcels came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession and hence should be treated ppellate court’s careful perusing of the consolidation entries and collateral successions was directed to the question of quantum (i.e. the precise share that can be said to be ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands) and not to the basic rtion of the Bhanglan holdings was ancestral and earned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the lower appellate court gravely erred in reducing the plaintiff’s share from 1/5th, as held by only. It was argued that both courts below have concurrently held the property at Village Bhanglan to be ancestral/coparcenary in nature, and once that finding has attained finality, the plaintiff, being one of the nothing less than 1/5th share in the - are cogent and consistent and were not impeached deed, partition deed, or other documentary proof showing that the land was treated as separate or that the coparcenary interest. The defendants’ ₹40,000 said to have been advanced to the plaintiff and on his subsequent residence at Durgapur is not supported by evidence of an agreement of he plaintiff renounced his right in ancestral property to be defeated by the mere fact of payment and physical That said, nothing in this conclusion prevents the appellate court from examining the precise extent of the ancestral portion and whether particular sub- parcels came to Fateh Singh by collateral succession and hence should be treated ppellate court’s careful perusing of the consolidation entries and collateral successions was directed to the question of quantum (i.e. the precise share that can be said to be ancestral in Fateh Singh’s hands) and not to the basic rtion of the Bhanglan holdings was ancestral and earned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the lower appellate court gravely erred in reducing the plaintiff’s share from 1/5th, as held by only. It was argued that both courts below have concurrently held the property at Village Bhanglan to be ancestral/coparcenary in nature, and once that finding has attained finality, the plaintiff, being one of the nothing less than 1/5th share in the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 coparcenary estate. Learned counsel contended that the lower appellate court misconstrued the legal concept of collateral succession and incorrectly held that substantial portions of the land had devolved upon Fateh Sin (i.e. from Nathu property. According to counsel, the property in question was all part of the estate of Daya Singh, the common ancestor, and merely because shares changed to subsequent successions within the family would not alter the character of the estate from ancestral/coparcenary to separate. So long as the property could be traced back to the common ancestor and there was continuity of possession in the family, the estate retained its ancestral character. It was also urged that the lower appellate court overlooked the presumption in Hindu law that property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is ancestral in his hands qua his male descendants. The finding reducing the plaintiff’s entitlement to 1/54th share was therefore termed perverse, contrary to established principles, and liable to be set aside. 25. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendants supporte of the lower appellate court. It was submitted that the trial court fell in error in treating the entirety of the Bhanglan estate as ancestral. On the admitted record, only one-third of the one devolved upon Fateh Singh directly from his father; the remaining shares came to him later by way of collateral succession from his brothers Jaimal and Khiali and from collaterals that property inherited by a person from his collaterals does not assume the character of ancestral/coparcenary property but remains his separate property, in 1992 (O&M) coparcenary estate. Learned counsel contended that the lower appellate court misconstrued the legal concept of collateral succession and incorrectly held that substantial portions of the land had devolved upon Fateh Sin Nathu, Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore became his separate property. According to counsel, the property in question was all part of the estate of Daya Singh, the common ancestor, and merely because shares changed to subsequent successions within the family would not alter the character of the estate from ancestral/coparcenary to separate. So long as the property could be traced back to the common ancestor and there was continuity of possession in the ily, the estate retained its ancestral character. It was also urged that the lower appellate court overlooked the presumption in Hindu law that property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is ancestral his hands qua his male descendants. The finding reducing the plaintiff’s entitlement to 1/54th share was therefore termed perverse, contrary to established principles, and liable to be set aside. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendants supporte of the lower appellate court. It was submitted that the trial court fell in error in treating the entirety of the Bhanglan estate as ancestral. On the admitted record, third of the one-third share of Sobha Singh in the estate of Da devolved upon Fateh Singh directly from his father; the remaining shares came to him later by way of collateral succession from his brothers Jaimal and Khiali and from collaterals Nathu and Narain. The law, according to counsel, is well settled at property inherited by a person from his collaterals does not assume the character of ancestral/coparcenary property but remains his separate property, in -15- coparcenary estate. Learned counsel contended that the lower appellate court misconstrued the legal concept of collateral succession and incorrectly held that substantial portions of the land had devolved upon Fateh Singh from his collaterals , Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore became his separate property. According to counsel, the property in question was all part of the estate of Daya Singh, the common ancestor, and merely because shares changed hands due to subsequent successions within the family would not alter the character of the estate from ancestral/coparcenary to separate. So long as the property could be traced back to the common ancestor and there was continuity of possession in the ily, the estate retained its ancestral character. It was also urged that the lower appellate court overlooked the presumption in Hindu law that property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is ancestral his hands qua his male descendants. The finding reducing the plaintiff’s entitlement to 1/54th share was therefore termed perverse, contrary to established Per contra, learned counsel for the defendants supported the reasoning of the lower appellate court. It was submitted that the trial court fell in error in treating the entirety of the Bhanglan estate as ancestral. On the admitted record, third share of Sobha Singh in the estate of Daya Singh devolved upon Fateh Singh directly from his father; the remaining shares came to him later by way of collateral succession from his brothers Jaimal and Khiali and and Narain. The law, according to counsel, is well settled at property inherited by a person from his collaterals does not assume the character of ancestral/coparcenary property but remains his separate property, in - coparcenary estate. Learned counsel contended that the lower appellate court misconstrued the legal concept of collateral succession and incorrectly held that gh from his collaterals , Narain, Jaimal and Khiali) and therefore became his separate property. According to counsel, the property in question was all part of the estate of hands due to subsequent successions within the family would not alter the character of the estate from ancestral/coparcenary to separate. So long as the property could be traced back to the common ancestor and there was continuity of possession in the ily, the estate retained its ancestral character. It was also urged that the lower appellate court overlooked the presumption in Hindu law that property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is ancestral his hands qua his male descendants. The finding reducing the plaintiff’s entitlement to 1/54th share was therefore termed perverse, contrary to established d the reasoning of the lower appellate court. It was submitted that the trial court fell in error in treating the entirety of the Bhanglan estate as ancestral. On the admitted record, ya Singh devolved upon Fateh Singh directly from his father; the remaining shares came to him later by way of collateral succession from his brothers Jaimal and Khiali and and Narain. The law, according to counsel, is well settled at property inherited by a person from his collaterals does not assume the character of ancestral/coparcenary property but remains his separate property, in TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 which his sons acquire no birth analysed the pedig share of the estate in Village Bhanglan could be treated as ancestral/coparcenary in the hands of Fateh Singh. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his entitlement could not exceed 1/54th conclusion was inevitable in light of the binding precedents governing Hindu coparcenary law, and that the trial court had erred by ignoring the crucial distinction between succession from a direct ancestor and succe collaterals. 26. I have carefully considered the rival submissions and examined the record. As already found above, there is no infirmity in the concurrent finding that the property at Village Bhanglan is ancestral/coparcenary to the extent it upon Fateh Singh from his father Sobha Singh. The controversy now centres upon the extent of the coparcenary interest. 27. The pedigree table and revenue record show that Daya Singh held the estate at Village Bhanglan. On his death, the land was divided in three equal shares between his sons, namely upon his three sons Jaimal Nathu and Narain ultimately came to vest in Fateh Singh. The lower appellate court rightly pointed out that the shares which so devolved up directly from his father but through collateral succession from his brothers and collaterals. Under Hindu law as expounded in authoritative decisions, property which a Hindu inherits from his father, father’s father or fa 1992 (O&M) which his sons acquire no birth-right. Thus, the lower appellate court correctly analysed the pedigree and the mutations (Ex.P7, Ex.P24) to hold that only 1/9th share of the estate in Village Bhanglan could be treated as ancestral/coparcenary in the hands of Fateh Singh. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his entitlement could not exceed 1/54th share. Learned counsel added that this conclusion was inevitable in light of the binding precedents governing Hindu coparcenary law, and that the trial court had erred by ignoring the crucial distinction between succession from a direct ancestor and succe I have carefully considered the rival submissions and examined the record. As already found above, there is no infirmity in the concurrent finding that the property at Village Bhanglan is ancestral/coparcenary to the extent it upon Fateh Singh from his father Sobha Singh. The controversy now centres upon the extent of the coparcenary interest. The pedigree table and revenue record show that Daya Singh held the estate at Village Bhanglan. On his death, the land was divided in three equal shares between his sons, namely Nathu, Narain and Sobha. Sobha’s one upon his three sons Jaimal, Khiali and Fatta (alias Fateh Singh). On the death of Narain, and subsequently Jaimal and Khiali, their respective shares ultimately came to vest in Fateh Singh. The lower appellate court rightly pointed out that the shares which so devolved upon Fateh Singh did not come to him directly from his father but through collateral succession from his brothers and collaterals. Under Hindu law as expounded in authoritative decisions, property which a Hindu inherits from his father, father’s father or fa -16- right. Thus, the lower appellate court correctly ree and the mutations (Ex.P7, Ex.P24) to hold that only 1/9th share of the estate in Village Bhanglan could be treated as ancestral/coparcenary in the hands of Fateh Singh. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his share. Learned counsel added that this conclusion was inevitable in light of the binding precedents governing Hindu coparcenary law, and that the trial court had erred by ignoring the crucial distinction between succession from a direct ancestor and succession from I have carefully considered the rival submissions and examined the record. As already found above, there is no infirmity in the concurrent finding that the property at Village Bhanglan is ancestral/coparcenary to the extent it devolved upon Fateh Singh from his father Sobha Singh. The controversy now centres upon The pedigree table and revenue record show that Daya Singh held the estate at Village Bhanglan. On his death, the land was divided in three equal shares , Narain and Sobha. Sobha’s one-third devolved , Khiali and Fatta (alias Fateh Singh). On the death of , and subsequently Jaimal and Khiali, their respective shares ultimately came to vest in Fateh Singh. The lower appellate court rightly pointed on Fateh Singh did not come to him directly from his father but through collateral succession from his brothers and collaterals. Under Hindu law as expounded in authoritative decisions, property which a Hindu inherits from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is - right. Thus, the lower appellate court correctly ree and the mutations (Ex.P7, Ex.P24) to hold that only 1/9th share of the estate in Village Bhanglan could be treated as ancestral/coparcenary in the hands of Fateh Singh. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his share. Learned counsel added that this conclusion was inevitable in light of the binding precedents governing Hindu coparcenary law, and that the trial court had erred by ignoring the crucial ssion from I have carefully considered the rival submissions and examined the record. As already found above, there is no infirmity in the concurrent finding that devolved upon Fateh Singh from his father Sobha Singh. The controversy now centres upon The pedigree table and revenue record show that Daya Singh held the estate at Village Bhanglan. On his death, the land was divided in three equal shares third devolved , Khiali and Fatta (alias Fateh Singh). On the death of , and subsequently Jaimal and Khiali, their respective shares ultimately came to vest in Fateh Singh. The lower appellate court rightly pointed on Fateh Singh did not come to him directly from his father but through collateral succession from his brothers and collaterals. Under Hindu law as expounded in authoritative decisions, property ther’s father’s father is TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 ancestral property in his hands vis which he inherits from other collaterals, such as a brother, uncle or cousin, is his separate property and not ancestral thrown into the common hotchpot, does not become joint family property. 28. On this legal principle, the reasoning of the lower appellate court cannot be faulted. Only the portion of the estate which devolved upon Fateh Singh from his father Sobha Singh could be regarded as ancestral/coparcenary. The shares which came to him from collateral succession and thus his separate property. The trial court overlooked this distinction and erroneously treate ancestral. The lower appellate court, in correcting this error, examined the pedigree, the consolidation record and the mutations and arrived at the conclusion that only 1/9th share of the total estate co ancestral/coparcenary in Fateh Singh’s hands. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his entitlement therein would extend only to 1/54th share. 29. The plaintiff’s argument that the entire estate was ancestral merely because it could be traced back to Daya Singh is legally untenable. The concept of ancestral property is not so broad. The test is not whether the property belonged to some remote common ancestor but whether it has devolved upon the present holder directly from his by way of collateral succession does not satisfy that test. Equally, there is no evidence of Fateh Singh having blended his separate acquisitions with the joint family estate so as to impart a copa 1992 (O&M) ancestral property in his hands vis-à-vis his male descendants. However, property which he inherits from other collaterals, such as a brother, uncle or cousin, is his separate property and not ancestral. Such property, unless and thrown into the common hotchpot, does not become joint family property. On this legal principle, the reasoning of the lower appellate court cannot be faulted. Only the portion of the estate which devolved upon Fateh Singh ther Sobha Singh could be regarded as ancestral/coparcenary. The shares which came to him from Nathu, Narain, Jaimal and Khiali were by collateral succession and thus his separate property. The trial court overlooked this distinction and erroneously treated the entirety of the estate at Village Bhanglan as ancestral. The lower appellate court, in correcting this error, examined the pedigree, the consolidation record and the mutations and arrived at the conclusion that only 1/9th share of the total estate co ancestral/coparcenary in Fateh Singh’s hands. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his entitlement therein would extend only to 1/54th share. The plaintiff’s argument that the entire estate was ancestral merely t could be traced back to Daya Singh is legally untenable. The concept of ancestral property is not so broad. The test is not whether the property belonged to some remote common ancestor but whether it has devolved upon the present holder directly from his father, grandfather or great by way of collateral succession does not satisfy that test. Equally, there is no evidence of Fateh Singh having blended his separate acquisitions with the joint family estate so as to impart a coparcenary character to the same. -17- vis his male descendants. However, property which he inherits from other collaterals, such as a brother, uncle or cousin, is his Such property, unless and until voluntarily thrown into the common hotchpot, does not become joint family property. On this legal principle, the reasoning of the lower appellate court cannot be faulted. Only the portion of the estate which devolved upon Fateh Singh ther Sobha Singh could be regarded as ancestral/coparcenary. The , Narain, Jaimal and Khiali were by collateral succession and thus his separate property. The trial court overlooked this d the entirety of the estate at Village Bhanglan as ancestral. The lower appellate court, in correcting this error, examined the pedigree, the consolidation record and the mutations and arrived at the conclusion that only 1/9th share of the total estate could be characterised as ancestral/coparcenary in Fateh Singh’s hands. Since Rakha Singh was one out of five sons, his entitlement therein would extend only to 1/54th share. The plaintiff’s argument that the entire estate was ancestral merely t could be traced back to Daya Singh is legally untenable. The concept of ancestral property is not so broad. The test is not whether the property belonged to some remote common ancestor but whether it has devolved upon the present father, grandfather or great-grandfather. Property coming by way of collateral succession does not satisfy that test. Equally, there is no evidence of Fateh Singh having blended his separate acquisitions with the joint rcenary character to the same. - vis his male descendants. However, property which he inherits from other collaterals, such as a brother, uncle or cousin, is his until voluntarily On this legal principle, the reasoning of the lower appellate court cannot be faulted. Only the portion of the estate which devolved upon Fateh Singh ther Sobha Singh could be regarded as ancestral/coparcenary. The , Narain, Jaimal and Khiali were by collateral succession and thus his separate property. The trial court overlooked this d the entirety of the estate at Village Bhanglan as ancestral. The lower appellate court, in correcting this error, examined the pedigree, the consolidation record and the mutations and arrived at the conclusion uld be characterised as ancestral/coparcenary in Fateh Singh’s hands. Since Rakha Singh was one out of The plaintiff’s argument that the entire estate was ancestral merely t could be traced back to Daya Singh is legally untenable. The concept of ancestral property is not so broad. The test is not whether the property belonged to some remote common ancestor but whether it has devolved upon the present grandfather. Property coming by way of collateral succession does not satisfy that test. Equally, there is no evidence of Fateh Singh having blended his separate acquisitions with the joint TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 30. In this view, the finding of the lower appellate court restricting Rakha Singh’s share to 1/54th in the estate of Village Bhanglan is in consonance with settled Hindu law and is supported by the record. This Court finding and rejects the plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to 1/5th share 31. Coming now to the decree dated 09.01.1979, which was the foundation of the present litigation, it is not in dispute that Fateh Singh, as Karta o the family, suffered the said decree in favour of his other sons. In law, however, a Karta is not competent to alienate or relinquish the coparcenary property except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and any such act cannot bind the interests of a coparcener not party thereto. Since it now stands determined that the plaintiff Rakha Singh had a subsisting coparcenary interest to the extent of 1/54th share in the land of Village Bhanglan, the decree dated 09.01.1979 could not legally divest him of that share. To that limited extent the decree is illegal, collusive and void vis in holding that the decree cannot prejudice the plaintiff’s coparcenary rights, though it would remai remaining interests of the defendants. 32. With regard to the property situated at village finds no reason to take a view different from the one concurrently reached by th two courts below. The plaintiff’s sole plea was that since his father Fateh Singh had no source of income other than the ancestral property at village acquisition made by him in his lifetime must be presumed to have been purchased out of the income of that ancestral property and, therefore, should be impressed with the character of joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. This contention, 1992 (O&M) In this view, the finding of the lower appellate court restricting Rakha Singh’s share to 1/54th in the estate of Village Bhanglan is in consonance with settled Hindu law and is supported by the record. This Court finding and rejects the plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to 1/5th share Coming now to the decree dated 09.01.1979, which was the foundation of the present litigation, it is not in dispute that Fateh Singh, as Karta o the family, suffered the said decree in favour of his other sons. In law, however, a Karta is not competent to alienate or relinquish the coparcenary property except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and any such act cannot bind the nterests of a coparcener not party thereto. Since it now stands determined that the plaintiff Rakha Singh had a subsisting coparcenary interest to the extent of 1/54th share in the land of Village Bhanglan, the decree dated 09.01.1979 could not est him of that share. To that limited extent the decree is illegal, collusive and void vis-à-vis the plaintiff as right in holding that the decree cannot prejudice the plaintiff’s coparcenary rights, though it would remain operative qua the separate property of Fateh Singh and the remaining interests of the defendants. With regard to the property situated at village finds no reason to take a view different from the one concurrently reached by th two courts below. The plaintiff’s sole plea was that since his father Fateh Singh had no source of income other than the ancestral property at village acquisition made by him in his lifetime must be presumed to have been purchased e income of that ancestral property and, therefore, should be impressed with the character of joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. This contention, -18- In this view, the finding of the lower appellate court restricting Rakha Singh’s share to 1/54th in the estate of Village Bhanglan is in consonance with settled Hindu law and is supported by the record. This Court therefore affirms that finding and rejects the plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to 1/5th share. Coming now to the decree dated 09.01.1979, which was the foundation of the present litigation, it is not in dispute that Fateh Singh, as Karta o the family, suffered the said decree in favour of his other sons. In law, however, a Karta is not competent to alienate or relinquish the coparcenary property except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and any such act cannot bind the nterests of a coparcener not party thereto. Since it now stands determined that the plaintiff Rakha Singh had a subsisting coparcenary interest to the extent of 1/54th share in the land of Village Bhanglan, the decree dated 09.01.1979 could not est him of that share. To that limited extent the decree is illegal, as right. The courts below were thus right in holding that the decree cannot prejudice the plaintiff’s coparcenary rights, n operative qua the separate property of Fateh Singh and the With regard to the property situated at village Gharkhanna, this Court finds no reason to take a view different from the one concurrently reached by th two courts below. The plaintiff’s sole plea was that since his father Fateh Singh had no source of income other than the ancestral property at village Bhanglan, any acquisition made by him in his lifetime must be presumed to have been purchased e income of that ancestral property and, therefore, should be impressed with the character of joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. This contention, - In this view, the finding of the lower appellate court restricting Rakha Singh’s share to 1/54th in the estate of Village Bhanglan is in consonance with therefore affirms that Coming now to the decree dated 09.01.1979, which was the foundation of the present litigation, it is not in dispute that Fateh Singh, as Karta of the family, suffered the said decree in favour of his other sons. In law, however, a Karta is not competent to alienate or relinquish the coparcenary property except for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and any such act cannot bind the nterests of a coparcener not party thereto. Since it now stands determined that the plaintiff Rakha Singh had a subsisting coparcenary interest to the extent of 1/54th share in the land of Village Bhanglan, the decree dated 09.01.1979 could not est him of that share. To that limited extent the decree is illegal, . The courts below were thus right in holding that the decree cannot prejudice the plaintiff’s coparcenary rights, n operative qua the separate property of Fateh Singh and the , this Court finds no reason to take a view different from the one concurrently reached by the two courts below. The plaintiff’s sole plea was that since his father Fateh Singh , any acquisition made by him in his lifetime must be presumed to have been purchased e income of that ancestral property and, therefore, should be impressed with the character of joint Hindu family/coparcenary property. This contention, TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 however, is unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that proper as his self-acquired property unless it is affirmatively proved that the consideration came from joint family funds or that the purchaser clearly intended to blend the property with the joint est income from ancestral property does not raise a presumption that every subsequent purchase was made from such income. The burden of proof lies squarely upon the person asserting the joint family charact 33. In the present case, plaintiff Rakha Singh has not placed on record even the basic document of title, namely the sale deed under which Fateh Singh acquired the land at village the Court cannot e Furthermore, no accounts or evidence were produced to show the income derived from the Bhanglan lands, or that such income was sufficient to purchase the Gharkhanna lands. On the contrary, the record financially sound enough to part with a substantial sum of 1967 to enable the plaintiff to purchase a truck, which subsequently became the foundation of his flourishing transport business at Durgapur. This pa an indicator that Fateh Singh had resources independent of the alleged joint family income and was capable of making acquisitions from his own separate funds. 34. Another important aspect, noticed by both courts below, is that there is no evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested an intention to treat the law, a coparcener may voluntarily throw his self 1992 (O&M) however, is unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that property purchased by a coparcener in his own name will be treated acquired property unless it is affirmatively proved that the consideration came from joint family funds or that the purchaser clearly intended to blend the property with the joint estate. Mere possibility that the purchaser may have had income from ancestral property does not raise a presumption that every subsequent purchase was made from such income. The burden of proof lies squarely upon the person asserting the joint family character. In the present case, plaintiff Rakha Singh has not placed on record even the basic document of title, namely the sale deed under which Fateh Singh acquired the land at village Gharkhanna. In the absence of this primary evidence, the Court cannot even ascertain the date, terms or nature of the purchase. Furthermore, no accounts or evidence were produced to show the income derived from the Bhanglan lands, or that such income was sufficient to purchase the lands. On the contrary, the record financially sound enough to part with a substantial sum of 1967 to enable the plaintiff to purchase a truck, which subsequently became the foundation of his flourishing transport business at Durgapur. This pa an indicator that Fateh Singh had resources independent of the alleged joint family income and was capable of making acquisitions from his own separate funds. Another important aspect, noticed by both courts below, is that there evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested an intention to treat the Gharkhanna property as part of the joint estate. In Hindu law, a coparcener may voluntarily throw his self -19- however, is unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is a settled principle of ty purchased by a coparcener in his own name will be treated acquired property unless it is affirmatively proved that the consideration came from joint family funds or that the purchaser clearly intended to blend the ate. Mere possibility that the purchaser may have had income from ancestral property does not raise a presumption that every subsequent purchase was made from such income. The burden of proof lies squarely upon the In the present case, plaintiff Rakha Singh has not placed on record even the basic document of title, namely the sale deed under which Fateh Singh . In the absence of this primary evidence, ven ascertain the date, terms or nature of the purchase. Furthermore, no accounts or evidence were produced to show the income derived from the Bhanglan lands, or that such income was sufficient to purchase the lands. On the contrary, the record shows that Fateh Singh was financially sound enough to part with a substantial sum of ₹40,000 in the year 1967 to enable the plaintiff to purchase a truck, which subsequently became the foundation of his flourishing transport business at Durgapur. This payment itself is an indicator that Fateh Singh had resources independent of the alleged joint family income and was capable of making acquisitions from his own separate funds. Another important aspect, noticed by both courts below, is that there evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested property as part of the joint estate. In Hindu law, a coparcener may voluntarily throw his self-acquired property into the - however, is unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is a settled principle of ty purchased by a coparcener in his own name will be treated acquired property unless it is affirmatively proved that the consideration came from joint family funds or that the purchaser clearly intended to blend the ate. Mere possibility that the purchaser may have had income from ancestral property does not raise a presumption that every subsequent purchase was made from such income. The burden of proof lies squarely upon the In the present case, plaintiff Rakha Singh has not placed on record even the basic document of title, namely the sale deed under which Fateh Singh . In the absence of this primary evidence, ven ascertain the date, terms or nature of the purchase. Furthermore, no accounts or evidence were produced to show the income derived from the Bhanglan lands, or that such income was sufficient to purchase the shows that Fateh Singh was ₹40,000 in the year 1967 to enable the plaintiff to purchase a truck, which subsequently became the yment itself is an indicator that Fateh Singh had resources independent of the alleged joint family Another important aspect, noticed by both courts below, is that there evidence to show that Fateh Singh at any point of time declared or manifested property as part of the joint estate. In Hindu acquired property into the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-1647-1992 common hotchpot, b evidence is forthcoming in the present case. The plaintiff’s bare assertion that Fateh Singh purchased the insufficient to displace the presumption of supported by documentary proof. 35. Thus, the concurrent findings of both courts below that the property at village Gharkhanna sound appreciation of law and e this land was either ancestral or blended with the joint estate, has no birthright or coparcenary interest therein. The decree dated 09.01.1979, in so far as it related to the land at village plaintiff’s claim for possession and injunction qua this land was rightly dismissed. 36. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passe same are upheld and all the three RSA’s stand dismissed. 37. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. September 18, 2025 tripti Whether Whether reportable 1992 (O&M) common hotchpot, but such an intention must be clear and unequivocal. No such evidence is forthcoming in the present case. The plaintiff’s bare assertion that Fateh Singh purchased the Gharkhanna lands from joint family income is insufficient to displace the presumption of self supported by documentary proof. Thus, the concurrent findings of both courts below that the property at Gharkhanna was the self-acquired property of Fateh Singh are based on sound appreciation of law and evidence. The plaintiff, not being able to prove that this land was either ancestral or blended with the joint estate, has no birthright or coparcenary interest therein. The decree dated 09.01.1979, in so far as it related to the land at village Gharkhanna, was therefore perfectly valid and binding, and the plaintiff’s claim for possession and injunction qua this land was rightly dismissed. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, the same are upheld and all the three RSA’s stand dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. , 2025 (MANDEEP PANNU Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking Whether reportable -20- ut such an intention must be clear and unequivocal. No such evidence is forthcoming in the present case. The plaintiff’s bare assertion that lands from joint family income is self-acquisition, especially when not Thus, the concurrent findings of both courts below that the property at acquired property of Fateh Singh are based on vidence. The plaintiff, not being able to prove that this land was either ancestral or blended with the joint estate, has no birthright or coparcenary interest therein. The decree dated 09.01.1979, in so far as it related to was therefore perfectly valid and binding, and the plaintiff’s claim for possession and injunction qua this land was rightly dismissed. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any illegality d by the learned Appellate Court, the same are upheld and all the three RSA’s stand dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. MANDEEP PANNU) JUDGE speaking : Speaking : Yes - ut such an intention must be clear and unequivocal. No such evidence is forthcoming in the present case. The plaintiff’s bare assertion that lands from joint family income is acquisition, especially when not Thus, the concurrent findings of both courts below that the property at acquired property of Fateh Singh are based on vidence. The plaintiff, not being able to prove that this land was either ancestral or blended with the joint estate, has no birthright or coparcenary interest therein. The decree dated 09.01.1979, in so far as it related to was therefore perfectly valid and binding, and the plaintiff’s claim for possession and injunction qua this land was rightly dismissed. In view of the above discussion, this Court does not find any illegality d by the learned Appellate Court, the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.19 15:49 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document