1 2025:CGHC:48942-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 202 of 2012 • Muktanand Sahu, S/o Late Dayanand Sahu, aged about 22 Years, R/o Sejbahar Raipur, PS Tikrapara, Distt. Raipur, C.G. ...Appellant versus 1. Yaswant Sahu, S/o Madanlal Sahu, aged about 31 Years, R/o Nandi Chowk, Tikrapara Raipur, PS Tikrapara, Distt. Raipur, C.G. 2. Manish Kumar Sahu, S/o Shri Ram Sahu, aged about 24 Years, R/o Kathadih PS Tikrapara, Raipur, Qut. No. H-1, A.K.V.M. Colony Uarla Raipur, Distt. Raipur, C.G. 3. Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu, S/o Lalit Sahu, aged about 25 Years, R/o Sanjay Nagar Raipur, PS Tikrapara, Distt. Raipur C.G. 4. State of Chhattisgarh, Through, Police Station Patan, District Durg, C.G. ... Respondents For Appellant Mr. Avinash K. Mishra, Advocate. For Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 Mr. Amiyakant Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent No.4 Mr. H.A.P.S. Bhatia, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ. Judgment on Board (24.09.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. By this acquittal appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of AKHILESH BEOHAR Digitally signed by AKHILESH BEOHAR Date: 2025.09.26 15:13:46 +0530 2 Criminal Procedure (for short, the “Cr.P.C.”), the appellant, who is the son of the deceased, challenges the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 25.08.2012, passed in Sessions Trial No. 162/2011 (State of Chhattisgarh vs. Yashwant Sahu and others) by the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, C.G., whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted the accused/respondents Nos. 1 to 3 of the offences under Sections 302 read with Section 34, 201 read with Section 34 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”). 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that in between 12.04.2011 and 14.04.2011, the accused persons/respondents Nos. 1 to 3, in furtherance of their common intention, committed the murder of Dayanand Sahu (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) by strangulation. It is alleged that respondent No. 1- Yashwant Sahu, pressed the neck of the deceased with a piece of cloth and accused/respondent No. 2- Manish Kumar Sahu assaulted him with a knife, while accused/respondent No. 3- Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu, also assaulted him with an iron rod, as a result of which, the deceased sustained injuries over his body and thereafter, accused persons strangulated him. It is further alleged that the accused persons, in order to conceal the evidence, covered the dead body with a piece of cloth and hid it under leaves. During the investigation, the dead body of the deceased was recovered on 14.11.2011 at about 1:30 p.m., pursuant to which, Merg intimation Ex.P-21 was recorded, FIR Ex.P-33 was registered against 3 unknown persons, and spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-17. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-1 and the dead body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by PW-25 Dr. S.K. Bagh, who proved the postmortem report Ex.P-40. According to the postmortem report, the cause of death of deceased was due to neck injuries, signs of antemortem injuries were present and the mode of death of deceased was homicidal in nature. During the investigation, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were taken into custody vide Exs.P-44 to P-46 respectively. The memorandum statement of respondent No. 1- Yashwant Sahu, was recorded vide Ex.P-5, pursuant to which, blood-like stained white scarf, one Nokia mobile phone and Idea SIM No. 9669734422 were seized vide Ex.P-12 and Ex.P-16 respectively. Similarly, the memorandum statement of respondent No. 2- Manish Kumar Sahu, was recorded vide Ex.P-6, consequent to which, one steel knife, full blue jeans pant and a black vest were seized vide Exs.P-11 and Ex.P-15 respectively. Likewise, the memorandum statement of respondent No. 3- Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu was recorded vide Ex.P-7, pursuant to which, one Tata Indica car bearing registration No. CG04-B-8505, its documents, an iron rod and a rubber mat were seized vide Ex.P-13. From the spot, plain and blood-stained soil, a dot pen and clothes of the deceased were seized vide Ex.P-4. The seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for chemical examination and as per the FSL reports (Exs. P-51 and 4 P-52), blood was found on the articles marked as ‘E’ (knife), ‘H’ (rubber mat) and ‘I’ (full pants of respondent No. 2- Manish Kumar Sahu). 3. After due investigation, respondent Nos.1 to 3 were charge- sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the offence. 4. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 25 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited 21 documents Exs.P-1 to P-53. However, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in support of their defence have not examined any witness and not exhibited any document. 5. The trial court, after hearing the counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused persons/respondents of the charges leveled against them. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant- son of the deceased, has filed the instant appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as there is ample evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question. He would further submit that the prosecution has proved its case 5 beyond all reasonable doubts. He would also submit that, as per the FSL reports (Exs. P-51 and P-52), blood was found on the steel knife, jeans and the rubber mat seized from respondent Nos. 1 to 3 respectively. He would further submit that the call detail records (Exs. P-36 and P-37) show that, prior to the incident, a discussion had taken place between respondent No. 1– Yashwant Sahu and the deceased. Despite this, the learned trial Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 without properly appreciating the evidence on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal is perverse and illegal, and is liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 would support the impugned judgment and submit that the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure, namely PW-4 Mohan Lal Jangde and PW-5 Arjun Sahu, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution. He would further submit that although blood was found on the seized knife, jeans, and rubber mat, but no human blood was detected, therefore, the FSL report is of no evidentiary value to the prosecution. He would also submit that the call detail records (Exs. P-36 and P-37) were not duly proved by the prosecution, and the alleged mobile number ‘9669734422’ did not belong to respondent No. 1 – Yashwant Sahu, but was issued in the name of one Suresh Singh, who has not been examined by the prosecution. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 of the 6 charges levelled against them. Hence, the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed. 8. Learned counsel for the State/respondent No.4 would support the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1, whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC 1 2025 INSC 114 7 pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by 8 the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 9 that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 11. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffer from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 12. In the matter of Sharad Birdichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra2, the Supreme Court outlined the five golden principles that form the panchsheel of proving a case based on circumstantial evidence. These principles were narrated by their Lordships in paragraph 153, as follows: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra3 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2)the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3)the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and 2 (1984) 4 SCC 116 3 (1973) 2 SCC 793 10 tendency, (4)they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5)there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 13. Admittedly, the present case is not based on direct evidence, but on circumstantial evidence along with the recovery of a scarf and a SIM card bearing registration No. 9669734422 from respondent No. 1- Yashwant Sahu; a steel knife from respondent No. 2- Manish Kumar Sahu; and an iron rod and car mat from respondent No. 3- Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu, on which, blood was found, according to the FSL report (Exs.P-51 & 52). However, the learned trial Court relying upon the statements of PW-4 Mohan Lal Jangde and PW-5 Arjun Sahu; the memorandum and seizure witnesses, they have not supported the prosecution’s case; non-examination by the prosecution of Suresh Singh, to whom the deceased allegedly made his last call; the fact that the seized articles were recovered from an open place; and the absence of other corroborative witnesses, acquitted respondent Nos. 1 to 3. 14. So far as the seizure from respondent No. 1 – Yashwant Sahu is concerned, although a white scarf and a SIM card bearing registration No. 6999734422 were seized pursuant to his memorandum statement, but no blood much less human blood was found on the seized scarf as per the FSL report (Exs. P-51 and P-2). Furthermore, according to the statement of PW-22 Bhargava Sharma, Nodal Officer, Idea Cellular Limited, the SIM bearing 11 registration No. 6999734422 was issued in the name of one Suresh Singh and was not allotted to respondent No. 1 – Yashwant Sahu. Notably, Suresh Singh has not been examined by the prosecution for reasons best known to it. Since the alleged seizure of the said SIM card and scarf from the possession of respondent No. 1 has not been duly proved by the prosecution, the trial Court is justified in acquitting respondent No. 1 – Yashwant Sahu of the charges levelled against him. 15. Similarly, pursuant to the memorandum statement of respondent No. 2 – Manish Sahu, a knife, blue jeans and a vest were seized. However, PW-4 Mohan Lal Jangde and PW-5 Arjun Sahu, who were witnesses to the memorandum and seizure, have not supported the prosecution’s case. Although the FSL report confirms the presence of blood on the seized knife, it is pertinent to note that the knife was seized on 03.05.2011, but was received at the FSL only on 21.07.2011. In the absence of any evidence regarding its safe custody during the intervening period, the possibility of fabrication or tampering cannot be ruled out. 16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Balwan Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh and another4 held that if the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found on the articles is of human origin though, even though the 4 (2019) 7 SCC 781 12 blood group is not proved because of disintegration of blood and held in Para-24 as under: “24. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence of PWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of the prosecution.” 17. Similarly, in the matter of Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan5, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the disclosure alone would not automatically lead to conclusion that the offence was also committed by the accused. The burden lies on prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of material object and its use in commission of offence. Para 25 is relevant and is reproduced hereunder:- “25. With regard to Section 27 of the Act, what is important is discovery of the material object at the disclosure of the accused but such disclosure alone would not automatically lead to the conclusion that the offence was also committed by the accused. In fact, thereafter, burden lies on the prosecution to establish a close link between discovery of the material objects and its use in the commission of the offence. What is admissible under Section 27 of the Act is the information leading to discovery and not any opinion formed on it by the prosecution. 18. In light of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Balwan Singh and Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen (supra), it is clear that mere recovery of a weapon stained with blood, without establishing that the blood is of human origin and without 5 (2011) 11 SCC 724 13 conclusively linking the weapon to the commission of the offence, is insufficient to strengthen the prosecution’s case. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the authenticity and relevance of the recovery, including the origin of the blood and the direct connection of the recovered article to the crime and the accused. In the absence of such proof, mere recovery of a weapon stained with blood is of no evidentiary value to the prosecution. 19. Likewise, pursuant to the memorandum statement of respondent No. 3- Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu, an Indica Car and rubber mat were seized and blood was found only on rubber mat, however, no human blood, much less any blood group, could be identified. Further, the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure, namely PW-4 Mohan Lal Jangde and PW-5 Arjun Sahu have not proved the recovery of the alleged rubber mat from respondent No. 3- Hirandera @ Hiru Sahu. Moreover, the trial Court also recorded a finding that the said offence was committed by unknown persons. The respondents were not named in the FIR (Ex.P-33); instead, it was registered against unknown persons and the recovery pursuant to the memorandum statements of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 has not been established. No incriminating circumstances have been proved by the prosecution to convict the respondents. Therefore, the acquittal of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is neither perverse nor contrary to the material available on record. We are, therefore, unable to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and do not find any merit in the appeal. 14 20. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant against the acquittal of accused persons/respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge Akhilesh