RSA-139-1992 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA Kanwal Kant & Another Smt. Bhagwan Kaur through her LRs CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Present: Mr. M.L.Saggar, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Armaan Saggar, LRs of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded ex- MANDEEP PANNU, J (ORAL) 1. The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs against the the learned lower dated 24.07.1987 decreeing the suit of the performance was re alternative relief of refund of earnest money with interest. Brief Facts 2. Appellant/ of contract against Bhagwan Kaur and six others. The case of the plaintiff was that Bhagwan Kaur, widow of Arjun Singh, executed an agreement to sell dated 28.05.1973 in his ₹2,47,500/-. An amount of (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA Reserved on Pronounced on ant & Another VERSUS Bhagwan Kaur (deceased) through her LRs & Others HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Mr. M.L.Saggar, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Armaan Saggar, Advocate for the appellants. LRs of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded -parte vide order dated 23.07.2025 MANDEEP PANNU, J (ORAL) The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs against the judgment and decree the learned lower Appellate Court, whereby the decree of the learned trial Court 1987 decreeing the suit of the performance was reversed, and instead, the lower A alternative relief of refund of earnest money with interest. Appellant/Plaintiff, Kanwal Kant, filed a suit for specific performance of contract against Bhagwan Kaur and six others. The case of the plaintiff was that Bhagwan Kaur, widow of Arjun Singh, executed an agreement to sell dated his favour, agreeing to sell a plot for a total consideration of . An amount of ₹36,000/- was paid as earnest money, and the balance -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-139-1992 (O&M) Reserved on: 18.08.2025 Pronounced on: 25.08.2025 .....Appellants .....Respondents HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU Mr. M.L.Saggar, Sr. Advocate with Advocate for the appellants. LRs of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded parte vide order dated 23.07.2025 The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the judgment and decree dated 19.09.1991 passed by ppellate Court, whereby the decree of the learned trial Court 1987 decreeing the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs for specific versed, and instead, the lower Appellate Court granted only the alternative relief of refund of earnest money with interest. laintiff, Kanwal Kant, filed a suit for specific performance of contract against Bhagwan Kaur and six others. The case of the plaintiff was that Bhagwan Kaur, widow of Arjun Singh, executed an agreement to sell dated ell a plot for a total consideration of was paid as earnest money, and the balance .....Respondents The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the passed by ppellate Court, whereby the decree of the learned trial Court plaintiffs for specific ppellate Court granted only the laintiff, Kanwal Kant, filed a suit for specific performance of contract against Bhagwan Kaur and six others. The case of the plaintiff was that Bhagwan Kaur, widow of Arjun Singh, executed an agreement to sell dated ell a plot for a total consideration of was paid as earnest money, and the balance TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 was to be paid before the Sub The date fixed for the execution of the sale deed was 3. It was a stipulation in the agreement that if No. 1, Bhagwan Kaur, was not able to get the portion of the plot vacated from tenants, who had industries installed therein, she would execute and register the sale deed of the remaining portion within the stipulated period. It was further agreed that if the vendee so desired, the sale deed of the entire plot could be executed in one lot. It was also agreed that if within the stipulated period the vendor was unable to o the sale deed, then the vendee would be entitled to approach the Court for enforcement of the contract, and in that event the vendor would be liable for costs and damages. On the other hand, if the money paid would be liable to forfeiture. 4. Before the stipulated date, i.e. 25 to know that Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Department of Industries, Punjab, under a con transfer the plot. As Bhagwan Kaur could not obtain the necessary permission and clearance certificate from the Department of Industries, she made a subsequent endorsement on the back of the orig performance until she was able to obtain the required clearance and permission, with an undertaking to inform the plaintiff as soon as such permission and clearance were obtained. 5. The willing to perform his part of the contract. However, No.1 - Bhagwan Kaur neither obtained the necessary clearance nor informed him (O&M) was to be paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed. The date fixed for the execution of the sale deed was It was a stipulation in the agreement that if No. 1, Bhagwan Kaur, was not able to get the portion of the plot vacated from who had industries installed therein, she would execute and register the ed of the remaining portion within the stipulated period. It was further agreed that if the vendee so desired, the sale deed of the entire plot could be executed in one lot. It was also agreed that if within the stipulated period the vendor was unable to obtain possession of the portion under tenants and register the sale deed, then the vendee would be entitled to approach the Court for enforcement of the contract, and in that event the vendor would be liable for costs and damages. On the other hand, if the vendee committed breach, the earnest money paid would be liable to forfeiture. Before the stipulated date, i.e. 25.11. to know that Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Department of Industries, Punjab, under a condition that until the loan was paid off, she had no right to transfer the plot. As Bhagwan Kaur could not obtain the necessary permission and clearance certificate from the Department of Industries, she made a subsequent endorsement on the back of the original agreement, extending the time for performance until she was able to obtain the required clearance and permission, with an undertaking to inform the plaintiff as soon as such permission and clearance were obtained. The appellant/plaintiff alleged that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, Bhagwan Kaur neither obtained the necessary clearance nor informed him -2- Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed. The date fixed for the execution of the sale deed was 25.11.1973. It was a stipulation in the agreement that if respondent No.1/defendant No. 1, Bhagwan Kaur, was not able to get the portion of the plot vacated from who had industries installed therein, she would execute and register the ed of the remaining portion within the stipulated period. It was further agreed that if the vendee so desired, the sale deed of the entire plot could be executed in one lot. It was also agreed that if within the stipulated period the btain possession of the portion under tenants and register the sale deed, then the vendee would be entitled to approach the Court for enforcement of the contract, and in that event the vendor would be liable for costs vendee committed breach, the earnest .11.1973, the appellant/plaintiff came to know that Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Department of Industries, dition that until the loan was paid off, she had no right to transfer the plot. As Bhagwan Kaur could not obtain the necessary permission and clearance certificate from the Department of Industries, she made a subsequent inal agreement, extending the time for performance until she was able to obtain the required clearance and permission, with an undertaking to inform the plaintiff as soon as such permission and that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. However, respondent No.1/defendant Bhagwan Kaur neither obtained the necessary clearance nor informed him Registrar at the time of execution of the sale deed. defendant No. 1, Bhagwan Kaur, was not able to get the portion of the plot vacated from who had industries installed therein, she would execute and register the ed of the remaining portion within the stipulated period. It was further agreed that if the vendee so desired, the sale deed of the entire plot could be executed in one lot. It was also agreed that if within the stipulated period the btain possession of the portion under tenants and register the sale deed, then the vendee would be entitled to approach the Court for enforcement of the contract, and in that event the vendor would be liable for costs vendee committed breach, the earnest plaintiff came to know that Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Department of Industries, dition that until the loan was paid off, she had no right to transfer the plot. As Bhagwan Kaur could not obtain the necessary permission and clearance certificate from the Department of Industries, she made a subsequent inal agreement, extending the time for performance until she was able to obtain the required clearance and permission, with an undertaking to inform the plaintiff as soon as such permission and that he had always been ready and respondent No.1/defendant Bhagwan Kaur neither obtained the necessary clearance nor informed him TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 about it. Instead, through her counsel, she served notice dated intimating that she had extended the period of performance only up to 25 and called upon the which she threatened to forfeit the earnest money. The plaintiff replied that Bhagwan Kaur had failed to obtain the necessary permission and that the extension of time was not till 6. The parties exchanged communications. On appellant/plaintiff went to th performance of the contract and remained present in Court, also moving an application expressing readiness to execute the sale deed. However, Bhagwan Kaur did not turn up. The concealed defects in her title and her inability to transfer the plot because of non issuance of clearance certificate from the Industries Department. 7. The suit was contested by while the other defendants were proceeded against ex parte. No.1/Defendant No. 1 admitted her ownership of the property and execution of the agreement, as well as receipt of earnest money, but pleaded that she had filed a suit for setting aside therefore the present suit was not maintainable. She contended that the contract had come to an end on permission was required to execute the s afterthought since the plaintiffs were not ready with the balance consideration. 8. Replication was filed contentions of respondent No.1/defendant No.1 (O&M) about it. Instead, through her counsel, she served notice dated intimating that she had extended the period of performance only up to 25 and called upon the appellant/plaintiff to pay the balance within six weeks, failing which she threatened to forfeit the earnest money. The plaintiff replied that Bhagwan Kaur had failed to obtain the necessary permission and that the extension of time was not till 25.12.1973, but until she obtained clearance and permission. The parties exchanged communications. On plaintiff went to the District Court with the necessary balance amount for performance of the contract and remained present in Court, also moving an application expressing readiness to execute the sale deed. However, Bhagwan Kaur did not turn up. The appellant/plaintiff alleged that Bhagwan Kaur intentionally concealed defects in her title and her inability to transfer the plot because of non issuance of clearance certificate from the Industries Department. The suit was contested by respondent No.1/ while the other defendants were proceeded against ex parte. Defendant No. 1 admitted her ownership of the property and execution of the agreement, as well as receipt of earnest money, but pleaded that she had filed a suit for setting aside the agreement which was pending in another Civil Court, and therefore the present suit was not maintainable. She contended that the contract had come to an end on 25.11.1973. She further pleaded that no clearance or permission was required to execute the sale and that the plea of impediment was an afterthought since the plaintiffs were not ready with the balance consideration. Replication was filed by the appellant/plaintiff controverting the contentions of respondent No.1/defendant No.1- -3- about it. Instead, through her counsel, she served notice dated 09.08.1974, intimating that she had extended the period of performance only up to 25.12.1973, plaintiff to pay the balance within six weeks, failing which she threatened to forfeit the earnest money. The plaintiff replied that Bhagwan Kaur had failed to obtain the necessary permission and that the extension but until she obtained clearance and permission. The parties exchanged communications. On 03.10.1974, the e District Court with the necessary balance amount for performance of the contract and remained present in Court, also moving an application expressing readiness to execute the sale deed. However, Bhagwan Kaur ed that Bhagwan Kaur intentionally concealed defects in her title and her inability to transfer the plot because of non issuance of clearance certificate from the Industries Department. respondent No.1/defendant No. 1 alone, while the other defendants were proceeded against ex parte. Respondent Defendant No. 1 admitted her ownership of the property and execution of the agreement, as well as receipt of earnest money, but pleaded that she had filed a suit the agreement which was pending in another Civil Court, and therefore the present suit was not maintainable. She contended that the contract 1973. She further pleaded that no clearance or ale and that the plea of impediment was an afterthought since the plaintiffs were not ready with the balance consideration. by the appellant/plaintiff controverting the - Bhagwan Kaur. 1974, 1973, plaintiff to pay the balance within six weeks, failing which she threatened to forfeit the earnest money. The plaintiff replied that Bhagwan Kaur had failed to obtain the necessary permission and that the extension but until she obtained clearance and permission. 1974, the e District Court with the necessary balance amount for performance of the contract and remained present in Court, also moving an application expressing readiness to execute the sale deed. However, Bhagwan Kaur ed that Bhagwan Kaur intentionally concealed defects in her title and her inability to transfer the plot because of non- defendant No. 1 alone, Respondent Defendant No. 1 admitted her ownership of the property and execution of the agreement, as well as receipt of earnest money, but pleaded that she had filed a suit the agreement which was pending in another Civil Court, and therefore the present suit was not maintainable. She contended that the contract 1973. She further pleaded that no clearance or ale and that the plea of impediment was an by the appellant/plaintiff controverting the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 9. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 10. Before conclusion of defendant’s evidence, an application under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) stay of the present suit on the ground that her earlier suit for declaration that the agreement had become infructuous was pending. Issue was framed suit was liable to be stayed the suit. (O&M) On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:- Whether the defendants committed breach of the agreement in question? OPP Whether the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract? OPP Whether the suit is bad for mis causes of actions?OPD Whether the agreement is not admissible in law and has no legal force? OPD Whether the relief of possession is premature and incompetent? OPD Whether there is a legal impedim in preliminary objection No.4 and 5 of the written statement? OPD Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD Whether the value of suit for court fee and jurisdiction is wrong? OPD Whether the time was essence of the agreement? OPD 10) Relief. Before conclusion of defendant’s evidence, an application under of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) stay of the present suit on the ground that her earlier suit for declaration that the agreement had become infructuous was pending. Issue was framed suit was liable to be stayed?” The trial Court vide order dated -4- On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the Whether the defendants committed breach of the agreement in Whether the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their ether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of the defendants and Whether the agreement is not admissible in law and has no legal Whether the relief of possession is premature and incompetent? Whether there is a legal impediment in the way of sale as alleged in preliminary objection No.4 and 5 of the written statement? OPD Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD Whether the value of suit for court fee and jurisdiction is wrong? ssence of the agreement? OPD Before conclusion of defendant’s evidence, an application under of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) was filed for stay of the present suit on the ground that her earlier suit for declaration that the agreement had become infructuous was pending. Issue was framed “Whether the The trial Court vide order dated 05.19.1979 stay On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the Whether the defendants committed breach of the agreement in Whether the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their joinder of the defendants and Whether the agreement is not admissible in law and has no legal Whether the relief of possession is premature and incompetent? ent in the way of sale as alleged in preliminary objection No.4 and 5 of the written statement? OPD Whether the value of suit for court fee and jurisdiction is wrong? Before conclusion of defendant’s evidence, an application under was filed for stay of the present suit on the ground that her earlier suit for declaration that the hether the 1979 stayed TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 11. The earlier suit filed by Bhagwan Kaur was, however, dismissed on 21.10.1980. Her appeal was dismissed on her children, namely, Prabh Dayal Singh, Pritpal Singh, and Kirpal Randhawa, filed a suit for declaration that they were in joint possession of the property along with their mother, Bhagwan Kaur, and their other brothers, Bhupinder Pal Singh and Suba Pal Singh. In that suit, Bhagwan Kaur admi Will in her favour, but t 21.11.1984 and final decree on share. 12. On 19 present suit since the earlier suit of accordingly restored. During pendency, on Bhagwan Kaur, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded as defendant No. 6. The application was allowed. He fil alleging that Bhagwan Kaur was only a co thus incompetent to enter into the agreement. He claimed that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable against him and other heirs. On his pleadings, additional Issue No. 9A was framed: “W execute the agreement to sell 13. Evidence was led by the parties. The trial Court, after hearing the parties, decreed the suit for specific Findings of the First Appellate Court 14. Defendant No. 6 Appellate Court concurred with the trial Court on all issues except Issue No. 9A. It (O&M) The earlier suit filed by Bhagwan Kaur was, however, dismissed on 1980. Her appeal was dismissed on 12.04. her children, namely, Prabh Dayal Singh, Pritpal Singh, and Kirpal Randhawa, declaration that they were in joint possession of the property along with their mother, Bhagwan Kaur, and their other brothers, Bhupinder Pal Singh and Suba Pal Singh. In that suit, Bhagwan Kaur admi ill in her favour, but the Will was not proved. Preliminary decree was passed on and final decree on 12.06.1985, holding each heir entitled to 1/7th On 19.10.1984, the appellants/plaintiffs moved for restoration of the present suit since the earlier suit of Bhagwan Kaur stood dismissed. The suit was accordingly restored. During pendency, on 04.12. Bhagwan Kaur, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded as defendant No. 6. The application was allowed. He fil alleging that Bhagwan Kaur was only a co-sharer and not exclusive owner, and thus incompetent to enter into the agreement. He claimed that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable against him and other heirs. On his pleadings, additional Issue No. 9A was framed: Whether Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to execute the agreement to sell?OPD Evidence was led by the parties. The trial Court, after hearing the parties, decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of the plaintiffs. Findings of the First Appellate Court Defendant No. 6-Prabh Dayal Deol ppellate Court concurred with the trial Court on all issues except Issue No. 9A. It -5- The earlier suit filed by Bhagwan Kaur was, however, dismissed on 12.04.1983. Thereafter, on 07.10.1983, her children, namely, Prabh Dayal Singh, Pritpal Singh, and Kirpal Randhawa, declaration that they were in joint possession of the property along with their mother, Bhagwan Kaur, and their other brothers, Bhupinder Pal Singh and Suba Pal Singh. In that suit, Bhagwan Kaur admitted their claim, setting up a ill was not proved. Preliminary decree was passed on 1985, holding each heir entitled to 1/7th plaintiffs moved for restoration of the Bhagwan Kaur stood dismissed. The suit was 04.12.1985, Prabh Dayal Singh, son of Bhagwan Kaur, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded as defendant No. 6. The application was allowed. He filed his written statement sharer and not exclusive owner, and thus incompetent to enter into the agreement. He claimed that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable against him and other heirs. On his pleadings, following hether Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to ?OPD.” Evidence was led by the parties. The trial Court, after hearing the performance in favour of the plaintiffs. Prabh Dayal Deol alone filed appeal. The lower ppellate Court concurred with the trial Court on all issues except Issue No. 9A. It The earlier suit filed by Bhagwan Kaur was, however, dismissed on 1983, her children, namely, Prabh Dayal Singh, Pritpal Singh, and Kirpal Randhawa, declaration that they were in joint possession of the property along with their mother, Bhagwan Kaur, and their other brothers, Bhupinder Pal Singh tted their claim, setting up a ill was not proved. Preliminary decree was passed on 1985, holding each heir entitled to 1/7th plaintiffs moved for restoration of the Bhagwan Kaur stood dismissed. The suit was 1985, Prabh Dayal Singh, son of Bhagwan Kaur, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC to be impleaded ed his written statement sharer and not exclusive owner, and thus incompetent to enter into the agreement. He claimed that the agreement was ollowing hether Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to Evidence was led by the parties. The trial Court, after hearing the alone filed appeal. The lower ppellate Court concurred with the trial Court on all issues except Issue No. 9A. It TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 held that the plot had Industries. On his death in 1970, the property devolved upon his natural heirs equally. The alleged proved in accordance with law. The copy Ex. attesting witnesses were not examined. Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. It was thus held that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and could not enter 15. The lower taken a loan from the Industries Department and resumption proceedings were pending, she was not in a position to convey title. Referring to PW8, it observed that resumption of the plot was still subsisting. It refused specific performance but directed refund of earnest money with interest. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant 16. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the lower Appellate Court has erred in recording a finding that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner of the suit property and, therefore, was not entitled to enter into any agreement to sell the same. He fur of the Will and have not claimed any title through it. Rather, Bhagwan Kaur has always claimed exclusive ownership through of ownership has only been cha defeat the interest of the appellants/plaintiffs. Furthermore, the lower Appellate Court has also erred in burdening the appellants/plaintiffs with the onus to prove the Will. (O&M) held that the plot had been allotted to Arjun Singh in 1958 by the Director of Industries. On his death in 1970, the property devolved upon his natural heirs equally. The alleged Will dated 10.03.1964 in favour of Bhagwan Kaur was not proved in accordance with law. The copy Ex. attesting witnesses were not examined. Ingredients of Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. It was thus held that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and could not enter The lower Appellate Court further held that as Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Industries Department and resumption proceedings were pending, she was not in a position to convey title. Referring to bserved that resumption of the plot was still subsisting. It refused specific performance but directed refund of earnest money with interest. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the lower Appellate Court has erred in recording a finding that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner of the suit property and, therefore, was not entitled to enter into any agreement to sell the same. He further submits that appellants/plaintiffs are not the propounders of the Will and have not claimed any title through it. Rather, Bhagwan Kaur has always claimed exclusive ownership through-out all the litigations and her status of ownership has only been challenged by defendant No.6 defeat the interest of the appellants/plaintiffs. Furthermore, the lower Appellate Court has also erred in burdening the appellants/plaintiffs with the onus to prove -6- been allotted to Arjun Singh in 1958 by the Director of Industries. On his death in 1970, the property devolved upon his natural heirs 1964 in favour of Bhagwan Kaur was not proved in accordance with law. The copy Ex. PA was not sufficient proof as the Ingredients of Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. It was thus held that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and could not enter into the agreement. ppellate Court further held that as Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Industries Department and resumption proceedings were pending, she was not in a position to convey title. Referring to the statement bserved that resumption of the plot was still subsisting. It, therefore refused specific performance but directed refund of earnest money with interest. Submissions of learned counsel for the appellant Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the lower Appellate Court has erred in recording a finding that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner of the suit property and, therefore, was not entitled to enter into any agreement to ther submits that appellants/plaintiffs are not the propounders of the Will and have not claimed any title through it. Rather, Bhagwan Kaur has out all the litigations and her status llenged by defendant No.6 – Prabh Dayal, just to defeat the interest of the appellants/plaintiffs. Furthermore, the lower Appellate Court has also erred in burdening the appellants/plaintiffs with the onus to prove been allotted to Arjun Singh in 1958 by the Director of Industries. On his death in 1970, the property devolved upon his natural heirs 1964 in favour of Bhagwan Kaur was not PA was not sufficient proof as the Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act were not satisfied. It was thus held that into the agreement. ppellate Court further held that as Bhagwan Kaur had taken a loan from the Industries Department and resumption proceedings were statement of therefore, refused specific performance but directed refund of earnest money with interest. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the lower Appellate Court has erred in recording a finding that Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner of the suit property and, therefore, was not entitled to enter into any agreement to ther submits that appellants/plaintiffs are not the propounders of the Will and have not claimed any title through it. Rather, Bhagwan Kaur has out all the litigations and her status Prabh Dayal, just to defeat the interest of the appellants/plaintiffs. Furthermore, the lower Appellate Court has also erred in burdening the appellants/plaintiffs with the onus to prove TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 17. No one has contested the is pertinent to mention here that legal representatives of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 23.07.2025. Findings 18. Having considered the record and the rival contentions, this Court is satisfied that the decisive controversy turns on Issue No. 9 Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to execute the agreement to sell?” 19. Firstly, On an application under Section 10 CPC, the present suit was stayed dated 05.09.1979 because of declaration that the agreement had become infru stood forfeited. That earlier suit was dismissed on dismissed on 12.04. Bhagwan Kaur on 04.12.1985), mother and brothers, were joint in possession. In that suit Bhagwan Kaur Will in her favour and a preliminary decree followed on decree on 12.06. tenor of these later proceedings, commenced during the pendency of the present specific-performance the agreement treating herself as full owner, weigh against the credibility of the defence to resist performance. 20. Turning to Issue 9 findings on this issue by holding that the plot had been allotted t (O&M) No one has contested the present appeal on behalf is pertinent to mention here that legal representatives of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 23.07.2025. Having considered the record and the rival contentions, this Court is satisfied that the decisive controversy turns on Issue No. 9 Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to execute the agreement to Firstly, the procedural history supports the On an application under Section 10 CPC, the present suit was stayed 1979 because of the earlier suit filed by declaration that the agreement had become infru stood forfeited. That earlier suit was dismissed on 12.04.1983. It was only thereafter, on including Prabh Dayal Singh (later impleaded as defend 04.12.1985), instituted a separate suit claiming that they, along with their mother and brothers, were joint in possession. In that suit Bhagwan Kaur ill in her favour and a preliminary decree followed on 12.06.1985 declaring 1/7th share of Bhagwan Kaur. The timing and tenor of these later proceedings, commenced during the pendency of the present performance suit and long after Bhagwan Kaur had herself sued to forfeit agreement treating herself as full owner, weigh against the credibility of the defence to resist performance. Turning to Issue 9-A, the lower appellate court reversed the trial court findings on this issue by holding that the plot had been allotted t -7- present appeal on behalf the respondents. It is pertinent to mention here that legal representatives of contesting respondents No.1 and 2 were proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 23.07.2025. Having considered the record and the rival contentions, this Court is satisfied that the decisive controversy turns on Issue No. 9-A i.e “whether Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to execute the agreement to ral history supports the appellants/plaintiffs case. On an application under Section 10 CPC, the present suit was stayed vide order the earlier suit filed by Bhagwan Kaur seeking a declaration that the agreement had become infructuous and that earnest money stood forfeited. That earlier suit was dismissed on 21.10.1980 and her appeal 1983. It was only thereafter, on 07.10.1983, that the sons of including Prabh Dayal Singh (later impleaded as defendant No. 6 instituted a separate suit claiming that they, along with their mother and brothers, were joint in possession. In that suit Bhagwan Kaur set up a ill in her favour and a preliminary decree followed on 21.11.1984 and a final 1985 declaring 1/7th share of Bhagwan Kaur. The timing and tenor of these later proceedings, commenced during the pendency of the present and long after Bhagwan Kaur had herself sued to forfeit agreement treating herself as full owner, weigh against the credibility of the A, the lower appellate court reversed the trial court findings on this issue by holding that the plot had been allotted to Arjun Singh on the respondents. It is pertinent to mention here that legal representatives of contesting respondents Having considered the record and the rival contentions, this Court is whether Bhagwan Kaur was not the sole owner and competent to execute the agreement to plaintiffs case. order Bhagwan Kaur seeking a ctuous and that earnest money her appeal , that the sons of ant No. 6 instituted a separate suit claiming that they, along with their set up a 1984 and a final 1985 declaring 1/7th share of Bhagwan Kaur. The timing and tenor of these later proceedings, commenced during the pendency of the present and long after Bhagwan Kaur had herself sued to forfeit agreement treating herself as full owner, weigh against the credibility of the A, the lower appellate court reversed the trial court o Arjun Singh on TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 12.06.1958 by the Director of Industries and that Arjun Singh died on and his estate devolved equally upon his natural heirs and that the copy Ex. PA of the will dated 10.03. Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act, as no attesting witness was examined and registration officials footing, it concluded Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and thus incompetent to enter into 21. This Court is unable to agree with Court. The plaintiffs are not the propounders of the through it and were not asserting it as the root of their claim. consistently invoked by Bhagwan Kaur herself across litigations to project exclusive ownership but was being denied in apparently in connivance with Bhagwan Kaur so it was expected from Bhagwan Kaur not to produce the original while contracting in 1973, and having pleaded as such in her earlier declaratory suit to forfeit the agreement (filed on equity, be permitted to defeat prove the very W the original Will while compelling the evidence by summoning certified copy and officials warrants an adverse inference against her, particularly when coupled with her own repeated assertions of exclusivity in pleadings and conduct. In these circumstances, the trial court rightly accepted that, a Bhagwan Kaur held and asserted full title and competence to sell, and it decreed performance accordingly. The lower (O&M) 1958 by the Director of Industries and that Arjun Singh died on and his estate devolved equally upon his natural heirs and that the copy Ex. PA of 10.03.1964 was not proved in accordance with Sections 63 of Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act, as no attesting witness was examined and registration officials deposed only footing, it concluded Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and thus incompetent to enter into the agreement for the entirety. This Court is unable to agree with The plaintiffs are not the propounders of the through it and were not asserting it as the root of their claim. consistently invoked by Bhagwan Kaur herself across litigations to project exclusive ownership but was being denied in the present case by defendant N apparently in connivance with Bhagwan Kaur so it was expected from Bhagwan roduce the original Will. Having chosen to rest on exclusive title while contracting in 1973, and having pleaded as such in her earlier declaratory suit to forfeit the agreement (filed on 29.04. equity, be permitted to defeat specific performance by declining prove the very Will she repeatedly invoked when it suited her. Her withholding of ill while compelling the appellants/ evidence by summoning certified copy and register entries through Sub officials warrants an adverse inference against her, particularly when coupled with her own repeated assertions of exclusivity in pleadings and conduct. In these circumstances, the trial court rightly accepted that, a Bhagwan Kaur held and asserted full title and competence to sell, and it decreed performance accordingly. The lower Appellate court’s insistence that the -8- 1958 by the Director of Industries and that Arjun Singh died on 03.05.1970 and his estate devolved equally upon his natural heirs and that the copy Ex. PA of 1964 was not proved in accordance with Sections 63 of Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act, as no attesting witness was only about register entries. On that footing, it concluded Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and thus the agreement for the entirety. This Court is unable to agree with this approach of lower Appellate The plaintiffs are not the propounders of the Will as they do not derive title through it and were not asserting it as the root of their claim. The will was consistently invoked by Bhagwan Kaur herself across litigations to project the present case by defendant N apparently in connivance with Bhagwan Kaur so it was expected from Bhagwan ill. Having chosen to rest on exclusive title while contracting in 1973, and having pleaded as such in her earlier declaratory 29.04.1976), Bhagwan Kaur cannot, in specific performance by declining to produce and ill she repeatedly invoked when it suited her. Her withholding of appellants/plaintiffs to resort to secondary register entries through Sub-Registrar officials warrants an adverse inference against her, particularly when coupled with her own repeated assertions of exclusivity in pleadings and conduct. In these circumstances, the trial court rightly accepted that, at the time of contracting, Bhagwan Kaur held and asserted full title and competence to sell, and it decreed ppellate court’s insistence that the 1970 and his estate devolved equally upon his natural heirs and that the copy Ex. PA of 1964 was not proved in accordance with Sections 63 of the Indian Succession Act and 68 of the Evidence Act, as no attesting witness was register entries. On that footing, it concluded Bhagwan Kaur was not exclusive owner and thus ppellate ill as they do not derive title The will was consistently invoked by Bhagwan Kaur herself across litigations to project the present case by defendant No-6 apparently in connivance with Bhagwan Kaur so it was expected from Bhagwan ill. Having chosen to rest on exclusive title while contracting in 1973, and having pleaded as such in her earlier declaratory 1976), Bhagwan Kaur cannot, in to produce and ill she repeatedly invoked when it suited her. Her withholding of plaintiffs to resort to secondary Registrar officials warrants an adverse inference against her, particularly when coupled with her own repeated assertions of exclusivity in pleadings and conduct. In these t the time of contracting, Bhagwan Kaur held and asserted full title and competence to sell, and it decreed ppellate court’s insistence that the TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 appellants/plaintiffs must prove the W misdirects the burden and ignores the vendor’s consistent admissions and representations forming the very basis of the contract. 22. Coming to the next question the resumption of plot by industries depart still sub and that due to that reason specific performance cannot be ordered, this court does not find itself in agreement with the same as the trial court has dealt with this proposition in detail and in right perspective in para n under issue No.6 plot originally allotted to Arjun Singh had been resumed by the department for want of certain violations, but subsequently there is a deed of conveyance in favour of Arjun Singh and also an office noting principal amount has been paid. In this way, there cannot be said to be any legal impediment in the matter of getting the sale deed registered. It is pertinent to mention here that findings on Appellate court erred in holding that resumption still existed, the findings being without any basis. 23. In the Court misdirected itself in shifting the burden regarding the will and in ignoring Bhagwan Kaur’s repeated assertions of exclusive ownership and her withholding of the original W contrary to the pleadings and the evidence which show that resumption stood appealed and later revoked/cancelled; (iii) the endorsement extending time till departmental clearance/permission squarely fixes the duty on the vendor and vindicates the appellants/ (O&M) appellants/plaintiffs must prove the Will, though they are not its propound misdirects the burden and ignores the vendor’s consistent admissions and representations forming the very basis of the contract. Coming to the next question the A resumption of plot by industries depart still sub and that due to that reason specific performance cannot be ordered, this court does not find itself in agreement with the same as the trial court has dealt with this proposition in detail and in right perspective in para n No.6 by observing that there is a letter plot originally allotted to Arjun Singh had been resumed by the department for want of certain violations, but subsequently there is a deed of conveyance in favour of Arjun Singh and also an office noting Ex.PW 10 /B to the effe principal amount has been paid. In this way, there cannot be said to be any legal impediment in the matter of getting the sale deed registered. It is pertinent to mention here that findings on Issue Nos. 1 to 6 were not challenged ppellate court erred in holding that resumption still existed, the findings being without any basis. In the said premises, this Court holds ourt misdirected itself in shifting the burden regarding the will and in ignoring Bhagwan Kaur’s repeated assertions of exclusive ownership and er withholding of the original Will; (ii) its conclusion that resumption subsisted is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence which show that resumption stood appealed and later revoked/cancelled; (iii) the endorsement extending time till departmental clearance/permission squarely fixes the duty on the vendor and appellants/plaintiffs’ readiness; and (iv) the trial C -9- ill, though they are not its propounders, misdirects the burden and ignores the vendor’s consistent admissions and representations forming the very basis of the contract. Appellate Court below observed that resumption of plot by industries depart still subsisted due to non payment of loan and that due to that reason specific performance cannot be ordered, this court does not find itself in agreement with the same as the trial court has dealt with this proposition in detail and in right perspective in para number 13 of the judgement by observing that there is a letter Ex.PW 10/1 indicating that the plot originally allotted to Arjun Singh had been resumed by the department for want of certain violations, but subsequently there is a deed of conveyance in favour PW 10 /B to the effect that the entire principal amount has been paid. In this way, there cannot be said to be any legal impediment in the matter of getting the sale deed registered. It is pertinent to 6 were not challenged. Learned lower ppellate court erred in holding that resumption still existed, the findings being premises, this Court holds that (i) the lower Appellate ourt misdirected itself in shifting the burden regarding the will onto the plaintiffs and in ignoring Bhagwan Kaur’s repeated assertions of exclusive ownership and ill; (ii) its conclusion that resumption subsisted is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence which show that resumption stood appealed and later revoked/cancelled; (iii) the endorsement extending time till departmental clearance/permission squarely fixes the duty on the vendor and readiness; and (iv) the trial Court’s decree ers, misdirects the burden and ignores the vendor’s consistent admissions and ourt below observed that sisted due to non payment of loan and that due to that reason specific performance cannot be ordered, this court does not find itself in agreement with the same as the trial court has dealt with this umber 13 of the judgement PW 10/1 indicating that the plot originally allotted to Arjun Singh had been resumed by the department for want of certain violations, but subsequently there is a deed of conveyance in favour ct that the entire principal amount has been paid. In this way, there cannot be said to be any legal impediment in the matter of getting the sale deed registered. It is pertinent to ed lower ppellate court erred in holding that resumption still existed, the findings being ppellate the plaintiffs and in ignoring Bhagwan Kaur’s repeated assertions of exclusive ownership and ill; (ii) its conclusion that resumption subsisted is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence which show that resumption stood appealed and later revoked/cancelled; (iii) the endorsement extending time till departmental clearance/permission squarely fixes the duty on the vendor and ourt’s decree TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-139-1992 granting specific equities. The findings of the trial court, returned after a detailed appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, are restored Appellate Court on Issue 9 are set aside. Conclusion 24. For all the above reasons, the findings of the lower are reversed and those of the trial court are upheld. The plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the agreement to sell dated Regular Second Appeal stands allowed. T 24.07.1987 decreeing the suit for specific performance is lower Appellate interest is set aside. 25. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. August 25, 2025 tripti Whether speaking/non Whether reportable (O&M) granting specific performance accords with the contract, the evidence, and the equities. The findings of the trial court, returned after a detailed appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, are restored and ourt on Issue 9-A and on the supposed impossibility of performance For all the above reasons, the findings of the lower are reversed and those of the trial court are upheld. The plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the agreement to sell dated Second Appeal stands allowed. The decree of the decreeing the suit for specific performance is ppellate Court’s decree dated 19.09.1991 interest is set aside. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 2025 Whether speaking/non-speaking : Speaking Whether reportable : Yes/No -10- performance accords with the contract, the evidence, and the equities. The findings of the trial court, returned after a detailed appreciation of and the contrary findings of the lower A and on the supposed impossibility of performance For all the above reasons, the findings of the lower Appellate Court are reversed and those of the trial court are upheld. The plaintiffs are entitled to specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 28.05.1973. Consequently, the he decree of the learned trial Court dated decreeing the suit for specific performance is upheld and the learned dated 19.09.1991 confining relief to refund with Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (MANDEEP PANNU) JUDGE speaking : Speaking : Yes/No performance accords with the contract, the evidence, and the equities. The findings of the trial court, returned after a detailed appreciation of the contrary findings of the lower A and on the supposed impossibility of performance ourt are reversed and those of the trial court are upheld. The plaintiffs are entitled to 1973. Consequently, the dated learned confining relief to refund with TRIPTI SAINI 2025.09.03 12:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document