-1 of 7- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 570 of 2024 1. The Union of India through Ministry of Home, having its office at North Block, New Delhi, P.O. & P.S. –North Block, New Delhi. 2. Inspector General (WS) Central Industrial Security Force, CISF Complex, Kharghar, P.O. & P.S. – Kharghar, Nawi Mumbai-10. 3. Assistant Inspector General, Directorate, CISF, 13 CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, P.O. & P.S.-Lodhi Road, New Delhi. 4. Deputy Inspector General (DAE), CISF, DAE Headquarters, ECIL Post, P.O. & P.S.- Hyderabad, Hyderabad – 62 (Andhra Pradesh). 5. Commandant, CISF, UCIL Unit, Jaduguda, Jamshedpur, P.O. Sundarnagar, P.S.- Jaduguda, District- East Singhbhum ... ... Appellants Versus Rakesh Kumar, Son of Sri Pritam Singh, residing at CISF Unit UCIL, New Patar, Qtr No. A/13, 104, Sundarnagar, Jamshedpur, P.O.- Sundarnagar, P.S.-Jadugora, District-East Singhbhum... Respondent --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Appellants : Mr. Abhijeet Kr. Singh, CGC --------- C.A.V. On: 27.02.2025 Pronounced On: 27.3.2025 M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral) I.A. No. 11172 of 2024 in/and L.P.A. No. 570 of 2024 This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone delay of 600 days in filing this Appeal challenging the judgment dt 01.01.2023 in W.P.(S) No. 4247 of 2012 of the learned Single Judge. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is contended that the order passed by the High Court could not come to the knowledge of the applicants immediately; thereafter it came to their knowledge and then they sent a copy of the judgment along with the relevant documents to FHQ, New Delhi on 07.03.2023 for administrative decisions/orders. -2 of 7- 3. In response to the said letter, the FHQ, New Delhi gave a letter on 13.07.2024, informing that the Additional Solicitor General of India had opined that the order can be challenged before the Division Bench by filing a Letters Patent Appeal. 4. Thereafter matter was taken up with Ministry of Law and Justice, Calcutta through a letter dt. 15.07.2024 and advice was received on 03.08.2024. 5. On 06.08.2024, request was made to the Additional Solicitor General of India, Jharkhand to prepare memo of appeal along with an application for condonation of delay. The file was then assigned to an Advocate, who drafted the memo of appeal and forwarded it on 18.08.2024 for necessary approval and thereafter the appeal was filed on 05.10.2024. 6. It is contended that there was no willful delay on the part of the applicants but due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the applicants, they could not move to this Court in time. 7. A reading of the above application for condonation of delay filed by the applicants shows that though the impugned order was passed on 12.01.2023 in the writ petition, but the appeal was filed on 05.10.2024 with a delay of 600 days. 8. The plea of the applicants that they did not immediately come to know of the order cannot be accepted because the order was passed in the presence of the Additional Solicitor General of India representing the applicants, who were respondents in the writ petition. 9. Even after the order came to the knowledge of the applicants and they initiated action on 07.03.2023 by writing to the FHQ, New Delhi, the -3 of 7- FHQ, New Delhi admittedly responded only on 13.07.2024, a year four months later that the Additional Solicitor General wanted the impugned order to be challenged before Division Bench by filing an appeal. 10. Obviously, nothing was done between 07.03.2023 and 13.07.2024 and it took more than a year to initiate steps for filing the L.P.A. 11. Even the certified copy of the impugned order appears to have been applied for on 14.08.2024, long after the order was passed by the learned Single Judge on 12.01.2023. 12. Therefore, it is apparent that the applicants, though they were aware that the L.P.A. is to be filed within 30 days from the date of the passing of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, took no steps for filing the appeal expeditiously and were clearly negligent. Therefore, the plea of the applicants for condonation of the said period of delay is not liable to be accepted. 13. We are surprised that the appeal was filed by the applicants beyond the period of limitation without even filing an application for condonation of delay initially though the law officers of the Government would be fully aware that such an application is warranted, if the appeal is not filed within time. 14. Also the reading of the application for condonation of delay indicates that at every stage, the respondents had not taken steps to file the appeal with the requisite expedition though they are fully aware that the time for filing an appeal is only 30 days. The practice of the file being moved from table to table and from officer to officer has been criticised by the Supreme Court in several decisions. -4 of 7- 15. In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another1, the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9- 2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the 1 (2012) 3 SCC 563 -5 of 7- absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” (emphasis supplied) 16. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 17. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd.2, Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others6. 18. In Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR7, the Supreme Court held that it could not look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has 2 (2022) 3 SCC 159 3 (2022) 2 SCC 327 4 (2021) 11 SCC 557 5 (2022) 9 SCC 263 6 (2022) 9 SCC 266 7 2024 INSC 262: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 -6 of 7- been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 19. By allowing multiple people to deal with the question as to whether or not the judgment of the learned Single Judge is to be challenged, and without speeding up the process within the Department, it is not open to the applicants to file the appeal with inordinate delay and seek condonation of the same. 20. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of 600 days in filing the appeal. -7 of 7- 21. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed. 22. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (M. S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) APK