APHC010384262012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI WEDNESDAY,THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO: 294 OF 2012 Between: 1. Marni Vidyasagara Papajirao, S/o. Narasanna, Aged about 68 years, Occ; Business, R/o. Chituri Mansion, D.No.47-2-9, Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. 2. Marni Raja Sekhar, S/o. Vidyasagara Papajirao, age:40 years. Engineer, O.A.K. Chass Circle Fair Fax State,Varginia, USA, ( Rep., by its GPA Holder Marni Vidyasagara Papijirao) 3. Chitturi Sudharani, W/o. Satyanarayana Murthy, aged 38 years, D.No.47-2-9, Mansion Chituri Cultivation R/o. Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. 4. Chitturi Suryanarayana Murthy, S/o.Krishnarao, age 42 years, R/o. Chituri Mansion, D.No.47-2-9, Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. ...Appellants/Respondents/Defendants AND Marni Gopala Krishna, Rep., by his GPA Holder, Kanumilli Srinivasa Rao, age: 46 years. Business R/o. Rajahmundry. ...Respondent/ Respondent/Plaintiff Appeal under section 100 of C.P.C, against the Decree & judgment dated 30-11-2011 passed in A.S No.266 of 2004 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru, reversing the Decree & Judgment dated 28-10-2004 passed in O.S No.37 of 1996 on the Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the judgment and Decree of the Trial Court and material papers in the Suit and upon hearing arguments of Sri M Siva Kumar, Advocate for the Appellant and Sri Vuyyuru Lakshmana Rao, Advocate for Respondents. This Court doth Order and decree as follows: 1. That the Second Appeal No.294 of 2012 be and hereby is allowed; 2. That the Judgment and decree, dated 30.11.2011 in A.S.No.266 of 2004, on the file of the II Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru be and hereby is set aside confirming the decree and judgment, dated 28.10.2004 passed in O.S.No.37 of 1996 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. 3. That each party be and hereby are directed to bear their own costs in the second appeal. Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, 1. The II Additional District Judge, Eluru,West Godavari district 2. The Civil Judge(Senior Division), Kovvur, West Godavari district 3. Two CD Copies VNA * HIGH COURT DATED;30/07/2025 DECREE SA NO. 294 OF 2012 allowing the second appeal • APHC010384262012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI BvH WEDNESDAY,THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA I.A No.1 of 2Q2fi RAO in/and SECOND APPEAL NO: 294 OF 9ni9 Appeal under section 100 of C.P.C, against the Decree & judgment dated 30-11-2011 passed in A S No.266 of 2004 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru, 28-10-2004 passed in O.S No.37 of 1996 on the Senior Civil Judge, Kowur. Between: reversing the Decree & Judgment dated 1. Marni Vidyasagara Papajirao, S/o. Narasanna, Occ; Aged about 68 years, D.No.47-2-9, Business, R/o. Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. Chituri Mansion, 2. MArni Raja Sekhar, S/o. Vidyasagara Papajirao, age;40 years. Engineer, O.A.K. Chass Circle Fair Fax State,Varginia its GPA Holder Marni Vidyasagara Papijirao) , USA, ( Rep., by 3. Chitturi Sudharani, W/o. Cultivation Satyanarayana Murthy, aged 38 Chituri years, D.No.47-2-9, R/o. Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. Mansion, 4. Chitturi Suryanarayana Murthy, S/o.Krishnarao, age 42 years, R/o. Chituri Mansion, D.No.47-2-9, Gandhipuram.Rajahmundry. ...Appellants/Respondents/Defendants AND Marni Gopala Krishna, Rep., by his GPA Holder, Kanumilli Srinivasa Rao, age; 46 years Business R/o. Rajahmundry. ...Respondent/ Respondent/Plaintiff lA NO: 1 OF -?012(SAMP 623 OF 2012 in the circumstances stated Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the High Court may be pleased to in OS.No.37/1996 onthe file in the affidavit filed in support of the petition of execution proceedings inAS.No.266/2004 in court at Kovvur, pending disposal of the SA stay of the Senior Civil Judge lA NO: 1 OF 2025 that in the 41 Rule 27 of CPC praying support of the petition, the High to file copies of revenue Petition under Order circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in Court may be pleased to permit records and pattedars, owners additional evidence and mark and our names as adangais/pahanies reflecting - of the suit schedule property as Exhibits B.9 to B.26 in the above S.A.No.294/2012. possessors them as __ .Manohar Reddy, Senior Counsel for Sri Counsel for the Petitioners. Sri O Nl Siva Kumar Counsel for the Respondent: Sri M R S Srinivas for Sri Vuyyuru Lakshmana Rao The Court made the following Order; APHC010384262012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI E;*E WEDNESDAY,THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO: 294 OF 2012 Between; 1. Marnr Vidyasagara Papajirao, S/o. Narasanna Business Mansion, D.No.47-2-9, Gandhlpuram,Rajahmundry. 2. iviArni Raja Sekhar, S/o. Vidyasagara Papajirao Engineer, O.A.K. Circle Fair Fax State,Varginia, USA, ( Rep. MarniVidyasagara Papijirao) 3. Chitturi sudharani, W/o. Satyanarayana Murthy Cultivation Mansion, D.No.47-2-9, Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. 4. Chitturi Suryanarayana Murthy, S/o.Krishnarao R/o. D.No.47-2-9, Gandhipuram,Rajahmundry. R/o. Chituri Chass by its GPA Holder R/o. Chituri Chituri Mansion, ...Petitioners AND 1, Marni Gopala Krishna, Rep., by his GPA Holder Kanumilli Srinivasa Rao Business R/o. Rajahmundry. ...Respondent lA NO: 1 OF 2012 (SAMP 623 OF 2012 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay of execution proceedings inAS.No.266/2004 in OS.No.37/1996 onthe file of the Senior Civil Judge court at Kovvur, pending disposal of the SA lA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to file copies of revenue records and our names as pattedars, owners and May pleased to permit adangais/pahanies reflecting possessors of the suit schedule property as additional evidence and mark them as Exhibits B.9 to B 26 in the above S.A.No.294/2012 in the interests of justice and pass Counsel for the Petitioners: SRI O MANOHAR REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR IVI SIVA KUMAR Counsel for the Respondent: SRI M.R.S. SRINIVAS FOR VUYYURU LAKSHMANA RAO The Court made the following: COMMON JUDGMENT: - This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.P.C.” for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 30.11.2011 in A.S.No.266 of 2004, on the file of the 11 Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru (“First Appellate Court” for short) reversing the Judgment and decree, dated 28.10.2004 in O.S.No.37 of 1996, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur (“Trial Court” for short). 2. The appellants herein are the defendants and the respondent herein is the plaintiff in O.S.No.37 of 1996. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.37 of 1996 before the trial Court with a prayer for granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiff and for costs of the suit. 4. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in the above said suit filed A.S.No.266 of 2004 before the First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Judge allowed the appeal setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendants in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.37 of 1996, is as follows: Originally the plaint schedule property belongs to Marini Nageswara Rao. Plaintiff, defendant and one Tataramji are sons of late Marini Narasanna. Marini Narasanna and Tataramji died in the year 1975 and 1992 respectively. Flowever, during his lifetime, Marini Narasanna executed a registered settlement deed, dated 17.01.1969 in favour of plaintiff setting the plaint schedule property along with other properties. After this, the plaintiff left the country and settled in U.S.A. Subsequently, on 22.09.1969 Marini Narasanna along with 1 defendant and Tataramji partitioned all the remaining properties under registered partition deed dated 22.09.1969. The plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the properties including the plaint schedule property from the date of settlement deed. On 28.08.1992, the plaintiff executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Kanumilli Srinivasa Rao to manage his properties including the plaint schedule property. The old Sy.Nos. 112/1 and 112/2 are the part of corresponding R.S.No.228 which is total extent of Ac.88-12 cents of land. Out of this total extent, the father Marini Narasanna and elder brother Tataramji got shares of Ac.26.84 cents of land and Ac.25-37 cents of land respectively and the plaintiff got Ac.35-91 cents. As the plaintiff and Tataramji got excess land to the ceiling limit, they surrendered Ac.5-96 cents of land and Ac.20-36 ents of land respectively in R.S.No.228 to the Government. The Government accepted the surrender and assigned the same to the landless poor and accordingly, sub-division was affected and land in possession of the plaintiff and Tataramji was sub-divided as R.S.No.228/27. As the plaintiff had no children, the defendant with intention to knock away the properties in collusion with the other defendants, proclaiming to trespass the schedule property and threatening the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is constrained to file the suit. 7. The 1 ^‘defendant filed written statement before the trial Court denying the material averments made in the plaint and the same was adopted by the defendant Nos.2 to 5. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: an The defendants admitted the relationship with the plaintiff and execution of settlement deed by Marini Narasanna in favour of plaintiff and allotment of certain lands in old Sy.Nos.112/1 and 112/2 and the partition deed, dated 22.09.1969. The defendants contended that the plaint schedule property is a fiction and does not exist. The alleged plaint schedule property is not the same as mentioned in the settlement deed and plaintiff has no land in R.S.No.228, but has land only in R.S.No.227 with eastern boundary as Rivuleti Bineru and this fact is clearly established by the plaintiff’s declaration under the Land Ceiling Act. They further contended that the 1®* defendant in his declaration under the Land Ceiling Act, claimed Ac.41-75 cents of land in R.S.No.228 and accordingly his declaration was accepted and there are no disputes among the brothers on this fact and accordingly he surrendered an extent of Ac.5-04 cents of land. Thus, the 1®* defendant is having balance of Ac.36-24 cents in R.S.No.228. Further asserted that the 1®' defendant has leased out the total extent to the 4^^ defendant and his tenant by spending lacks of rupees dug bore wells and raised Mango, Guava and Cashew gardens and also obtained mortgage loans from Primary Agricultural Co operative Society. Furthermore, it is clear from the letters of the plaintiff in August, 1992 to trace out his lands. The General Power of Attorney of the plaintiff obtained pattadar passbooks. At the time of issuance of pattadar passbooks, the 1""* defendant agitated before the authorities and also filed W.P.No.6109 of 1996 before the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. Further, the boundaries in the schedule of the suit are wrongly mentioned and are misleading and that they prayed to dismiss the suit. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned trial Judge framed the following issues for trial; (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (2) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 to P.W.3 were examined and Exs.A.I to A.9were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.5 were marked. On behalf of both the parties Ex.X.1 to Ex.X.23 were marked. 10. The learned trial Judge after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.266 of 2004 wherein, the following point came up for consideration; Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is sustainable on the facts and law or requires any interference? 11. The learned First Appellate Judge after hearing the arguments, answered the point, as above, against the defendants and allowed the appeal setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge by decreeing the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendants in O.S.No.37 of 1996 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. On hearing both sides counsel at the time of admission of the appeal, on 27.11.2024, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the First Appellate Court committed grave error in ignoring the land ceiling declaration in 1975 covered by Ex.B.6, dated 24.08.1976? (2) Whether the First Appelfate Court erred in ignoring the basic requirements for grant of injunction and more particularly plaintiff does not prove element of possession in ignoring R.S. No.288? 13. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri M. Siva Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri M.R.S. Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Vuyyuru Lakshmana Rao, learned counsel for the Respondent. 14. The law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh\ the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.” ^AIR 1993 sc 398 In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujai ^ the Apex Court held as follows; "The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drav\/n by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 15. The undisputed facts are the plaintiff, 1®' defendant and one Tataramji are sons of Marini Narasanna and Marini Marasanna died in the year 1975 and Tataramji died in the year 1992. The 2""* defendant is the of 1®^ defendant, the defendant is the daughter of 1®‘ defendant, the 1 defendant is the father-in-law of 4^^ defendant. The specific case of the plaintiff is that he got an extent of Ac.28-91 cents of land in R.S.No.227, Ac.7- 00 cents of land in R.S.No.228 and Ac.14-00 cents of land in R.S.No.360 under Ex.A.1 settlement deed said to have been executed by his father. It is evident that an extent of Ac.5-96 cents of land in R.S.No.228 was surrendered by the plaintiff in Land Ceiling declaration submitted before the Land Ceiling Authority and therefore he was left with balance extent of Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228 of Jangareddigudem and after due enquiry, the Land Reforms Tribunal accepted the said land ceiling declaration, the same is undisputed by both the parties to the suit. son St 16. As per the plaint schedule, the plaint schedule property is an extent of Ac.29-95 cents situated in R.S.No.228 of Jangareddigudemwith specific boundaries mentioned in the plaint schedule. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that he got title under Ex.A.1. The defendants specifically pleaded in the written statement itself that the plaintiff got Ac.7-00 cents of land in R.S.No.228 and he surrendered Ac.5-96 cents and he was left with balance extent of Ac.1-04 cents in R.S.No.228 and the plaintiff is also having land in AIR 1999 SC 471 R.S.No.227 for an extent of Ac.28-91 cents and Ac.14-00 cents in R.S.No.360. It was pleaded by the defendants except western boundary mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed, the boundaries mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed are not tallied with the schedule property and the defendants specifically pleaded that the plaintiff is not in possession of the plaint schedule property within specified boundaries mentioned in the plaint schedule. Ex.A.9 true copy of fair adangalrelating to R.S.No.228 of Jangareddigudem and Ex.A.9 shows that the land covered by old Sy.Nos.94, 112/1&2, 118, 119, 125 to 127 and 129 for total extent of Ac.72-20 cents is correlated as new Sy.No.228 and the details of extent of old Survey Numbers are not furnished in it. Therefore, there is no evidence to show that the present suit schedule property in R.S.No.228 is corresponding to old R.S.Nos.112/2 and 112/1 for total extent of Ac.88-22 cents. 17. It is also specifically pleaded by the defendants that boundaries mentioned in the Ex.A.1 settlement deed except western boundary, are not tallied with plaint schedule. As seen from Ex.A.1 settlement deed and plaint schedule, East, South and North boundaries are not tallied with plaint schedule. Both the parties in the suit are claiming possession over the suit schedule property. Therefore, the oral and documentary evidence on record has to be scrutinized with due care and caution. 18. In the plaint it was pleaded that the plaintiff raised Cashew nut garden and in some extent they raised chilli crop. P.W.1 admitted in his evidence in cross examination that he never raised coconut garden or brinjal crop in the suit schedule property or in any part of the suit schedule. No documentary evidence is produced by the plaintiff to show that they raised cashew nut garden or coconut garden or chilli crop. P.W.1 himself admitted in his evidence in cross examination itself that he has no personal knowledge about the delivery of property to the plaintiff. P.W.1 is the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff. He further admits the Advocate Commissioner observed that the location of Byneru canal is situated near to the plaint schedule property. P.\N.2 is the plaintiff. He adnnits in his cross examination itself that after surrendering the land in R.S.No.228, he is having Ac. 1-04 cents alone within the boundaries mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed. He pleaded ignorance about the cancellation of pattadar passbook and title deed by the revenue authorities. 19. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants v/ould contend that the identity of the property is in dispute, and the land of the plaintiff and plaint schedule property are different. As seen from the plaint schedule, the schedule property is situated in R.S.No.228/27 of Jangareddigudem for an extent of Ac.29-95 cents. As stated supra, P.W.1 admitted Ex.A.1 settlement deed is the basis for title of the plaintiff. As per Ex.A.1, the plaintiff got Ac.28-91 cents in R.S.No.227, Ac.7-00 cents in R.S.No.228, Ac.14-00 cents in R.S.No.360 from his father under Ex.A.1 settlement deed. Ex.A.6 goes to show that the plaintiff filed a declaration before the Land Ceiling authority and he surrendered land of Ac.5-96 cents in R.S.No.228 and he was left with balance extent of Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228. The plaintiff filed a declaration before the Land Ceiling authority. In the declaration submitted by the plaintiff to the Land Ceiling authority, it is evident that the plaintiff herein having land in old Sy.No.112/2 corresponding to new Sy.No.227 for an extent of Ac.28-91 cents and old Sy.No.112/1 corresponding to new Sy.No.228 for an extent of Ac.7-00 cents and he filed a declaration before the Land Reforms Tribunal containing new R.S. numbers only. The Tribunal in its order dated 24.08.1976 accepted the same, directed the plaintiff to surrender the surplus land and accordingly, he surrendered extent of Ac.5-96 cents in R.S.No.228. As stated supra, he was left with balance extent of Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228 and Ac.28-91 cents in R.S.No.227. It is also evident that after elaborate enquiry and verification, the Land Reforms Tribunal passed an order by accepting the declaration submitted by the declarant/plaintiff in which the new survey numbers are mentioned. an 20. The plaintiff herein is claiming relief of prohibitory injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property situated in R.S.No.228/27 for an extent of Ac.29-96 cents. As stated supra, in R.S.No.228 the plaintiff has got Ac.7-00 cents, out of Ac.7-00 cents of land, he surrendered only Ac.5-96 cents and he was left with balance extent of Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228 whereas the plaintiff is seeking relief of permanent injunction in respect of Ac.29-96 cents in R.S.No.228. It is also evident that except western boundary, the boundaries mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed are not tallied with the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff admits in his evidence itself that Ex.A.1 settlement deed is the basis for title of the plaintiff. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9 and Ex.X.1 to Ex.X.9. P.W.1 and P.W.2 stated in their evidence that the land covered by Ex.A.1 settlement deed is suit schedule land, but they have not specifically stated about the boundaries of the plaint schedule property. Ex.A.1 settlement deed is a registration extract of settlement deed executed in favour of plaintiff by his father. Ex.A.2 is registration extract of partition deed executed in between Narasanna and Tataramji. Ex.A.3 is General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of P.W.1. Ex.A.4 is true copy of Field Measurement Book issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer. The sub division of R.S.No.228 is mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed. Ex.A.4 is no way helpful to the plaintiff to prove his possession in the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A.5 to Ex.A.8. Ex.A.5 is pattadar passbook and Ex.A.6 is title deed passbook. Ex.A.7 and Ex.A.8 are the land revenue receipts. Furthermore, the pattadar passbook does not contain the signatures of Mandal Revenue Officer and Village Revenue Officer and only rubber stamp of Mandal Revenue Officer is affixed on pattadar passbook. Ex.A.7 is the land revenue receipt, dated 04.01.1994. Ex.A.8 is the land revenue receipt, dated 13.01.1996. The land revenue receipts are relating to the year 1994 and January, 1996 prior to filing of the suit. Moreover, Ex.A.5, Ex.A.7 and Ex.A.8 land revenue receipts fails to establish that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property as on the date of suit. Ex.A.9 is the true copy of the fair adangal issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer. Ex.A.9 is no way helpful to show that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property as on the date of suit. Moreover, Ex.A.9 said to have been issued in the year 1997 whereas the suit is filed in the year 1996, therefore, the evidence produced by the plaintiff itself is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the suit schedule property is situated within the boundaries mentioned in the plaint schedule. 21. The 1®* defendant retied on the evidence of D.W.1. D.W.I is Mandal Revenue Inspector.He produced relevant documentary evidence under Ex.X. lO to Ex.X.20. As seen from Ex.X.10, the pattadar passbook issued the name of plaintiff in R.S.No.228/27 in an extent of Ac.29-91 cents is hereby cancelled by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem after conducting enquiry as per the orders issued by the Sub-Collector in Ex.X.10. In Ex.X.10 it was specifically mentioned that in pursuance of the proceedings issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovvur under Ex.X.11 and also proceedings issued by the Sub-Collector, Kovvur, he conducted detailed enquiry and issued notice to the plaintiff to surrender the pattadar passbook and title deed passbook because those pattadar passbook and title deed passbook cancelled. As seen from Ex.X. 12, Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovvur clearly stated in his letter addressed to Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem that “according to Rule 15(3) of A.P. ROR Act and Rules, the Mandal Revenue Officer, may within a period of one year as provided in sub section (3) of the Act on his own accord initiate proceedings for correction of mistake in the record of rights which he discovers himself or which is reported to him by other Revenue Officer”. Ex.X.10 proceedings is the basis for cancellation of pattadar passbook and title deed passbook. In Ex.X.10 proceedings, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem asserted that in pursuance of the directions received from Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovvur, he conducted enquiry under Section 3, sub section (3) and Section 6A and Rule 15(3) of A.P. ROR Act and he cancelled the pattadar passbook No.E.251984 issued in favour of the plaintiff herein in R.S.No.228/27 for an extent of Ac.29-91 cents. in are any In Ex.X.11, the Mandal Revenue Officer Jangareddigudem asserted that no enquiry has been conducted and prescribed procedure were not followed, issued pattadar passbook by the then Mandal Revenue Officer as states supra and that the corresponding title deed is also cancelled along with pattadar passbook by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem and also notice was issued under Ex.X.10 to the plaintiff by directing the plaintiff to surrender the pattadar passbook and title deed passbook before the office immediately for due cancell-ation. It is also relevant to refer the letter addressed to Sub-Collector, Kovvur by Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem under Ex.X.11, dated 06.12.1997. Ex.X.11 goes to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer conducted enquiry based on the orders issued by District Collector vide Roc.No.107/1995 (SA), dated 10.11.1995 and the Mandal Revenue Officer conducted detailed enquiry and recorded the statements of witnesses and sent Ex.X.11 report to the Sub- Collector, Kovvur. Ex.X.11 proceedings goes to show that Mandal Revenue Officer conducted detailed enquiry based on the orders issued by the District Collector, West Godavari District vide Roc.No. 107/1995 (SA), dated 10.11.1995. By following instructions issued by the District Collector, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem conducted detailed enquiry and sent Ex.X.11 report to the Sub-Collector, Kovvur by cancelling Ex.A.5 and Ex.A.6 pattadar passbook and title deed passbook issued in favour of the plaintiff 22. Ex.X.11 further goes to show that Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem conducted detailed enquiry as per the orders issued by the District Collector, West Godavari as stated supra and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem after conducting enquiry as per Rules came to a conclusion that the plaintiff herein was never in possession of any land either in R.S.No.228 or R.S.No.227 and plaintiff used to reside at United States of America from 1969 and he is also permanent resident of Visa holder of United States of America and he never visited nor cultivated any part of his land holding in R.S.No.228 and 227 in Jangareddigudem. In Ex.X.11 report, Mandal Revenue Officer further reiterated the power of attorney holder i.e.. , P.W.1 herein is another permanent resident Visa holder of United States of America and he never visited and cultivated the lands in Jangareddigudem.ln Ex.X.11 report, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem further reiterated that the registered gift deed, dated 17.01.1969 is relied by the plaintiff and the boundaries of his land gifted to him by his father are clearly mentioned in Ex.A.1 settlement deed, the eastern boundary is Rivulet Bineru, the Sy.No.228 does not have any such boundary. He further reiterated in his report that even title-wise, the plaintiff does not have any land in R.S.No.228 and he found nearly an extent of Ac.26-17 cents in R.S.No.227 which has been incorporated by four Rythus viz., BollinaBapiraji encroached an extent of Ac.12-45 cents; D. Balarama Krishna encroached an extent of Ac.6-31 cents; M. Suryanarayana encroached an extent of Ac.4-82 cents and K. Rama Rao encroached an extent of Ac.2-59 cents. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem further reiterated in his report that pattadar passbook and title deed passbook under Ex.A.5 and Ex.A.6 were issued to the plaintiff by the then Mandal Revenue Officer without conducting detailed enquiry and without following the procedure prescribed as per revenue Rules and after conducting detailed enquiry, Mandal Revenue Officer, Jangareddigudem sent a detailed report under Ex.X.11 to Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovvurand that the pattadar passbook and title deed passbook issued under Ex.A.5 and Ex.A.6 are cancelled. Therefore, Ex.A.5 and Ex.A.6 pattadar passbook and title deed passbook fled by the plaintiff are also not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the plaintiff is in possession over the suit schedule property. Moreover, Ex.A.5 does not contain the signature of Mandal Revenue Officer,but only rubber stamp of Mandal Revenue Officer affixed on the pattadar passbook. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff placed a reliance of Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs and others^, wherein the Apex Court held as follows: ^(2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 594 The general principles as to when a mere suit for permanent injunction will lie, and when it is necessary to file a suit for declaration and/or possession with injunction as a consequential relief, are well settled.We may refer to them briefly. Where a plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of such possession is interfered or threatened by the defendant injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a right to protect his possession against any person who does not prove a better title by seeking a prohibitory injunction. But a person in wrongful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.” a property and a suit for an In the case on hand, to prove his possession of the plaintiff date of suit i.e., on 09.04.1996, no document is filed by the plaintiff to prove his possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. As noticed supra, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.4 as on the are not conclusive proof that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. Ex.A.5 and Ex.A.6 are pattadar passbook and title deed passbook and those two Officer as per the District after conducting detailed enquiry. Ex.A.7 is land revenue receipt, dated 04.01.1994, Ex.A.8 is land revenue receipt, dated 13.01.1996, Ex.A.9 is copy of adangal of Jangareddigudem Town, dated 20.12.1993 and those Ex.A.7 way helpful to come to a conclusion that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property as on the date of suit i.e., 09.04.1996. documents are cancelled by the Mandal Revenue proceedings issued by the District Collector, West Godavari to Ex.A.9 are no 24. In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession, the plaintiff will have to as on the date of suit, he establish that in a lawful possession of the suit schedule property and the defendant tried to interfere to disturb such lawful In respect of landed property, possession may be established with reference to the actual use and cultivation. The question of title is not an issue in such a was possession. suit, though it may arise incidentally or collaterally. In the case on hand, the First Appellate Court held in its judgment that though the plaintiff claimed that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property by way of raising garden with Mango, Guava and cashew nut trees, he is not filed any material to prove the same. The First Appellate Court also further held in its judgment that the 1 defendant has not placed any evidence to prove or establish either title or possession of the property. 25. In a case of Chandrabhan (deceased) through Lrs. and others vs. Saraswati and others'*, the Apex Court held as follows: “The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this be summarised thus; case may (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of lav>/. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. matter, either cases. '*2022 see OnLine Se 1273 (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” Admittedly, in the case on hand, as noticed supra, the learned First Appellate Judge held in its judgment itself "though the plaintiff claimed that he is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property, he has not filed any material to prove the same”. The learned First Appellate Judge also defendant is also not placed any material to prove or establish either title or possession over the plaint schedule property”. As noticed supra, in a simple suit for prohibitory injunction, the burden heavily casts upon the plaintiff to prove that he is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property and the defendants are interfering with his possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property and plaintiff is also supposed to prove as on the date of suit he was in a lawful possession of the plaint schedule property and the defendants tried to interfere to disturb such lawful possession. But, the learned First Appellate Judge held in its judgment that the 1®* defendant has not placed any evidence to prove or establish either title or possession of the property. St held that “the 1 26. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the finding of facts arrived by the Courts below, but does not absolute rule some of the well recognized exceptions are where: (1) The Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence: (2) The Courts have drawn wrong inference from proved facts by applying the law wrongly or; (3) The Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. In the case on hand, the learned First Appellate Judge has wrongly cast the burden of proof on the defendants in a simplicitor for prohibitory injunction filed by the plaintiff that the 1®* defendant has not placed any material to prove or establish either title or possession over the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the said finding itself is a perversive finding. 27. As stated supra, the First Appellate Court held in its judgment that “the copy of declaration filed before Land Ceiling Authority cannot be considered as a conclusive with regard to allotment of re-survey numbers to the old survey numbers. Ex.B.6 is the Land Ceiling declaration given by the plaintiff. As per the settlement deed, the plaintiff got Ac.28-91 cents in R.S.No.227; Ac.7-00 cents in R.S.No.228 and the land surrendered by the plaintiff in R.S.No.228 is an extent of Ac.5-96 cents and the balance of land left over to the plaintiff is Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228. As noticed supra, as per Ex.X.11, the plaintiff is not in possession of any land either in R.S.No.227 or in R.S.No.228 and the new survey numbers corresponding to old survey numbers are clearly mentioned by the plaintiff in the land ceiling declaration before Land Reforms Tribunal and the same is accepted by the Tribunal after conducting detailed enquiry. The First Appellate Court failed to consider Ex.X.10 and Ex.X.11 and without considering the Ex.X.10 to Ex.X.19, came to a wrong conclusion that Ex.B.6 cannot be considered as a conclusive, it is also nothing but wrong conclusion drawn by the First Appellate Court. When once the plaintiff surrendered Ac.5-96 cents in R.S.No.228 and after surrendered the land, the balance of land left over to the plaintiff is Ac. 1-04 cents in R.S.No.228. In such a case, the plaintiff is not entitled prohibitory injunction in respect of Ac.28-95 cents in R.S.No.228. Furthermore, in the land ceiling declaration new survey numbers corresponding to old survey numbers are mentioned by the plaintiff himself. It is not at all the case of the plaintiff that R.S.No.227 is sub-divided as R.S.No.288. Therefore, the learned First Appellate Judge ignored the material evidence i.e., Ex.B.6 and Ex.X.10 to Ex.X.19 and drawn wrong inference from the proved facts by applying the law wrongly. In such a case, this Court being second appellate Court is having ample power for interfering with the said finding of the fact arrived by the learned First Appellate Judge. In Chandraban’s case (4 supra), the Apex Court held as follows; To be ‘substantial’, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179). In a case of Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (dead) by LRs. vs. Nanital Harakchand Sah (dead) and others^ the Apex Court held as follows: “From the discussions in the judgment it is clear that the High Court has based its findings on the documentary evidence placed on record and statements made by some witnesses which can be construed as admissions or conclusions. The position is well settled that when the judgment of the final Court of fact is based on mis-interpretation of documentary evidence consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High or on ^(2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 404 Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the judgment. The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by Courts, A finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. Since the parties have been in litigating terms for several decades the records are voluminous. The High Court as it appears from the judgment has discussed the documentary evidence threadbare in the light of law relating to their admissibility and relevance.” In the case on hand, the judgment of the First Appellate Court is based mis-interpretation of evidence and ignoring Ex.B.6 proceedings and Ex.X.10 to Ex.X.12 proceedings. 28. In a case of Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul and another vs. Pratima Maity and others®, the Apex Court held as follows: “Though as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellants the for interference with concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is very limited, where the trial Court and/or the first Appellate Court misdirected themselves in appreciating the question of law and placed the onus on the wrong party certainly there is a scope for interference under Section 100 CPC after formulating a substantial question of law.” on scope In the case on hand, the First Appellate Court observed in the judgment itself though the plaintiff claimed possession over the plaint schedule property that he is in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property by way of raising garden with Mango, Guava, Cashew nut, he has not filed documentary evidence and further the First Appellate Court also wrong conclusion that the 1®‘ defendant has not placed any evidence to or establish either title or possession over the property, it is nothing but perversive finding. The finding of the learned First Appellate Judge that any came to a prove in a ®(2004) 9 Supreme Court Cases 468 suit for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff, though the plaintiff has not established any material evidence to prove that he is raising crops in the plaint schedule property. But, unfortunately. First Appellate Court and thrown the burden on the 1®* defendant to prove his possession over the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the said finding of the learned First Appellate Judge is unknown to law. 29. The law is well settled that if the judgment of the First Appellate Court is based on mis-interpretation of the documentary evidence or consideration of inadmissible evidence by ignoring the material evidence, then the High Court in a second appeal is entitled to interfere with the said judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Judge. 30. In a case of Balasubramanian and another vs. Wl. Arockiasamy (dead) through legal representatives^, the Full Bench of Apex Court (Three Judges Bench) held as follows: “In the background of the legal position and on reasserting the position that there is very limited scope for reappreciating the evidence or interfering with the finding of fact rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary for us to take note as to whether in the instant facts the High Court has breached the said settled position. To that extent the factual aspects and the evidence tendered by the parties has already been noted above in brief. Further, what is distinct in the present facts of the case is that the finding rendered by the learned Munsif (trial court) and by the learned District Judge (first appellate court) are divergent. The trial court on taking note of the pleadings and the evidence available before it was of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove exclusive possession and, in such light, held that the entitlement for permanent injunction has not been established. While arriving at such conclusion the trial court had taken note of the right as claimed by the plaintiff and in that background had arrived at the conclusion that except for the say of plaintiff as PW1 there was no other evidence. On the ^(2021) 12 Supreme Court Cases 529 documentary evidence it was indicated that the kist receipts at Ext.A-5 series would not establish possession merely because the name has been subsequently substituted in the patta records and the kist had been paid.” In the case on hand, the plaintiff relied on two land revenue receipts, those land revenue receipts Ex.A.7 and Ex.A.8 relates prior to institution of the suit. Moreover, as held by the Full Bench of Apex Court in the aforesaid case law that the cist receipts would not establish the possession of the property. 31. In the case on hand, a specific finding is given by the learned First Appellate Judge that “though the plaintiff claimed that he is in possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property by way of raising garden with Mango, Guava, Cashew nut trees, he has not filed any material evidence to prove the same and the learned First Appellate Judge further held that the 1 defendant has not placed any evidence to prove or establish either title or possession over the property”. The said finding of the learned First Appellate Judge will indicate perversity and material irregularity in misdirecting itself in wrongly expecting the 1®* defendant to discharge the burden in a suit for bare injunction filed by the plaintiff and arriving at a wrong conclusion. The learned First Appellate Judge is not even discussed about the enquiry conducted by the revenue authorities as per the instructions issued by the District Collector, West Godavari District and Sub-Collector, Kovvur and Revenue Divisional Officer, Kovvur and the learned First Appellate Judge failed to consider the proceedings under Ex.X.10 to Ex.X.12 and arrived wrong conclusion by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. St 32. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the learned First Appellate Judge came to a wrong conclusion and set aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. Therefore, the decree and judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Judge is liable to be set aside by affirming the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge. I.A.No.l of 2025 in S.A.No.294 of 2012 33.This application is filed by the petitioners/appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC to permit the petitioners to file copies of revenue records and adangals/pahanies reflecting their names as pattadars, possessors of the suit schedule property as additional evidence and mark them as Exhibits B.9 to B.26 in the above S.A.No.294 of 2012. owners and 34. The contention of the petitioners, in brief, is as follows; The petitioners herein have filed the above SA.No.294 of 2012 aggrieved by the decree and judgment, dated 30.11.2011 passed in A.S.No.266 of 2004 on the file of II Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru, reversing the decree and judgment, dated 28.10.2004 passed O.S.No.37 of 1996 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. The subject matter of the suit as well as the first appeal filed by the respondent herein is relating to land situated in Sy.No.228/27 of Jangareddigudern, West Godavari District. The respondent contended that the said survey number land belongs to them. Though the respondent contended to that effect, he did not file proper evidence before the trial Curt and as such his suit was dismissed. Though the petitioners herein are absolute owners, possessors and enjoyers of the survey number land and are in possession of adangals/pahanis and other relevant revenue records and are still in possession of the subject land, the appellate Court without appreciating the facts and law, erroneously allowed the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the father-in-law of 4*^ petitioner used to look after the 35. The respondent filed a counter and contended that the petitioners cannot take their own sweet time and cannot adduce additional evidence and when they want In order to protract the case proceedings pleaded that if the proposed additional evidence is allowed, he will suffer irreparable loss and injury and he prayed that the petition filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of CPC may be dismissed. in cases. as He further 36. Heard both sides counsel on record. 37. Order XLi Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if- (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to the produced, by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reason for its admission. The general principle is that the appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the trial Court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception under Order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code, enable the appellate Court to take evidence in exceptional circumstances only. The proviso under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. permits the party to produce additional evidence before the appellate Court provided it has to be come under the ambit of order 41 Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. 38. The documents to be received as additional evidence filed by the petitioners is the certified copy of adangal/pahani patrika fasali 1400 relates to the year 1990 whereas the suit is filed in the year 1996. The certified copies of adangal/pahani patrikas filed as additional evidence by the petitioners are relates to fasali 1410, 1415, 1420 and 1422. Those prove the defendants are in schedule property on as on the date of suit i.e. documents to be received under I.A.No.1 of 2025 are no way helpful to possession and enjoyment over the plaint in the year, 1996. The other as additional evidence as sought by the petitioners are subsequent to institution of the suit. All other documents to be received as additional evidence are subsequent to the are not relevant to decide the subject institution of the suit, therefore, those matter of the present appeal. 39. The learned counsel for the respondent/ptaintiff placed a reliance of K.R. Mohan Reddy vs. Net Work Inc. represented through MD®, wherein the Apex Court held as follows: It is now a trite law that the conditions precedent for application of clause of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 is different from that of clause(b). In the event the former is to be applied, it would be for the applicant to show that the ingredients or conditions precedent mentioned therein (aa) are satisfied. On the other hand clause(b) to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 of Order 41 of CPC is to be taken recourse to, the appellate Court was bound to consider the entire evidences on record and come to an independent finding for arriving at a just decision; adduction of additional evidence has been prayed by the as appellant was necessary. In a case of State of Gujarat Vs. Mhendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai ® relying upon Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham^°, the Apex Court held as under: (SCC p. 775, para 10) ....though the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the 10. , the (2007) 14 Supreme Court Cases 257 ®(2006) 9SCC 772 ^°AIR 1965 SC 1008 appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way." In a case of Sanjay Kumar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand''\ the Apex Court held as follows; “As observed and held by this Court in the case of A. Andisamy Chettiar v. A. Subburaj Chettiar, (2015) 17 SCC 713, the admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It is further observed that the true test, therefore is, whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced." an Admittedly, in the case on hand, the plaintiff herein filed a simple suit for permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property in the year 1996, the documents to be received as additional evidence filed by the petitioners relates to subsequent to the institution of the suit. In a simple suit for permanent injunction, the entire burden casts upon the party who approached the Court for seeking a relief of prohibitory injunction and the plaintiff is supposed to prove that he is in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the date of suit i.e., 09.04.1996. Moreover, Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC also does not empower the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence, it can pronounce judgment in the case. Therefore, the documents to be received as additional evidence are no more required for the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a second appeal. Therefore, I do not find any grounds to allow the (2022) 7 Supreme Court Cases 247 application under I.A.No.1 of 2025 filed by the petitioners and it is liable to be dismissed. 40. In the result, I.A.No.1 of 2025 in S.A.No.294 of 2012 is dismissed. S.A.No.294 of 201 2; 41. In the result, the Second Appeal No.294 of 2012 is allowed and the Judgment and decree, dated 30.11.2011 in A.S.No.266 of 2004, on the file of the II Additional District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru is hereby set aside confirming the decree and judgment, dated 28.10.2004 passed in O.S.No.37 of 1996 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed. of Ow w . Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To 1. The II Additional District Judge, Eluru,West Godavari district (with records if any) 2. The Civil Judge(Senior Division), Kovvur, West Godavari district. 3. One CC to Sri. M Siva Kumar, Advocate [OPUC] 4. One CC to Sri. Vuyyuru Lakshmana Rao, Advocate [OPUC] 5. The Section Officer, V.R Section. High Court of Andhra Pradesh Amaravathi 6. Two CD Copies at Stu vna HIGH COURT DATED:30/07/2025 JUDGMENT + DECREE I.A No.1 of 2025 in/and SA NO. 294 OF 2012 ^ 0 7 AUS 2025 )g .^-sijiii^ntSectioiJX'C^ DISMISSING THE I.A NO.1 OF 2025 allowing the second appeal 2. The Civil .ii irinof.spmor Divio._