Page No.# 1/8 GAHC040012932025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./171/2025 Jayanta Doley and anr Son of Shri Hoern Doely, resident of Ghuna Khura Chuk, PO and PS Ghilamara, Division Dhakuakhana, Lakhimpur District, Assam. 2: Ian Techi Tara Age: Occupation : Son of Shri Rak Techi resident of Amba Kolma Village Doimukh PO and PS Doimukh Papum Pare District Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of AP represented by the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : Taba Tagum, Tassar Tato,Mompa Kino,Along Tabang,Anil Podo,Rup Techi Tara,Hage Tai,N Ngongnya,Rage Koyu,Likha Tabin Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANJAN MONI KALITA ORDER 11.12.2025 Heard Mr. R. Koyu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. D. Loyi, learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Page No.# 2/8 2. The instant application has been filed jointly by the petitioners under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 praying for quashing of the Doimukh P.S. Case No.87/2025 registered under Section 118(2) BNS, 2023 corresponding to GR Case No.536/2025 arising out of the FIR dated 28.06.2025. 3. On receipt of the FIR, the Police registered Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025 against the petitioner No. 2. 4. The gist of the allegation as has been narrated in the FIR dated 28.06.2025 is that the petitioner No. 2 engaged petitioner No. 1 as a construction worker in the construction of a building at Lower Emchi village under Doimukh circle. On 28.06.2025. It was alleged that the petitioner No. 1 who was working as a construction worker along with some other workers sought to leave from work site early without finishing some portion of work. When the petitioner No. 1 requested them to complete the work and thereafter go, the petitioner No. 2 was involved with some verbal altercation and thereafter, a scuffle occurred between the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 whereby the petitioner No. 1 fell down on the ground and sustained some minor injuries. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that though the FIR has been filed against the petitioner No. 2 by the petitioner No. 1, looking into the entire issue and with the help of friends and relatives, both the petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 have come to a mutual agreement whereby the petitioner No. 2 wishes not to pursue ahead with the case which has been filed against the petitioner No. 2. Accordingly, a mutual agreement settlement has been executed by the Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2 on 28.07.2025, wherein, it has been specifically stated that the petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2 have mutually agreed to resolve all disputes, difference and discords between them pertaining to FIR dated 28.06.2025 which resulted in registration Page No.# 3/8 of Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025 under Section 118(2) of BNS, 2023. It was also alleged that the parties shall undertake to maintain cordial relations and refrain from making any further allegations, claims or accusations against each other in respect of the said incident. The petitioner No. 1 has further agreed to not press and pursue the case pertaining to Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025 and shall withdraw the same with all interest and purpose, as the same has been amicably settled and resolved by both the parties. It was also agreed by the parties in the aforesaid settlement that though the offence under the FIR is not compoundable, the parties shall jointly file an application before the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court for quashing the Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025. It was further stated that settlement agreement that both the parties have executed the mutual settlement agreement, without any force or coercion and as per their sweet will. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in view of the aforesaid settlement agreement and wishes of the parties to close the Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025, this Court may quash the FIR in terms of the ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various cases in non compoundable offences. 7. Mr. D. Loyi, the learned PP has submitted that in view of the mutual settlement agreement and taking into account the allegation involved in the instant case, this case can be closed, at this stage. 8. In the case of Shiji alias Pappu (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraph-17 has held as under: - “17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction Page No.# 4/8 against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C.” 9. While in the case of Jagdish Chanana (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph nos. 2 & 3 has held as under: - “2. During the pendency of these proceedings in this Court Crl. Misc. Petition No. 42 of 2008 has been filed putting on record a compromise deed dated 30-4-2007. The fact that a compromise has indeed been recorded is admitted by all sides and in terms of the compromise the disputes which are purely personal in nature and arise out of commercial transactions, have been settled in terms of the compromise with one of the terms of the compromise being that proceedings pending in Court may be withdrawn or compromised or quashed, as the case may be. 3. In the light of the compromise, it is unlikely that the prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is involved in the transactions that had been entered into between the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore, would be a futile exercise. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash FIR No. 83 dated 12-3-2005, PS City Sonepat and all consequent proceedings.” 10. In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, after discussing several judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, including the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 in similar circumstances, has laid down the following principles which are quoted herein below: - “16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject. may be summarised in the following propositions: Page No.# 5/8 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim has settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction his remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Page No.# 6/8 Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 11. In this connection, it may be relevant to refer to the propositions laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra). The relevant portion of paragraph-61 of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is reproduced herein below: - “61. ……But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavor stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim….” 12. In the instant case also, it is seen that the dispute between the parties is primarily of personal and private nature, not involving any other person or society at large and as stated above, the parties have already come to a mutual agreement by settling all their disputes and differences by executing the MoU. 13. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and Ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking into account the fact that the dispute between the parties arose from their marital relationship and that they had already resolved their entire disputes among themselves, even if, the proceedings are allowed to be continued, the chance of conviction is very remote and bleak, for ends of justice, allowed the petition for quashing. It may be relevant herein, to reproduce paragraph-15.5 of the Page No.# 7/8 aforesaid case. “15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused, the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.” 14. In the instant case in hand, it is seen that the allegations against each other is personal in nature without having any possible influence on the society at large. It is also apparent that no heinous or serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape, dacoity or any such nature is involved in the allegations made against each other by the parties in the instant case. It is also seen from the facts and in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, the possibility of conviction of any of the parties is remote and therefore, the continuation of such criminal proceeding would be a futile exercises and wastage of time. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussions and after consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties as well as the materials available on record and taking into account the ratios laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases, this Court is of the considered opinion that ends of justice would be served, if the instant petition is allowed by setting aside the FIR dated 28.06.2025 corresponding to Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025. 16. In view of the aforesaid finding, the Instant Criminal Petition is allowed by quashing and setting aside the aforesaid FIR dated 28.06.2025 corresponding to Doimukh P.S. Case No. 87/2025. In view of the aforesaid directions, the instant criminal petition is disposed Page No.# 8/8 of, as allowed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant