- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B M SHYAM PRASAD AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1062 OF 2017 (A) BETWEEN: STATE OF KARNATAKA BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, PUTTUR SUB-DIVISION, PUTTUR, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. VIJAYKUMAR MAJAGE, SPP-II.) AND: 1. RAVIPRASAD S/O LINGAPPA GOWDA, AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS, RESIDING AT MADAPPADI HOUSE, UBARADKA MITHOOR VILLAGE, SULLIA TALUK, D.K.-574239. 2. SUKUMARA S/O DHANANJAYA GOWDA, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, RESIDING AT GARNADKA HOUSE, UBARADKA MITHOOR VILLAGE, SULLIA TALUK, D.K. 574239. Digitally signed by LAKSHMINARAYAN N Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 3. SRI. BABU MERA S/O LATE BATYA MERA, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT BERADKA MANE, UBARADKA MITTOORU VILLAGE, SULYA TALUK, DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. PRASANNA D.P., ADV. FOR R1, SRI. JAGADEESH M.L., ADV. FOR R2, SRI. S. JAVEED, ADV. FOR R3.) [CAUSETITLE AMENDED VIDE COURT ORDER DATED:11.08.2022.] THIS CRL.A. IS FILED U/S.378(1) & (3) CR.P.C PRAYING TO GRANT LEAVE TO FILE AN APPEAL AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF ACQUITTAL DATED 05.01.2017 PASSED IN SPL.C.NO.38/2014 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. DIST. AND SESSIONS (SPL.) JUDGE, D.K., MANGALURU THEREBY ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENTS/ACCUSED NO.1 AND 2 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 376(D) AND 506 OF IPC AND SEC. 4 OF POCSO ACT AND SEC. 3(1)(xii) OF SC/ST (POA) ACT. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B M SHYAM PRASAD and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA) This appeal is preferred by the State, challenging the Judgment and Order dated 5th January 2017 passed in Special Case No.38 of 2014 by the II Additional District & Sessions (Special) Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore (for short - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 hereinafter referred to as the "trial Court"). By the said order, the trial Court acquitted the accused of the alleged offences. 2. Facts leading to this appeal are that, based on the complaint received on 05th March 2014, by victim girl aged 17 year 7 months, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Puttur Sub-division, filed charge-sheet against the accused for commission of offences punishable under Sections 376-D and 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short hereinafter referred to as "POCSO Act") and Section 3(1)(xii) of Schedule Castes & Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short hereinafter referred to as the "SC/ST (PoA) Act). It is alleged in the complaint that the victim belongs to Scheduled Tribe and she resides with her parents-PWs2 & 3, and her brothers. Her father was carrying out a construction under the government scheme near his old house, and the construction work was entrusted to one Raviprasad. On 4th March 2014 PW2-father left to work and PW3-mother also left to bring ration and she was all alone in the house. At that time, accused 1 & 2 were doing construction work in the building - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 nearby. When the victim came to front-yard to water the plants, accused came near the victim, where Accused No.1 held her arms and legs and lifted her to the old house and there, against her will and despite her resistance, committed sexual assault, confined her in the house and went outside. Thereafter, Accused No.2 also came in and committed illicit physical contact with the victim girl. It is further alleged in the complaint that after commission of rape on the victim girl, the accused threatened her with dire consequences and also humiliated her by taking her caste name. After the incident, the victim made telephone call to her neighbour Mohana, and informed him about the incident and also told him to immediately inform her parents about the incident. At about 12:00 noon, her mother came home and the victim girl narrated the incident to her mother. Even during that time accused 1 & 2 were doing the construction work. Though her mother scolded them, they did not respond and remained silent. When the father returned home, he was informed about the incident. Subsequently, the victim girl went to the police station along with her parents on the next day, i.e., on 05th - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 March 2014 at about 4:00 pm and lodged complaint with the police as per Exhibit P1. 3. After investigation, PW15-Deputy Superintendent of Police filed charge-sheet against accused for the offence punishable under Sections 376-D and 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(xii) of SC/ST (PoA) Act 1989. Accordingly, accused were arrested on 07th March 2014, and were remanded to custody till the disposal of the case. 4. To bring home the guilt of the accused, fifteen witnesses were examined as PWs1 to 15 and got marked 22 documents as Exhibits P1 to P22 and eleven material objects were marked as MOs1 to 5 and MOs7 to 12. On closure of prosecution evidence, statement of the accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded. Accused had denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them but have not chosen to adduce any defence evidence on their behalf. Having heard the arguments on both sides, the trial Court acquitted accused 1 and 2 for the offences alleged. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 Challenging the impugned judgment of acquittal, State is before the Court in this appeal. 5. Sri Vijayakumar Majage, the learned State Public Prosecutor-II appearing for the State, submits that the Judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is illegal and contrary to the evidence and materials placed on record and hence the same is liable to be set aside. The Court below has failed to properly appreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused. The evidence of victim-PW1 is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused, as she has categorically stated as to the heinous act committed by the accused upon her. She has corroborated the averments made in the complaint and there is nothing elicited in the cross-examination so as to give a complete go-by to her evidence regarding the offence committed by the accused. Acquitting the accused without properly appreciating the material evidence, has resulted in miscarriage of justice. He further submits that the trial Court ought to have seen that in a case of this nature, evidence of victim alone is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused, as no woman will come - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 forward to lodge a complaint unless and until she really is a victim of sexual assault. He submits that the evidence of PW8- Headmaster of the School who has issued the certificate regarding the date of birth of victim as per Exhibit P7, also goes to show that according to School Register, the date of birth of victim is 29th July 1996, and as such, she was a minor as on the date of alleged incident. PW14-Medical officer, who examined the victim girl, has issued report Exhibits P11 to P14 and as per his opinion, there is evidence suggestive of recent sexual assault upon the victim. Hence, this evidence is also sufficient to establish the case of prosecution. His further submission is that, delay if any, in lodging the complaint in the case of this nature, is not fatal to prosecution, as it is natural that victim being a minor and coming from rural background, having informed the incident to the parents and then would lodge the complaint. Even otherwise, his submission is that there is no inordinate delay in the registration of First Information. The trial Court ought not to have given much importance to the minor discrepancies occurred in the evidence of PW1 and hence submit that if the evidence of victim is read as a whole, it clearly discloses that victim was a minor and the - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 alleged offence has been committed upon her. On all these grounds he sought to allow the appeal and convict the accused for the offences alleged against them. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for respondent/accused 1 and 2 submits that the trial Court has appreciated the entire evidence on record placed before it in its proper perspective and has acquitted the accused and the same does not warrant interference by the Court in this appeal and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeal. 7. Having heard submissions advanced by the learned State Public Prosecutor-II and learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-accused, the following points would arise for our consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court suffers from legal infirmities requiring this Court to intercede? 2. What order? Regarding Point No.1: 8. Before we delve into adverting to the actual facts of the case and appreciation of evidence, it is necessary to refer the dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding scope and - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 power of Appellate Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. 9. In the case of MOTIRAM PADU JOSHI & OTHERS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in 2018 SCC ONLINE SC 676, at paragraph 23 of the judgment, it is held thus: “23. While considering the scope of power of the appellate court in an appeal against the order of acquittal, after referring to various judgments, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007)4 SCC 415, this Court summarised the principle as under:- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 10. In the case of MUNISHAMAPPA & OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & CONNECTED APPEALS reported in 2019 SCC ONLINE 69, at paragraph 16 of the judgment it is held as under: “16. The High Court in the present case was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. In such a case, - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 it is well settled that the High Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because it opines that a different view is possible or even preferable. The High Court, in other words, should not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because two views are possible. The interference of the High Court in such cases is governed by well-established principles. According to these principles, it is only where the appreciation of evidence by the trial court is capricious or its conclusions are without evidence that the High Court may reverse an order of acquittal. The High Court may be justified in interfering where it finds that the order of acquittal is not in accordance with law and that the approach of the trial court has led to a miscarriage of justice. …” 11. In the case of HARI RAM & OTHERS v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN reported in 2000 SCC ONLINE 933, at paragraph 4 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “4. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan on the other hand contended that the power of the High Court while hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal is in no way different from the power while hearing an appeal against conviction and the Court, therefore was fully justified in re-appreciating the entire evidence, upon which the order of acquittal was based. The High Court having examined the reasons of the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony of PWs 6 & 7 and having arrived at the conclusion, that - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 those reasons are in the realm of conjectures and there has been gross miscarriage of justice and the mis- appreciation of the evidence on record is the basis for acquittal, was fully entitled to set aside an order of acquittal and no error can be said to have been committed. It is too well settled that the power of the High Court, while hearing an appeal against an acquittal is as wide and comprehensive as in an appeal against a conviction and it had full power to re- appreciate the entire evidence, but if two views on the evidence are reasonably possible, one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal, merely because it feels that it would sitting as a trial court, have taken the other view. While re- appreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence requires that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of the learned trial Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice.…” 12. In the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. KISTOORA RAM reported in 2022 SCC ONLINE 684, at paragraph 8 of the judgment it is held as under: - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 “8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable. The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not possible at all.” 13. In the case of MAHAVIR SINGH v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported in (2016)10 SCC 220, at paragraph 12 of the judgment, it is observed thus: “12. In the criminal jurisprudence, an accused is presumed to be innocent till he is convicted by a competent court after a full-fledged trial, and once the trial court by cogent reasoning acquits the accused, then the reaffirmation of his innocence places more burden on the appellate court while dealing with the appeal. No doubt, it is settled law that there are no fetters on the power of the appellate court to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence both on facts and law upon which the order of acquittal is passed. But the court has to be very cautious in interfering with an appeal unless there are compelling and substantial grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court while passing an order has to give clear reasoning for such a conclusion.” - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 14. On the basis of the complaint, Sullia Police registered case in crime No.68 of 2014 against accused 1 and 2 for offences punishable under Sections 376-D and 506 of Indian Penal Code, Section 4 of POCSO Act, 2012, and under Section 3(1)(xii) of SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989, and submitted First Information Report to the Court as per Exhibit P10 on 5th March 2014 at 9:20 pm. 15. The case of the prosecution is that, the complainant-victim belongs to Scheduled Tribe and she resides with her parents-PWs2 & 3, and her brothers. Her father was carrying out a construction under the government scheme near his old house, and the construction work was entrusted to one Raviprasad. On 4th March 2014 when PWs2 and 3 were not there in the house and when the victim came to front-yard to water the plants, accused came there and accused No.1 held her arms and legs and lifted her and took her to the old house and there against her will and in spite of her resistance, committed sexual assault and thereafter, confined her in the house and went out. Thereafter, accused No.2 also came in - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 and committed illicit physical contact with the victim. It is further alleged in the complaint that after commission of rape on the victim girl, the accused threatened her with dire consequences and have also humiliated her by taking the name of her caste. Thus, the accused committed offences punishable under Sections 376-D and 506 of Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(xii) of SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. 16. Though the Investigating Officer has charge- sheeted nineteen witnesses, out of that, prosecution examined fifteen witnesses as PW1 to PW15 and marked 22 documents as Exhibits P1 to P22 and eleven material objects have been marked as MOs1 to 5 and 7 to 12. 17. We have scrutinized the materials placed before us. It is the case of the prosecution that, as on the date of alleged incident, the age of the victim was 17 year 7 months and for this reason, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of POCSO Act. To prove this fact, the prosecution has produced Exhibit P7-Birth certificate issued by Mahatma - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 Gandhi Malnad High School, Kodiyalbailu, Sullia Taluk. The evidence of PW8-Chidananda K, Headmaster of the said School is also adduced. The birth certificate issued by the school reveals that the date of birth of the victim girl was 29th July 1996. The original School Admission Register extract has not been produced by the prosecution. Even the Transfer Certificate issued by the school for admission to the first-year High School, i.e., to eighth standard, is also not produced. Investigating officer has not offered any explanation for non- production of material piece of evidence i.e., birth certificate or the transfer certificate. Investigating officer has also failed to get the age of victim determined through ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted upon the orders of the Committee or the Board as required under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. It is pertinent to note that in the case of SUNIL v. STATE OF HARYANA reported in AIR 2010 SC 392 and in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. MUNNA @ SHAMBHOO NATH reported in (2016)1 SCC 696, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that evidence on the approximate age of the victim is insufficient to conclude the exact age of - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 victim. In the case of JARAIL SINGH v. THE STATE OF HARYANA reported in AIR 2013 SC 3467, it was held that the age of rape victims should be determined by Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the JJ Rules'). There is no difference regarding minority between the child in conflict with the law and the child who is a victim of crime. According to Rule 12(3) of the JJ Rules, priority will be given to school documents when determining the age of the victim. Medical experts' opinion are only allowed if there are no school documents. It is clear that only in the absence of the school documents, other evidence is permissible to determine the age of the victim. 18. In the case of MAHADEO, S/O. KERBA MASKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2013) 14 SCC 637 the Hon’ble Apex Court, making reference to the statutory provisions contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, wherein Rule 12 prescribes the procedure to be followed in determining the age of the Juvenile is set out, held that in every case concerning a child or - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 juvenile in conflict with the law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, by the Committee seeking evidence by obtaining: “12(3)(a)(i) The matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) The date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) The birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a Panchayat. ” The Juvenile Justice Act is amended in 2015 i.e., The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. However, the State Government has not framed separate Rules. But, the procedure for determining the age of the juvenile is incorporated in Section 94 of the Act, 2015.” 19. Exhibit P14 is the medical certificate issued by Dr Joshima Janardhan, who is examined as PW14. In Exhibit P14, the Medical officer has opined that the age of the victim is more than 17 years and less than 18 years. Without any test, PW14 has given his opinion that the victim was below 18 years of age. Further, he has clearly admitted that in the medical - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 assessment of the age of a particular person, there may be chances of one or two years plus or minus. Even in the ossification test, there may be a chance of one or two years plus or minus. During the cross-examination of PW1-victim, she has clearly stated that at the time of giving statement before the Puttur Court, her age was nineteen years. Further, she has admitted that as per the advice of the Women Association, Dalit Association and from the Police, she has stated before the Puttur Court that her age was 17 years. This testimony of PW1 is not consistent with evidence of PW8- Headmaster and also the contents of Exhibit P7-School certificate. The trial Court has considered all these materials in its proper perspective and held that the prosecution has failed to prove that victim was minor as on the date of the alleged incident as defined under Section 2(d) of POCSO Act. Even on re-appreciation, re-examination and reconsideration of the entire evidence on record, we do not find any error/illegality in the finding given by the trial Court. 20. The other submission of the learned State Public Prosecutor-II that, delay if any, in lodging the complaint in the - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 case of this nature is not fatal is concerned, the Investigating officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 376-D of Indian Penal Code and accordingly, sought to convict the accused under the said Section. In this regard, we have examined the material placed before us. The alleged incident took place on 4th March, 2014 at 9:00 am. Complaint came to be filed on 5th March 2014 at 4:00 pm. Exhibit P10 First Information Report reveals that the learned Magistrate has received First Information Report on 05.03.2014 at 9.00 pm. The signature of the complainant is not obtained in Column No.12 of the First Information Report. It is stated in the complaint that due to criminal intimidation by the accused, PW1 could not file complaint at the earliest. Whereas the statement recorded under Section 164(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure marked as Exhibit P15, reveals that on 05th March, 2014, victim had gone to the residence of Advocate Krishnamurthy and he informed her to come to office at 10:00 am. Accordingly, she visited the office at 10:00 am and narrated the facts. Thereafter, she lodged complaint against accused. She has further deposed in her evidence that the villagers requested her - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 not to lodge complaint to police, but her father did not heed to their request and hence, she filed the complaint belatedly. During the cross-examination of PW1, victim has stated that at the time of incident she was possessing a mobile phone. Further she has admitted in her evidence that she had informed about this incident to her paternal uncles over phone (Chikkappa and Doddappa), but they did not come to the place of crime. Further, she has admitted that, Sullia Police Station and Government Hospital are situated at a distance of one kilometer from her house. She has also informed about the incident to CW5-Mohana over phone. He told her to file a complaint. These admissions made in the cross-examination and also while making statement under 164(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure, have not been disclosed in complaint Exhibit P1. If the incident had really taken place as alleged by the prosecution, the victim, being a prudent girl studied up to ninth standard and having mobile in her hand, would have sent a message to police station or would have called Police seeking protection and would have informed about the alleged rape committed by the accused. But she has not done so. After lapse of 31 hours from the time of alleged crime, she has a - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 lodged complaint with the Police without proper explanation as stated in her evidence, which create reasonable doubt as to the alleged act of the accused. 21. With regard to the medical evidence, Exhibit P1- complaint does not indicate any injury on victim's body. In the evidence of victim, she has deposed that she has sustained injuries on her back and private part when she protested against sexual intercourse and at the time of sexual assault there was bleeding and her clothes were stained with blood. 22. PW10-Dr. Joshima Janardhan has not deposed regarding the injuries caused to victim on her back or private part. Exhibits P11 & P13-Certificates of examination for sexual offence issued by PW14, does not disclose any injury on the body of the victim. Name of the accused is also not disclosed in the complaint. While recording the statement under Section 164(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure Exhibit P15, victim has not deposed as to the injuries caused on her back and to her private part. These material omissions and contradictions will also create doubt as to the alleged act of the accused. - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 23. Additionally, during the course of cross-examination on 18th March 2016, PW1-victim has stated that only at the instance of the Police, Women Association and Dalit Association, she has given statement as per Exhibit P15 under Section 164(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure. But, at the time of giving that statement, the Women Association, Dalit Association and Police were outside the Court and after recording the statement, they took her from the Court. Further, she has deposed that no incident took place as stated in her statement marked at Exhibit P15. Additonally, she has also deposed that accused have not harassed her as stated in Exhibit P15. In this regard, the learned SPP-II submits that, the accused won over the victim upon recording her further statement on 18th March, 2016, therefore, she has not supported the case of prosecution. A perusal of evidence recorded on 18th March, 2016 and the Order Sheet of the trial Court reveals that after closure of the evidence of PW1, without any application filed under Section 311 of Code of Criminal Procedure, PW1 was examined fully. Admittedly, the accused are in judicial custody from the date of arrest till the date of acquittal judgment. Even in cross-examination made by - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 Additional Public Prosecutor after treating her as a hostile witness, the learned Public Prosecutor has not elicited any answer from the mouth of PW1 that only at the instance of Women Association, Dalit Association and Police, she has given statement as per Exhibit P15. Therefore, the question of accused winning over the PW1 does not arise as they were in judicial custody at the time of recording the evidence of PW1 and also other witnesses. 24. Therefore, the interested testimony of PW1 is quite inconsistent to her complaint and to her statement recorded under Section 164(5) of Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, testimony of PW1 does not inspire confidence. Apart from this, the statement of PW2 and PW3-parents of the victim also do not support the case of the prosecution. Both are treated as hostile witnesses with the permission of the Court and were cross-examined by the Additional Public Prosecutor. During their cross-examination also, they have categorically denied the statement said to have been recorded by the Investigating Officer under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure which are marked as Exhibits P3 and P4. - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 Other seizure mahazar witnesses and panch witnesses have also not supported the case of the prosecution. 25. Viewed from any angle, we do not find any cogent, corroborative, convincing, clinching evidence to constitute the commission of offence punishable under Section 376-D of Indian Penal Code. The trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record in accordance with law in its proper perspective. Even on re-appreciation, re-examination and re- consideration of evidence on record, so also, keeping in mind the aforesaid decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court we do not find any error/illegality/infirmity in the impugned judgment of acquittal. 26. In the result, we proceed to pass the following: O R D E R (i) Appeal is dismissed; (ii) Judgment and Order dated 5th January 2017 passed in Special Case No.38 of 2014 by the II Additional District & Sessions (Special) Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore is confirmed; - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:22047-DB CRL.A No. 1062 of 2017 (iii) Registry to send the trial court records along with the copy of this judgment to the concerned Court. Sd/- (B M SHYAM PRASAD) JUDGE Sd/- (G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE lnn List No.: 1 Sl No.: 46