Page No.1 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 2025:CGHC:49174-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 173 of 2012 [Arsing out of judgment dated 17.09.2009, passed in Sessions Trial No.46 of 2005 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramchandra Chetti and others) by the Sessions Judge, Korba (CG)] The State of Chhattisgarh, through- District Magistrate, Korba, District Korba, (Chhattisgarh) ... Appellant Versus 1 - Ramchandra Chetti And Ors. S/o Shri B.K. Chetti Aged About 55 Years R/o C.S.E.B. Colony, Quarter No. N.D. 66 Korba East, Ps Kotwali Korba, Distt. - Korba C.G., Chhattisgarh 2 - Smt. Jayshree Chetti W/o R.C. Chetti Aged About 48 Years R/o Cseb Colony, Quarter No. N.D. -66 Korba East, Ps Kotwali Korba Distt. - Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Basant Soni S/o Late Rangbahadur Aged About 23 Years R/o Kashinagar, Police Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Ramkumar S/o Late Maniram Dewangan Aged About 26 Years R/o Kashinagar, Police Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 5 - Paltan S/o Bundram Soura [Died and Deleted by CO dt. 21-11- 2012] 6 - Virendra Singh S/o Jaisingh Aged About 25 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 7 - Manharan Lal S/o Bahorik Lal Aged About 25 Years R/o Kosabadi, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 8 - Jeevan S/o Jamvant Dhobi Aged About 23 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh SAIFAN KHAN Digitally signed by SAIFAN KHAN Page No.2 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 9 - Ravi Soni S/o Ayodhya Prasad Soni Aged About 25 Years R/o Bhalusatka, Tah. And Distt. And Distt. Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 10 - Deepak Kujur S/o Jwakim (Jakim) Aged About 25 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 11 - Amit S/o Silbanush Kujur Aged About 31 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 12 - Tirathram S/o Jamvant Aged About 26 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 13 - Rajesh S/o Munna Lal Vastrakar Aged About 23 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 14 - Vijay S/o Manharan Lal Chandra Aged About 23 Years R/o Purana Kashinagar, Korba, Chowki Rampur, Distt. - Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 15 - Ajay S/o S. Kujur Aged About 25 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 16 - Sushil Das S/o Shankar Das Aged About 23 Years R/o Aara Machine, Azad Chowk Kashinagar, Police Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 17 - Rajendra Kumar S/o Munna Lal Vastrakar Aged About 23 Years R/o Podi Bahar, Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 18 - Abhishek Chetti S/o Shri Ramchandra Chetti Aged About 28 Years R/o Cseb Colony, Quarter No. N.D. -66 Korba East, Police Chowki Rampur, Ps Kotwali Korba Distt. - Korba C.G., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 19 - Shyamu Chetti S/o Late Hari Vittal Chetti Aged About 48 Years R/o Cseb Colony Korba East Old C- 52, Police Chowki Rampur, Distt. - Korba C.G. , District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents [Cause-titles taken from Case Information System (CIS)] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For Appellant/State : Mr. R.S. Marhas, Addl. Advocate General For Respondents : Mr. Ashutosh Shukla, Advocate ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Division Bench Page No.3 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board (25.09.2025) Sanjay K. Agrawal, J (1) By this acquittal appeal filed under Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the “CrPC”), the appellant/State is calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of impugned judgment of acquittal dated 17.09.2009, passed in Sessions Trial No.46 of 2005 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Ramchandra Chetti and others) by the Sessions Judge, Korba (CG), whereby the learned trial Court has acquitted all the accused/respondents No.01 to 19 herein for offence under Sections 147, 148, 452/149, 294, 506(B)/149, 427/149, 395/149, 397/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Facts of the case, in brief: (2) Before dealing with the prosecution case, it would be advantageous to notice admitted facts in the case. The suit accommodation owned by the accused/respondent No.2- Smt. Jayshree Chetti was let to the complainant- Suryakant Thakur (PW-03) vide rent agreement (Ex.D/02) dt. 11.01.2001 for a period of 03 years. Thereafter, accused/respondents No.02 & 03 claimed eviction of the suit property and also made complaint to the Municipal Corporation, Korba alleging illegal construction in it with prayer for demolition of the illegal construction on 11.02.2005. It is also admitted that complainant (PW-03) has filed a civil suit for Page No.4 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 declaration and permanent injunction, which was pending consideration on the date of alleged offence i.e. 16.03.2005. Thus, under this factual backdrop, the prosecution case has to be noticed. (3) According to the case of the prosecution, on 16.03.2005, at about 09:30 AM, the accused-respondents herein constituted unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons entered in Jagat Vikas Dairy, situated at Kosabadi Main Road, Korba, which was owned by the accused/respondent No.02 and let out to the complainant- Suryakant (PW-03) and, in furtherance of their common object, committed dacoity of cash of Rs.20,000/- from the cash box and caused damage to the property inside the shop and, thereby committed the aforesaid offences in question. Thereafter, pursuant to the written complaint (Ex.P/02) lodged by the complainant- Suryakant (PW-03), FIR (Ex.P/02A) was registered against accused persons and wheels of investigation started running, in which, nazari naksha (Ex.P/07) was prepared. MLC of the injured person/complainant (PW-03) was conducted by Dr. Paliwal (PW-04) vide Ex.P/07A, whereby it has been opined that the injuries are simple in nature. The accused persons were arrested vide Ex.P/23 to Ex.P/37, whereas accused- Raghveer and Dinesh were absconded and later on got arrested. Further, following articles were seized from the possession of following accused persons: Accused Article Sezied Dinesh - Hammer Page No.5 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 Raghveer - Crowbar Manharam - Hammer Virendra - Gaiti Basant - Spade Paltan - Gaiti Spot - damaged Jeep (4) However, no jewelry, cash or damaged property, which are alleged to have been looted, have not been seized by any of the accused persons. Thereafter, statements of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the accused persons in the competent court of criminal jurisdiction and, ultimately, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. (5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 48 documents, whereas the accused persons in support of their defence, have examined 02 witness and exhibited 12 document. The learned trial Court also examined 02 witnesses. (6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record proceeded to acquit all the accused persons for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452/149, 294, 506(B)/149, 427/149, 395/149, 397/149 of IPC vide impugned judgment dated 17.09.2009, against which, both these acquittal Page No.6 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 appeals are preferred before this Court. Submissions of parties: (7) Mr. R.S. Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the accused persons, as there is ample evidence available on record to connect them with the offences in question in shape of direct testimony of Suryakant Thakur (PW-03) [injured witnesses], Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) [eye witness] and Yuvaraj Dewangan (PW- 09) and, therefore, the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in acquitting all the accused persons by recording findings which are perverse and contrary to the record. Hence, in exercise of appellate power, the acquittal appeal preferred by the appellant-State deserves to be allowed and, further, the accused persons (respondents No.01 to 19) are liable to be punished for the offences in question. (8) Per-contra, Ashutosh Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the acquitted accused persons (A-1 to A-19) by rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand 1 submits that the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal is extremely limited. He further submits that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not reliable and trustworthy and, even 1 2025 INSC 114 Page No.7 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 nothing incriminating (i.e. alleged looted article) have been seized from any the acquitted accused/respondents. The matter is a civil nature, which has been given shape to a criminal case, as there is outstanding litigation between the parties and, in order to not vacate the suit premises, the respondents herein have falsely been implicated in the present case. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in acquitting all the accused persons are well merited and, no interference by this Court is called for in it. Hence, both the acquittal appeals are liable to be dismissed. (9) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. Discussion and analysis: (10) At the very outset, we would firstly consider the scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, for which, it would be profitable to notice the relevant principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable 907 Surendra Singh and another (supra), whereby in Para-11 & 12 it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 Page No.8 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482- 83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, Page No.9 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however,must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused Page No.10 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” Page No.11 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” (11) Thus, in light of the above quote guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (12) In the case at hand, for the offences in question, all the accused persons have been charged with the aid of Section 149 of IPC. However, learned trial Court has clearly recorded a finding that for constitution of unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 149 of IPC, the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. For constitution of unlawful assembly, in light of Section 141 of IPC, it is mandatory that five or more persons constitute the said assembly with a common object. In this regard, the learned trial Court has relied upon the statement of complainant- Suryakant (PW-03), who has named respondents Page No.12 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 No.02 & 03 and their two sons i.e. accused/respondent No.18 & 19 and he has also named accused- Dinesh and Raghveer, but the learned trial Court did not rely upon Dinesh and Raghveer, as they were absconding. Furthermore, in Para-13, Suryakant (PW-03) has clearly stated that since identification parade has not been conducted for Dinesh and Raghveer and, he did not know them prior to the date of offence, therefore, their names have not been considered by the learned trial Court as member of unlawful assembly. The said finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the names of Dinesh and Raghveer cannot be considered as member of unlawful assembly for the purpose of 141/149 of IPC, is correct finding of fact based on evidence available on record. (13) Now, Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) has been held to be eye- witness by the prosecution. Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) is uncle of Suryakant (PW-03). However, the learned trial Court did not consider his testimony as eye-witness for the reasons that while lodging FIR via written complaint (Ex.P/02), Suryakant (PW-03) did not mentioned in it that Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) is the eye- witness to the incident. Even otherwise, there is no evidence available on record to show that in the incident Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) has suffered any injury or he taken part while interfering in the alleged incident. Further, Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) did not name the accused/respondent No.02 in his police statement (Ex.D/02) to be the persons involved in the incident in Page No.13 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 question. Even, no test identification parade has been conducted at the instance of Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) in the present case. As such, for the aforesaid reasons, the learned trial Court has rightly held that Karan Singh Thakur (PW-06) is not the eye-witness and has rightly disbelieved his testimony. (14) Similarly, Yuvraj Dewangan (PW-09) has also been cited as an important witness by the prosecution. Yuvraj Dewangan (PW-09) was the salesman in the shop/dairy of the complainant. He made statement before the Court that on the date of offence 70-80 persons entered into the shop including Ramu Chetti (A-1) and he went out to call Suryakant (PW-03). He has also named accused- Ramu Chetti and has stated that Rs.11,000/- has been taken out from the cash box by the crowd. However, said Yuvraj Dewangan (PW-09) has been declared hostile. As such, only naming accused- Ramu Chetti (A-1) and Raghveer Singh, he has not supported the case of the prosecution at all. Therefore, the learned trial Court has discarded the testimony of Yuvraj Dewangan (PW-09), which is absolutely justified and correct, as the same is based on evidence available on record. (15) Furthermore, in the present case, it is not in dispute that there exists dispute between the accused/respondents No.01 & 02 and the complainant- Suryakant (PW-03) with regard to suit property and litigation was going on the date of offence by both the parties. Page No.14 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 Suryakant (PW-03) in para- 29 to 31 in his statement before the Court has also admitted that he has taken shop in question on rent and he has also received notice from the Municipal Corporation for removing the illegal construction in it. It is also not in dispute that the officer of the concerned Municipal Corporation also came on the spot on 11.02.2005 for demolition of the illegal construction, which is duly proved by Jagjit Singh Dhillan (DW-01) and Ajay Pandey (DW- 02). Even otherwise, neither the alleged amount of cash to the tune of Rs.20,000/- nor golden chain or mobile has been seized and produced before the Court. Further, it is a finding recorded by the learned trial Court that from the accused party, 03 members, namely, Raghveer, Dinesh and Jayshree have suffered more injuries than complainant- Suryakant (PW-03) vide their MLC reports, which have duly been proved by Dr. Paliwal (PW-04). Moreover, a perusal of statement of Suryakant (PW-03) recorded under Section 161 of CrPC vide Ex.D/01, there is a omission with regard to the factum of keeping Rs.20,000/- cash in the cash box of the shop. Conclusion: (16) In view of foregoing analysis, we are unable to hold that the accused persons (private respondents No.01 to 19 herein) are the authors of the crime and, therefore, they are liable to be convicted for the offences in question. The learned trial Court has rightly held all the accused persons (private respondents No.01 to 19 herein) Page No.15 of 15 IN ACQA-173-2012 entitled for acquittal for offences under Sections 147, 148, 452/149, 294, 506(B)/149, 427/149, 395/149, 397/149 of IPC on the basis of finding recorded in the impugned judgment dated 17.09.2009 and we do not find that the said findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. (17) Accordingly, this acquittal appeal filed by the State is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost. Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge s@if