HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 12073 of 2025 Court No. - 51 HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J. Heard Ms. Anjum Haq learned counsel for the appellant, learned A.G.A. for the State, and perused the entire record. Despite service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of the opposite party no.2. 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been preferred to quash the summoning order dated 24.04.2025 as well as the entire proceedings of S.S.T. No. 147 of 2025, arising out of Case Crime No. 0311 of 2024, under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3), 329(4) BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Police Station Sarpataha, District Jaunpur. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised a solitary submission that no offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is made out against the appellant. It is submitted that the said provision has been invoked only because Section 351(3) BNS, corresponding to erstwhile Section 506 IPC, finds place in the Schedule appended to the SC/ST Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that even the basic ingredients of Section 351(3) BNS are absent from the allegations made in the FIR as well as from the material collected during investigation. It is submitted that there is no allegation indicating any intention on the part of the appellant to cause alarm to the complainant, which is the sine qua non for constituting the offence of criminal intimidation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the appellant has falsely been implicated in the present case due to a long-standing land dispute between the parties. It is contended that the opposite party no.2 wanted to grab the land allotted in favour of Somari and, since the appellant had intervened in the village panchayat to settle the dispute, he has been maliciously implicated in the present matter. It is further 5. Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Anjum Haq, Shailesh Kumar Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A. Samiruddin .....Appellant(s) State of U.P. and Another .....Respondent(s) submitted that the First Information Report was lodged after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about one month and twenty-four days from the alleged date of incident. During investigation, several independent witnesses namely Somari, Maghu, Badri, Ayyub Khan, Mohd. Hasan Khan, Mohd. Sabi Khan and Suresh stated that construction work was going on over the disputed land and the opposite party no.2 herself came there and created disturbance, and also threw mud and bricks upon the appellant. It is also pointed out that Jagdish, who was shown in the First Information Report as an eye- witness, subsequently stated that he was not present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. Learned counsel further submits that even the medical evidence discloses only simple injuries which were about eight days old. Learned counsel further submits that the Investigating Officer, ignoring the material collected during investigation, submitted charge-sheet only against the appellant while exonerating the other named accused persons namely Rukmuddin, Shabrin Bano and Qayyum. It is argued that no offence under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3), 329(4) BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is made out from the allegations contained in the First Information Report as no caste-related abusive words have been alleged against the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations regarding use of weapons are wholly bald and omnibus in nature and no material has been brought on record to demonstrate any overt act on the part of the appellant so as to create an apprehension of imminent danger or alarm in the mind of the complainant. 6. It is thus submitted that once Section 351(3) BNS itself is not attracted, the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, which is dependent upon commission of a scheduled offence, also cannot survive. 7. Per contra, learned A.G.A. vehemently opposed the appeal and submitted that from a bare perusal of the FIR and material collected during investigation, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence is made out against the appellant. It is submitted that the impugned summoning order has been passed after due consideration of the police report and material available on record and does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 8. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 9. From a perusal of the FIR and the statements recorded during investigation, it transpires that no specific allegation of caste-related abuse has been levelled against the appellant. There is no averment that any caste-indicative words were uttered by the appellant against the informant or that the alleged occurrence took place on account of 10. CRLA No. 12073 of 2025 2 the caste identity of the complainant. There is also no material to indicate that the appellant was aware that the opposite party no.2 belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. So far as the offence under Section 351(3) BNS is concerned, this Court finds that the essential ingredient of “intention to cause alarm” is conspicuously absent from the allegations. Mere use of threatening language or general allegations made during the course of an altercation would not ipso facto constitute the offence of criminal intimidation unless the threat is of such a nature as is intended to create alarm in the mind of the complainant. 11. In the present case, despite allegations that the appellant abused and assaulted the complainant, there is no specific assertion either in the FIR or in the statements recorded during investigation that the appellant extended any definite threat to the life, reputation or property of the complainant with the intention to cause alarm to her. 12. The material on record does not disclose any specific overt act, particular threat or conduct attributable to the appellant from which it may reasonably be inferred that the alleged acts were intended to create fear or alarm in the mind of the complainant. The allegations remain vague and omnibus in nature. Moreover, the alleged occurrence is stated to have taken place in the presence of several persons and in the backdrop of an admitted land dispute and, in such circumstances, the allegation of criminal intimidation does not appear to satisfy the ingredients of Section 351(3) BNS. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka 2015(7) SCC 423 has held that mere expression of words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of criminal intimidation. 14. Similar view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba Vs. State of West Bengal, 2015 (7) SCC 423, wherein the Court held as under: 15. “Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person charged threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald allegation that the appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Consequently, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of the offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted.” The aforesaid judgments clearly lay down that unless there are specific 16. CRLA No. 12073 of 2025 3 allegations disclosing a threat with intent to cause alarm, the offence of criminal intimidation would not be made out merely on the basis of vague and omnibus allegations. Once this Court finds that the offence under Section 351(3) BNS is not prima facie made out, the very foundation for invoking Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act disappears, inasmuch as the said provision is attracted only when an offence specified in the Schedule is committed against a person on the ground that such person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community. 17. Accordingly, the present appeal deserves to be partly allowed. 18. The appeal is partly allowed. 19. The summoning order dated 24.04.2025 and the entire proceedings of S.S.T. No. 147 of 2025, arising out of Case Crime No. 0311 of 2024, are hereby quashed only to the extent of offences under Section 351(3) BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 20. However, the proceedings in respect of the remaining offences shall continue in accordance with law. 21. May 15, 2026 pks CRLA No. 12073 of 2025 4 (Madan Pal Singh,J.) Digitally signed by :- PANKAJ KUMAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad