1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 4051 OF 2017 BETWEEN SMT. C. SARASAMMA W/O P. NAGARAJ, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, NO.115/1, NEAR BANASWADI BUS STAND, DODDA BANASWADI, BENGALURU-560043 ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. *M.N. SHESHADRI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. TEJASWINI RAJKUMAR AND SRI. VARUN GOWDA, ADVOCATES) AND 1 . KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION A BODY CORPORATE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION ACT, 1982, (CENTRAL) ACT, LXIII OF 1951) HAVING ITS HEAD OFFICE AT NO.1/1, THIMMAIAH ROAD, BENGALURU-560 052. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER (LEGAL) RECOVERY-II. 2 . M/S. ETHNIC INFORMATICS PRIVATE LTD., A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT NO.17/1, CUNNINGHAM ROAD, BENGALURU-560 052, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR 3 . SRI. S. BADRINARAYAN S/O K. SRINIVASA MURTHY, MAJOR, R * Corrected vide chamber order dated 21.04.2025 2 RESIDING AT FLAT NO. A-2, KRISHNALEELA APARTMENTS, 8TH MAIN ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003. 4 . SMT. ROOPA JAGANNATH D/O JAGANNATH, MAJOR, RESIDING AT NO.58, RANGANATHA NILAYA, 3RD STAGE, VINAYAKA LAYOUT, VIJAYANAGAR, BANGALORE-560 040. 5 . SRI. O.N RAVI SHANKAR S/O O.V NARASIMHA SHETTY, MAJOR, RESIDING AT SITE NO. 89, CORPORATION DIVISION, NO.5, WARD NO.7, 11TH CROSS, 2ND MAIN ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BANGALORE-560 003. 6 . SRI. O.N RAMESH BABU S/O O.V NARASIMHA SHETTY, MAJOR, RESIDING AT SITE NO.89, CORPORATION DIVISION, NO.5, WARD NO.7, 11TH CROSS, 2ND MAIN ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BANGALORE-560 003. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. BIPIN HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR R1, SRI. LAXMIKANTH K.B, ADVCATE FOR R6, R3-SERVED & UNREPRESENTED VIDE ORDER DATED 20.09.2021, NOTICE TO R2, R4, R5 & R6 ARE DISPENSED WITH) THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 32(9) OF THE KARNATAKA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED25.11.2015 PASSED IN MISC.NO.521/2004 ON THE FILE OF THE XXXVII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE, (CCH-38), ALLOWING THE PETITION FILED U/S 31(1)(aa) & 32 OF SFC ACT. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, RAJESH RAI K, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 3 CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K CAV JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K) This Miscellaneous First Appeal is directed against the order passed in Misc.No.521/2004 dated 25.11.2015 by the XXXVII Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge (CCH-38), Bangalore City, (hereinafter referred to as the 'learned Sessions Judge' for short) whereby, the learned Sessions Judge allowed the petition filed by the respondent No.1-Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation' for short) under Sections 31(1)(aa) and 32 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the SFC Act' for short). 2. The abridged facts apposite for consideration are as under: The respondent No.2 Company i.e., M/s. Ethnic Informatics Private Limited had obtained a term loan of Rs.2,40,00,000/- from respondent No.1-Corporation. The said term loan was sanctioned on 13.01.2001 with terms and condition under the general scheme for developing software solutions for educational institutions which was proposed to be established at Basaveshwaranagar, Bangalore. After sanctioning the said loan, respondents No.3 and 4 executed a 4 Guarantee Deed dated 16.04.2001 and the respondents No.5 and 6 executed a Guarantee Deed dated 20.04.2001 and the appellant executed a Guarantee Deed dated 08.06.2002. Further, they all collectively executed Mortgage Deed and Hypothecation Deed in favour of respondent No.1-Corporation. Since the borrower failed to repay the loan, the Corporation initiated proceedings for recovery under Section 29 of SFC Act and the Corporation took over the unit on 04.09.2003. The Corporation issued a recall notice to the appellant and respondents No.3 to 6 invoking the guarantee executed by them in favour of the Corporation. The said notice was served to the appellant and respondents, however, the borrower i.e., respondent No.2 failed to repay the debts of respondent No.1- Corporation. Once again a legal notice was issued on 22.12.2003 to the appellant and other guarantors to repay the loan amount. Since the said notice also remained un-complied by the guarantors, the Corporation was left with no alternative but to file a Miscellaneous Petition under Section 31(1)(aa) and Section 32 of the SFC Act, against the appellant and others to recover a sum of Rs.3,24,22,923/- with cost and interest in Miscellaneous Petition No.521/2004 before the learned Sessions Judge. Albeit, the summonses were severed to respondents No.2 to 6, however, respondents No.2 to 5 remained absent. As such, they were placed ex-parte. The appellant herein appeared through her counsel and contested the case. 5 3. To prove the claims of the Corporation before the learned Sessions Judge, the Corporation examined one witness i.e., the officer of the Corporation as PW.1 and marked 14 documents as Exs.P1 to P14. Also, the appellant examined herself as RW.1 and marked 6 documents as Exs.R1 to R6. 4. On assessment of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Sessions Judge allowed the application filed by the respondent No.1 and passed the order as under: "ORDER Petition filed by the petitioner corporation u/s 31[1] [aa] & 32 of S.F.C. Act is allowed with cost. The Petitioner Corporation is entitled to recover petition claim amount of Rs.3,24,22,923/- (Rupees Three crores twenty four lakhs twenty two thousand nine hundred and twenty three only) with interest at the rate of 19% p.a. from the date of filing of petition till its realization. The Respondents 2 to 6 are jointly and severally liable to discharge the dues of respondent No.1 Company. In the event the respondents fail to discharge the dues of Petitioner Corporation, the petitioner corporation is at 10 Misc. No.521 of 2004 liberty to recover its dues by alienating the petition schedule property." Being aggrieved by the above order, the appellant/guarantor- respondent No.6 sought this appeal. 5. We have heard the learned Senior counsel Sri. M.N. Seshadri for the appellant, learned counsel Sri Bipin Hegde for 6 respondent No.1 and the learned counsel Sri Laxmikanth K.B., for respondent No.6. 6. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge grossly erred by passing the impugned order by neither assigning valid reason nor examining credibility of the witnesses and the documents placed by the appellant in right perspective. He further contended that, the learned Sessions Judge has failed to address the cardinal and solitary issues raised by the appellant in the petition regarding the execution, the credibility of the Deed of Guarantee dated 08.06.2002 as per Ex.P6 and also failed to note the cause of action for filing the miscellaneous petition. According to the learned Senior counsel, the execution of Ex.P6-Deed of Guarantee has been denied unequivocally and expressly by the appellant stating that the Corporation fraudulently procured her signature on blank papers. She never stood as guarantor for loan sanctioned in favour of respondent No.2. By enunciating his arguments, he contended that, it is admitted in the evidence of PW.1-officer of the Corporation that he was not present in the head office during sanctioning of the loan amount. Further, he failed to recollect that who accompanied the appellant to his office to execute Deed of Guarantee-Ex.P6. It is categorically admitted by him that, the appellant did not execute Ex.P6 in his presence. The learned Senior counsel by emphasising 7 on Ex.P6 contended that there was no seal and signature affixed by any official of respondent No.1-Corporation on Ex.P6. As such, much credence cannot be attached to the evidence of PW.1 who is a hearsay witness to the entire transaction. In such circumstances, the Corporation failed to discharge the initial burden of proving the execution of Ex.P6. The learned Senior counsel, by placing reliance on evidence of RW.1 i.e., the appellant, submitted that, RW.1 has stated in her evidence that at no point of time had she stood as guarantor to the loan transaction between respondents No.1 and 2 and that her signature was procured fraudulently on blank papers. This solitary evidence of RW.1 is unchallenged in cross-examination. He further contended that, it is a settled position of law that admission of signature on a document is not the admission of the execution of the document. According to the learned Senior counsel, the execution implies conscious execution and knowledge of its contents. Placing reliance on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Veena Singh v. Collector reported in (2022) 7 SCC 1, he contended that the execution of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed the documents. Where an individual affixes signature on blank papers and it is later converted into a different document, it cannot be termed as execution of documents with the consent and knowledge of the executor. Additionally, he contended that the appellant lodged a complaint before the Ramamurthynagar Police 8 Station, Bangalore for the offence of cheating and forgery committed by respondent No.1 and others for having fraudulently obtained her signature on Ex.P6. On the strength of said complaint, the Police registered a case against respondent No.1 and others for the offence punishable under Section 420 r/w Section 34 of IPC in Crime No.14/2006 and after a detailed investigation, the said Police filed a final report against respondent No.1 and others for the offences punishable under Section 420 r/w Section 120B of IPC. In such circumstances, it is categorically established that, the appellant never executed Ex.P6 and her signature was fraudulently obtained on it by respondent No.1-Corporation colluding with others. Hence, according to the learned Senior counsel, the learned Sessions Judge ought not to have allowed the Miscellaneous Petition filed by respondent No.1 and ordered to recover the claim amount. With these submissions, he prays to allow the appeal. In order to buttress his argument, he relied on the following judgments. 1. Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine Punj 177 2. Jayalakshmidevamma v. Janardhan Reddi reported in 1958 SCC OnLine AP 140 3. A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian reported in 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44 9 4. Traders Syndicate v. Union of India reported in 1982 SCC OnLine Cal 149 5. Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2003) 1 SCC 240 6. Veena Singh v. Collector reported in (2022) 7 SCC 1 7. Veeramachineni Gangadhara Rao v. Andhra Bank Ltd., reported in (1971) 1 SCC 874 7. Refuting the above submission, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the learned Sessions Judge, on meticulously examining the evidence and materials on record, passed a well reasoned order which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. He further contended that the appellant failed to establish her defence that her signature on Ex.P6 was fraudulently obtained by respondent No.1-Corporation and others by placing probable defence. According to the learned counsel, the appellant raised an improbable defence before the learned Sessions Judge and before this Court in an earlier round of litigation. Before the learned Sessions Court, she denied the execution of Ex.P6 and her signature unequivocally alleging that, one of the Managers i.e., Sri. Lokesh of the Corporation obtained her signature on blank papers nearly 40-50 places to disburse hand loan to her and thereafter, the same was used for the collateral 10 security of the loan of respondent No.2-company. In the earlier round of litigation i.e., the writ petition filed by respondents No.2 to 6 challenging the notice of the Corporation, the appellant contended that she stood as a guarantor and mortgaged her properties in favour of respondent No.1-Corporation and claimed that the Corporation cannot exercise any powers under Section 29 of the SFC Act against the guarantor. In such circumstances, the defence taken by the appellant that she did not execute Ex.P6 is far from truth. 8. He further contended that, the Corporation, to prove its case, examined PW.1 and marked 14 documents as Ex.P1 to P14 which categorically established that the appellant and respondents No.3 to 6 executed the Deed of Guarantee and thereafter, both the principal debtor and the appellant and other guarantors failed to repay the loan amount. He further contended, that the Corporation has complied with the mandatory provisions required to be complied under Sections 29, 30, 31(a)(aa), 32(1)(a), 32(3), 32(6) of the SFC Act. Accordingly, the Corporation initially issued a recall notice to the principal borrower as per Ex.P7 and also issued a legal notice to the guarantors as per Ex.P9. Subsequently, the Corporation initiated the miscellaneous proceedings against the appellant and others. The other guarantors have not challenged the claim of the Corporation expect the appellant. According to the learned counsel, 11 the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments held that, the relief sought for in an application under Section 31(1) of SFC Act is akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of decree at a stage posterior to passing of the decree. In an application under Section 31, the Corporation cannot seek personal decree against the mortgagers. The scope of enquiry under Sections 31 and 32 is limited. He also contended that, the liability of the surety is coextensive with that of the principal borrower. The liability of surety is immediate and same is not deferred until the Corporation exhausts its remedy against the principal borrower. According to the learned counsel, it is equally well settled that the guarantor alone can be sued without suing the principal borrower, so long as creditor satisfies the Court that the principal debtor or the principal borrower is in default. With these submissions, he prays to dismiss the appeal. In order to buttress his argument, he relied on the following judgments: 1. Sarasamma v. Karnataka State Finance Corporation and Others in W.A.No.2263/2007 c/w W.A.Nos.1077/2008, 1078/2008 and 479/2006 2. Tamarind v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation and Others in SLP (C) No(s).37064-37067/2013 12 3. Sri.G.B.Lokesh and Others v. The State of Karnataka Through CC Police in Crl.Rev.Pet.No.103/2016 [LV Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (CCC-56)] 4. Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Natson Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd., reported in (1979) 1 SCC 193 5. KSIIDC Ltd. v. S.K.K. Kulkarni, reported in (2009) 2 SCC 236 6. Everest Industrial Corpn. v. G.S.F.C., reported in (1987) 3 SCC 597 7. Gulhati and Another v. Karnataka State Financial Corporation and Others reported in ILR 2007 KAR 44 8. Bayanabai Kaware v. Rajendra, reported in (2018) 1 SCC 585 9. Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh reported in (2006) 5 SCC 558 10. Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd., reported in (1991) 2 SCC 637 11. Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill reported in (2021) 15 SCC 300 13 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the materials placed on record, the points that arise for our consideration are: 1. "Whether the appellant proves that the Deed of Guarantee dated 08.06.2002 as per Ex.P6 is not executed by her and that the Corporation has fraudulently obtained her signature on it and used the same as collateral security for respondent No.2’s loan transaction with respondent No.1- Corporation? 2. Whether the learned Sessions Judge is justified in allowing the Misc.No.521/2004?" 10. We have carefully examined the evidence let in by the appellant and the respondents. The borrowing of loan by the respondent No.2-Company from respondent No.1-Corporation is not disputed. Further, it is also not disputed that a recall notice-Ex.P7 was issued by respondent No.1 to respondent No.2 the principal borrower and guarantors. Since, there was no response by respondent No.2-Company, the Corporation issued notice to the guarantors including this appellant, being one of the guarantors under Section 31 of SFC Act as per Ex.P9. It is further to be noted that the respondents No.3 to 6 the other guarantors have not challenged the claim of the Corporation. 14 11. Ahead of delving into the auxiliary merits of the case, it is imperative to briefly refer the provisions stipulated in Sections 29(1), 30(b), 31(1)(aa) and 32(1A) (3) and (6) of the SFC Act, which reads as under: "29. Rights of Financial Corporation in case of default.—(1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof 1[or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation] or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation, the Financial Corporation shall have the 2[right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concerns], as well as the 3[right to transfer by way of lease or sale] and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. 30. Power to call for repayment before agreed period.—Notwithstanding anything in any agreement to the contrary, the Financial Corporation may, by notice in writing, require any industrial concern to which it has granted any loan or advance to discharge forthwith in full its liabilities to the Financial Corporation,— (a) XXXX (b) if the industrial concern has failed to comply with the terms of its contract with the Financial Corporation in the matter of the loan or advance; 31. Special provisions for enforcement of claims by Financial Corporation.—(1) Where an industrial concern, in breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof 1[or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation] or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to 15 make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, 2[then, without prejudice to the provisions of section 29 of this Act and of section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)] any officer of the Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf, may apply to the district judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business for one or more of the following reliefs, namely:— (a) XXXX (aa) for enforcing the liability of any surety; 32. Procedure of district judge in respect of applications under section 31: (1) XXXX [(1A) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (aa) of sub- section (1) of section 31, the district judge shall issue a notice calling upon the surety to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why his liability should not be enforced.] (2) XXXX (3) Before passing any order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) 1[or issuing a notice under sub-section (1A)] the district judge may, if he thinks fit, examine the officer making the application. (4) XXXX (4A) XXXX (5) XXXX (6) If cause is shown, the district judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance 16 with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,(5 of 1908) in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. (7) XXXX 12. As per the plain reading of the above provisions it could be gathered that an application under Section 31(1) is not in the nature of a plaint. This is clear from the form of the application, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry stipulated under Section 32(6), the nature of relief that can be granted and the method of execution. The proceedings under Section 32 of the SFC Act are therefore, akin to execution proceedings. A combined reading of Sections 31 and 32 of the SFC Act indicates that an investigation is needed to find out the terms and conditions on which the loan was sanctioned by the Corporation to the industrial concern and whether the Corporation was entitled to the relief under Section 31(1) on account of breach of the terms of agreement. Further, Section 32(6) provides that the District Judge shall proceed with the investigation of claim of financial corporation according to the provisions of CPC. A conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 31 and 32(6) of the SFC Act suggest that the scope of investigation under Section 32(6) is narrow and limited. This Sub-Section does not stipulate the investigation of each and every plea that arises before the District Judge. The scope of investigation is rather restricted to the claim of the financial 17 corporation to be entitled for any relief as sought for under Section 31(1)(aa). This scope was compounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Natson Manufacturing Co., reported in (1979) 1 SCC 193 and the procedure in dealing with such application under Section 32(6) of the SFC Act is hereby quoted verbatim: "Sub-Section (6) of Section 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed. The claim of the Corporation is not the monetary claim to be investigated though it may become necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim does not involve all the contentions that can be realised in a suit. The claim of the Corporation is that there is a breach of agreement or default in making repayment of loan or advance or instalment thereof and, therefore, the mortgaged property should be sold. It is not a money claim." 13. In the light of the provisions as above and the documents placed by the Corporation, in our considered view, the Corporation has complied with the mandatory provisions of the SFC Act before filing the Miscellaneous Petition before the learned Sessions Judge. Nevertheless, though the learned Sessions Judge passed a concise order, as per the provisions discussed supra and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is not mandatory on the part of the learned Sessions Judge to delve into the factual nitty-gritty and other aspects of the matter while deciding the petition under Sections 31(1)(aa) and 32 of the SFC Act. 18 14. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the execution of Ex.P6 was denied and that signature of the appellant on Ex.P6 was obtained fraudulently by the Corporation. On careful perusal of the evidence and the statement of objection filed by the appellant before the Sessions Court depicts that, she contended that her signature on Ex.P6 was fraudulently obtained by one of the Managers at the Corporation on blank papers on nearly 40-50 places to disburse hand loan to her and thereafter, the same was used for the collateral security of the loan of respondent No.2-company. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 and on perusal of the documents placed by him i.e., the memorandum of writ petition in W.P.No.18965/2005 filed by the appellant and others challenging the demand notice issued by the respondent No.1-Corporation dated 24.02.2005, wherein it is categorically stated by the appellant herein, who is petitioner No.4 in the said writ petition that, “the claim of the KSFC on the other hand is that the petitioners No.3 and 4 as guarantors mortgaged the schedule property in its favour. In such a situation Section 29 of the Act does not enable KSFC to sell the properties on its own without obtaining any adjudication.” It is further stated that, “the petitioners are willing for a one time settlement of the claim, and it sought for information for effecting the same and when the KSFC also had agreed to take up one time settlement it is stopped from taking action under Section 29 of the 19 Act.” In such circumstances, the defence taken by the appellant is that respondent No.1-Corporation fraudulently obtained her signature on Ex.P6 cannot be believed at any stretch of imagination. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that mere admission of the initial by the executant would not be tantamount to an admission of execution of the document by placing reliance on the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Veena Singh v. Collector reported in (2022) 7 SCC 1, held in paragraphs No.54, 56 and 58 as follows: "54. The expression “execute” has been further defined in Words and Phrases in the following terms. “To complete as a legal instrument; to perform what is required to give validity to.” 56.Mulla's The Registration Act [ Justice K. Kannan, Mulla's The Registration Act (LexisNexis, 2012) p. 416.] notes the following in relation to the meaning of “execution” [ Justice K. Kannan, Mulla's The Registration Act (LexisNexis, 2012), pp. 254-56.] : “Admission of Execution … It is submitted that the mere proof or admission that a person's signature appears on a document cannot by itself amount to execution of the document… Where a person had signed a document after being aware of the nature of the document, he has executed the document, and, it is submitted, the Registrar cannot go into the question whether the document has been obtained by 20 coercion; but when a signature has been obtained by false representations and the ostensible executant did not sign with the intention of being bound by the terms of the document, such a person cannot be said to have executed the document.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This understanding of the phrase “execution” is also adopted by textbooks in relation to the law of evidence. Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”) prescribes the requirement for proving that a document has been executed. The proviso to Section 68 stipulates that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness to prove the execution of a document if it has been registered under the Registration Act, provided that its execution is not specifically denied by the person who is purported to have executed it. In relation to this provision, Sarkar's Law of Evidence notes: “The term “execution” is not defined in any statute. It means completion i.e. the last act or acts which complete a document and in English law this is known as “signing, sealing and delivering”. The ordinary meaning of executing a document is signing it as a consenting party thereto. *** [s 67.4] Meaning and Proof of “Execution” *** Execution consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper …” 16. We do not dispute the preposition enumerated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment, however, by perusal of Ex.P6 and the admission of RW.1’s signature in Ex.P6 during her cross-examination, it could be gathered that she consciously and 21 knowingly affixed her signature on Ex.P6. Further, she was also aware of the contents of Ex.P6. Per contra, RW.1/appellant has failed to prove her defence that in order to obtain and disburse the said hand loan, the Manager of the Corporation-Sri. Lokesh obtained her signature on blank papers in nearly 40–50 places at his office by placing material documents or examining any witness to that effect. Though a complaint had been lodged by the appellant against the officials of the Corporation and others, however, it is brought to our notice that the officials of the Corporation have been discharged from the said criminal case in Crl.Rev.Pet.No.103/2016 dated 14.02.2023 by the LV Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru (CCH-56) and that order has become final. 17. In such circumstances, the appellant has comprehensively failed to prove the alleged interpolation, fraud and fabrication of Ex.P6 by respondent No.1-Corporation. As discussed supra, the scope of investigation within the contemplation of Sub- Section (6) of Section 32 of the Act is very narrow and limited, the scope of investigation is restricted to the claim of the financial corporation which has to be established in order to entitle it for any of the relief as mentioned in Sub-Section 1 of Section 31 of the Act. Under Section 31 of the Act, the financial corporation can approach the District Judge for the reliefs mentioned in Sub-Clause (a), (aa), (b) and (c) of Sub-Section (1) of that Section. The term 22 'investigation' as stipulated under Sub-Section 6 of Section 32 of the Act is therefore restricted to such claim of the Financial Corporation. 18. Against this backdrop, we hold that, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly appreciated the evidence and materials on record and passed a well-reasoned order which does not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, we answer the point No.1 raised above in the negative and point No.2 in the affirmative and proceed to pass the following: ORDER The Miscellaneous First Appeal is dismissed being devoid of merits. SD/- (ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE SD/- (RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE HKV