IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMP(M) No.201 of 2025 Decided on: 20.04.2026 Managing Director, HPMC & another ….Applicants Versus Surender Singh & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? For the applicants: Mr. Rahul Gathania, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No.1(a) to 1(e). Romesh Verma, Judge The present application has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. It has been averred in the application that the applicants were earlier under the impression that the suit is still before the District Judge, Sirmaur District Nahan, as a result of which the copy of impugned judgment could not be obtained. It has been stated in the application that the counsel who appeared and contested the case on behalf of the applicants had though intimated about the appeal well within time and had also written letters in the name of Branch Manager, H.P.M.C, Halonipul, Tehsil, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur H.P., but those letters were never attended to and were never forwarded to the Head Office at Shimla owing to the fact 2 that the premises as well as the office of the HPMC at Rajgarh had been rented out to the Bhura Jams and they did not pay any heed to handover those letters which could have been regarding the decision of the case against the present applicants. Further, it has been averred that the applicants were under the bonafide belief that the suit is still pending. When the applicants came to know about the decision of the case have immediately applied for the certified copy of the judgments. After obtaining the judgments of the learned courts below, the Law Officer was consulted and after due deliberation, the applicants have decided to file the appeal. Thereafter, the applicants contacted its counsel regarding the filing of appeal in this Court and after perusing the judgments and the complete record, the present appeal has been filed. It has further been stated that the delay in filing the present appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but the same has occurred due to unavoidable circumstances. 2. The non-applicant has filed reply to the application and refuted all the averments as made in the application. It has been stated in the reply that the delay in filing the appeal is intentional and willful and no plausible explanation has been given for the delay in filing the appeal. 3 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the case file. 4. The admitted facts of the case are that the present applicants were the defendants before the learned trial Court. The non-applicants/respondents filed a suit for possession, mandatory and permanent prohibitory injunction on the ground that the present applicants dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit land forcibly and illegally. When the plaintiffs objected, the defendants asked the plaintiff to seek the demarcation of the suit land and thereafter the plaintiffs, got the suit land demarcated and it was found that they have illegally encroached over the suit land. Therefore, the suit for possession on the basis of title was filed by the plaintiff/respondent. 5. The present applicants/defendants contested the suit by raising various objections and took the plea of adverse possession against the plaintiffs. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the non-applicants, however, in appeal vide judgment and decree dated 11.01.2024, the suit as preferred by the present respondents for possession has been decreed. 6. The applicants in their application have admitted that the counsel who was appearing for the applicants in learned Courts below had intimated about the decision of the appeal well 4 in time and had also written letters in the name of Branch Manager, H.P.M.C, Halonipul, Tehsil, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur H.P., but as per the case of the applicants those letters were never attended to and were never forwarded to the Head Office at Shimla. It has been further contended that as and when the applicants came to know about the decision of the case have immediately applied for the certified copy of the judgments. The application is silent that when the applicants got the knowledge and from whom they got the said knowledge about the passing of the impugned judgment by the learned District Judge. The averments as made in the application are lacking the ingredients of sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. Though, there is admission on the part of the applicants that the counsel who was representing them had written letters with respect to the decision in the case, however, the photo copies of the said letters have not been appended with the application. It is the case of the applicants that officials in the office of HPMC at Rajgarh did not paid any heed to handover those letters. 7. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a 5 meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal 6 approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It is a well settled principle of law that the limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. 9. The Hon’be Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by l.Rs. & others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in following manner: “12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the 7 Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. 14 to 20 xx xx xx xx 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite unsat- isfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its dis- cretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High 8 Court should have exercised the discretion in a sys- tematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. xx xx xx 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implement- ing the statute as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as un- der: “12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A re- 9 sult flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consis- tently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.” 10. In view of the exposition of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the applicants have failed to show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal against the judgment in time, rather there is admission on behalf of the applicants that the counsel for the applicants had intimated about the appeal well within time and had also written letters in the name of Branch Manager, H.P.M.C, Halonipul, Tehsil, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur H.P. Further, it has been admitted that the letters which were sent by the counsel for the applicants were never attended to and were never forwarded to the Head Office at Shimla owing to the fact that the premises as well as the office of the HPMC at Rajgarh had been rented out to the Bhura Jams and they did not pay any heed to handover those letters which could have been regarding the decision of the case. No sufficient reasons have been assigned in the 10 present application for condonation of delay. Therefore, this Court has got no other option, but to dismiss the present application, which has been filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 11. Consequently, in view of above, the present application being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( Romesh Verma ) Judge April 20, 2026 (vt)